Afghanistan: The 9 Surges of Mr Obama's War

Tom Englehardt, writing at TomDispatch, goes beyond the headline "30,000 extra troops" of President Obama's recent announcement to detail the extent of the US escalation and long-term commitment --- despite Obama's initial declaration of a "beginning to the end" of the military presence in July 2011 --- to the intervention in Afghanistan (N.B.: All links in original article):

In his Afghan “surge” speech at West Point last week, President Obama offered Americans some specifics to back up his new “way forward in Afghanistan.” He spoke of the “additional 30,000 U.S. troops” he was sending into that country over the next six months. He brought up the “roughly $30 billion” it would cost us to get them there and support them for a year. And finally, he spoke of beginning to bring them home by July 2011. Those were striking enough numbers, even if larger and, in terms of time, longer than many in the Democratic Party would have cared for. Nonetheless, they don’t faintly cover just how fully the president has committed us to an expanding war and just how wide it is likely to become.

A Gut Reaction to Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Speech: The Halfway House of The Long War

Despite the seeming specificity of the speech, it gave little sense of just how big and how expensive this surge will be. In fact, what is being portrayed in the media as the surge of November 2009 is but a modest part of an ongoing expansion of the U.S. war effort in many areas. Looked at another way, the media's focus on the president’s speech as the crucial moment of decision, and on those 30,000 new troops as the crucial piece of information, has distorted what’s actually underway.

In reality, the U.S. military, along with its civilian and intelligence counterparts, has been in an almost constant state of surge since the last days of the Bush administration. Unfortunately, while information on this is available, and often well reported, it’s scattered in innumerable news stories on specific aspects of the war. You have to be a media jockey to catch it all, no less put it together.

What follows, then, is my own attempt to make sense of the nine fronts on which the U.S. has been surging, and continues to do so, as 2009 ends. Think of this as an effort to widen our view of Obama’s widening war.

Obama’s Nine Surges

1. The Troop Surge: Let’s start with those “30,000” new troops the president announced.

First of all, they represent Obama’s surge, phase 2. As the president pointed out in his speech, there were “just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan” when he took office in January 2009. In March, Obama announced that he was ordering in 21,000 additional troops. Last week, when he spoke, there were already approximately 68,000 to 70,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. If you add the 32,000 already there in January and the 21,700 actually dispatched after the March announcement, however, you only get 53,700, leaving another 15,000 or so to be accounted for. According to Karen DeYoung of the Washington Post, 11,000 of those were “authorized in the waning days of the Bush administration and deployed this year,” bringing the figure to between 64,000 and 65,000. In other words, the earliest stage of the present Afghan “surge” was already underway when Obama arrived.

It also looks like at least a few thousand more troops managed to slip through the door in recent months without notice or comment. Similarly, with the 30,000 figure announced a week ago, DeYoung reports that the president quietly granted Secretary of Defense Robert Gates the right to “increase the number by 10 percent, or 3,000 troops, without additional White House approval or announcement.” That already potentially brings the most recent surge numbers to 33,000, and an unnamed “senior military official” told De Young “that the final number could go as high as 35,000 to allow for additional support personnel such as engineers, medevac units and route-clearance teams, which comb roads for bombs.”

Now, add in the 7,500 troops and trainers that administration officials reportedly strong-armed various European countries into offering. More than 1,500 of these are already in Afghanistan and simply not being withdrawn as previously announced. The cost of sending some of the others, like the 900-plus troops Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has promised, will undoubtedly be absorbed by Washington. Nonetheless, add most of them in and, miraculously, you’ve surged up to, or beyond, Afghan War commander General Stanley McChrystal’s basic request for at least 40,000 troops to pursue a counterinsurgency war in that country.

2. The Contractor Surge: Given our heavily corporatized and privatized military, it makes no sense simply to talk about troop numbers in Afghanistan as if they were increasing in a void. You also need to know about the private contractors who have taken over so many former military duties, from KP and driving supply convoys to providing security on large bases. There’s no way of even knowing who is responsible for the surge of (largely Pentagon-funded) private contractors in Afghanistan. Did their numbers play any part in the president’s three months of deliberations? Does he have any control over how many contractors are put on the U.S. government payroll there? We don’t know.

Private contractors certainly went unmentioned in his speech and, amid the flurry of headlines about troops going to Afghanistan, they remain almost unmentioned in the mainstream media. In major pieces on the president’s tortuous “deliberations” with his key military and civilian advisors at the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times, all produced from copious officially inspired leaks, there wasn't a single mention of private contractors, and yet their numbers have been surging for months.

A modest-sized article by August Cole in the Wall Street Journal the day after the president’s speech gave us the basics, but you had to be looking. Headlined “U.S. Adding Contractors at Fast Pace,” the piece barely peeked above the fold on page 7 of the paper. According to Cole: “The Defense Department's latest census shows that the number of contractors increased about 40% between the end of June and the end of September, for a total of 104,101. That compares with 113,731 in Iraq, down 5% in the same period... Most of the contractors in Afghanistan are locals, accounting for 78,430 of the total...” In other words, there are already more private contractors on the payroll in Afghanistan than there will be U.S. troops when the latest surge is complete.

Though many of these contractors are local Afghans hired by outfits like DynCorp International and Fluor Corp., TPM Muckracker managed to get a further breakdown of these figures from the Pentagon and found that there were 16,400 “third country nationals” among the contractors, and 9,300 Americans. This is a formidable crew, and its numbers are evidently still surging, as are the Pentagon contracts doled out to private outfits that go with them. Cole, for instance, writes of the contract that Dyncorp and Fluor share to support U.S. forces in Afghanistan “which could be worth as much as $7.5 billion to each company in the coming years.”

3. The Militia Surge: U.S. Special Forces are now carrying out pilot programs for a mini-surge in support of local Afghan militias that are, at least theoretically, anti-Taliban. The idea is evidently to create a movement along the lines of Iraq's Sunni Awakening Movement that, many believe, ensured the "success" of George W. Bush's 2007 surge in that country. For now, as far as we know, U.S. support takes the form of offers of ammunition, food, and possibly some Kalashnikov rifles, but in the future we'll be ponying up more arms and, undoubtedly, significant amounts of money.

This is, after all, to be a national program, the Community Defense initiative, which, according to Jim Michaels of USA Today, will “funnel millions of dollars in foreign aid to villages that organize ‘neighborhood watch’-like programs to help with security.” Think of this as a “bribe” surge. Such programs are bound to turn out to be essentially money-based and designed to buy “friendship.”

4. The Civilian Surge: Yes, Virginia, there is a “civilian surge” underway in Afghanistan, involving increases in the number of “diplomats and experts in agriculture, education, health and rule of law sent to Kabul and to provincial reconstruction teams across the country.” The State Department now claims to be “on track” to triple the U.S. civilian component in Afghanistan from 320 officials in January 2009 to 974 by “the early weeks of next year.” (Of course, that, in turn, means another mini-surge in private contractors: more security guards to protect civilian employees of the U.S. government.) A similar civilian surge is evidently underway in neighboring Pakistan, just the thing to go with a surge of civilian aid and a plan for a humongous new, nearly billion-dollar embassy compound to be built in Islamabad.

5. The CIA and Special Forces Surge: And speaking of Pakistan, Noah Shachtman of Wired’s Danger Room blog had it right recently when, considering the CIA’s “covert” (but openly discussed) drone war in the Pakistani tribal borderlands, he wrote: “The most important escalation of the war might be the one the President didn’t mention at West Point.” In fact, the CIA’s drone attacks there have been escalating in numbers since the Obama administration came into office. Now, it seems, paralleling the civilian surge in the Af/Pak theater of operations, there is to be a CIA one as well. While little information on this is available, David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt of the New York Times report that in recent months the CIA has delivered a plan to the White House “for widening the campaign of strikes against militants by drone aircraft in Pakistan, sending additional spies there and securing a White House commitment to bulk up the C.I.A.’s budget for operations inside the country.”

In addition, Scott Shane of the [New York] Times reports:

The White House has authorized an expansion of the C.I.A.’s drone program in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas, officials said..., to parallel the president’s decision… to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. American officials are talking with Pakistan about the possibility of striking in Baluchistan for the first time -- a controversial move since it is outside the tribal areas -- because that is where Afghan Taliban leaders are believed to hide.

The Pakistani southern border province of Baluchistan is a hornet’s nest with its own sets of separatists and religious extremists, as well as a (possibly U.S.-funded) rebel movement aimed at the Baluchi minority areas of Iran. The Pakistani government is powerfully opposed to drone strikes in the area of the heavily populated provincial capital of Quetta where, Washington insists, the Afghan Taliban leadership largely resides. If such strikes do begin, they could prove the most destabilizing aspect of the widening of the war that the present surge represents.

In addition, thanks to The Nation magazine’s Jeremy Scahill, we now know that, from a secret base in Karachi, Pakistan, the U.S. Army’s Joint Special Operations Command, in conjunction with the private security contractor Xe (formerly Blackwater), operates “a secret program in which they plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, ‘snatch and grabs’ of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan.” Since so many U.S. activities in Pakistan involve secretive, undoubtedly black-budget operations, we may only have the faintest outlines of what the “surge” there means.

6. The Base-Building Surge: Like the surge in contractors and in drone attacks, the surge in base-building in Afghanistan significantly preceded Obama's latest troop-surge announcement. A recent NBC Nightly News report on the ever-expanding U.S. base at Kandahar Airfield, which it aptly termed a “boom town,” shows just how ongoing this part of the overall surge is, and at what a staggering level. As in Iraq from 2003 on, billions of dollars are being sunk into bases, the largest of which -- especially the old Soviet site, Bagram Air Base, with more than $200 million in construction projects and upgrades underway at the moment -- are beginning to look like ever more permanent fixtures on the landscape.

In addition, as Nick Turse of TomDispatch.com has reported, forward observation bases and smaller combat outposts have been sprouting all over southern Afghanistan. “Forget for a moment the ‘debates’ in Washington over Afghan War policy,” he wrote in early November, “and, if you just focus on the construction activity and the flow of money into Afghanistan, what you see is a war that, from the point of view of the Pentagon, isn't going to end any time soon. In fact, the U.S. military's building boom in that country suggests that, in the ninth year of the Afghan War, the Pentagon has plans for a far longer-term, if not near-permanent, garrisoning of the country, no matter what course Washington may decide upon.”

7. The Training Surge: In some ways, the greatest prospective surge may prove to be in the training of the Afghan national army and police. Despite years of American and NATO “mentoring,” both are in notoriously poor shape. The Afghan army is riddled with desertions -- 25% of those trained in the last year are now gone -- and the Afghan police are reportedly a hapless, ill-paid, corrupt, drug-addicted lot. Nonetheless, Washington (with the help of NATO reinforcements) is planning to bring an army whose numbers officially stand at approximately94,000 (but may actually be as low as 40-odd thousand) to 134,000 reasonably well-trained troops by next fall and 240,000 a year later. Similarly, the Obama administration hopes to take the police numbers from an official 93,000 to 160,000.

8. The Cost Surge: This is a difficult subject to pin down in part because the Pentagon is, in cost-accounting terms, one of the least transparent organizations around. What can be said for certain is that Obama’s $30 billion figure won’t faintly hold when it comes to the real surge. There is no way that figure will cover anything like all the troops, bases, contractors, and the rest. Just take the plan to train an Afghan security force of approximately 400,000 in the coming years. We’ve already spent more than $15 billion on the training of the Afghan Army and more than $10 billion has gone into police training -- staggering figures for a far smaller combined force with poor results. Imagine, then, what a massive bulking up of the country's security forces will actually cost. In congressional testimony, Centcom commander General David Petraeus suggested a possible price tag of $10 billion a year. And if such a program works (which seems unlikely), try to imagine how one of the poorest countries on the planet will support a 400,000-man force. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has just suggested that it will take at least 15-20 years before the country can actually pay for such a force itself. In translation, what we have here is undoubtedly a version of Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn rule (“You break it, you own it”); in this case, you build it, you own it. If we create such security forces, they will be, financially speaking, ours into the foreseeable future. (And this is even without adding in those local militias we’re planning to invest “millions” in.)

9. The Anti-Withdrawal Surge: Think of this as a surge in time. By all accounts, the president tried to put some kind of limit on his most recent Afghan surge, not wanting “an open-ended commitment.” With that in mind, he evidently insisted on a plan, emphasized in his speech, in which some of the surge troops would start to come home in July 2011, about 18 months from now. This was presented in the media as a case of giving something to everyone (the Republican opposition, his field commanders, and his own antiwar Democratic Party base). In fact, he gave his commanders and the Republican opposition a very real surge in numbers. In this regard, a Washington Post headline says it all: “McChrystal’s Afghanistan Plan Stays Mainly Intact.” On the other hand, what he gave his base was only the vaguest of promises (“…and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011”). Moreover, within hours of the speech, even that commitment was being watered down by the first top officials to speak on the subject. Soon enough, as the right-wing began to blaze away on the mistake of announcing a withdrawal date “to the enemy,” there was little short of a stampede of high officials eager to make that promise ever less meaningful.

In what Mark Mazzetti of the Times called a “flurry of coordinated television interviews,” the top civilian and military officials of the administration marched onto the Sunday morning talk shows “in lockstep” to reassure the right (and they were reassured) by playing “down the significance of the July 2011 target date.” The United States was, Secretary of Defense Gates and others indicated, going to be in the region in strength for years to come. (“...July 2011 was just the beginning, not the end, of a lengthy process. That date, [National Security Advisor] General [James] Jones said, is a ‘ramp’ rather than a ‘cliff.’”)

How Wide the Widening War?

When it came to the spreading Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, the president in his speech spoke of his surge goal this way: “We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.” This seems a modest enough target, even if the means of reaching it are proving immodest indeed. After all, we’re talking about a minority Pashtun insurgency -- Pashtuns make up only about 42% of Afghanistan’s population -- and the insurgents are a relatively lightly armed, rag-tag force. Against them and a minuscule numberof al-Qaeda operatives, the Pentagon has launched a remarkable, unbelievably costly build-up of forces over vast distances, along fragile, extended supply lines, and in a country poorer than almost any other on the planet. The State Department has, to the best of its abilities, followed suit, as has the CIA across the border in Pakistan.

All of this has been underway for close to a year, with at least another six months to go. This is the reality that the president and his top officials didn’t bother to explain to the American people in that speech last week, or on those Sunday talk shows, or in congressional testimony, and yet it’s a reality we should grasp as we consider our future and the Afghan War we, after all, are paying for.

And yet, confoundingly, as the U.S. has bulked up in Afghanistan, the war has only grown fiercer both within the country and in parts of Pakistan. Sometimes bulking-up can mean not reversing but increasing the other side’s momentum. We face what looks to be a widening war in the region. Already, the Obama administration has been issuing ever stronger warnings to the Pakistani government and military to shape up in the fight against the Taliban, otherwise threatening not only drone strikes in Baluchistan, but cross-border raids by Special Operations types, and even possibly “hot pursuit” by U.S. forces into Pakistan. This is a dangerous game indeed.

As Andrew Bacevich, author of The Limits of Power, wrote recently, “Sending U.S. troops to fight interminable wars in distant countries does more to inflame than to extinguish the resentments giving rise to violent anti-Western jihadism.” Whatever the Obama administration does in Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, the American ability to mount a sustained operation of this size in one of the most difficult places on the planet, when it can’t even mount a reasonable jobs program at home, remains a strange wonder of the world.

The Latest from Iran (3 December): Normal Service?

2000 GMT: What War Game is The Economist Playing Out? The British journal has an "analysis" which, given the publication's usual journalistic standards, is shocking: "An Iranian nuclear bomb, or the bombing of Iran?"

The piece starts with a series of false steps and distortions to get from premise --- the second enrichment plant at Fordoo near Qom --- to conclusion: "brazen", "belligerent" Iran is "on the threshold of becoming a nuclear (military) power". That's pnly a prelude, however, to "news" posing as advocacy of Bomb, Bomb Iran.

The journal gives unwarranted prominence to a road show by two former US Senators and a former Air Force General who are talking up a strike and then intones, "Israel’s threats of military action might be more credible than America’s". That allows The Economist to play big boys with big toys, sketching out how a military attack might unfold, before offering a most sensible "compromise":

So which will it be: a war with Iran, or a nuclear-armed Iran? Short of a revolution that sweeps away the Iranian regime—ushering in one that agrees, like post-apartheid South Africa, to give up its nuclear technology—sanctions may offer the only hope of avoiding the awful choice.

1940 GMT: Strike. A statement from the "Lawyers of the Green Movement of Iranian People" calls for strikes as "a civil action for acquiring one’s rights" and adds this summary of the movement: "The Green Movement doesn’t belong to anybody. Its leaders are different shades of people that are gathered around democracy. It is the people that are leading the movement."

Any information about this initiative would be appreciated, as the group is new to us.

1920 GMT: Preventing 16 Azar. An article in Deutsche Welle summarises that more than 90 students have been arrested in the last three weeks. The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran outlines some of the cases of the "stepped up persecution and prosecution of student activists throughout the country".

1910 GMT: A Signal from the Leader? An EA reader tips us off that Ayatollah Khomeini's office has distributed copies, not published before, of a Supreme Leader speech from this summer reminding members of Parliament of their proper role and responsibilities.

Now, this would have no connection whatsoever with the troublesome rebellion of more than a few legislators against the Ahmadinejad Government, right?

NEW Iran, the Greens, and the ex-Bushman: With Washington Friends Like These, Who Needs….?
Latest Iran Video: A Non-Crowd for Ahmadinejad in Isfahan? (2 December)
Iran: English Text of Ayatollah Montazeri’s Answers on the Green Movement
The Latest from Iran (2 December): Postures and a Resolution

1810 GMT: Any Connection Here? On the same day that a Government minister threatened his son with arrest and trial, Hashemi Rafsanjani put forth another general criticism of that Government: "Today there is no room to hide the matter. The difficulties presented by the political disputes are grave."

Rafsanjani also repeated a call for national unity, linking it to support of Ayatollah Khameini: "I believe there is no one other that the Leader of the Revolution who can bring about unity and we should all assist the leader to create a sympathetic atmosphere where people can be satisfied.” He refrained, however, from specific reference to a National Unity Plan or any demands upon the regime.

So here's the question --- does Rafsanjani reverse his strategy of the last three months and go on an offensive or does he continue with an effective boycott, refusing official functions and duties such as Friday Prayers apart from his leadership of the Expediency Council?

1600 GMT: It's the Economy, Folks. A belated hat-tip to Robert Worth of The New York Times, who published an article on Wednesday about the issues surrounding President Ahmadinejad's proposals for subsidy reform.

1545 GMT: "Soft War" = Less Music, No Make-Up. The head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Ezatollah Zarghami, has announced that the state outlet will focus on fighting a soft war against Iran's enemies.

In that cause, the new five-year work plan includes: reduced use of music, protection of women through prohibition of make-up, use of more debates, the training of devoted and experienced staff, "a revolutionary and ultra-conservative atmosphere", the spread of hope about the future of the establishment and the raising of public awareness about the positive services provided by it, and the provision of models of the correct lifestyle with a focus on the importance of family values. (Summary at Tehran Bureau)

1515 GMT: Going After Hashemi. According to Rah-e-Sabz, Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi is calling for the arrest and trial of Hashemi Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi.

1250 GMT: American Tough Guy. National Security Advisor James Jones has laid down the law to Tehran:

By the end of the year we should be able to ascertain what Iran's true colors are on this, and the end of the year is coming. We're still hopeful. The door is still open, but the window is closing.

No coincidence that the Obama officials pushing hardest for sanctions on Iran are located in Jones' National Security Council.

1145 GMT: Two new posts following up our initial update at 0600 GMT --- a full English translation of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's answers on the Green Movement and a video apparently showing a lack of turnout for President Ahmadinejad's speech in Isfahan.

1130 GMT: Mahmoud in a Mood. The President is being just a bit defiant today. He has declared that as Parliament changed his proposal for subsidy reforms, he won't implement the law. (Reuters has an English summary.)

1120 GMT: Dissing Rafsanjani, Defying Khamenei? According to the reformist Parleman News, the President is refusing to attend Expediency Council meetings chaired by Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is the Head of the Council, even though the Supreme Leader has ordered him to do so.

1020 GMT: Conflicting reports on the Damascus explosion. Most reports still say several dead, but Syrian Minister of Interior is insisting that only three people died after a tyre exploded.

0950 GMT: Protest of the Week. An EA source reveals:

"Last week Mr Ramin, the Deputy Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, who was attending the memorial for former Minister Ali Kordan, could not find his shoes when leaving the mosque.

"It seems someone stole Ramin’s shoes to protest Ahmadinejad’s policy toward the press."

0940 GMT: Reuters is reporting six dead in the Damascus blast.

Meanwhile, in Tehran, it appears that the rumours of the scapegoating and even imprisonment of former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi for post-election abuses can be put to rest. He has been named the President's Inspector General.

0930 GMT: Have just landed in UK to learn of the bomb in Damascus killing Iiranian pilgrims. Update on that and other stories in next hour.

0630 GMT: Protest of the Week. An EA source reveals:

"Last week Mr Ramin, the Deputy Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, who was attending the memorial for former Minister Ali Kordan, could not find his shoes when leaving the mosque.

"It seems someone stole Ramin’s shoes to protest Ahmadinejad’s policy toward the press."

0620 GMT: The Road to 16 Azar? Confirming news from Tuesday: more than 3000 students of Tehran University have invited Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi to participate in demonstrations on 16 Azar (7 December) in the Technical Faculty.

In Parliament, the leading reformist party, the Imam Khomeini Line (Reformists) held a press conference. Hussein Hashemian, the head of the party, said, "We follow Iranian people and in their belief the election is not over. This is why we follow up on their protests." Mohammad Reza Taabesh, the deputy leader added, "What happened after the election was due to the imprudence, inexperience, and carelessness of leaders and people in charge."

MP Dariush Ghanbari pressed the specific case of the abuses at Kahrizak Prison, declaring that Iranian people are still waiting for the open trial of the people in charge.

0610 GMT: While we catch up with internal moves and developments in Iran, international media continue to focus on the nuclear question. President Ahmadinejad furnished them with a soundbite in his Isfahan speech when he declared that Iran would now ensure that it was self-sufficient in producing 20 percent enriched uranium for its medical research reactor.

Go behind the headline and the significance emerges:

1. Ahmadinejad is now responding in an almost knee-jerk fashion. The "10 enrichment plants" declaration now apprears to be a heated reaction from Sunday's Cabinet meeting --- it is being dropped because this is a fantasy, not a plan.

2. That in turn points to an Iranian weakness which may become a hindrance for the President.

Iran's nuclear programme is clearly hindered not only by problems with enrichment capacity but also by a lack of uranium stock. Unless that can be addressed, Ahmadinejad's promises will likely be exposed as bluff.

0600 GMT: Returning from Holland this morning, with updates back to normal from 1200 GMT.

In the meantime, we're noting two stories. It looks like President Ahmadinejad, for all his global travels, is having a hard time with legitimacy at home. Despite extensive publicity for his trip to Isfahan yesterday, with schools asking parents to allow their children to attend, the crowd was far below expectations.

Ahmadinejad's reception can be compared to the far larger crowd
six months ago, when Mohammad Khatami visited Isafahan to support Mir Hossein Mousavi's Presidential campaign.

Meanwhile, more on Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s answers to questions about the Green Movement, which we noted on Tuesday. Montazeri declared that “people will not be satisfied with anything less than their rightful demands”.

Montazeri asserted, “Killing, threatening, arresting, unlawful prosecutions, handing heavy and unfair sentences to political activists and freedom-seekers and propagating lies, will not affect people's determination.” He praised the Green Movement’s emphasis on a peaceful form of struggle against violations of people’s rights, and he also commended the Movement’s ability to draw the attention and sympathy of international human rights organizations.

Montazeri concluded by condemning the government’s treatment of post-election protesters and detainees and advised the government to respect people’s requests.