Archives: March 2009http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/en-USSquarespace V5 Site Server v5.13.166 (http://www.squarespace.com)Text: Clinton Remarks to Hague Conference on Afghanistan9-11AfghanistanAfghanistan National Development StrategyAfghanistan National Solidarity ProgramBan Ki-MoonBarack ObamaDrugsFriends of Democratic PakistanHamid KarzaiKai EideMumbai attacksRichard HolbrookeTaibanUS Foreign PolicyScott LucasTue, 31 Mar 2009 19:29:53 +0000http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/2009/3/31/text-clinton-remarks-to-hague-conference-on-afghanistan.html497390:6637762:7482874Latest Post: Playing for Time - Clinton-Obama and the Hague Conference on Afghanistan hillary-clintonCLINTON: Thank you very much, Minister Verhagen, and Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Special Representative Kai Eide, President Karzai, Minister Spanta, friends and colleagues, I want to thank all of you, and especially the United Nations and the Government of the Netherlands for hosting us. I also want to acknowledge the extraordinary contribution of the government and people of the Netherlands to the mission in Afghanistan. And I want to also acknowledge President Karzai, who fills a critical leadership role in his nation, and whose government helped to shape the shared comprehensive and workable strategy that we are discussing today. We are here to help the people of Afghanistan prevail against a ruthless enemy who poses a common threat to us all. Afghanistan has always been a crossroads of civilization, and today we find our fate converging in those plains and mountains that are so far and yet so near in this interconnected world to all of us. Thanks to the efforts of the international community, the perpetrators of the horrific terrorist attacks of 9/11 – attacks which killed citizens from more than 90 countries – were driven from Afghanistan, and the Afghan people made a promising start toward a more secure future. But since those first hopeful moments, our collective inability to implement a clear and sustained strategy has allowed violent extremists to regain a foothold in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, and to make the area a nerve center for efforts to spread violence from London to Mumbai. The range of countries and institutions represented here is a universal recognition that what happens in Afghanistan matters to us all. Our failure to bring peace and progress would be a setback not only to the people of Afghanistan, but to the entire enterprise of collective action in the interest of collective security. Our success, on the other hand, will not only benefit Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region, but also the blueprint for a new diplomacy powered by partnership and premised on shared interests. So as we recommit ourselves to meet our common challenge with a new strategy, new energy, and new resources, let us be guided by an ancient Afghan proverb, “patience is bitter, but its fruit is sweet.” The plan I outline today is the product of intensive consultations with nations that have donated troops and support; Afghanistan’s neighbors and international institutions that play a vital role in Afghanistan’s future. The results of these consultations are clear: Our strategy must address the challenge in Afghanistan and Pakistan; it must integrate military and civilian activities and support them with vigorous international diplomacy; and it must rest on the simple premise that while we can and will help, Afghanistan’s future ultimately rests with the Afghan people and their elected government. Security is the essential first step; without it, all else fails. Afghanistan’s army and police will have to take the lead, supported by the International Security Assistance Force. President Obama has announced that the United States will deploy 17,000 more soldiers and 4,000 additional military trainers to help build up Afghan security forces. The international community will also have to help. We should provide every army and police unit in Afghanistan with an international partner that can provide training and help build capacity. Our collective goal should be standing up an army of at least 134,000 soldiers and a police force of at least 82,000 officers by 2011. These steps will provide the people of Afghanistan with an opportunity to fight and win their own battle for their nation’s future. We must also help Afghans strengthen their economy and institutions. They know how to rebuild their country, but they need the raw material of progress – roads, public institutions, schools, hospitals, irrigation, and agriculture. The United States is supporting the Government of Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy, the National Solidarity Program, and other initiatives that help Afghans improve their lives and strengthen their own communities. In consultation with the Afghan Government, we have also identified agriculture – which comprises 70 percent of Afghanistan’s economy – as the key for development. In the 1970s, Afghans exported food to their neighbors. They were often called the garden of Central Asia. Today, this sector lags far behind, and its problems feed the deadly malignancy of the narcotics trade. The United States is focusing its efforts on rural development in provinces near the Afghan-Pakistan border, and we hope that others gathered here will heed the United Nations’ and Afghan Government’s call for help throughout the country with job creation, technical expertise, vocational training, and investments in roads, electrical transmission lines, education, healthcare, and so much else. As we work with the Afghan people to supply these building blocks of development, we must demand accountability from ourselves and from the Afghan Government. Corruption is a cancer as dangerous to long-term success as the Taliban or al-Qaida. A government that cannot deliver accountable services for its people is a terrorist’s best recruiting tool. So we must work with bodies such as Afghanistan’s Independent Directorate of Local Governance to ensure that the government at all levels is responsible and transparent. The international community, gathered here, can help by providing auditors and governance experts and training a new generation of civil servants and administrators. To earn the trust of the Afghan people, the Afghan Government must be legitimate and respected. This requires a successful election in August – one that is open, free, and fair. That can only happen with strong support from the international community. I am, therefore, pleased to announce today that to advance that goal, the United States is committing $40 million to help fund Afghanistan’s upcoming elections. We must also support efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to separate the extremists of al-Qaida and the Taliban from those who joined their ranks not out of conviction, but out of desperation. This is, in fact, the case for a majority of those fighting with the Taliban. They should be offered an honorable form of reconciliation and reintegration into a peaceful society if they are willing to abandon violence, break with al-Qaida, and support the constitution. Just as these problems cannot be solved without the Afghan people, they cannot be solved without the help of Afghanistan’s neighbors. Trafficking in narcotics, the spread of violent extremism, economic stagnation, water management, electrification, and irrigation are regional challenges that require regional solutions. The United Nations has a central role in this effort to coordinate with the Government of Afghanistan and neighbors in the region to make sure that programs are properly prioritized and well focused. We are committed to working with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and UN Special Representative Kai Eide to achieve that goal. The United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, will lead American efforts as we move forward, and we welcome the appointment of special representatives by other countries. If we are to succeed, we will need the help of all the nations present here. As President Obama has pointed out, “the world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos.” While there is great temptation to retreat inward in these difficult economic times, it is precisely at such moments that we must redouble our effort. And as we make commitments and contributions, we must ensure they are flexible enough to respond to immediate needs and evolving opportunities. And we all must be willing to coordinate those efforts together. The challenge we face is difficult, but the opportunity is clear if we move away from the past. All too often in the past seven years, our efforts have been undermanned, under-resourced and underfunded. This goal is achievable. We know we have made progress where we have made adequate investment and worked together. The status of Afghanistan’s army, the lives of women and girls, the country’s education and health systems are far better today than they were in 2001. So if all of us represented here work with the government and people of Afghanistan, we will help not only to secure their future, but ours as well. Now the principal focus of our discussions today is on Afghanistan, but we cannot hope to succeed if those who seek to reestablish a haven for violence and extremism operate from sanctuaries just across the border. For this reason, our partnership with Pakistan is critical. Together, we all must give Pakistan the tools it needs to fight extremists within its borders. The Obama Administration has made a strong commitment through our support for legislation called the Kerry-Lugar assistance program. And in a few weeks, we will have a chance to join together in Tokyo for a meeting of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan to provide the support that the Pakistani Government and people need. I urge the nations here today in support of Afghanistan to join us in Tokyo on April 17th to help the people of Pakistan. This effort has already required great sacrifice and it will require more. But in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we face a common threat, a common enemy, and a common task. So let us use today, this conference, to renew and reinvigorate our commitment and our involvement, and to lay a firm foundation for a safer region and a safer world. It is in the interests of all of the people who we represent as we sit around this conference table here in The Hague, and for the kind of world that we wish to help create. Thank you very much.]]>http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/rss-comments-entry-7482874.xmlBurying Gaza: How Israel's Military Put Away the Oranim RevelationsCNNEthan BronnerGazaIsraelIsrael Defense ForcesJerusalem PostLarry DerfnerMiddle East & IranNew York TimesOperation Cast LeadOranim CollegePalestineRoi ElkabetsUncategorizedWar CrimesWashington PostScott LucasTue, 31 Mar 2009 08:29:55 +0000http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/2009/3/31/burying-gaza-how-israels-military-put-away-the-oranim-revela.html497390:6637762:7482873Related Post: The Israeli Military and Gaza’s Civilians - Returning to The Oranim Transcripts israel-soldiers21I was working yesternoon afternoon when the news came through, via the Jerusalem Post, that the Israeli military had categorically dismissed accounts --- all but two from the graduates of military course at Oranim College ---of the abuse and killing of civilians in the Gaza War. I was struck by how quickly the Israel Defense Forces threw out the claims, noted by nine Israeli human rights groups: ""The speedy closing of the investigation immediately raises suspicions that the very opening of this investigation was merely the army's attempt to wipe its hands of all blame for illegal activity during Operation Cast Lead." Even more blatant, however, was the disconnect between the military's "findings" and the actual statements of the Oranim soldiers. For example, the Post noted the IDF's conclusion report on "Aviv", who "claimed to have known of a soldier who had been given orders to fire at an elderly Palestinian woman. During his interrogation, Aviv admitted he had never witnessed such an incident and that he'd based his statement on a rumor he had heard." In fact, it is unclear from the original testimony "Aviv" never claimed in his testimony, reprinted in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz and on this website, whether he witnessed the order by a company commander to a sniper squad to kill the woman, who was walking in a prohibited area. It is clear, however, that he was under orders to use deadly force to ensure "that we wouldn’t get hurt and they wouldn’t fire on us":
[We were] to go into a house. We were supposed to go in with an armored personnel carrier..., to burst through the lower door, to start shooting inside....From above they said it was permissible, because anyone who remained in the sector and inside Gaza City was in effect condemned, a terrorist, because they hadn’t fled.
Significantly (and unnoted in the Post article, "Zvi" follows the testimony of "Aviv" with the clarification that this was "force protection" and not the deliberate murder of civilians:
Aviv’s descriptions are accurate, but it’s possible to understand where this is coming from. And that woman, you don’t know whether she’s … She wasn’t supposed to be there, because there were announcements and there were bombings. Logic says she shouldn’t be there. The way you describe it, as murder in cold blood, that isn’t right.
Put bluntly, the Israeli military invaded one of the most densely-populated areas in the world and marked off parts of it as "prohibited", with shoot-to-kill orders against anyone who trespassed. The Israeli military could have stated this: inevitably civilians were going to die in a war. Even this, however, could not be admitted. Instead, the Oranim testimony had to be discredited: "A claim made by a different soldier, Ram, who had supposedly been ordered to open fire at a woman and two children, was also found by the probe to be false." This was a blatant distortion of the testimony of "Ram", who made clear that it was not he but a sharpshooter who killed the woman and children after a breakdown in communication:
There was a house with a family inside. Entry was relatively calm. We didn’t open fire, we just yelled at everyone to come down. We put them in a room and then left the house and entered it from a different lot. A few days after we went in, there was an order to release the family. They had set up positions upstairs. There was a sharpshooters’ position on the roof. The platoon commander let the family go and told them to go to the right. One mother and her two children didn’t understand and went to the left, but they forgot to tell the sharpshooter on the roof they had let them go, and it was was okay and he should hold his fire and he … he did what he was supposed to, like he was following his orders.
In the Gaza War of public opinion, Israel's effort was to ensure that it always held the higher moral ground. That, however, is difficult when Israel and not Hamas had overwhelming force, and that force --- inevitably --- was being used against civilians. In recent weeks, reports by bodies such as the United Nations and Human Rights Watch had detailed the humanitarian costs, but the Oranim revelations were even more damaging. They came from within Israeli ranks. So Tel Aviv had to step up its "information" campaign. Reporters were summoned to a briefing by an armoured unit commander, Colonel Roi Elkabets, to give "examples of what he said were the dilemmas they faced". Ethan Bronner of The New York Times wrote accordingly, "Officers are stepping forward, some at the urging of the top command, others on their own, offering numerous accounts of having held their fire out of concern for civilians, helping Palestinians in need and punishing improper soldier behavior". And the campaign, far more effectively than the military invasion of Gaza, worked. Today's British and American media faithfully cite the IDF's findings on Oranim, "The Israeli military on Monday rejected allegations that its soldiers committed atrocities against Palestinians in Gaza" (CNN); "Brig. Gen. Avichai Mendelblit, the IDF's advocate general, found no evidence to support the most serious accusations, including alleged instances in which civilians were shot without cause" (Washington Post); "The military police found that the crucial components of their descriptions were based on hearsay and not supported by specific personal knowledge" (New York Times). None of those reporters referred to the original Oranim transcripts. War is about winning, not about the truth. So one can set aside last week's commentary by Larry Derfner, ironically in the same Jerusalem Post that moved quickly to put the military's "findings2:
We can refuse to think about this, we can tell ourselves that Oranim is a hotbed of left-wingers, we can bury this so the anti-Semites and The Hague don't use it against us. Or we can admit the truth and decide that we have to change. We can be loyal to Israel's image. Or we can be loyal to our sons.
]]>http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/rss-comments-entry-7482873.xmlUPDATE: Mehsud Claims Responsibility for Lahore Attack; 18 DeadAfghanistanBaitullah MehsudIndia & PakistanMullah OmarNorthwest FrontierPakistanTalibanScott LucasTue, 31 Mar 2009 07:30:54 +0000http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/2009/3/31/update-mehsud-claims-responsibility-for-lahore-attack-18-dea.html497390:6637762:7482872The Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud (pictured has told the BBC that his organization carried out Monday's attack on the Lahore police station, in which 18 people died, ""in retaliation for the continued drone strikes on by the US in collaboration with Pakistan on our people". Eight attackers were among the dead; another four have been detained. There is a wider significance to Mehsud's statement, missed by the BBC. Last month, a coalition of Pakistani insurgent groups in the Northwest Provinces agreed to suspend attacks within the country, concentrating instead of the fight against American troops in Afghanistan. The news came shortly after reports that Mehsud had been "sacked" by Afghanistan Taliban Mullah Omar for refusing to halt internal operations. Thus the Obama Administration, as it launches its new strategy for Pakistan, faces some local groups who are devoted to fighting battles in Afghanistan and also the challenge posed within the country by Mehsud. Already a "two-front" war is developing.]]>http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/rss-comments-entry-7482872.xmlMiss Universe Visits Guantanamo Bay: "I Didn't Want to Leave"Camp X-RayDayana MendozaDetaineesGlobalGuantanamo BayMiss UniverseWar On TerrorScott LucasTue, 31 Mar 2009 05:24:26 +0000http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/2009/3/31/miss-universe-visits-guantanamo-bay-i-didnt-want-to-leave.html497390:6637762:7482871Here's one for the Bush Legacy Posse on America's Contribution to the World. From the blog of Dayana Mendoza, Venezuela's Miss Universe: Guantanamo Bay This week, Guantanamo!!! It was an incredible experience. We arrived in Gitmo on Friday and stared going around the town, everybody knew Crystle and I were coming so the first thing we did was attend a big lunch and then we visited one of the bars they have in the base. We talked about Gitmo and what is was like living there. The next days we had a wonderful time, this truly was a memorable trip! We hung out with the guys from the East Coast and they showed us the boat inside and out, how they work and what they do, we took a ride around the land and it was a loooot of fun! We also met the Military dogs, and they did a very nice demonstration of their skills. All the guys from the Army were amazing with us. We visited the Detainees camps and we saw the jails, where they shower, how the recreate themselves with movies, classes of art, books. It was very interesting. We took a ride with the Marines around the land to see the division of Gitmo and Cuba while they were informed us with a little bit of history. The water in Guantanamo Bay is soooo beautiful! It was unbelievable, we were able to enjoy it for at least an hour. We went to the glass beach, and realized the name of it comes from the little pieces of broken glass from hundred of years ago. It is pretty to see all the colors shining with the sun. That day we met a beautiful lady named Rebeca who does wonders with the glasses from the beach. She creates jewelry with it and of course I bought a necklace from her that will remind me off Guantanamo Bay :) I didn't want to leave, it was such a relaxing place, so calm and beautiful.]]>http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/rss-comments-entry-7482871.xmlToday's Enduring America Contribution to Britain's Anti-Terrorism CampaignAnti-TerrorismCulture of FearLegal RightsUK & IrelandScott LucasTue, 31 Mar 2009 04:50:26 +0000http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/2009/3/31/todays-enduring-america-contribution-to-britains-anti-terror.html497390:6637762:7482870]]>http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/rss-comments-entry-7482870.xmlThe Afghanistan Effect: US-Iran Talks Today?AfghanistanCNNHillary ClintonManouchehr MottakiMiddle East & IranMohammad Mehdi AkoundzadehShanghai Cooperation OrganizationZalmay KhalilzadScott LucasTue, 31 Mar 2009 04:44:20 +0000http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/2009/3/31/the-afghanistan-effect-us-iran-talks-today.html497390:6637762:7482869clinton-the-hagueCNN has a wonderfully naive story this morning, based on the public position of the US Secretary of State, "Clinton doesn't rule out Iran talks at Afghanistan conference". It puts out Hillary Clinton's statement, as more than 80 countries gather at The Hague for discussions:
I believe that there will be an opening by this conference that will enable all the countries, including Iran, to come forward. The fact that they accepted the invitation to come suggests that they believe there is a role for them to play, and we're looking forward to hearing more about that.
The wonderful naiveté is in CNN's assumption that direct US-Iran talks would be at high level:
Clinton said she has "no plans" to meet with Deputy Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Mehdi Akoundzadeh, who is attending the conference. But she left open the possibility, saying she would not predict how the discussions would flow.
As anyone who has braved such an event probably knows, most of the substantive negotiations occur away from the conference table amongst the teams of supporting officials who accompany Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers. Indeed, that was the pattern of US-Iran talks on Afghanistan after 9-11 until spring 2003, when they were broken by the Bush Administration in favour of thoughts of regime change in Tehran. (CNN's innocent re-telling of the US-Iran relationship puts it this way: "Clinton noted Iran's history of cooperating with the United States on Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion in 2001. In 2003, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad held talks with Iranian officials in Geneva, Switzerland, about how the two countries could work together.") CNN also seems to have no knowledge that these US-Iran talks, as we wrote on Sunday, have already resumed in places like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Moscow. Those looking for real signals on what may come should note Iran's careful consderation of the level of representation at the conference. Tehran has not sent its Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, withholding the open declaration of high-level equality in interchange. Even more importantly, the Iranian representative to the Shanghai talks --- the same Mohammad Mehdi Akoundzadeh who will be at The Hague --- has put down a marker on the US military approach:
The presence of foreign troops cannot bring peace and stability for Afghanistan. It encourages radicalism.
Politically Akounzadeh is making clear that Iran does not want the US, and US-Iran talks at the centre of the Afghanistan process:
Resolving ongoing problems in Afghanistan will be possible through regional partnership and Islamic Republic of Iran supports this stance....He said that the Americans have linked Afghan issue to their own internal problems, considering Afghanistan from an American angle, while this policy and strategy has never been successful, rather it has increased problems in Afghanistan and the region.
Instead, Iran will be seeking in any talks to make Washington one of a number of players in an Afghanistan solution, rather than the leader of the pack.]]>http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/rss-comments-entry-7482869.xmlThe Israeli Military and Gaza's Civilians: Returning to The Oranim TranscriptsAvihai MandelblitGazaHa'aretzIsraelIsraeli Defense ForcesMiddle East & IranOperation Cast LeadOranim CollegeScott LucasMon, 30 Mar 2009 16:49:51 +0000http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/2009/3/30/the-israeli-military-and-gazas-civilians-returning-to-the-or.html497390:6637762:7482868Related Post: Burying Gaza - How Israel’s Military Put Away the Oranim Revelations israel-soldiers2"In effect, we were supposed to go up floor by floor, and any person we identified - we were supposed to shoot." The Israeli military has now completed its investigation of the claims made by graduates of the Yitzhak Rabin pre-military preparatory program, held at Oranim Academic College, of abuses by the Israeli Defense Forces during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. According to the Jerusalem Post:
The Military Police completed its official investigation into the accounts on Monday and concluded that they were categorically false and based on rumors....The probe also concluded that the stories of the soldiers who participated in the conference were purposely exaggerated and made extreme, in order to make a point to the participants at the conference. The IDF Advocate-General Brig.-Gen. Avihai Mandelblit decided to close the case in the wake of the findings.
We will comment on the "investigation" in a separate blog. For the moment, here are the extracts from the soldiers' accounts, as they appeared in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz: Danny Zamir: "I don't intend for us to evaluate the achievements and the diplomatic-political significance of Operation Cast Lead this evening, nor need we deal with the systemic military aspect [of it]. However, discussion is necessary because this was, all told, an exceptional war action in terms of the history of the IDF, which has set new limits for the army's ethical code and that of the State of Israel as a whole. "This is an action that sowed massive destruction among civilians. It is not certain that it was possible do have done it differently, but ultimately we have emerged from this operation and are not facing real paralysis from the Qassams. It is very possible that we will repeat such an operation on a larger scale in the years to come, because the problem in the Gaza Strip is not simple and it is not at all certain that it has been solved. What we want this evening is to hear from the fighters." Aviv: "I am squad commander of a company that is still in training, from the Givati Brigade. We went into a neighborhood in the southern part of Gaza City. Altogether, this is a special experience. In the course of the training, you wait for the day you will go into Gaza, and in the end it isn't really like they say it is. It's more like, you come, you take over a house, you kick the tenants out and you move in. We stayed in a house for something like a week. "Toward the end of the operation there was a plan to go into a very densely populated area inside Gaza City itself. In the briefings they started to talk to us about orders for opening fire inside the city, because as you know they used a huge amount of firepower and killed a huge number of people along the way, so that we wouldn't get hurt and they wouldn't fire on us. "At first the specified action was to go into a house. We were supposed to go in with an armored personnel carrier called an Achzarit [literally, Cruel] to burst through the lower door, to start shooting inside and then ... I call this murder ... in effect, we were supposed to go up floor by floor, and any person we identified - we were supposed to shoot. I initially asked myself: Where is the logic in this? "From above they said it was permissible, because anyone who remained in the sector and inside Gaza City was in effect condemned, a terrorist, because they hadn't fled. I didn't really understand: On the one hand they don't really have anywhere to flee to, but on the other hand they're telling us they hadn't fled so it's their fault ... This also scared me a bit. I tried to exert some influence, insofar as is possible from within my subordinate position, to change this. In the end the specification involved going into a house, operating megaphones and telling [the tenants]: 'Come on, everyone get out, you have five minutes, leave the house, anyone who doesn't get out gets killed.' "I went to our soldiers and said, 'The order has changed. We go into the house, they have five minutes to escape, we check each person who goes out individually to see that he has no weapons, and then we start going into the house floor by floor to clean it out ... This means going into the house, opening fire at everything that moves , throwing a grenade, all those things. And then there was a very annoying moment. One of my soldiers came to me and asked, 'Why?' I said, 'What isn't clear? We don't want to kill innocent civilians.' He goes, 'Yeah? Anyone who's in there is a terrorist, that's a known fact.' I said, 'Do you think the people there will really run away? No one will run away.' He says, 'That's clear,' and then his buddies join in: 'We need to murder any person who's in there. Yeah, any person who's in Gaza is a terrorist,' and all the other things that they stuff our heads with, in the media. "And then I try to explain to the guy that not everyone who is in there is a terrorist, and that after he kills, say, three children and four mothers, we'll go upstairs and kill another 20 or so people. And in the end it turns out that [there are] eight floors times five apartments on a floor - something like a minimum of 40 or 50 families that you murder. I tried to explain why we had to let them leave, and only then go into the houses. It didn't really help. This is really frustrating, to see that they understand that inside Gaza you are allowed to do anything you want, to break down doors of houses for no reason other than it's cool. "You do not get the impression from the officers that there is any logic to it, but they won't say anything. To write 'death to the Arabs' on the walls, to take family pictures and spit on them, just because you can. I think this is the main thing in understanding how much the IDF has fallen in the realm of ethics, really. It's what I'll remember the most." "One of our officers, a company commander, saw someone coming on some road, a woman, an old woman. She was walking along pretty far away, but close enough so you could take out someone you saw there. If she were suspicious, not suspicious - I don't know. In the end, he sent people up to the roof, to take her out with their weapons. From the description of this story, I simply felt it was murder in cold blood." Zamir: "I don't understand. Why did he shoot her?" Aviv: "That's what is so nice, supposedly, about Gaza: You see a person on a road, walking along a path. He doesn't have to be with a weapon, you don't have to identify him with anything and you can just shoot him. With us it was an old woman, on whom I didn't see any weapon. The order was to take the person out, that woman, the moment you see her." Zvi: "Aviv's descriptions are accurate, but it's possible to understand where this is coming from. And that woman, you don't know whether she's ... She wasn't supposed to be there, because there were announcements and there were bombings. Logic says she shouldn't be there. The way you describe it, as murder in cold blood, that isn't right. It's known that they have lookouts and that sort of thing." Gilad: "Even before we went in, the battalion commander made it clear to everyone that a very important lesson from the Second Lebanon War was the way the IDF goes in - with a lot of fire. The intention was to protect soldiers' lives by means of firepower. In the operation the IDF's losses really were light and the price was that a lot of Palestinians got killed." Ram: "I serve in an operations company in the Givati Brigade. After we'd gone into the first houses, there was a house with a family inside. Entry was relatively calm. We didn't open fire, we just yelled at everyone to come down. We put them in a room and then left the house and entered it from a different lot. A few days after we went in, there was an order to release the family. They had set up positions upstairs. There was a sharpshooters' position on the roof. The platoon commander let the family go and told them to go to the right. One mother and her two children didn't understand and went to the left, but they forgot to tell the sharpshooter on the roof they had let them go, and it was was okay and he should hold his fire and he ... he did what he was supposed to, like he was following his orders." Question from the audience: "At what range was this?" Ram: "Between 100 and 200 meters, something like that. They had also came out of the house that he was on the roof of, they had advanced a bit and suddenly he saw then, people moving around in an area where they were forbidden to move around. I don't think he felt too bad about it, because after all, as far as he was concerned, he did his job according to the orders he was given. And the atmosphere in general, from what I understood from most of my men who I talked to ... I don't know how to describe it .... The lives of Palestinians, let's say, is something very, very less important than the lives of our soldiers. So as far as they are concerned they can justify it that way." Yuval Friedman (chief instructor at the Rabin program): "Wasn't there a standing order to request permission to open fire?" Ram: "No. It exists, beyond a certain line. The idea is that you are afraid that they are going to escape from you. If a terrorist is approaching and he is too close, he could blow up the house or something like that." Zamir: "After a killing like that, by mistake, do they do some sort of investigation in the IDF? Do they look into how they could have corrected it?" Ram: "They haven't come from the Military Police's investigative unit yet. There hasn't been any ... For all incidents, there are individual investigations and general examinations, of all of the conduct of the war. But they haven't focused on this specifically." Moshe: "The attitude is very simple: It isn't pleasant to say so, but no one cares at all. We aren't investigating this. This is what happens during fighting and this is what happens during routine security." Ram: "What I do remember in particular at the beginning is the feeling of almost a religious mission. My sergeant is a student at a hesder yeshiva [a program that combines religious study and military service]. Before we went in, he assembled the whole platoon and led the prayer for those going into battle. A brigade rabbi was there, who afterward came into Gaza and went around patting us on the shoulder and encouraging us, and praying with people. And also when we were inside they sent in those booklets, full of Psalms, a ton of Psalms. I think that at least in the house I was in for a week, we could have filled a room with the Psalms they sent us, and other booklets like that. "There was a huge gap between what the Education Corps sent out and what the IDF rabbinate sent out. The Education Corps published a pamphlet for commanders - something about the history of Israel's fighting in Gaza from 1948 to the present. The rabbinate brought in a lot of booklets and articles, and ... their message was very clear: We are the Jewish people, we came to this land by a miracle, God brought us back to this land and now we need to fight to expel the gentiles who are interfering with our conquest of this holy land. This was the main message, and the whole sense many soldiers had in this operation was of a religious war. From my position as a commander and 'explainer,' I attempted to talk about the politics - the streams in Palestinian society, about how not everyone who is in Gaza is Hamas, and not every inhabitant wants to vanquish us. I wanted to explain to the soldiers that this war is not a war for the sanctification of the holy name, but rather one to stop the Qassams." Zamir: "I would like to ask the pilots who are here, Gideon and Yonatan, to tell us a little about their perspective. As an infantryman, this has always interested me. How does it feel when you bomb a city like that?" Gideon: "First of all, about what you have said concerning the crazy amounts of firepower: Right in the first foray in the fighting, the quantities were very impressive, very large, and this is mainly what sent all the Hamasniks into hiding in the deepest shelters and kept them from showing their faces until some two weeks after the fighting. "In general the way that it works for us, just so you will understand the differences a bit, is that at night I would come to the squadron, do one foray in Gaza and go home to sleep. I go home to sleep in Tel Aviv, in my warm bed. I'm not stuck in a bed in the home of a Palestinian family, so life is a little better. "When I'm with the squadron, I don't see a terrorist who is launching a Qassam and then decide to fly out to get him. There is a whole system that supports us, that serves as eyes, ears and intelligence for every plane that takes off, and creates more and more targets in real-time, of one level of legitimacy or another. In any case, I try to believe that these are targets [determined according to] the highest possible level of legitimacy. "They dropped leaflets over Gaza and would sometimes fire a missile from a helicopter into the corner of some house, just to shake up the house a bit so everyone inside would flee. These things worked. The families came out, and really people [i.e., soldiers] did enter houses that were pretty empty, at least of innocent civilians. From this perspective it works. "In any case, I arrive at the squadron, I get a target with a description and coordinates, and basically just make sure it isn't within the line of our forces. I look at the picture of the house I am suppose to attack, I see that it matches reality, I take off, I push the button and the bomb takes itself exactly to within one meter of the target itself." Zamir: "Among the pilots, is there also talk or thoughts of remorse? For example, I was terribly surprised by the enthusiasm surrounding the killing of the Gaza traffic police on the first day of the operation: They took out 180 traffic cops. As a pilot, I would have questioned that." Gideon: "There are two parts to this. Tactically speaking, you call them 'police.' In any case, they are armed and belong to Hamas ... During better times, they take Fatah people and throw them off the roofs and see what happens. "With regard to the thoughts, you sit with the squadron and there are lots of discussions about the value-related significance of the fighting, about what we are doing; there is a lot to talk about. From the moment you start the plane's engine until the moment you turn it off, all of your thoughts, all of your concentration and all of your attention are on the mission you have to carry out. If you have an unjustified doubt, you're liable to cause a far greater screw-up and knock down a school with 40 children. If the building I hit isn't the one I am supposed to hit, but rather a house with our guys inside - the price of the mistake is very, very high." Question from the audience: "Was there anyone in the squadron who didn't push the button, who thought twice?" Gideon: "That question should be addressed to those involved in the helicopter operation, or to the guys who see what they do. With the weapons I used, my ability to make a decision that contradicts what they told me up to that point is zero. I dispatch the bomb from a range within which I can see the entire Gaza Strip. I also see Haifa, I also see Sinai, but it's more or less the same. It's from really far away." Yossi: "I am a platoon sergeant in an operations company of the Paratroops Brigade. We were in a house and discovered a family inside that wasn't supposed to be there. We assembled them all in the basement, posted two guards at all times and made sure they didn't make any trouble. Gradually, the emotional distance between us broke down - we had cigarettes with them, we drank coffee with them, we talked about the meaning of life and the fighting in Gaza. After very many conversations the owner of the house, a man of 70-plus, was saying it's good we are in Gaza and it's good that the IDF is doing what it is doing. "The next day we sent the owner of the house and his son, a man of 40 or 50, for questioning. The day after that, we received an answer: We found out that both are political activists in Hamas. That was a little annoying - that they tell you how fine it is that you're here and good for you and blah-blah-blah, and then you find out that they were lying to your face the whole time. "What annoyed me was that in the end, after we understood that the members of this family weren't exactly our good friends and they pretty much deserved to be forcibly ejected from there, my platoon commander suggested that when we left the house, we should clean up all the stuff, pick up and collect all the garbage in bags, sweep and wash the floor, fold up the blankets we used, make a pile of the mattresses and put them back on the beds." Zamir: "What do you mean? Didn't every IDF unit that left a house do that?" Yossi: "No. Not at all. On the contrary: In most of the houses graffiti was left behind and things like that." Zamir: "That's simply behaving like animals." Yossi: "You aren't supposed to be concentrating on folding blankets when you're being shot at." Zamir: "I haven't heard all that much about you being shot at. It's not that I'm complaining, but if you've spent a week in a home, clean up your filth." Aviv: "We got an order one day: All of the equipment, all of the furniture - just clean out the whole house. We threw everything, everything, out of the windows to make room. The entire contents of the house went flying out the windows." Yossi: "There was one day when a Katyusha, a Grad, landed in Be'er Sheva and a mother and her baby were moderately to seriously injured. They were neighbors of one of my soldiers. We heard the whole story on the radio, and he didn't take it lightly - that his neighbors were seriously hurt. So the guy was a bit antsy, and you can understand him. To tell a person like that, 'Come on, let's wash the floor of the house of a political activist in Hamas, who has just fired a Katyusha at your neighbors that has amputated one of their legs' - this isn't easy to do, especially if you don't agree with it at all. When my platoon commander said, 'Okay, tell everyone to fold up blankets and pile up mattresses,' it wasn't easy for me to take. There was lot of shouting. In the end I was convinced and realized it really was the right thing to do. Today I appreciate and even admire him, the platoon commander, for what happened there. In the end I don't think that any army, the Syrian army, the Afghani army, would wash the floor of its enemy's houses, and it certainly wouldn't fold blankets and put them back in the closets." Zamir: "I think it would be important for parents to sit here and hear this discussion. I think it would be an instructive discussion, and also very dismaying and depressing. You are describing an army with very low value norms, that's the truth ... I am not judging you and I am not complaining about you. I'm just reflecting what I'm feeling after hearing your stories. I wasn't in Gaza, and I assume that among reserve soldiers the level of restraint and control is higher, but I think that all in all, you are reflecting and describing the kind of situation we were in. "After the Six-Day War, when people came back from the fighting, they sat in circles and described what they had been through. For many years the people who did this were said to be 'shooting and crying.' In 1983, when we came back from the Lebanon War, the same things were said about us. We need to think about the events we have been through. We need to grapple with them also, in terms of establishing a standard or different norms. "It is quite possible that Hamas and the Syrian army would behave differently from me. The point is that we aren't Hamas and we aren't the Syrian army or the Egyptian army, and if clerics are anointing us with oil and sticking holy books in our hands, and if the soldiers in these units aren't representative of the whole spectrum in the Jewish people, but rather of certain segments of the population - what are we expecting? To whom are we complaining? "As reservists we don't take relate seriously to the orders of the regional brigades. We let the old people go through and we let families go through. Why kill people when it's clear to you that they are civilians? Which aspect of Israel's security will be harmed, who will be harmed? Exercise judgment, be human."]]>http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/rss-comments-entry-7482868.xmlCNN on Top of the World: Porn Beats Out PakistanAfghanistanBarack ObamaChristiane AmanpourHamid KarzaiIndia & PakistanJournalism & MediaPakistanUK & IrelandUS Auto IndustryScott LucasMon, 30 Mar 2009 15:12:12 +0000http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/2009/3/30/cnn-on-top-of-the-world-porn-beats-out-pakistan.html497390:6637762:7482867UPDATE (5:20 p.m. BST): CNN has now put in a new Number 1 story, "Obama: US Auto Industry Must Not Vanish", which (as far as I know) has nothing to do with pornography whatsoever. CNN's international website now has "Pakistan police academy attack kills 8" as its Number 2 story. Number 1? "Husband's porn threatens [British] minister's job". Next up: Christiane Amanpour puts the tough questions to Afghan President Hamid Karzai --- Playboy or Penthouse?]]>http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/rss-comments-entry-7482867.xmlPakistan: Attack on Lahore Police Station Kills Up to 60BBCCNNDawnGeo NewsIndia & PakistanPakistanScott LucasMon, 30 Mar 2009 11:17:52 +0000http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/2009/3/30/pakistan-attack-on-lahore-police-station-kills-up-to-60.html497390:6637762:7482866Latest Post: Mehsud Claims Responsibility for Lahore Attack; 18 Dead UPDATE (3:10 p.m. BST/7:10 p.m. Lahore): Dawn is quoting Pakistani security sources that eight attackers were killed, including two who blew themselves up, and six detained. Geo News is saying four attackers killed and four detained, with eight policemen "martyred" and 95 wounded. Military spokesman is also telling CNN eight security personnel killed; previous statement of 30 people killed is being blamed on "wrong information". UPDATE (12:30 p.m. BST/4:30 p.m. Lahore): There is still confusion in press accounts. The Pakistan newspaper Dawn is reporting, "The police have overpowered the gunmen and the operation has concluded", but "official confirmations of the development are...awaited". It puts the death toll at "only" 13 although "it is likely to rise". Al Jazeera is reporting up to 50 dead, with security sources saying at least four gunmen killed and six seized. The Daily Telegraph in Britain is citing reports of 60 dead from Pakistani television stations, with police statements of 92 wounded. About 25 gunmen were involved in the attack. UPDATE (12.15pm BST/4.15pm Lahore): Reports suggest that Pakistani security forces have retaken the training centre, arresting at least one suspect. CNN says that at least 10 are dead, with local media reporting the number of dead as high as 25. The BBC, however, says there could be 40 dead. Morning Update: A gun battle is continuing in Lahore between Pakistani security forces and attackers who invaded a police training centre Monday, throwing grenades and firing at officers taking morning roll call. The attack killed 20 and wounded 25. Pakistani Rangers and police, supported by the Army and helicopters, have taken up positions around the centre.]]>http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/rss-comments-entry-7482866.xmlEnduring America Special: If It's Sunday, It Must Be Mr Obama's WarBarack ObamaCBSCNNDavid PetraeusFace the NationFinancial TimesFox NewsRichard HolbrookeRobert GatesUS Foreign PolicyUS PoliticsScott LucasMon, 30 Mar 2009 08:02:07 +0000http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/2009/3/30/enduring-america-special-if-its-sunday-it-must-be-mr-obamas.html497390:6637762:7482864Sunday morning is special in US politics. It's the time when Administrations can sell their policies on political talk shows (and, in due course, when opponents can have a shot at the President and his advisors). Yesterday the Obama Administration put on a full-court press for its Pakistan-Afghanistan strategy. The President went on Face the Nation on CBS --- we've got the video and transcript. We also have the full text for General David Petraeus and US special envoy Richard Holbrooke with CNN and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates with Fox News. And, as a global economy bonus, there is today's Obama interview with the Financial Times. We'll offer a full analysis later, but for now have a look at how Mr Obama's War is being laid out for the US public.]]>http://www.enduringamerica.com/march-2009/rss-comments-entry-7482864.xml