Afghanistan Special: Who is Trying to Undermine Possible US-Iran Co-operation?

UPDATE 0940 GMT: President Hamid Karzai has acknowledged that his office has received cash from Iran, but insists it is a "transparent" process. Karzai said he money was not for an individual but to help run the Presidential office.

Karzai added that many countries, including the US, had given similar assistance.

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The article in The New York Times is shaky as journalism, but it is invaluable as a piece of evidence for intrigue within the US and Afghan Governments over the current notion of peace talks and a possible role for Iran in discussions of Afghanistan's future.

Here is the dramatic opening of the account by Dexter Filkins:

One evening last August, as President Hamid Karzai wrapped up an official visit to Iran, his personal plane sat on the airport tarmac, waiting for a late-running passenger: Iran’s ambassador to Afghanistan.

The ambassador, Feda Hussein Maliki, finally appeared, taking a seat next to Umar Daudzai, Mr. Karzai’s chief of staff and his most trusted confidant. According to an Afghan official on the plane, Mr. Maliki handed Mr. Daudzai a large plastic bag bulging with packets of euro bills. A second Afghan official confirmed that Mr. Daudzai carried home a large bag of cash.

“This is the Iranian money,” said an Afghan official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “Many of us noticed this.”

The bag of money is part of a secret, steady stream of Iranian cash intended to buy the loyalty of Mr. Daudzai and promote Iran’s interests in the presidential palace, according to Afghan and Western officials here. Iran uses its influence to help drive a wedge between the Afghans and their American and NATO benefactors, they say.

The payments, which officials say total millions of dollars, form an off-the-books fund that Mr. Daudzai and Mr. Karzai have used to pay Afghan lawmakers, tribal elders and even Taliban commanders to secure their loyalty, the officials said.

“It’s basically a presidential slush fund,” a Western official in Kabul said of the Iranian-supplied money. “Daudzai’s mission is to advance Iranian interests.”

All of Filkins' sources are anonymous, and he has no documentary evidence for the claims. So we are left with a faith-based approach to even more dramatic assertions:

When [Iranian President] Ahmadinejad visited Kabul [earlier this year], he brought two boxes of cash, an Afghan official said. “One box was for Daudzai personally, the other for the palace,” the official said.

If you don't like the Iranians or Daudzai, you embrace the story. If you are sympathetic to Tehran or to Daudzai, you throw out the report as propaganda from duplicitious sources aided by Western media.

Maybe a more profitable approach, then, is to ask why the story is appearing now and in this form. And for that, you have to fill in what Filkins does not mention, i.e., all of the current political context.

The manoeuvres for an Afghan settlement --- the "peace talks" --- are at their most public in years. The main story line is that the Karzai Government is talking to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. However, that is only the "local" part of a wider terrain.

Outside countries have a keen interest in what happens in those talks. The US does, Pakistan does, Iran does. Indeed --- albeit usually at an "international" level rather than through direct approaches --- so do European countries, Russia, and other regional actors.

Read through EA in recent days, for example, and you will see how Washington has been trying to keep the Pakistani Government at arm's distance from the talks. The Obama Administration does not trust Islamabad's goals --- especially those of agencies like Inter Services Intelligence, with their historic links to groups across Afghanistan's political spectrum, including "insurgents" --- and it would like the Pakistanis to deal with the bad guys, supporting US covert and military operations, within their country.

This autumn, the narrative over Iran --- despite all the tensions over Tehran's nuclear programme and the hostile rhetoric over Middle Eastern issues, especially Israel --- has been different. Key officials in the Obama Administration, notably special envoy Richard Holbrooke, have long taken the position that Iran had to be part of discussions over Afghanistan's future. Tehran has had a long-time influence --- perhaps the dominant outside influence --- in the west of the country.

If the US is truly seeking a comprehensive resolution, rather than one involving only Kabul and parts of Afghanistan, then Iran had to be acknowledged. That is why, for the first time ever, an Iranian Foreign Ministry official was at the high-level talks of the International Contact Group earlier this month.

Perhaps if Iran's role in discussions could be compartmentalised to the "local" of cities like Herat in the west, then this might have been unopposed. But some folks, both in Kabul and Washington, fear that Tehran's interests go farther, covering "national" questions as well.

More specifically, they worry that Iran is trying to get inside the Afghan Government, both now and in the future, through contacts with key officials. And it is always the case that some advisors inside the Karzai Administration don't like other advisors. So return now to Filkins' article:

“Karzai knows that without the U.S., he is finished,” an associate of the president said. “But it’s like voodoo. Daudzai is the source of all the problems with the U.S. He is systematically feeding him misinformation, disinformation and wrong information.”

Are the people feeding Filkins primarily motivated by power plays in Afghan politics, seeking to take down Daudzai? Or is their primary concern the prospect of an Iranian hand in international negotiations? Or both? 

Take your pick. What matters --- both on the specific issue of Afghanistan and on the wider question of US-Iran relations --- will derails the efforts of those Obama officials who had been pressing for co-operation with Tehran. Dissect this passage from Filkins:

Obama administration officials have expressed alarm about Iranian intentions. Last week, Richard C. Holbrooke, the administration’s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, complained to Afghanistan’s finance minister, Hazrat Omar Zakhilwal, about Mr. Daudzai and Iran’s influence in the presidential palace, a former Afghan official said.

Mr. Holbrooke did not respond to requests for comment. In an interview, Mr. Zakhilwal declined to talk about the discussion with Mr. Holbrooke or about any Iranian activities in Afghanistan.

“We have no choice but to be friendly with Iran,” Mr. Zakhilwal said. “It’s a hostile neighborhood.”

No surprise that Holbrooke will not boost Filkins with a response --- in this case, the Times reporter does not even bother to cite any source for the dramatic claim. And no wonder that Zakhilwal would tell Filkins to bark up another tree, given his perceived realities of the region.

The Obama Administration has long been divided over whether to pursue a "grand settlement" with Tehran on regional issues as well as the nuclear question or to ostracise Iran (or even doing elements of both at the same time). On this occasion, it just so happens that this bureaucratic saga intersects with the mysteries of internal Afghan politics.

If the narrative of "peace talks" continues, this collision will be ongoing. That, rather than Filkins' wondrous bags of money, is the real story here.