Iran: So, What Are the Green Movement's Goals Tomorrow?

Qods Day: A Protest For Palestine or Against Iran’s Government?
Iran’s Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday
The Latest from Iran (17 September): Tomorrow

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Last night EA's Chris Emery sent me this challenging question:

"What do you think the Green Movement consider to be their achievable aims on Friday and, more generally, beyond that? What would be their ideal result?

"My view is that the Green Movement is unsure what is achievable now and aim simply to demonstrate that they have not gone away (an achievement in itself --- but not necessarily leverage). Sadly, I think the authorities probably have a clearer idea of their aims and consider most of them, but not all, achievable."

This was my immediate reply:

The immediate aim? Stand up to Ahmadinejad.

I appreciate the wider points about aims but just surviving after everything thrown at the movement would be a victory. It maintains some space for all the complex negotiations going on in Tehran and Qom.

For me, if the President succeeds, this is no longer an Islamic Republic. Karroubi and senior clerics are saying this but they need the public display if they're to have any traction against the forces around Ahmadinejad.

Chris' response:

I agree both on the aim and the achievement of still making noise. It would be a victory but how will it limit the President's power? If Ahmadinejad's aim is to establish a military dictatorship and the Supreme Leader's is to preserve the authority of his office, then I think these demonstrations put much more pressure on the Supreme Leader than on Ahmadinejad. The President seems unconcerned by his lack of legitimacy and confident of the loyalty and capability of the security services. Ayatollah Khamenei has placed his lot with a man who literally is not bothered by the protests.

In regard to the complex negotiations in Tehran and Qom, you have to ask why they need more space and how they will use it. Are they hoping that the demos will somehow make a strategy for limiting Ahmadinejad's power clearer? Are they hoping that Ahmadinejad will have his wings clipped by the Supreme Leader? I think that rather than the people providing space for never-ending complex negotiations, which have now been rumbling on for more 3 months, those in the negotiations need to provide the space for the people by showing some real leadership. Open letters to the Supreme Leader backed by real threats, strikes, etc.

But they won't, and I expect that Ahmadinejad will get up on friday and say I won, I am your President, my mandate is to root out those contaminating the revolution or acting as foreign agents. You will not win. In other words, your demonstrations do not scare me.

I think that in the long term, the genie will never go back in the bottle and that is the Green movement's fantastuc legacy. However, in the short term, they need some direction if they are to persuade the Supreme Leader that the situation demands some immediate concessions.

Over the next 24 hours, we'll be debating this question, with other EA staff putting in their views and, of course, welcoming the thoughts of our readers.

Tomorrow is Qods Day.

Qods Day: A Protest For Palestine or Against Iran's Government?

Iran: So, What Are the Green Movement’s Goals Tomorrow?
Iran’s Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday
The Latest from Iran (17 September): Tomorrow

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Meir Javedanfar offers this useful overview, originally published on The Guardian website, of Qods Day --- "A Green Day for Iran":

International Jerusalem Day (Rooze jahaniye Qods) is observed in Iran on the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan. This year it falls on 18 September. Jerusalem Day was designated by the late Ayatollah Khomeini as a day of support for Palestinians and opposition against Israel. It is a day when the government issues permits for hundreds of thousands of Iranians to pour on to the streets and demonstrate.

Some attend due to genuine support for Palestinians. Others take part because of government pressure. This is especially true of civil servants. Some fear that failure to attend could damage their job security and prospects. When it comes to the number of demonstrators, there is no limit on how many people can come out to the streets. In fact, as far as the government is concerned, the more the merrier.

This is in direct contrast to demonstrations held by reformists. The Ahmadinejad administration, using violence and intimidation, has done its utmost to limit such protests, if not eradicate them entirely. This has forced many of Iran's demonstrators to come up with new ways of voicing their opposition, using seemingly legal means. One popular method is going on top of their roofs to shout "Allahu akbar" (God is greatest). This is not against the law. In fact, this is one of the methods of protest used by those who took part in the 1979 revolution.

With Jerusalem Day approaching, opposition forces in Iran are sensing another opportunity to vent their anger under legal guises. As far as they are concerned, it is legal for all Iranians to protest openly on the streets on that day. Participation is not constrained by domestic political ideology. Therefore, in cities such as Tehran, there are plans by reformists to turn this year's Jerusalem Day into a green (reformist) day.

What is particularly clever about this strategy is that although green is considered as a hostile colour to Ahmadinejad, when it comes to Palestinian politics, it is a favourable colour (even to Ahmadinejad supporters), because it is the colour of Hamas. Therefore on Jerusalem Day it will be difficult for the government to ban people or to arrest them for wearing green, as they could use the excuse that they are showing solidarity with Hamas. In fact, we may even see some of Ahmadinejad's supporters wearing green.

This year's Jerusalem Day will be an important opportunity for Iran's reformists. They are likely to take full advantage, since the number of demonstrations in Iran has been decreasing due to the violent government crackdown.

This is in addition to other problems facing Iran's reformists before and after the recent presidential elections. One of them is the fact that their numbers were limited to major cities, especially Tehran. Towns and villages in rural areas showed less support because they are not connected to the internet, which made it more difficult for the reformists to campaign and mobilise support before and after the elections.

There is also the fact that many of the demonstrators were students. The majority of Iran's students are in Tehran or other big cities such as Shiraz and Esfahan. Regional towns and villages do not have big universities, so anti-government activities cannot spread through the student population.

Furthermore, the pro-reformist demonstrations in Iran have become synonymous with Tehran, especially its northern and western parts, which are considered the most affluent. In Iran, there is a certain amount of animosity held towards rich parts of Tehran, which has made it more difficult for reformists to persuade Iranians from other parts of the country to join them.

When it comes to aiding the Palestinians, there are many reformists who believe in an "Iran first" policy, meaning that Iran's welfare and national interest should be placed above that of its allies in Gaza. Although this does not mean that they are anti-Palestinian, it does reflect the frustration that many Iranians feel towards Ahmadinejad's policy. During the recent Gaza war, the reformist Kargozaran newspaper published an advert condemning both Israel and Hamas. This was unprecedented. No one had dared to criticise Hamas before in the mass media. The newspaper's staff were subsequently threatened and its offices shut down.

Despite such feelings, attending the demonstrations and showing solidarity with the Palestinians could benefit the reformists – especially in light of the recent accusations by Yadollah Javani, the head of the political bureau of the pro-Ahmadinejad Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who said that Clinton, Obama and Israel had supported the reformists in Iran. By participating in the Jerusalem Day demonstrations, the reformists could make it more difficult for the conservatives to level such accusations against them.

The reformists are likely to be helped further by the publication of a report in Tabnak, Iran's most popular news analysis website, that Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi, who served as Ahmadinejad's minister of science, held a meeting with his Israeli counterpart in Indonesia in 2008. This has made Ahmadinejad, who prides himself on being an ardent enemy of Israel, look like a hypocrite, much to the reformists' delight.

The Iranian government hailed the 2006 Palestinian elections, which Hamas won, as fully transparent, fair and just. Perhaps what Iran's leaders didn't realise is that those elections, and the manner in which they were carried out, were setting an example for the people of Iran as well – and now they want the same for their own country.

The Latest from Iran (16 September): Smoke Before Battle

NEW Iran’s Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday
Iran: Montazeri Letter to Islamic Clerics (14 September)
The Latest from Iran (15 September): Momentum Builds

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2030 GMT: An Artistic Clash for the Supreme Leader? A colleague writes with an essential correction of our first item today (0710 GMT) on Ayatollah Khamenei's meeting yesterday with ""artists, directors, screenwriters, poets, and writers":

"The English version of Khamenei's speech to the artists actually doesn't reflect what the meeting was about. It wasn't for him to give them any guidance but rather, as Fars News fascinating account of it reveals, it was meant for the various artists to speak 'frankly' with Khamenei. While Fars New tries to whitewash some of the conversations that the artists had with Khamenei, it is clear even by their own censored account that it was a raucous meeting and that at least a couple of the artists, including Majid Majidi (who accoring to Fars News breaks down into tears) conveyed some kind of oppositional sentiment. One filmmaker when asked to speak says he doesn't feel well and sits down. Another when told there is no time for him to speak, after he had prepared a talk complains, 'You keep contacting me for a couple of days asking me to come and speak my mind and now you tell me there's no time?'"

1855 GMT: Really? According to Peykeiran, the Supreme Leader's representative with the Revolutionary Guard has warned that the arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi or Mehdi Karroubi would turn them into martyrs for the Green opposition.

Given that the Supreme Leader supposedly signed the order for Karroubi's arrest two weeks ago, this is a bit confusing. Then again, as our readers are debating in their comments, Ayatollah Khamenei's position may be far from secure.

1800 GMT: Easy Does It. In a measured, even careful, interview with Tabnak, Hashemi Rafsanjani has downplayed his absence from leading Friday Prayers on Qods Day for the first time in a quarter-century: "It is not necessary after 30 years that I should lead the prayers."

1555 GMT: Why are tents being erected around the main campus of Tehran University, where this Friday's prayers will be held?

1545 GMT: Make of this what you will: the Iranian Government has declared national holidays on Saturday and Monday, the day before and after the celebration of the end of Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr.

1310 GMT: Cyber-charge. Talk about a story turning in a few hours. The opposition's aggressive fightback on the Web continues: Mowj-e-Sabz has launched an English-language website.

1215 GMT: Cyber-bounce. Indeed, after our worry this morning (0950 GMT) about a drop in information via the Web, there is a bit of a resurgence. Mehdi Karroubi seems to have a new website for his statements and news. Is this an alternative for the Etemade Melli site, which is still down?

News is also being posted on tagheer.ir.

1200 GMT: If the Iranian regime is trying to block news in and out of Iran, the effort is incomplete. Fereshteh Ghazi has interviewed Ayatollah Mousavi-Tabrizi, who highlights the clerical resistance: "The authorities know [their] pressures have no effect on my position and action or those of Qom scholars." He adds, in relation to the arrest of his children and the family members of other clerics on Monday, "My sons and the sons of Mr. Nazemzadeh and Mr. Ahmadi aren't clerics, so why are they tried in clerics' court?"(summary in English via Ghazi's Twitter account)

Twitter traffic from inside Iran is also picking up.

1120 GMT: The US network NBC is interviewing President Ahmadinejad today and broadcasting the discussion on tomorrow morning's Today programme.

1110 GMT: The Mousavi Facebook page is still active, just posting the statement of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomenei, inviting all Iranians to participate in the rally on Qods Day "a day...for the oppressed to fight oppressors and tyranny".

1100 GMT: Morning MediaFail. CNN ($199/story) are not eligible, since they no longer have news from inside Iran. Instead, the award goes to Robert Tait and The Guardian of London. Amidst all the tension in advance of Qods Day, the confusion over Friday Prayers, the raids, the arrests, the Karroubi letters, the protests by senior clerics, their story today?

"Chinese jeans bearing name of God anger Iranians".

In their quasi-defence, the prominent notation "Read This in Chinese" is a clue that The Guardian's market attention is far away from Tehran.

1050 GMT: Cyber-war. Internet traffic from Iranians inside Iran is almost at a standstill this morning. Nothing is coming through via Twitter and contacts also remove no interaction on Facebook.

Etemade Melli/Saham News and Norooz are down. Mowj-e-Sabz and Kaleme are both up.

0950 GMT: Correcting an oversight. We have reported the arrest of the three grandchildren of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri on Monday. The children of Ayatollah Hossein Mousavi Tabrizi,were also arrested.

The catalyst for the arrests may have been an Iftar at the house of Ayatollah Yusuf Sane'i. EA has received information that this Iftar, where reformist clerics and their families gathered, angered the regime and also led to the filing of a court action by President Ahmadinejad's office against Sane'i.

0935 GMT: The Islamic Republic News Agency carries the short item that President Ahmadinejad will introduce Ahmad Khatami, who will give the Friday Prayer address this week.

0925 GMT: Associated Press is claiming, from Iranian state radio, that the Government has confirmed Ahmad Khatami will lead Qods Day prayers.

0710 GMT: Yesterday's confusion over Qods Day continues. While Tuesday was a pretty good one for the Green leadership, as Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami signalled that they would join forces with Mehdi Karroubi, the Government's disarray over Friday prayers was never resolved. We've tried to see the events in wider perspective, leading up to Qods Day, in a separate analysis, "Iran's Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces".

Rather than offer any specific guidance, the Supreme Leader spent Tuesday telling "artists, directors, screenwriters, poets, and writers" that they should be putting out proper art. His reference point was not the current internal conflict but the 1980-1988 war with Iraq: "The eight-year Sacred Defense was the embodiment of outstanding characteristics, prominent cultural values, and lofty beliefs, and those who recount it in an artistic manner are like a mirror reflecting the manifestation of splendor and glory."

If there was contemporary resonance in Ayatollah Khamenei's address, it may be in this cryptic injunction to artists that "their sensitive views should not create a spirit of despair in people".

Iran: The Supreme Leader and the Larijani-Karroubi Meeting

Iran’s Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday
The Latest from Iran (16 September): Smoke Before Battle

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Maryam at Keeping the Change has posted an article on Monday's meeting between Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani and Mehdi Karroubi, offering important detail on the discussion. Equally significant is her reading of the power politics behind the encounter:

"The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach."

Maryam's reading is a vital contrast to our analysis, developed this morning, that it is President Ahmadinejad and his allies that are in the lead with the Supreme Leader scrambling to regain his own position. At the same time, her pondering of "careful strategy" v. "non-strategy" could be applied not only to Ayatollah Khamenei but to the Government's measures in the run-up to Qods Day.

More Details on Karroubi's Meeting Monday with Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani

The website Rouydad adds additional detail to the earlier piece we posted from Karroubi's news outlet, Eteemade Melli. According to this newest report, during yesterday's meeting Karroubi informed Larijani of his concerns with the work of the three-man committee investing the prisoner rape and assault claims, as well as the actions of the state news agecy "Voice & Visage." At the end of the meeting Karroubi reportedly told Larijani of his hope that "unlike his brother [Sadegh Larijani], [Ali Larijani] will not sell his religion to the world." The report goes on to claim that Larijani asked Karroubi to "keep quiet" until the domestic situation improves, promising that his allegations would be properly investigated once calm had been restored. Karroubi replied, "I would prefer death to remaining quite in the face of these violations."

Interestingly, Rouydad's account of the meeting begins with a quotation from a source inside Parliament, stating that: "On the orders of the Supreme Leader, Larijani met with Karroubi. Mr. Larijani is the bearer of the Leader's message." With this in mind, Larijani's request for restraint from Karroubi and Karroubi's purported refusal to do so take on added signficance. As we observed in our earlier post on this meeting, it appears that the Refomists' hand is not as weak as some have suggested and that attempts at conciliation have not been wholly put aside by the Supreme Leader. If anything, this development, taken together with the events of the last week, may indicate that Khamanei is taking multiple approaches to the post-election conflict. On the one hand, he appears to be using some elements of his arsenal, such as the Revolutionary Guard, to strike a confrontational approach with the Reformists, while at the same time using other allies, such as the hardline pragmatic Ali Larijani, to pursue negotiations with Opposition leaders.

The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach. This reading is borne out by a pattern which appears to have developed post June 12, with periods of intense confrontation followed by spurts of appeasement and vice-versa (witness the fourth Tehran trials and accusations against Reformist leaders of collusion with foreign governments, followed by Khamanei's public statements denying the possibility of any such conspiracy) .

In all likelihood, it is the second analysis that may best capture Khamanei's mindset -- Khamanei is, after all, known to be less than an astute politician, with a tendency to favor uncompromising, agressive political strategies to diplomacy. He is, as such, disinclined to pursue appeasement unless his preferred confrontational approach has failed. In this vein, the recent events surrounding Karroubi are telling. After the raid on his offices, the closure of his newspaper, and the threats of arrest against him have all failed to silence Karroubi, Khamanei may have decided that conciliation should, at least in the short term, be explored. If Karroubi remains defiant, however, we should expect to see Khamanei return to his tried and true aggressive posture.

Other than providing potential insight into Khamanei's political strategy, Karroubi's meeting with Larijani should serve as a small reminder of the in-roads made by the Reformists over the last two months and of the Government's heretofore inability to decisively snuff out the Movement's leaders. There is little doubt that the current situation inside the country, as well as the Government's response, is unique in the history of the Islamic Republic. This is hardly the Iran of 1988, when thousands of political activists were summarily executed, expelled, and otherwise removed from the Iranian political scene. Of course, the circumstances were differen then: those killed and exiled during that period were hardly Establishment darlings, but rather were, by and large, members of dissident groups ideologically opposed to the Islamic Republic; moreover, their elimination was religiously sanctioned by a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini. Perhaps more tellingly, however, the recent events in Iran also bear little ressemblance to the atmosphere that reigned during the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when the Reformists remained cowed and unable to unite against the conservative forces that were working to disrupt Khatami's efforts at change.

Outside of the brutal crackdown against demonstrators, the Government has not yet resorted to large scale violence, such as mass executions or targeted assassinations of Movement leaders, to resolve the crisis. At the same time, the Reformists have managed to maintain some semblance of unity (with Khatami, Karroubi, and Mousavi almost appearing to alternate in the role of "Movement Leader"). Moreover, the Opposition has adapted its tactics in order to maintain pressure on the Government, focusing its message less directly on the election issue and more on the events and incidents that occurred in the aftermath of the dispute, such as the show trials and allegations of prisoner rape and abuse. While these may seem like modest accomplishments, the country's history of political repression and opposition to reform over the last 30 years make them the signposts of a society in transition.

As always, trying to predict where this conflict is headed is futile. What we can conclude, however, is that the Establishment has yet to achieve a decisive victory and that this failure, in and of itself, may tell us more about the future of Iran than any one arrest, office closure, or high-ranking political meeting ever will.

Iran's Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday

The Latest from Iran (16 September): Smoke Before Battle
Iran: The Supreme Leader and the Larijani-Karroubi Meeting
Iran Analysis: Checking the Scorecard of Opposition
The Latest from Iran (15 September): Momentum Builds

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It was a quieter day on Tuesday, but make no mistake, there were some significant moves. And in those moves were the indications of both possibilities and problems for the opposition and for the Government.

For the Green movement, yesterday brought alignment of the pieces. Mehdi Karroubi, to say the least, is already in play; the question now, after all the Government threats against him, is how high a profile he takes on Friday. Tuesday morning brought the entry of Mir Hossein Mousavi with the announcement that he would participate in the Qods Day demonstration and encourage followers to do so; Mohammad Khatami repeated the process in the afternoon.

Expect the "followers" today to make their declarations, with political activists and possibly some clerical groups issuing statements that Qods Day will be their day. The obvious challenge is to turn declaration into mass practice. Communications within Iran are still difficult, and the threat of arrests and violence is strong. How many turn out on the street in the next 48 hours?

The most striking story on Tuesday, however, came on the Government side. The regime was preparing to shut out Hashemi Rafsanjani from Qods Day prayers so President Ahmadinejad could introduce his hard-line supporter, Ahmad Khatami, and signal that Enough is Enough and This Game is Over; however, its powerful move turned into farce. Pro-Government outlets such as Fars News, seeking a dramatic proclamation, leaked the news, and the regime spent the rest of the day issuing denials, clarifications, and wait-and-sees amidst the confusion.

This morning we still don't know who will take the podium on Wednesday. Fars now makes no reference to Friday prayers, and the Islamic Republic News Agency prefers "Green Wave disturbance in the scramble for Qods rallies". I still think Ahmadinejad-Khatami is the plan for Friday, but the Government has converted an opportunity into a fumble and stumble.

This is not an indication that the the President is trouble. Paradoxically, the bungling comes from a position of power. Ahmadinejad and his allies can issue declarations, send out security forces for raids and arrests, and count on almost all of the state media to put out supporting "news".

At the same time, this is a large bureaucracy, so signs of clever co-ordination may actually be officials working off different scripts. For example, is the near-simultaneous release of some high-ranking opposition activists (for example, Mousavi campaign manager Javad Emam yesterday) and the arrest of others (Karroubi advisor Fayez Ahzad) the ultimate in carrot-and-stick or is it a confusion over whether to offer limited concession or bring down the fist?

This is a bureaucracy which is supposed to be governing --- running an economy, providing services, pursuing a foreign policy. For all the headlines that the third task is being pursued, with the dance around talks with Western powers and Ahmadinejad's forthcoming appearance at the UN, the other two areas aren't exactly inspiring confidence.

This is a bureaucracy which is not yet secure "within". After the apparent victory quelling conservative and principlist concerns, symbolised by the approval of the Ahmadinejad Cabinet, the last 48 hours have brought the first signs that leading MPs may be ready to poke the President in the eye once again. The symbolic issue is currently the nomination of the First Vice President, Mohammad Reza Rahimi: how much of a groundswell against him is signalled by the accusations of high-profile conservatives like Morteza Motahhari and Ahmad Tavakoli (who is close to the Larijanis)?

I'm not even sure this is a bureaucracy which has a comfortable alignment of power between the Supreme Leader and the President. Weeks of shifting relations between the two were supposed to culminate in last Friday's prayers, where Ayatollah Khamenei would put to rest the notion that the opposition could prevail against his Government. Instead, the "other" moves of the week --- the raids and arrests, the threats against opposition leaders --- brought the question: is the Supreme Leader now a follower of Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard? And yesterday just adds a punctuation mark. Who exactly is deciding what takes place on Friday?

And oh, yes, one other question as the timer for this chess match is started. While the opposition tries to line up for Friday and the Government looks to convert its immediate advantages of more powerful forces into checkmate, what happens to the piece that was supposed to be taken off the board on Tuesday?

Enduring America readers have shrewdly recognised and alerted others that Hashemi Rafsanjani is not the opposition movement. At the same time, he has been a catalyst --- symbolic and political --- for those trying to put pressure on the regime.

Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, thousands (how many thousands?) are ready to make moves on Friday. But does the former President suddenly jump onto the board --- and if so, are his own moves coordinated with those of the other pieces? --- or does he stand aside, possibly waiting for the Assembly of Experts meeting next Tuesday?

Qods Day is two days away.