Iran: Why the US Sanctions Game on Tehran is All Wrong
Wednesday, December 16, 2009 at 9:47 
Gary Sick, an official in the Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations and now a professor at Columbia University, was a key participant earlier this month in a Harvard University simulation of US-Iran relations. His conclusion, published in The National: "Is the United States really going to proceed with Iran on the basis of a sanctions policy that has consistently failed? One hopes that the Obama administration can demonstrate more imagination and agility than its Harvard namesakes."(David Ignatius also has a column on the event: "The simulated world of December 2010 looks ragged and dangerous. If the real players truly mean to contain Iran and stop it from getting the bomb, they need to avoid the snares that were so evident in the Harvard game."):
Can the United States forge a mutually constructive relationship with Iran? Can a global superpower find a way to persuade a recalcitrant and paranoid regional power to enter the community of nations as a responsible participant?
Iran: US State Department Pushes for “Proper” Sanctions in 2010
The Latest on Iran (16 December): What’s Next?
For 30 years, both America and Iran have answered those questions with a resounding no. The United States has historically taken a coercive approach, which has only driven Iran further into petulant isolation.
The Obama presidency promised a different strategy.
Rather than indulging in extravagant Axis-of-Evil invective, which even the outgoing Bush administration had come to regard as counter-productive, the United States would cool the rhetoric and extend a hand. That policy was only four months old in June, when Iran descended into its most excruciating domestic crisis since the civil war in the early 1980s. The resulting loss of legitimacy by the ruling elites and their utter preoccupation with their own survival meant that foreign policy decisions – always difficult at best – were now subject to a new set of internal dynamics and uncertainties.
Despite these new complications, Iran’s national security leadership accepted and even promoted an agreement with the so-called P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) for a swap of nuclear material. Iran would relinquish a sizable proportion of its stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU), which would be further enriched by Russia and then fashioned into fuel cells by France to supply the Tehran Research Reactor. Both sides regarded this as a win-win agreement and an important step towards further negotiations.
But the proposal met a chorus of disapproval from Iran’s parliament and even the “Green” opposition, who argued that Iran should not give up a “national asset” – the uranium – without absolute assurances that the P5+1 would fulfill their end of the bargain. Iran’s leaders were forced to propose an alternative arrangement: that the swap take place inside Iran.
At that point, the United States and its partners could have responded with a counter-offer that would, for example, sequester the Iranian LEU under strict safeguards until the replacement fuel cells were available, thus accomplishing most, if not all, of their original objectives. Instead, they ended all negotiations and introduced a sharply critical resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency board.
Iran predictably responded by declaring it would reduce its cooperation with the IAEA and, in a fit of blustery indignation, announcing a new plan to build 10 additional enrichment sites – a hollow threat since Iran lacked both the centrifuges and the necessary raw uranium fuel to carry it out.
Iran withdrew into its cocoon of haughty and pained victimization. The United States and its allies made a similar retreat to a posture of righteous indignation, the better to fashion “crippling” sanctions designed to force Iran to change its policies.
This sequence of events suggested that the future of interactions between the United States and Iran under Barack Obama might not look so different from his predecessors. A recent experience convinces me that such a conclusion may not be entirely fanciful.
Last week I participated in a simulation game at Harvard University’s Belfer Center focused on US-Iran relations. About half a dozen countries or entities (including the EU and the GCC) were represented by teams of participants, many of whom had long years of experience in regional politics. For my sins, I was made the head of the Iran team.
The goal of the American team was to assemble a consensus for new sanctions against Iran. The Iran team, on the other hand, felt confident that the US and its allies could not put together a package that would hurt us in any serious way, and that was indeed the case. By the end of the game, the Americans had driven away all their ostensible allies, and wasted immense time and effort, while Iran was better off than it had been at the beginning.
This was only a simulation, of course. But the moves of the US team were quite similar to the strategy actually employed by the United States over the course of the past three administrations. The pursuit of sanctions in this game, as in the real world, became an end in itself, with little impact on Iran or its ability to continue enrichment. The United States can (and in fact already has) put together a reasonable set of sanctions. These efforts may please the Israelis, the GCC states and other allies as a show of determination. But will they stop Iran?
Those of us on the Iran team scarcely paid any attention to all this massive US policy exertion. Admittedly, we felt lonely at times. But we never believed that our core objectives (freedom to proceed with our nuclear plans and our growing appetite for domestic political repression) were at risk – nor was the survival of our rather peculiar regime, which was of course our most immediate concern.
The offers made by the Iran team were modest in the extreme, yet they formed the basis of the final outcome. No other country had the courage or imagination to remind us of the earlier proposals and suggestions we had made, which were still on the table, nor did they try to sit us down and push us on our plans, or give us a juicy incentive that might have forced us to make real decisions. Also, no one attempted to broaden the discussion to other areas where the United States and Iran share some common interests and might have found common ground.
It was probably realistic that no one challenged Iran’s right to enrich. That has reluctantly been accepted as a fait accompli. But there was no effort to test Iran on safeguards, inspections or other arrangements that might provide reliable intelligence on Iranian activities; neither did any player propose restrictions on specific key elements of the Iranian nuclear program, which would lengthen the time required to break out into production of a nuclear device.
By the end of the game, Russia and China had initiated their own secret accommodation with Iran. That was an interesting development, but one that was by no means inevitable. It happened because of the single-minded pressure of the US team, who demanded support for a sanctions regime that was fundamentally contrary to Russian and Chinese interests.
Relations between the United States and Iran have always been more about domestic politics than foreign policy. That has never been truer than it is today.
For years, the United States attempted to isolate and contain Iran, without much success. Now Iran is isolating itself. A self-imposed “iron curtain” is descending around the country. Communications are subject to surveillance and punishment. Travel increasingly tends to be one way, as individuals decide to leave the country to “cool off” in the face of constant repression or simply to find decent jobs. “Commissars” are being placed in schools and universities to insure that teaching is in accordance with approved dogma according to the Revolutionary Guard. The basij, a popular paramilitary force, is increasingly being used for street enforcement, in place of the less-ideological police.
In the words of Charles Issawi, “Revolutions revolve – 360 degrees.” The leaders of the Iranian revolution are seemingly not content with merely imitating the tyrant that they so proudly overthrew 30 years ago. Instead they have gone even further, and now emulate the crude dictatorship of Saddam Hussein that is an insult to sophisticated Iranian culture. Iran is taking its place among those governments that are incompetent in all things except the repression of their own people.
The slow motion coup that is underway in Iran, with the Revolutionary Guard inserting itself into the very fabric of the state and economy, greatly complicates but does not prevent negotiation of important issues, including nuclear enrichment and human rights. Such an effort, however, requires patience and perseverance – qualities that come hard to American policy makers. Yet the United States negotiated a nuclear arms pact with the Soviet Union while also negotiating the Helsinki Accords, which gave birth to the modern human rights movement and empowered opponents of Soviet rule.
Is the United States really going to proceed with Iran on the basis of a sanctions policy that has consistently failed? One hopes that the Obama administration can demonstrate more imagination and agility than its Harvard namesakes.
Reader Comments (13)
The 5+1 have only one solution to succeed in finding a response for their own problems ( nuclear concern ); they have to bet on green movement and do everything they possibly can so that " the movement of iranian people " wins; they have been always shouting : " we don't want nuclear bomb " !!
Scott,
I beg to differ. During the past 20 years virtually no strategy worked out, as David Harris writes: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-harris/iran-policy-what-price-fa_b_389344.html
Sharper sanctions, especially targeting IRGC companies, are the only possible measure to put this crumbling regime under pressure.
I agree with Arshama. The fact is that this regime needs confrontation to justify it's survival. Also, a too loud support of the Green by the US will be a kiss of death & used by the regime as yet another excuse to crush them as "5th column".
THIS WON'T WORK!! THAT WON'T WORK!!
For me, the most annoying thing about commentators who insist that "further sanctions won't work" - is that they never ever come up with an idea of what will work. The closest idea they have is "we need more negotiations".
We should all remember Neville Chamberlain. He had obviously never read "Mein Kampf" thoroughly before he crawled on the floor before Hitler. Hitlers' blueprint was laid out clearly for all to see. These commentators I refer to have also obviously never really given much thought to Ahmadinejad's utterances over the past 4 years.
Deep down inside, Hitler knew all along what he wanted to do - and I think that also deep down inside, Ahmdinejad (and his friends/advisors) also know what they really want to do. Are these people really open to negotiation? For them, getting to the point that I believe that they want to get to is like climbing a mountain - one step at a time, and their "negotiations" are only meant to get them ahead by a single step at a time.
There has been a lot of criticism of Bush and his "policies" - but have American and European pacifists loud thoughts EVER been right either??
Barry
Fools who live in a fantasy world
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/report-on-nuke-threat-is-a-dud/story-e6frg6zo-1225811144890
Barry
Barry,
For what's it worth, my own preference has been to put the nuclear issue to the side and suspend discussions while Iran's internal situation is in flux. That approach brings its own issues and difficulties --- how to hold back Israel, for example --- but I think it's a more effective denial of legitimacy to Ahmadinejad and Co. than the questionable stick of sanctions.
If we have to focus on the nuclear issue, then I would back Sick's argument that there are diplomatic routes/manoeuvres that the "West" should have considered, such as calling the Iranians on the "swap" proposal inside the country by insisting it take place under strict international supervision.
S.
One of their first help to green movement :
" Tearing Down Internet Walls to foster and support the free flow of information to individual Iranian citizens ";
Despite of censorship inside of the country, iranian people will be able to have the true news of all over the world !
Scott,
or what’s it worth, my own preference has been to put the nuclear issue to the side and suspend discussions while Iran’s internal situation is in flux.
We are then officially on the same page :)
I can tell you what these sanctions WILL DO:
- Open Ahmadinejad's hand to lift the gasoline subsides--which is what he has been planning to do but has been fearing consumer revolt. To force consumers cut down on usage of subsidized fuel will save him some money!
- Now, he can blame ALL of his economic mismanagement on the "evil" West!
- These sanctions, and the "panic" around the missile test, are forcing some of us Iranians into silence about matters like the rapist butcher of press having been promoted to Ahmadinejad's SPECIAL envoy in the anti drug- and money-traffic department! We find it unfair that countries with UN-proven war crimes get to threaten Iran on a daily basis; and increase their threats BECAUSE our country demonstrates that I can/will defend itself.
So I REALLY think these sanctions WILL WORK to embolden Ahmadinejad (and produce more budget military expenditure in countries whose economic growth may depend on fear mongering and arms dealership!
Barry is wrong in his likening Iran to Hitler's Germany. IRI has no record of committing acts of aggression against any of its neighbours, even when inflicted with chemical weapons by Saddam's regime, it did not respond in kind.
All the terms proposed by IRI so far are consistent and honourable, despite the pressures on them, they have sought to remain within the NPT and allowed IAEA inspections. If the US commits itself to an even handed approach to its policy in the Middle East, persuades its ally Israel to sign up to the NPT and commit itself to nuclear disarmament and come to a fair settlement on the Palestinian issue then a lot of anger against the US in the region will dissipate. Obama has a historic opportunity to do that, he started well but it seems he is unable to escape the influence the Israeli lobby and the legacy of the Bush neo-cons to genuinely chart his own independent policy based on genuinely unclenching his fists and not merely pretending to. The fact of life is if you want to take a 'donkey' down a certain path than you might need to feed it more carrots first before you can use a stick. So far IRI has been offered a promise of a carrot sometime in the future. Surely even a donkey would not go for that!!
I Say crippling sanctions.They worked in iraq ,they take time,the people of iran know that we are behind there movement .We have no other choice America can't pick and choose,besides i'm sure there is closed door meetings goin on,its a game,and we play chess real well.America saw this coming long time ago.
Barry,
I believe Scott's plan is the way to go but sadly as we all know the West is fixated on the nuclear issue thus that's a no go. Your analogy with Germany has some truth to it but unlike Germany Iran does not have its people 100% behind them. For that reason alone I believe believe broad sanctions will only help the regime at this point. Even targeted sanctions are somewhat dubious because the IRGC and regime aligned Bonyads control the majority of the economy. You target these and you target the people. The best course is to let the reform movement do its thing because in the long run they alone are the one best positioned to resolve the nuclear crisis. The reality is the current regime cannot be trusted and the only way to get lasting results is if you have a regime that is based on deception.
Thx
Bill
meant not based on deception in my last post.
Rezvan
agreeing w you 100%