Thursday
Aug272009
Iran: The Regime's Knockout Punch? Not Quite.
Thursday, August 27, 2009 at 9:57
The Latest from Iran (27 August): Catching Breath
NEW Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Talks, Threats, and Propaganda
The Latest from Iran: Responding to the Trial (26 August)
The Latest from Iran (25 August): The Trials Resume
The 4th Tehran Trial: The Tehran Bureau Summary
Video: The 4th Tehran Trial (25 August)
The Tehran Trial: The Regime Goes After the Reformists AND Rafsanjani
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To appreciate how dramatic the regime's move was on Tuesday with the biggest of the four Tehran trials, in significance if not number of defendants, rewind 12 days to Saturday, 15 August. The regime had dodged a potential bullet the previous day when Hashemi Rafsanjani declined to lead Friday prayers in Tehran, but then it faced a torrent of disturbing news. The Supreme Leader, overruling opposition from the President's camp, pushed through the appointment of Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary. The "Karroubi letter", demanding action on the abuse of detainees, was now circulating publicly. Mir Hossein Mousavi announced the "Green Path of Hope". Conservative members of Parliaments and newspapers were criticising key Ahmadinejad allies like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, as doubts circulated over the President's still-to-be-declared Cabinet. Even Ayatollah Khamenei was not above the battle, with a group of clerics and former MPs (who met former President Khatami) raising the invocation of Law 111 to question the Supreme Leader's qualifications for his post.
This was more than a spectre. Only 10 days after the President had been inaugurated, the Ahmadinejad Government faced a challenge to its legitimacy as great as that of the immediate response to the 12 June elections. It might face not only the Green wave but also a renewed judiciary ready to challenge its (ab)use of the legal system for detentions, confessions, and trials, a Supreme Leader who was no longer ready to back Ahmadinejad to the full, and conservative and principlist MPs alienated by stories such as the death of Mohsen Roohulamini. And there was still the haunting question: what would Rafsanjani now do?
So, would the Ahmadinejad regime back down and accept compromise, to the point of crippling its authority? Or would it make an even more aggressive charge to knock back its opponents once and for all?
Tuesday's trial was the answer. This was the equivalent (for our American readers) of "swinging for the fences" in baseball and (for all others) of trying to land a one-punch knockout in the boxing ring. The crushing of the reformists, headlined by the non-Iranian press, was only one goal. This was also the occasion to put away the Rafsanjani challenge for good. It may even have been the declaration to the Supreme Leader that this was no time for his concessions --- token or real --- to the protests inside and outside the Establishment. No more Larijanis in key positions with power, no more apologies for detention centres like Kahrizak Prison.
Was it a knockout? At the end of Tuesday, the Government's challengers looked very wobbly. Apart from the "non-confession" of Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, the reformist leaders had been paraded and humiliated. The prosecutor mentioned the death penalty. Saeed Hajjarian had been forced to resign from his political party and to lay out --- as one of Iran's premier political theorists --- the designs of "velvet revolution". Tajzadeh, Aminzadeh, Nabavi, Atrianfar had all been put forth to show that there would be no backing down. (And, as a bonus, here was an Iranian-American, Kian Tajbakhsh, on trial and testifying to the "velvet revolution", linking billionaire George Soros and former President Mohammad Khatami.)
Here were the charges of "corruption", which had been raised by Ahmadinejad against Rafsanjani before the election, not only renewed but redoubled. Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi, nephew, and brother-in-law were all tarred in court for diversion of funds, electoral manipulation, and disinformation. While they were not amongst the defendants, they also faced a death penalty with the ending of their public lives. Mehdi Hashemi's attempts on Tuesday night to get some forum for a rebuttal showed how shaken he was. But was his father?
When we went to bed Tuesday night, it seemed that the referee might --- for the first time in 2 1/2 months, be counting out the opposition.
Yesterday, however, the challengers got off the mat.
Inevitably, there were regime opponents who were never going to be silenced, if only because there is little more that can done to them. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri put out an open letter defying a regime which "is neither Islamic nor republic". For the most part, however, the Green Wave/Path of Hope marked time yesterday. Mohammad Khatami denied the allegations against him, and Hossein Karroubi, describing his own court appearance on Tuesday, represented his father by declaring that the initial meeting with MPs over the detainee abuse inquiry was "very good". Mehdi Karroubi revealed that he had written the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, asking him for“the implementation of the Constitution, the legal defense of freedom and citizenship rights, and the maintenance of legal justice to defend the dignity of the system”.
Instead, the first real twitch came yesterday morning in a small but significant step. The Rafsanjani camp posted the audio of the former President's Saturday statement to the Expediency Council: the call for unity behind the Supreme Leader but also the call for justice and for Government officials to follow the Constitution and proper guidelines. At the time, it appeared to be only a clarification of Rafsanjani's statement but it may have been the prelude (keep reading) to a more dramatic statement.
By the afternoon, Rafsanjani's office was being less subtle. Mehdi Hashemi continued to declare his innocence and then turned "corruption" against Ahmadinejad, declaring that the President, as Mayor of Tehran, had "lost" millions of dollars. More importantly, I suspect, the Rafsanjani camp took the fight to Ahmadinejad's ally and Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, attacking his "hallucinations" and calling on both Rahim-Mashai and Ahmadinejad to back up their criticisms of Rafsanjani in court.
And then last night came the dramatic challenge to the President, from a most unexpected challenger. We had wondered on Tuesday whether the Supreme Leader was behind the fourth trial, especially given the attacks on Rafsanjani. In a speech to student leaders, he gave the answer: the opposition had not been engaged in a foreign-directed "velvet revolution" against Iran. For anyone thinking of more arrests, including leaders like Mousavi and Karroubi (and, less likely but still possible, for those throwing around spurious indictments in trials), “We should not proceed in dealing with those behind the protests based on rumours and guesswork. The judiciary should only give rulings based on solid evidence, not on circumstantial evidence.”
A three-word summary. Back. Off. Mahmoud.
Now it could be that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is playing a very clever double game. He could have allowed the fourth trial to proceed, with the criticisms of Rafsanjani, and then pulled back last night. That way, both Ahmadinejad (enough is enough) and Rafsanjani (you had your warning) would be strongly encouraged to pull back and let the Supreme Leader put the regime's house in order.
I take another view, however, based on the Supreme Leader's signal from 19 June. In that Friday prayer address, the only one he has made since the election, he made clear that he preferred the political views of the President but that he also found Rafsanjani an honourable man and leader. And he specifically criticised Ahmadinejad's pre-election charges of corruption. The message had been given: shake hands, boys.
Rafsanjani may have crossed that line on 17 July when he led prayers, but with his general caution, even circumspection, before and after that speech, I think he has tried to ensure that he did not cross Khamenei. (Once again, note last Saturday's address to the Expediency Council. And note that the audio was released on Wednesday morning, just to make it clear where Rafsanjani stood.) Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, went well over the line. So who has to be pulled back?
On the surface, and if you limit your gaze to the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad (and, behind him, the Revolutionary Guard), and Rafsanjani, the situation is easily repaired. No more sledgehammer allegations of corruption from the Government, and Rafsanjani keeps his distance from the Green opposition.
But this conflict is no longer "on the surface" and it certainly is not just around this trio. The 4th Tehran trial was just the latest, more dramatic assertion of Presidential authority, following detentions, beatings, purges of some ministries, and attempts to control others. So now there are contests within the Establishment: what happens to those 20+ officials who were forced out of the Ministry of Intelligence and who now "supervises" its work? Does Sadegh Larijani, put in by the Supreme Leader, have real authority to "correct" the abuses of the system by the Ahmadinejad camp (and, again, the Revolutionary Guard)?
Already the next public display is upon us. Tomorrow the President, on Government Day, introduces the Friday prayer address in Tehran. No doubt he will point to his dedication and service in upholding the Islamic Republic and no doubt, given that the confirmation votes in Parliament on his Ministers begin on Sunday, he will declared that his Cabinet nominees are just as honourable and dedicated.
Ahmadinejad might win that short-term battle within Parliament (although I think that is far from certain). But, even if he does, that is only one punch in a 15-round contest. His regime connected with a blow on Tuesday, but it was far from a knockout.
Which leaves a warning to Mahmoud: when you thrown a punch that big and don't win immediately, you have to swing even harder next time. Or you have to put your hands up and ask for a referee's decision.
NEW Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Talks, Threats, and Propaganda
The Latest from Iran: Responding to the Trial (26 August)
The Latest from Iran (25 August): The Trials Resume
The 4th Tehran Trial: The Tehran Bureau Summary
Video: The 4th Tehran Trial (25 August)
The Tehran Trial: The Regime Goes After the Reformists AND Rafsanjani
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
To appreciate how dramatic the regime's move was on Tuesday with the biggest of the four Tehran trials, in significance if not number of defendants, rewind 12 days to Saturday, 15 August. The regime had dodged a potential bullet the previous day when Hashemi Rafsanjani declined to lead Friday prayers in Tehran, but then it faced a torrent of disturbing news. The Supreme Leader, overruling opposition from the President's camp, pushed through the appointment of Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary. The "Karroubi letter", demanding action on the abuse of detainees, was now circulating publicly. Mir Hossein Mousavi announced the "Green Path of Hope". Conservative members of Parliaments and newspapers were criticising key Ahmadinejad allies like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, as doubts circulated over the President's still-to-be-declared Cabinet. Even Ayatollah Khamenei was not above the battle, with a group of clerics and former MPs (who met former President Khatami) raising the invocation of Law 111 to question the Supreme Leader's qualifications for his post.This was more than a spectre. Only 10 days after the President had been inaugurated, the Ahmadinejad Government faced a challenge to its legitimacy as great as that of the immediate response to the 12 June elections. It might face not only the Green wave but also a renewed judiciary ready to challenge its (ab)use of the legal system for detentions, confessions, and trials, a Supreme Leader who was no longer ready to back Ahmadinejad to the full, and conservative and principlist MPs alienated by stories such as the death of Mohsen Roohulamini. And there was still the haunting question: what would Rafsanjani now do?
So, would the Ahmadinejad regime back down and accept compromise, to the point of crippling its authority? Or would it make an even more aggressive charge to knock back its opponents once and for all?
Tuesday's trial was the answer. This was the equivalent (for our American readers) of "swinging for the fences" in baseball and (for all others) of trying to land a one-punch knockout in the boxing ring. The crushing of the reformists, headlined by the non-Iranian press, was only one goal. This was also the occasion to put away the Rafsanjani challenge for good. It may even have been the declaration to the Supreme Leader that this was no time for his concessions --- token or real --- to the protests inside and outside the Establishment. No more Larijanis in key positions with power, no more apologies for detention centres like Kahrizak Prison.
Was it a knockout? At the end of Tuesday, the Government's challengers looked very wobbly. Apart from the "non-confession" of Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, the reformist leaders had been paraded and humiliated. The prosecutor mentioned the death penalty. Saeed Hajjarian had been forced to resign from his political party and to lay out --- as one of Iran's premier political theorists --- the designs of "velvet revolution". Tajzadeh, Aminzadeh, Nabavi, Atrianfar had all been put forth to show that there would be no backing down. (And, as a bonus, here was an Iranian-American, Kian Tajbakhsh, on trial and testifying to the "velvet revolution", linking billionaire George Soros and former President Mohammad Khatami.)
Here were the charges of "corruption", which had been raised by Ahmadinejad against Rafsanjani before the election, not only renewed but redoubled. Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi, nephew, and brother-in-law were all tarred in court for diversion of funds, electoral manipulation, and disinformation. While they were not amongst the defendants, they also faced a death penalty with the ending of their public lives. Mehdi Hashemi's attempts on Tuesday night to get some forum for a rebuttal showed how shaken he was. But was his father?
When we went to bed Tuesday night, it seemed that the referee might --- for the first time in 2 1/2 months, be counting out the opposition.
Yesterday, however, the challengers got off the mat.
Inevitably, there were regime opponents who were never going to be silenced, if only because there is little more that can done to them. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri put out an open letter defying a regime which "is neither Islamic nor republic". For the most part, however, the Green Wave/Path of Hope marked time yesterday. Mohammad Khatami denied the allegations against him, and Hossein Karroubi, describing his own court appearance on Tuesday, represented his father by declaring that the initial meeting with MPs over the detainee abuse inquiry was "very good". Mehdi Karroubi revealed that he had written the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, asking him for“the implementation of the Constitution, the legal defense of freedom and citizenship rights, and the maintenance of legal justice to defend the dignity of the system”.
Instead, the first real twitch came yesterday morning in a small but significant step. The Rafsanjani camp posted the audio of the former President's Saturday statement to the Expediency Council: the call for unity behind the Supreme Leader but also the call for justice and for Government officials to follow the Constitution and proper guidelines. At the time, it appeared to be only a clarification of Rafsanjani's statement but it may have been the prelude (keep reading) to a more dramatic statement.
By the afternoon, Rafsanjani's office was being less subtle. Mehdi Hashemi continued to declare his innocence and then turned "corruption" against Ahmadinejad, declaring that the President, as Mayor of Tehran, had "lost" millions of dollars. More importantly, I suspect, the Rafsanjani camp took the fight to Ahmadinejad's ally and Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, attacking his "hallucinations" and calling on both Rahim-Mashai and Ahmadinejad to back up their criticisms of Rafsanjani in court.
And then last night came the dramatic challenge to the President, from a most unexpected challenger. We had wondered on Tuesday whether the Supreme Leader was behind the fourth trial, especially given the attacks on Rafsanjani. In a speech to student leaders, he gave the answer: the opposition had not been engaged in a foreign-directed "velvet revolution" against Iran. For anyone thinking of more arrests, including leaders like Mousavi and Karroubi (and, less likely but still possible, for those throwing around spurious indictments in trials), “We should not proceed in dealing with those behind the protests based on rumours and guesswork. The judiciary should only give rulings based on solid evidence, not on circumstantial evidence.”
A three-word summary. Back. Off. Mahmoud.
Now it could be that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is playing a very clever double game. He could have allowed the fourth trial to proceed, with the criticisms of Rafsanjani, and then pulled back last night. That way, both Ahmadinejad (enough is enough) and Rafsanjani (you had your warning) would be strongly encouraged to pull back and let the Supreme Leader put the regime's house in order.
I take another view, however, based on the Supreme Leader's signal from 19 June. In that Friday prayer address, the only one he has made since the election, he made clear that he preferred the political views of the President but that he also found Rafsanjani an honourable man and leader. And he specifically criticised Ahmadinejad's pre-election charges of corruption. The message had been given: shake hands, boys.
Rafsanjani may have crossed that line on 17 July when he led prayers, but with his general caution, even circumspection, before and after that speech, I think he has tried to ensure that he did not cross Khamenei. (Once again, note last Saturday's address to the Expediency Council. And note that the audio was released on Wednesday morning, just to make it clear where Rafsanjani stood.) Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, went well over the line. So who has to be pulled back?
On the surface, and if you limit your gaze to the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad (and, behind him, the Revolutionary Guard), and Rafsanjani, the situation is easily repaired. No more sledgehammer allegations of corruption from the Government, and Rafsanjani keeps his distance from the Green opposition.
But this conflict is no longer "on the surface" and it certainly is not just around this trio. The 4th Tehran trial was just the latest, more dramatic assertion of Presidential authority, following detentions, beatings, purges of some ministries, and attempts to control others. So now there are contests within the Establishment: what happens to those 20+ officials who were forced out of the Ministry of Intelligence and who now "supervises" its work? Does Sadegh Larijani, put in by the Supreme Leader, have real authority to "correct" the abuses of the system by the Ahmadinejad camp (and, again, the Revolutionary Guard)?
Already the next public display is upon us. Tomorrow the President, on Government Day, introduces the Friday prayer address in Tehran. No doubt he will point to his dedication and service in upholding the Islamic Republic and no doubt, given that the confirmation votes in Parliament on his Ministers begin on Sunday, he will declared that his Cabinet nominees are just as honourable and dedicated.
Ahmadinejad might win that short-term battle within Parliament (although I think that is far from certain). But, even if he does, that is only one punch in a 15-round contest. His regime connected with a blow on Tuesday, but it was far from a knockout.
Which leaves a warning to Mahmoud: when you thrown a punch that big and don't win immediately, you have to swing even harder next time. Or you have to put your hands up and ask for a referee's decision.
tagged Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Behzad Nabavi, George Soros, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hossein Karroubi, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Kian Tajbakhsh, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mehdi Hashemi, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Atrianfar, Mohammad Khatami, Mohammad Sadegh Larijani, Mohsen Aminzadeh, Mostafa Tajzadeh, Roohul in Uncategorized
Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Behzad Nabavi, George Soros, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hossein Karroubi, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Kian Tajbakhsh, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mehdi Hashemi, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Atrianfar, Mohammad Khatami, Mohammad Sadegh Larijani, Mohsen Aminzadeh, Mostafa Tajzadeh, Roohul in Uncategorized
Reader Comments (12)
Please email & fax the following letters to United Nations to reject Fraud-Ahmadinajid at UN and Demand United Nations to leave Iran seat "EMPTY" till future legit. election.
http://docs.google.com/View?id=dcnj8jzc_8dxb9vbgf #IranElection
Peace and blessings from People of Iran.
In this multi dimensional chess game one thing seems certain, No one is wanting to back to a status quo or a sharing of the powers and the spoils except the leader himself. I seriously doubt if the S.L has the punch or the political smarts to put all these players back to their seat.
A.N did perhaps open pandoras box during his campaign when he started hanging out the dirty laundry for everyone to see. There was one golden rule in the IRI and that is I dont talk about the skeletons in your closet so you be sure do not talk about mine. A.N not being from the establishment, not having the history the other players have had, did just that. This may turn out to be one of the KEY MOMENTS in the hisory of the IRI.
One can argue that it was not A.N that opend the box but the S.L being scared by the first reformint movement he went againgst the clear advice or even orders made by Khomeini and allowed the Guards into politics. By doing that he opened the door for what can be the end of IRI as we have known it in the last 30 years.
It is clear that he is no longer (atleast for now and on his own) strong enough to close either box.
The clans within the land have declared war on each other and the king and his army are not capable of bringing back peace in the nation. When clans within the country fight each other it is the king that may win in the short term, but if the battle intensifies and prolongs it is always the King that will end up losing the most.
For Now it is the reformist (and the people) that have had the most casualties. Hashemi and The Guards are now starting to seriously hurt each other as well. And the S.L on his turn has allready lost most of his unwritten devine power and is being brought back to be a mere mortal, a man like you and me.
We are now reaching a stage that A.N and Hashemi may start getting hurt. Who will they hurt with them ?
In the longrun if this battle intensifies and continues there is only one big loser and that is the S.L.
Adding to the mix, http://enduringamerica.com/2009/08/26/the-latest-from-iran-responding-to-the-trial-26-august/#more-15934" rel="nofollow">yesterday in comment #28, Afshin raised some questions about Hashemi's designs in forwarding Karoubi's letter to Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah Sistani (2055 GMT post)-- another strand in the web.
AN may swing for the fences, but he faces knuckle-ball pitchers. (For the non-baseball folk, pitchers put a spin on the ball when they throw. The angular momentum from the spin determines the trajectory of the pitch, so batters anticipate where to swing based on the spin. Knuckle-balls are thrown with no spin- the ball can go anywhere, often leaving the batter looking foolish, especially if he's trying to knock the ball out of the park)
Thanks for this detailed and very nuanced analysis, Scott. My opinion: you should be called in to give an analysis to the State Department and White House. Why? Because--whether or not all your calls and conjectures are 100 % accurate--you really tease into high relief the incredibly nuanced forces and tactics that are integral to this struggle. The "big picture--make a plan--draft a sound-bite" exigency (not even really "choice") of White House politics wants an occasional reminder that the devil IS in the details, and they HAVE to be borne in mind at all times, even if they are not going to be picked up by the national press.
Thanks again, Scott
Afshin
I agree with you on the long term loser, and that is why, every day when I reflect on what has gone down, I can not for the life of me, stop to say what a stupid move by SL. He has not only lost his supreme-ness but more importantly the supreme-ness of his office. Never again post this crisis and his death will Iran have another supreme leader that is above all fray. This guy made a big blunder. He could have come out of this in so many ways, yet has continued to push forward and has left us all wondering what for? In going for the all out win, he has so reduced the size of his win, that when he finally obtains it it may be a hollow victory.
Scott
Well worth the wait to see this analysis.... AN should come and take a lesson from you in how to land a "big punch".
Thanks to all of you for kind words --- I still consider myself a featherweight in the boxing media of big-time politics, especially when it as complex as this!
S.
Agree with Dr. Gannon however I request that the EA tour include a rather lengthly stint on Capitol Hill with our friends in Congress.
[...] [...]
@ Dr. Charles E. Gannon
When our politicians start demanding that the government of the United States must choose sides, Scott might lay out this scenario & simply ask: "Which side do you have in mind?"
Oh wait, he'd have to say it all in 90 seconds... hmmmm
It's only one of the many reasons for us to keep out of this situation
@Amy
Very much the same sentiment I commented on in the nuclear article of the day... It seems all sane people are of the mind that doing nothing by the USA and letting this charade play out is the best hope of change in Iran
@All
If Pasdaran wins out and establish a coupe government and pushes out all other players then I recommend with great reservation strikes against all pasdaran and Bonyad millitary targets, to seperate the Army from the Pasdaran and create the conditions for a second coupe. Lets hope we don't get there.
Well, since we're catching breath, we might have time to read
http://tehranbureau.com/paranoid-style-iranian-politics/.
Written in 1993 by Ervand Abrahamian it explains the roots of the multi-dimensional chess game that's going on right now. After catching *my* breath - having read it - it left me with the feeling the people of Iran are no longer putting up with the paranoia. Which makes me feel good so I can now turn in, late as it is every night since mid June, and sleep well.
But not after thanking you, Scott Lucas and colleagues, for this excellent blog and all those who contribute with interesting comments.
You are my last resort for quality information, balanced analysis, and (sometimes) a smile.
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