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Entries in Al Jazeera (5)

Wednesday
Feb242010

The Latest from Iran (24 February): Shocks and Erosions

2100 GMT: Law and Order Story of the Week. After the court session for Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor of Kayhan, the newspaper's journalist Payam Fazli-Nejad was reportedly "heavily beaten, barely escaping his death", and Ahmadinejad right-hand man Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai has become "mamnou ol-tasvir" (his photos forbidden) on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

An Iranian activist today is adding that the weapon used on Fazli-Nejad was a "dessert knife".

NEW Latest Iran Video: Rafsanjani’s Daughter is Confronted
NEW Iran Special: Interpreting the Videos of the Tehran Dorm Attacks
Iran Document: Karroubi Statement on 22 Bahman & The Way Forward (22 February)
UPDATED Iran 18-Minute Video: Attack on Tehran University Dormitories (14/15 June 2009)
The Latest from Iran (23 February): Videoing the Attacks


2040 GMT: War on Terror, I Tell You. I'm sure it is entirely coincidental in light of current events --- announcement of arrest of Jundullah leader a week after it occurred, Ahmadinejad declaring that it is Iran not "the West" that is fighting terrorism (1745 GMT), declaration of 100 arrested on 22 Bahman as "terrorists" (1435 GMT) --- but this just in from the Ministry of Intelligence:


Three agents of the [Kurdish] Komala terrorist group who were planning to bomb a factory belonging to the defence ministry in Tehran were identified and arrested....Two foreign made bombs concealed in loudspeakers and three Kalashnikovs (assault rifles) were seized....Due to the occupying presence of the US forces in Iraq and their support of some terrorist groups like Komala, their training, and equipping them with military hardware is carried out by America's intelligence services.

1940 GMT: Urgent --- Assembly of Experts Statement. Fars News reports, and Zamaaneh summarises, that the statement at the end of the two-day Assembly meeting has not only declared support for the Supreme Leader (expected) but declared that the opportunity for the "repent and reform" of opposition leaders has ended (unexpected). This "sedition" against the "intelligence guidance" of Ayatollah Khamenei can no longer be tolerated.

1920 GMT: Is This the Level of Ahmadinejad's Support? Claimed video from Birjand in south Khorasan (eastern Iran) for the President's speech today:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRAdgALdStI[/youtube]

1910 GMT: Defending Against the Video. The Los Angeles Times, drawing from Iranian state media (see 0645 GMT) has a summary of damage control from regime officials:
"Today, police are powerful, popular, courageous and reasonable," Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, the top military adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, told police commanders...."Everywhere in the world, even in Europe and America, police strongly confront rioters. No government tolerates insecurity, arson and vandalizing of public properties."....

"All detention centers, interrogation rooms and reformatories have been ordered to install surveillance cameras and monitoring equipment," [Iran's police chief Gen. Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam] said. "Police inspectors will regularly visit the detention centers. Police are also setting up a committee to protect civil rights in detention centers."....

"Even when a European city hosts a summit, the city is militarized," said Brig. Gen. Hossein Hamedani, commander of the Tehran Revolutionary Guards. "How can we turn a blind eye to people's security?"


1900 GMT: Political Prisoner News (cont.). Iranian authorities have issued temporary release orders for Ebrahim Yazdi, head of the Freedom Movement of Iran, and Hedayat Aghai, of the Kargozaran Party, today.

The case of Yazdi, who has been released for 10 days, is still being considered; however, Aghai, freed released tomorrow for a week, has been sentenced to 2 1/2 years in prison.

It is also reported that Feizollah Arabsorkhi, executive member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party, has been sentenced to six years in prison for “activities against national security and propaganda against the regime”.

1850 GMT: Political Prisoner News. The Iranian Supreme Court has commuted the death sentence of Kurdish journalist Adnan Hassanpour, who has been jailed since 2007 for mohareb (war against God). Adnanpour will now serve a 31-year prison term.

1840 GMT: The wife of Mohammad Maleki, the first post-1979 chancellor of Tehran Revolution, has spoken to Radio Farda of her husband's deteriorating health. The 76-year-old Maleki, who was detained in August and charged in September with actions against national security, suffers from prostate cancer.

Ghodsi Mirmoez said her husband sounded very ill the last time they spoke and that she had not been allowed to meet him for more than 20 days. She pleaded, "I wonder if international organizations can do anything for my husband. His physical condition is grave."

1805 GMT: Not Defeated. Writing for Tehran Bureau, Ali Chenar in Tehran reflects on the politics of 22 Bahman and its aftermath and concludes:
Certainly one of the questions about the Green Movement is why it has remained a grassroots movement and not become a political organization. One reason might be that it does not care to become identified with a specific ideology and risk alienating various segments of the society whose support it currently enjoys. In the past eight months it has instead walked a fine line, remaining a popular but amorphous phenomenon, encompassing all political factions and social groups seeking justice. It has avoided intensifying the conflict, avoided pressing for regime change. Rather than evolving, it has maintained a state of entropy. Yet over the past several months, its inclusive nature has helped it sustain its momentum and survive.

What the Green Movement has achieved already is enormous. Many would tell you that the events of the past eight months have permanently changed the social and political landscape. A new era has begun. Those groups critical of the government now map the very fabric of Iranian society. They include both traditional conservatives and secular liberals, progressive students and cautious businessmen, men and women alike. As one observer told this correspondent, "Everyone has realized that everyone else thinks the emperor is naked too."

1745 GMT: It's Our "War on Terror" Now. President Ahmadinejad neatly twinned the "terrorism" and "Iran v. the West" themes in his speech today in Khorasan in eastern Iran. "Why have you [in the US] issued a passport for Rigi if you want to arrest a terrorist?....The Iranian security forces captured Rigi without any bloodshed. It is better for these countries to adopt the Iranian model of campaigning against terrorism."

1435 GMT: The Big "Terrorist" Push. Ahh, here we go. In the same week that Iranian authorities trumpet the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, Revolutionary Guard Commander Hossein Hamadani declares that security forces arrested about 100 members of dissident groups on 11 February. He asserts that they are members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran and Association of Iranian Monarchists and intended to carry out “bombings and assassinations”.

1355  GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. On a very slow day for news, we have noted the account by blogger and journalist Zhila Baniyaghoub, posted by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, about the detention of her husband, "Bahman Amouei", and others in Evin Prison. Amouei is among the hundreds of journalists and activists arrested in the postelection crackdown:
Bahman says he, along with 40 others are imprisoned in a cell less than 20 meters square. He says their whole day is wasted in lines; queuing for the toilet, queuing for the showers, and queuing for the telephone....

Their condition is so harsh that he envies Masud and Ahmad, who got transferred to the Rajai Shahr prison. They would at least be able to spread their legs.

I asked if he read books there. He retorted with another question, "Do you think it's possible to read in such conditions?"

0925 GMT: We've posted a four-minute video, circulating widely on the Internet, and translation of an encounter between Faezeh Hashemi, the daughter of Hashemi Rafsanjani, and an unidentified group of men.

0910 GMT: Larijani in Japan. No surprise that the Speaker of the Parliament would make headlines in Iranian state media, as he begins his 5-day trip in the Far East, for a nuclear declaration: "Although the Islamic Republic has remained committed to its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the agency does not fulfill its duties about supplying fuel needed for the Tehran research reactor. Based on terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA has no right to urge Iran to suspend its nuclear activities."

0800 GMT: Full credit to CNN for highlighting the role of social media in disseminating the post-election news about events in Iran, featuring activists such as "OxfordGirl".

Shame, however, that the report closed with a soundbite reduction of the events of 22 Bahman: "while activism on-line was successful in organising the masses and keeping opposition alive, the opposition inside the country either did not plan for or now lacks the power to respond to the Government's crackdown". (No doubt that social media can soon put that right.)

0755 GMT: Firebreak. Amidst the drumbeat in parts of the US media for military action against Tehran (see our entry yesterday on The Washington Post), some Obama Administration officials are holding the line against an attack. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, repeated yesterday, "I worry a lot about the unintended consequences of any sort of military action. For now, the diplomatic and the economic levers of international power are, and ought to be, the levers first pulled."

0745 GMT: And the (Jundullah) Beat Goes On. Press TV tries once more to drive home the right message, "Iran says it has irrefutable evidence confirming that terrorist ringleader Abdolmalek Rigi had been aided and abetted by the US government before his arrest."

On the side, however, it is interesting how state media's narrative is changing. Initially, Rigi was taken in Dubai as he was awaiting the departure of his plane. Or he was captured in Iran's Sistan-Baluchistan province. Or he was seized in Pakistan. Now "the leader of the Jundallah terrorist group was on a flight from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan when he was tracked down by Iranian security forces on Tuesday".

All especially interesting, in fact, because an EA source continues to report that Rigi was actually detained last week. (Al Jazeera is also reporting this from its sources.)

0645 GMT: At one point on Tuesday it felt as if EA staff were trying to measure an earthquake that had taken place in a remote area. We all had seen and been taken aback by the 18-minute video of the 15 June attack on Tehran University's dormitories, but we did not know how many people inside Iran had viewed or knew of the footage.

We did know, from one of our correspondents with excellent contacts in Iran, that the BBC Persian broadcast which first displayed extracts from the video had been viewed and that those who had seen it had been unsettled and angered. And this morning, we have confirmation that the footage has shaken the political ground: Fars News has posted a long article trying to put the imagery in the "proper" context.

The impact of earthquakes is not necessarily that they bring a collapse, however; they can have longer-term effects by eroding and thus changing the landscape. So Tuesday was also a case of challengers chipping away at the Ahmadinejad Government, even as the regime was trying to manufacture its own earthquake with the propaganda around the capture of Abdolmalek Rigi, the leader of the Baluch insurgent group Jundullah.

While Ministers used press conference to announce that Rigi's detention proved the US-Israel-Europe campaign to terrorise the Islamic Republic into submission, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and his allies in the Assembly of Experts were staking out their limited but important call for changes to Iran's electoral system. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani was away from the main political arena, beginning his five-day trip to Japan (an event which, in itself, deserves attention; what is Larijani hoping to accomplish, not just for his country but for himself?), but his media outlets were not halting their assault on President Ahmadinejad.

And then there were the ripples from Mehdi Karroubi's statement, which made clear that the opposition --- rebuilding, re-assessing --- has not been quieted.

The significance of the Tehran University video is two-fold. On the one hand, it points to rifts within the regime; as Mr Verde has analysed in a separate entry, the vital question, "Who leaked the fotoage?", brings a variety of answers, but all of them point to battles and uncertainties in the Islamic Republic and the inability of the Supreme Leader to resolve them. And on the other hand, its existence --- even if known only to a fraction of the Iranian people at this moment --- is a catalyst for anger and thus renewed determination of those who want justice and responsibility from their Government and system.

And so another day begins. There may not be aftershocks, but there will be more shifts. And it is in the shifts, rather than the drama of earthquakes, that this crisis is playing out.
Wednesday
Feb172010

Iran Nuke Shocker: Clinton/White House "Tehran Not Building Weapons"

Sharmine Narwani writes for The Huffington Post:

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs have been on a roll since Friday defending Iran's assertions that it is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

You heard right.

In response to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent claims that Iran had enriched uranium to the 20% level required for medical isotopes at the Natanz enrichment facility, Gibbs declared: "The Iranian nuclear program has undergone a series of problems throughout the year. We do not believe they have the capability to enrich to the degree to which they now say they are enriching."

Latest from Iran (17 February): Psst, Want to See Something Important?


If that is the case, then how on God's earth can the Iranians enrich uranium to the 90% level required for a nuclear bomb?



Natanz, where the alleged enrichment took place --- or according to US officials, didn't --- is the site that Israel most threatens to bomb. The Jewish state claims that Iran is on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon. Or maybe not. Last June, Israel's Mossad Chief Meir Dagan extended the date for when Iran could produce weapons grade uranium or have "breakout capacity" to 2014.

While the US media rallied to cover Ahmadinejad's declaration on Thursday that Iran was now a "nuclear state", Gibbs dismissed those assertions, responding that "Iran has made a series of statements that are far more political than they are. They're based on politics, not on physics."

So which is it? Is Iran working on a nuclear bomb or not? Let's look at the evidence most recently cited by US officials. Speaking on Sunday at a US-Islamic World Forum in Doha, Qatar where the US secretary of state is conducting a three-day tour --- in part to persuade Persian Gulf allies to support Obama's initiatives to contain a nuclear Iran --- Clinton said there was mounting evidence that the Islamic Republic was pursuing a nuclear weapon: "The evidence is accumulating that that's exactly what they are trying to do...Iran has consistently failed to live up to its responsibilities. It has refused to demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful."

When asked to point to evidence of a nuclear program, US State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley was quoted by Al Jazeera as saying: "Given the current trajectory that Iran is on - the fact that it still has centrifuges spinning, and the fact that it is unwilling to constructively engage the international community - we have to assume that Iran is pursuing a nuclear programme."

He continued: "Given all the steps that Iran has taken and all the actions that Iran refuses to take, we can only begin to draw the conclusion that Iran's intentions are less than peaceful."

If that is the basis on which the US is assembling a multi-national alliance to apply economic sanctions on the Iranian government, then it is deeply flawed premise. For one, it is virtually impossible to assess "intentions" when there is no real communication with the Islamic Republic, and therefore no way to anticipate or know its psyche.

A hostile stance toward US foreign policy is not a compelling barometer for assessing a country's preparedness to engage in risky belligerent actions --- neither is negative rhetoric or political posturing as Gibbs suggests. If that were the case, we would need to act on the perceived "intentions" of half the world's nations.

Secondly, for every one of the handful of allies who have bought in to our "intentions" theory, there are ten nations who do not see an Iran of harmful intentions. And it isn't just China and Russia that are hesitant. It is Brazil, Turkey, India, Qatar - important US allies - and the vast majority of the 118-nation Non-Aligned Movement.

A RAND report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force Directorate of Operational Plans and Joint Matters to take a fresh look at Iran's military, economic and religious strengths and limitations, last spring cautioned the administration to differentiate between Iran's rhetoric and its actions, an important factor in assessing intentions:

"Its revolutionary ideology has certainly featured prominently in the rhetoric of its officials," the report says. "However, the record of Iranian actions suggests that these views should be more accurately regarded as the vocabulary of Iranian foreign policy rather than its determinant."

The Report concludes that, in spite of its rhetoric and the concerns of neighboring states, Tehran does not seek territorial expansion or ideological exportation of its Islamic revolution. Instead, the report cautions that "the ideology and bravado of Iran's President Ahmadinejad and its religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei mask a preference for opportunism and realpolitik -- the qualities that define 'normal' state behavior."

The reading of events in the world is a major driver of US foreign policy formulation. Which is why these determinations should be taken out of the hands of elected officials and political appointees and placed squarely in the laps of area specialists of the non-ideological variety. There could be no better example of this than the Iraq WMD debacle, where American political ideologues pursued an agenda based on their "perceptions" and skewed world view rather than on reality and accumulated intelligence data.

And now we face more of the same erroneous logic regarding Iran's nuclear program, where "evidence" is based on perceived "intentions" rather than on indisputable fact. Which is why the number of nations willing to participate in rigorous sanctions against the Islamic Republic is miniscule compared to those against.

Worse yet, Gibbs' statement last Friday reveal that we know there is no real evidence of a growing Iranian nuclear capability. If they can't even enrich uranium to 20%, then they can't make a bomb --- period.
Tuesday
Feb162010

Today on EA (16 February 2010)

Iran: More posturing today over the nuclear issue, as well as slurs and counter-claims between the US and Iran on which country is the "dictatorship". Human rights continues to dominate internal news, and labour activism appears to be gathering speed, although there no firm signs of a nationwide general strike yet. We have live-blogging from Ahmadinejad's press conference, and as always, all news and links will be updated throughout the day on our live weblog.

Late-breaking news is of a rising challenge from the Karroubi family, with both Mehdi Karroubi's wife and son making pointed challenges to the regime. That bears out the importance of the analysis by EA's Mr Verdeof the beating of Medhi Karroubi's son Ali: "Imagine for a moment that the son or daughter of a Presidential or Prime Ministerial candidate in the US or Britain had been taken away by plainclothes security forces and kept in an unknown locations for days. Imagine that he or she had been beaten and threatened with rape...."



We've posted the text of human rights lawyer Shadi Sadr’s address to the United Nations last Friday: “In addition to the numerous examples of human rights that are systematically violated…during the post-election events, basic and fundamental human rights remain in serious peril, such as equality of persons before the law, the right to peaceful assembly, the rights of political prisoners, and the rights of human rights defenders and civil society activists.” Four labour unions published a public declaration of their ten minimal demands.

Middle East: We have the full transcript of US Secretary of State Clinton's interview by Al Jazeera at the Qatar Town Hall Meeting on 15 February.

Middle East and Afghanistan: Ali Yenidunya's Inside Line picks up on the capture of the second-ranking official in the "old Taliban" of Afghanistan and on the Saudi line for action against Iran.
Tuesday
Feb162010

Middle East Transcript: Hillary Clinton at Qatar Town Hall Meeting (15 February)

ABDERRAHIM FOUKARA, AL JAZEERA: Madam Secretary, if the criteria for judging U.S.-Muslim relations is the issue of Palestine, as millions of Arabs and Muslims seem to feel, they would say that those relations, taking that criterion into consideration, are not in very good shape right now. What say you to that?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, I am delighted to be part of this exciting interview and town hall at Al Jazeera. And thank you for participating.

The Latest from Iran (16 February): Un-Diplomatic Declarations

The first thing I would say is that, obviously, our relations with people around the world is much broader than any one issue, even an issue as important as the future of the Palestinian people and the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel. I think it is a mistake to only look at the United States and our role in working with other countries through any single prism. But I accept the fact that this is a critical issue. It’s a critical issue to us.



One of the very first decisions that President Obama made was that the United States would not be on the sidelines, that we would actively participate in trying to bring the parties into negotiations that would lead to a final resolution, and that it would result in a state for the people of Palestine, that they would have a chance to have their own future, fulfill their own dreams and aspirations, and that it would provide security for the people of Israel, that they too would be able to live side-by-side, in a two-state solution.

We have worked over this past year with both parties, as well as other interested countries, to try to bring that about. And I am hopeful that this year we will see the commencement of serious negotiations that will cover every issue that is outstanding. Obviously, those are the ones that have to be decided between the parties; no one can dictate to either the Israelis or the Palestinians what the outcome should be. They must make those decisions themselves. But the United States is very focused on being a facilitator and a help in every way possible to achieve that outcome. And we are working hard on it, we are working hard on it every day. And we hope that we will see the kind of break-through this year that everyone is anticipating.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, a lot of people look at the issue of settlement into the West Bank, and they wonder if the United States gives priority to the concerns of the few thousand settlers over its interests and its relations with over a billion Muslims. How do you account for that?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, the fact is that we do not, that our position is that settlement activity is illegitimate, and that the final resolution of borders has to be worked out that will give both sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians, the secure borders that they deserve to have. And both sides recognize that development and swaps will be necessary in order to achieve the outline of the Palestinian state. But, of course, it will be based, as I have said many times, on the 1967 lines, with the agreed swaps, and taking into account subsequent developments. Those are the very clear parameters that the United States believes that the parties should negotiate over.

So that is, then, our condition. It remains our condition. And we think the best way to resolve the ongoing concerns that are reflected in the question and the feelings that so many people have is to get the parties into a negotiation facilitated by the United States, and to assist them in whatever way we can to reaching a resolution on borders, on refugees, on security, on Jerusalem that will, once and for all, end the conflict.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, I have a few more questions, so I will be talking to you again, one-on-one, in a little while. But for now I would like to take a few questions from the audience, if that is okay with you.

QUESTION: Hello, Madam Secretary. My name is Kasi Irae. I am from Iran. But I was born and raised in Dubai. My question is about the war in Iraq. So, ever since -- throughout high school and subsequently in my university years, I have been watching the Iraq war. People are dying, you know, bombs are going off, and there are several (inaudible). And something I just -- I wonder if America were -- if Iraq didn’t have any oil. And my question is, would America be in Iraq if Iraq didn’t have any oil?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that what is happening in Iraq is very important on a number of fronts. And we are going to be leaving Iraq, and when we leave Iraq, as has been agreed to with our military -- and we are on schedule to do that -- we will, hopefully, have a relationship with Iraq as we would have with any other country. We hope to have a strong civilian partnership.

And I think that the short answer to your question is we will be in Iraq as we would be in any country, whether or not they have natural resources. And the Iraqis themselves are making the decision about the future of their oil industry. You may have followed the recent bidding that has been done, giving contracts to countries from all over the world, companies from China to Europe to the United States to the Middle East.

That’s the way it should be. The people of Iraq, through their democratically elected government -- something they did not have in the past -- should be making those decisions for themselves. That is really what the United States hopes will be the future of Iraq, that it will remain democratic, a strong democracy, a pluralistic society, where every part of the country gets to participate, that there isn’t any tilting of power for or against any group within Iraq, and that, as part of their democratic future, the Iraqi people will have the benefit of their oil revenues. Not one group, not any individual, but the Iraqi people.

And it is my hope that that becomes the reality for the Iraqis, that they benefit from their own natural resources, that they invest in education cities, that they build great health care facilities and housing for people. That is what we hope for them, and that is the direction that the Iraqi Government seems to be headed, themselves.

So, the United States is very pleased at the progress that Iraq is making. And the oil industry is broadly dispersed among many different companies and countries, at the decision of the Iraqis themselves. That is the way it should be, in our view.

MR. FOUKARA: Can I take the next question in Arabic, and preferably from a female voice, if that’s okay?

QUESTION: Hello, Madam Secretary. (Inaudible.) I was wondering in regards to your (inaudible) in Doha, the campaign is pretty much emphasizing to cut off support for Iran’s nuclear program, since you have evidence that they are, indeed, building nuclear weapons. How do you plan to implement that, especially in the Middle East?  (Inaudible) the vast majority of the companies (inaudible) Iranian, and you have much (inaudible) Iranian. How do you (inaudible) that issue?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you. I think it’s important to remember that when President Obama went into office a little over a year ago, he made it very clear that we wanted -- the United States wanted -- a different relationship with Iran. We have not had a very good relationship for over 30 years. And President Obama decided that it was time to try to change that. And I agreed, that we wanted to reach out to the Iranian leadership and look for ways that we could begin to cooperate and have something of a more normal government-to-government, people-to-people relationship. And President Obama has reached out, and has publicly and privately made it clear that we are extending a hand. But it is a two-way street to have any kind of engagement.

We also believe that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was very destabilizing for the entire region. People of Iranian descent may live in Qatar, but I think part of the reason why we’re so focused on the nuclear threat from Iran is that it would be very destabilizing to all the countries in this region. And we believe that it is in violation of Iran’s obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and violation of a number of United Nations resolutions for Iran to pursue nuclear weapons.

We have made it clear -- and it’s on the front page of the paper in Doha, what I said yesterday -- that Iran, as any country, has a right to peaceful, civil nuclear power. We drew that distinction. Unfortunately, there has not been the kind of response that we had hoped for from the Iranian leadership.

And, therefore, we have pursued a dual track approach. The engagement offered is still there. But it is important for us to work with like-minded countries here in the Gulf, in the broader region, and around the world who share our concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And the world community has made those concerns very clear. We have worked with Russia and Germany and France, the United Kingdom, and China to continually, over the course of this past year, make clear that we did not believe that Iran should pursue nuclear weapons.

So, where are we today? Well, on the nuclear front we see Iran being exposed for having a secret facility at Qom. We see Iran refusing an offer from Russia, the United States, and France to help it get the enriched uranium it needed to run something called the Tehran Research Reactor, which makes medical isotopes, something that we are willing to support Iran to do, for medical purposes. We see the president of Iran ordering the nuclear program to do its own enriching, and to begin to move toward the level of enrichment that certainly is troubling to us, because of what it well could be, with respect to nuclear weapons. We hear a lot of very negative language coming out of Iran.

And we are deeply concerned about the way Iran is treating its own people, and the way that it has executed demonstrators, imprisoned hundreds and hundreds of people whose only offense was peacefully protesting the outcome of the elections. Sitting here in this extraordinary campus, where you are encouraged to think and speak freely, it is hard to imagine what it must be like now to a young person in Iran, who wishes to have the same opportunities.

So, we are still hoping that Iran will decide to forgo any nuclear ambitions for nuclear weapons, and begin to respect its own people more on a daily basis, provide opportunities that the young students of Iran deserve to have for their future. But we cannot just keep hoping for that. We have to work to take action to try to convince the Iranian government not to pursue nuclear weapons.

And so, that is our policy. And that is what we are attempting to do. And we think it is very important for this region, but it is also important for the world.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, as a follow-up to what you said about giving young people in Iran an opportunity, a lot of Arabs and Muslims look at Gaza. They look at the young people in Gaza, and they say, “Well, aren’t those also worthy of an opportunity? And is the U.S. working to (inaudible) on Gaza, so that they can enjoy that opportunity?”

SECRETARY CLINTON: And they are right. That is exactly how we view the situation in Gaza. We consider it a humanitarian crisis. It is something that I have worked on, ever since I became Secretary of State. The United States has contributed many, many hundreds of millions of dollars to try to assist the people of Gaza. We have worked to encourage the lifting of the boycotts, and tried to get more important materials into Gaza. And I deeply, deeply feel the terrible situation that all the people of Gaza are experiencing.

We have begun to deal with the immediate necessities of food and medical supplies. But we need housing for people to live in. We need hospitals rebuilt. We need schools tha t can function and provide an education. And we are continuing to push very hard for that to be realized. And we hope that once we get into the negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, we will see more progress.

We would also love to see Hamas renounce violence, agree to recognize Israel, and be part of that future. Because, clearly, we want to see a secure and stable policy in place that would include Gaza. And that can only happen if Hamas decides that it wishes to be part of the solution, going forward.

So, this is a very, very serious humanitarian challenge that we feel very strongly about, and are working to try to address. That is part of the larger political challenge that we think can only be resolved through finally ending the conflict and creating a state for the Palestinian people to live in peace and security and pursue the kind of everyday activities, like educating their children, that should be the birthright of everyone.

MR. FOUKARA: Just for the sake of diversity, I am going to try to find and get a question in Arabic (inaudible), Madam Secretary.

QUESTION: (Speaks in Arabic.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I hope so. That is certainly our goal. And it is President Obama’s vision and hope that we would overcome stereotypes and misinformation, misconception. Because, clearly, the raw diversity of the Islamic world is something that Americans are learning more about, and recognizing to a greater degree.

But I think we have work to do. And so what we are trying to achieve is a broad program of outreach. And I have two young people here with me today, and I will ask them to stand up, so that you can see them. One of them is our new special envoy to the OIC, Rashad Hussein, who the President has just appointed. He is a trusted advisor to the President, works in the White House and in the State Department on behalf of this important position. The other is Farah Pandith, who is our special representative to the Muslim community, particularly young people. And Farah has been working non-stop, traveling the world, talking with and listening to young people in Muslim communities from Morocco to Malaysia. It has been a very concerted and broad outreach.

So, both of these young people are part of President Obama’s and my outreach, because we want to have the kind of conversation we are having today. We will not agree on everything. I don’t know any family that agrees on everything, let alone countries that have differences in experience and cultural views and the like. But we believe it is very important to have this kind of dialogue.

We are also investing hundreds of millions of dollars in more educational opportunities for Muslim students to come to the United States, because the young woman’s question raises one of the challenges. After 9/11, as some of you may know, America became very focused on protecting our citizens, and made it more difficult for people to come to study and work in the United States. We are trying to, you know, reverse that.

We are also sending out science and technology envoys. We have Nobel Prize winners and other very distinguished scientists who are traveling the world, coming to countries, talking about what we can do in partnerships on science and technology. Entrepreneurships is an important area of our emphasis. And at the end of April, April 26th to 27th, President Obama will host an entrepreneurship summit at the White House, where we are identifying and bringing young people from across the Muslim world to be part of that networking and opportunity experience.

So, we are working hard on this, and we would hope that many of the Muslim communities around the world will, you know, reciprocate by inviting American students, inviting American professors, inviting American business leaders, media personalities, because that is the kind of dialogue that we think will help to move us beyond this very narrow focus that we, unfortunately, see too much of in the past.

MR. FOUKARA: How do you feel about veering to this side a little bit now?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Indeed. Don’t want to leave anyone out.

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, why did the current U.S. Administration turn its back on UN and NATO central European allies’ calls, specifically, in the context of the missile shield program, and instead chose to accommodate Russia’s demands, which are more appropriate for the Cold War era?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Very good question, because I have the opportunity to explain our policy. And for those of you who may not have followed this issue, in the prior Administration of President Bush, a decision was made to deploy a so-called missile shield into Europe, particularly central and eastern Europe, as a defensive measure against potential missile attacks, particularly nuclear attacks.

When the Obama Administration came in, we conducted a very thorough review of the prior policy. And we concluded that it was not aimed at immediate threats, so much as longer-term threats, and that we could, with some changes in the architecture of the missile defense, be much more effective. And so we adopted a new approach. We did not eliminate missile defense, we changed how we were going to deploy it, and the various technologies that would be used for it. And you may have noticed in the last week there were announcements of placement in Poland and Romania.

Now, our belief is that there is a greater potential threat from Iran, with its missile -- with the development of its missile program, and with other potential rogue regimes or networks of terrorists who get a hold of missiles, than there are from a European-Russian conflict. We just do not see that as a problem, going forward. We may have political difficulties that we have to work out between the United States and Russia, or between Europe and Russia, but we don’t see that as a kind of long-term threat, the way we unfortunately see Iran with its missile development, and its (inaudible) nuclear weapons.

So, the missile shield, which would protect into the Caucasus and down to Turkey, would provide some additional guarantee against threatening behavior. And we also are talking at length with a lot of our friends in the Gulf, as to what more they need defensively, in the event that Iran pursues this nuclear ambition.

So, we still are very committed to missile defense, but we think we have a better plan that is more effective than the one we inherited.

QUESTION: May I follow up? During the Aegis program, the Navy-based program that is going to be implemented now, didn’t it fail most of its tests, the most recent one being (inaudible)?

SECRETARY CLINTON: But it succeeded in most of its tests. I mean, that’s why you test, you know. You test -- there were some radar problems with it, and it didn’t hit a target. But we have a lot of data that shows it being successful. So I think you can rest assured that we are going to have a very robust, respected missile defense system that is of the variety that we think will actually meet the threats that are on the horizon.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. FOUKARA: Just as a follow-up to what you said about Iran, Madam Secretary, you said in your speech before the U.S.-Islamic World Forum that more pressure should be applied to Iran. And there are a lot of people in the Middle East wondering if the United States is planning, at any one time, whether before the withdrawal from Iraq or after the withdrawal from Iraq, planning to launch a military attack of one kind or another against Iran.

SECRETARY CLINTON: No. We are planning to try to bring the world community together in applying pressure to Iran through sanctions adopted by the United Nations that will be particularly aimed at those enterprises controlled by the Revolutionary Guard which we believe is, in effect, supplanting the government of Iran. I mean, that is how we see it. We see that the Government of Iran, the supreme leader, the president, the parliament, is being supplanted, and that Iran is moving toward a military dictatorship. Now, that is our view.

And so, what we are trying to do is to send a message to Iran, a very clear message, that we still would be open to engagement, we still believe that there is a different path for Iran to take. But we want the world united in sending an unequivocal message to Iran that, “We will not stand idly by while you pursue a nuclear program that can be used to threaten your neighbor, and even beyond.” And we hope to try to influence the decision making within Iran. And that is our goal.

MR. FOUKARA: So, Madam Secretary, now you are saying there is no plan on the part of the United States to launch an attack? Not in the immediate future, not in the middle term, not in the long term?

SECRETARY CLINTON: We are interested in changing Iran’s behavior and -- now, we will always defend ourselves, and we will always defend our friends and allies. And we will certainly defend countries here in the Gulf who face the greatest immediate nearby threat from Iran. But we have pursued a dual track, not a triple track, but a dual-track approach of engagement and potential pressure, and that is what we’re focused on.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, I would like to take a short break with your permission and with the permission of the audience, a very short one. When we come back, we will take more questions from the audience.

(Applause.)

MR. FOUKARA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

QUESTION: (Speaks in Arabic.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, our goal, eventually, is to have a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. In fact, the President has set a goal of eventually (inaudible) zero nuclear weapons in the world. I mean, that is our stated goal. We know that it will take time, and we are negotiating right now with the Russians to reduce our nuclear arsenal, because we are very committed to demonstrating our -- the importance that we place on this goal. So that is our goal.

Now, I have spent a lot of time talking with the leaders, and leading influential people from the Gulf and the broader Middle East. And they worry a lot about Iraq having nuclear weapons. And they tell me all the time that this is something that would cause them to have to react. And they don’t want to. That’s not something that they want to spend their money on, that they want to be involved in. But, on the other hand, they don’t want to live in a region where they feel threatened.

So, our goal is to try to convince countries not to pursue nuclear weapons. And Iran signed a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And they really bound themselves not to do so, and now are, we believe, reconsidering if not violating that.

So it is an ongoing challenge that we think the world has to face up to. The Non-Proliferation Treaty conference will be held in May. President Obama is hosting, in April, a nuclear security summit. And maybe it’s because we have to worry about all kinds of scenarios all the time. We know that a lot of countries around the world share our concerns. And, therefore, we want to talk about how we prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, how we control nuclear material that could fall into the wrong hands. We have reason to believe that al-Qaeda would be very interested in getting its hands on nuclear material to make a nuclear bomb.

And this is not the Cold War. In the Cold War the feeling was that you could deter each other, that no rationale actor, no rationale state would use a nuclear weapon on another, because they would immediately be destroyed. So that has kept everything in balance. When you have people who are willing to kill themselves, and kill many others at the same time, that upsets the balance. So it’s not like it was 40 years ago. Now we are looking at threats that are much more difficult to evaluate and control, which is why we would like to move everyone towards a world in which we don’t have nuclear weapons. We know that will take time, but we are pursuing it, and we are committed to it.

MR. FOUKARA: (Inaudible) question is what if Qatar or another ally of the United States decides to go for nuclear capability? How would you handle that?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we would do everything we could to discourage it, because even though we have great relations with our friends here in the Gulf, we don’t think it is smart for more countries to be developing nuclear weapons.

And, given the legitimate concerns and even fears that some countries might have that others would have it and they wouldn’t have it, we would work to provide more defensive capability. Going back to the young man’s question about missile defense, we would do more to try to persuade our friends that they would be protected, and that they wouldn’t have to do this on their own. So that would be our response.

MR. FOUKARA: Israel. Everybody in the region knows that the Israelis have nuclear weapons. What if another state, another ally of the United States, decides openly that they want to have nuclear capability for military purposes? How would you handle that?

SECRETARY CLINTON: I would give you the same answer. I mean, we have had these conversations, as you might guess, going back many years. A number of countries that thought about it -- and this is public information -- like a Brazil or South Africa, decided not to pursue it. I mean it is a very expensive undertaking. It requires enormous commitment of technical expertise and financial resources. And in this world, as it exists today, it is not at all certain that it makes you safer.

So, I think a lot of countries who have done the balancing test have concluded not to pursue it. If a friend, an ally of ours, were to say, “Look, I worry about living in a neighborhood where a country that we are not friendly with has it and we don’t have it,” which is only a conversation that I think has been really active in the last year or two because of Iran, which is the focus of these conversations, again, we would say, you know, “We would hope that you would not do that,” and we would try to reassure our friends that we would provide the defense and provide them with the defensive capability that they need to protect themselves from whatever that threat might be. That, I think, is the best way for us to proceed, and for our allies and friends to proceed.

MR. FOUKARA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

QUESTION: (Speaks in Arabic.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we have to look at how we can best work with or influence or coexist with Iran. And that is really at the heart of your question: What is the best way to get along with Iran?

I can only tell you what so many leaders tell me, which is that they worry about Iran’s intentions. They worry about whether Iran will be a good neighbor, and will live peacefully. They know that Iran has funded activities that are against a lot of countries and people in the region. They know that Iran directly funds terrorist activities. So I think people have reason to worry.

And the question is, what can Iran do in order to allay the worries and the fears of their neighbors? And that is what we are trying to encourage Iran to consider. And yet, I don’t see much progress there, to be honest. I just wish that we could tell you that there was more progress.

And I don’t know whether the reaction that the Iranian Government had to the election, and now the opposition trying to express itself -- which we fully support their right to do so -- has made the Iranian Government even, you know, more unwilling to open up and talk with their friends and their neighbors about how to prevent the concerns from escalating. I wish that Iran would take a different approach. The United States, under President Obama, would really welcome a positive, normal relationship with Iran. But you can’t do that unless there is something coming back to you. And there hasn’t been. So, I wish that we could be having a town hall in Tehran. I wish that we could be having this conversation with members of the opposition and members of the government, and students from all points of view. But we are not.

So, our challenge is, how do we try to influence Iran to be a good neighbor and to treat its own people fairly and decently? And anyone who has answers to those questions, I really would love to hear them.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, we want to get off the subject of Iran, and use your time with us to talk to you about other topics. I have one question for you before I go back to the audience.

Madam Secretary, you are obviously a Secretary of the United States of America. Part of your job is to look after the interests of the state that is your country. But you are also a human being. We all, as human beings, feel the need to see justice, whether in the Israeli-Palestinian issue or any other issue. How do you find that balance, between being the Secretary of State and just Hillary Clinton?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I find the balance because I think that my country and the people of the United States want very much to see other people around the world have the same rights and opportunities that we have. And it is heartbreaking when you see people mistreated or abused or deprived of those rights, or suffering from natural disasters or war or oppression or other terrible events.

We can’t be everywhere at all times, despite the size and the reach of the United States. But the United States has been extremely generous and concerned about meeting the needs of people. And I personally believe strongly that that is part of our obligation on this earth, to reach out and provide help and support to those in need. So, I think that the balancing act is not that hard. The prioritizing is hard, because there is so much need, and there are so many people who are suffering.

I took a very long trip to Africa last summer, and had a wonderful visit in many different places. But you go to a place like Eastern Congo, where more people have died in the conflict in Eastern Congo than any conflict since World War II -- more than 5.5 million people -- yet we rarely talk about it. We rarely see it on television. Women are raped and mutilated. People are driven from their homes. It is a horrible humanitarian disaster. And we are struggling to try to figure out a way to end the fighting, and to give people a chance to go back to their small homes and grow their food and raise their children, which is just the kind of common, everyday living that everyone should be entitled to.

So, when you look around the world, there are so many challenges that -- the balance is not the hard part. It’s trying to figure out what we can constructively do, how the United States can best intervene, how we can bring people together, how we can work with others to end suffering in Darfur, or to try to provide a better life for girls to go to school in Afghanistan. It is a very long list. But I think you have to keep your heart open, and you have to keep your mind alert to try to find opportunities to help wherever you can.

MR. FOUKARA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

QUESTION: (Speaks in Arabic.)

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that women everywhere should be able to pursue an education, and to have the opportunity to make important choices for themselves. But not every woman everywhere wants the same things in life. And we have to be respectful of our differences. But I do believe that there are certain basic rights that every woman and girl should have, and then for women to choose how to pursue your life, how to live with your family, and all of these choices that are so important to us.

I have been very blessed over many years to have a number of close friends and associates of women who have been from Gulf countries or other places in the world, who are Muslim, who have a great pride in their heritage, but who also are very independent and very strong-minded, and who make their own way in life.

And I think that the education that you are receiving here is absolutely critical, because you will then have more opportunities. And it’s not so much about what one wears as what is in one’s mind and one’s heart, and the kind of person one becomes. And I think that should be the emphasis as to how we look at girls and women’s lives around the world.

And, you know, I have spent a lot of time working in Afghanistan. When President Karzai became president, there were a little less than a million children in school, and they were all boys. Now there are closer to 7 million children, and 40 percent of them are girls. And many families, even though they are conservative, want their daughters, just as their sons, to be educated.

And so, that’s what we should be striving for. And that’s why what Education City represents -- and I am sure you are aware of this -- is so important, not only in Qatar, not only in this region, but far beyond. And the fact that young women and young men go to school together, study together, learn together, sends a strong message to the entire world.

So, that is my hope, that each young woman has a chance to fulfill her God-given potential, just as I hope the same for each young man.

MR. FOUKARA: Madam Secretary, I just want to say thank you. I hope we will have another opportunity to do something like this down the road. And I want to thank the Qatar Foundation, and everybody who has taken part in this program. Thank you.

(Applause.)
Saturday
Feb132010

Revisiting 9/11: Did the US Misread Afghanistan and Bin Laden?

Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:

Evidence now available from various sources, including recently declassified U.S. State Department documents, shows that the Taliban regime led by Mullah Mohammad Omar imposed strict isolation on Osama bin Laden after 1998 to prevent him from carrying out any plots against the United States.

The evidence contradicts the claims by top officials of the Barack Obama administration that Mullah Omar was complicit in Osama bin Laden's involvement in the al Qaeda plot to carry out the terrorist attacks in the United States on Sep. 11, 2001. It also bolsters the credibility of Taliban statements in recent months asserting that it has no interest in al Qaeda's global jihadist aims.

The Afghanistan Occupation: 700 Military Bases (and Counting)

A primary source on the relationship between bin Laden and Mullah Omar before 9/11 is a detailed personal account provided by Egyptian jihadist Abu'l Walid al-Masri published on Arabic-language jihadist websites in 1997.



Al-Masri had a unique knowledge of the subject, because he worked closely with both bin Laden and the Taliban during the period. He was a member of bin Laden's Arab entourage in Afghanistan, but became much more sympathetic to the Afghan cause than bin Laden and other al Qaeda officials from 1998 through 2001.

The first published English-language report on al-Masri's account, however, was an article in the January issue of the CTC Sentinel, the journal of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, by Vahid Brown, a fellow at the CTC.

Mullah Omar's willingness to allow bin Laden to remain in Afghanistan was conditioned from the beginning, according to al-Masri's account, on two prohibitions on his activities: bin Laden was forbidden to talk to the media without the consent of the Taliban regime or to make plans to attack U.S. targets.

Former Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil told IPS in an interview that the regime "put bin Laden in Kandahar to control him better." Kandahar remained the Taliban political headquarters after the organisation's seizure of power in 1996.

The August 1998 U.S. cruise missile strikes against training camps in Afghanistan run by bin Laden in retaliation for the bombings of two U.S. Embassies in East Africa on Aug. 7, 1998 appears to have had a dramatic impact on Mullah Omar and the Taliban regime's policy toward bin Laden.

Two days after the strike, Omar unexpectedly entered a phone conversation between a State Department official and one of his aides, and told the U.S. official he was unaware of any evidence that bin Laden "had engaged in or planned terrorist acts while on Afghan soil". The Taliban leader said he was "open to dialogue" with the United States and asked for evidence of bin Laden's involvement, according to the State Department cable reporting the conversation.

Only three weeks after Omar asked for evidence against bin Laden, the al Qaeda leader sought to allay Taliban suspicions by appearing to accept the prohibition by Omar against planning any actions against the United States.

"There is an opinion among the Taliban that we should not move from within Afghanistan against any other state," bin Laden said in an interview with al Jazeera. "This was the decision of the Commander of the Faithful, as is known."

Mullah Omar had taken the title "Commander of the Faithful", the term used by some Muslim Caliphs in the past to claim to be "leader of the Muslims", in April 1996, five months before Kabul fell to the Taliban forces.

During September and October 1998, the Taliban regime apparently sought to position itself to turn bin Laden over to the Saudi government as part of a deal by getting a ruling by the Afghan Supreme Court that he was guilty of the Embassy bombings.

In a conversation with the U.S. chargé in Islamabad on Nov. 28, 1998, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, Omar's spokesman and chief adviser on foreign affairs, referred to a previous Taliban request to the United States for evidence of bin Laden's guilt to be examined by the Afghan Supreme Court, according to the U.S. diplomat’s report to the State Department.

Muttawakil said the United States had provided "some papers and a videocassette," but complained that the videocassette had contained nothing new and had therefore not been submitted to the Supreme Court. He told the chargé that the court had ruled that no evidence that had been presented warranted the conviction of bin Laden.

Muttawakil said the court trial approach had "not worked" but suggested that the Taliban regime was now carrying out a strategy to "restrict [bin Laden's] activities in such a way that he would decide to leave of his own volition."

On Feb. 10, 1999, the Taliban sent a group of 10 officers to replace bin Laden's own bodyguards, touching off an exchange of gunfire, according to a New York Times story of Mar. 4, 1999. Three days later, bodyguards working for Taliban intelligence and the Foreign Affairs Ministry personnel took control of bin Laden's compound near Kandahar and took away his satellite telephone, according to the U.S. and Taliban sources cited by the Times.

Taliban official Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, who was then in the Taliban Embassy in Pakistan, confirmed that the 10 Taliban bodyguards had been provided to bin Laden to "supervise him and observe that he will not contact any foreigner or use any communication system in Afghanistan," according to the Times story.

The pressure on bin Laden in 1999 also extended to threats to eliminate al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan. An e-mail from two leading Arab jihadists in Afghanistan to bin Laden in July 1999, later found on a laptop previously belonging to al Qaeda in and purchased by the Wall Street Journal , referred to "problems between you and the Leader of the Faithful" as a "crisis".

The e-mail, published in article by Alan Cullison in the September 2004 issue of The Atlantic, said, "Talk about closing down the camps has spread."

The message even suggested that the jihadists feared the Taliban regime could go so far as to "kick them out" of Afghanistan.

In the face of a new Taliban hostility, bin Laden sought to convince Mullah Omar that he had given his personal allegiance to Omar as a Muslim. In April 2001 bin Laden referred publicly to having sworn allegiance to Mullah Omar as the "Commander of the Faithful".

But al-Masri recalls that bin Laden had refused to personally swear such an oath of allegiance to Omar in 1998-99, and had instead asked al-Masri himself to give the oath to Omar in his stead. Al-Masri suggests that bin Laden deliberately avoided giving the oath of allegiance to Omar personally, so that he would be able to argue within the Arab jihadi community that he was not bound by Omar's strictures on his activities.

Even in summer 2001, as the Taliban regime became increasingly dependent on foreign jihadi troop contingents, including Arabs trained in bin Laden's camps, for its defence against the military advances of the Northern Alliance, Mullah Omar found yet another way to express his unhappiness with bin Laden's presence.

After a series of clashes between al Qaeda forces and those of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Taliban leader intervened to give overall control of foreign volunteer forces to the Tahir Yuldash of the IMU, according to a blog post last October by Leah Farrall, an Australian specialist on jihadi politics in Afghanistan.

In Late January, Geoff Morrell, the spokesman for Defence Secretary Robert Gates, suggested that the United States could not negotiate with Mullah Omar, because he has "the blood of thousands of Americans on his hands," implying that he had knowingly allowed bin Laden’s planning of the 9/11 attacks.