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Friday
Feb182011

Iran Analysis: Walking the Same Green Tightrope

At Friday prayers today, less than a week after the opposition protests on 25 Bahman, Ayatollah Jannati announced that the reformist leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi should remain under house arrest, with no phone or Internet communications with the rest of the world. On Tuesday, Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of the Expediency Council and 2009 Presidential candidate, said that the reformists had until that night to apologize to the Iranian people or face retribution. That same day, the head of the Parliament, Ali Larijani, and several other Iranian leaders called for harsh measures against the reformists, and MPs called for their execution.

But yesterday, EA noted that Sadegh Larijani, head of the Iranian judiciary, released a statement that it is "not in the best interest of the country to arrest Mousavi and Karroubi". Key MP Ahmad Tavakoli , an ally of the Larijanis,also said in a statement yesterday that Karroubi and Mousavi were guilty of sedition, and that former President Khatami was being given one last chance to public distance himself from the opposition movement.

With all of these statements, it becomes difficult to decipher which is the regime's approach to the reformist leaders. Are they political enemies, or enemies of the state? Are they breaking laws, and if so which ones? Should they be tried and executed, lynched by a mob of regime supporters and Basij, or kept under house arrest and silenced>

This tightrope that the regime's leadership is walking is by design. Since the early days and hours after the election, the regime has sought to crack down  hard on protesters, organizers, and journalists, but they have avoided outright confrontation with the reformist leaders. Placing Mousavi, Karroubi, or former Presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani or Mohammad Khatami under arrest, giving them  a trial, or executing them, would make them martyrs, likely to lead to increased unrest in the streets. The mixed messages listed above are designed to spread fear, divide the reformists from law-abiding citizens, and silence the opposition leaders. They are also designed to give the regime wiggle room. The danger is that if they give an official ultimatum to the opposition leadership, they risk either looking weak or making martyrs, increasing the possibility and scale of unrest.

Reformists Walking the Same TightropeThe irony is that the reformist leaders have been walking the exact same tightrope, but from the other direction. Both Mousavi and Karroubi have raised doubts to the legitimacy of the election results in 2009, but they have stopped short of publicly declaring that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is illegitimate. When pressed, each has repeatedly said that his goals are the reform of the current system of government, not the overthrow of it. None of the prominent opposition figures has called for outright rebellion, and Mousavi and Karrobui have always applied for permits to protest before this week. On occasions, they have not gone to protests because the official permit was denied. Thus far, they have been unwilling to cross the line from political figures to leaders of rebellion.

The reformist leaders do not want to let up on pressure on the regime or concede any ground, but they have also been unwilling to declare the regime unlawful or illegitimate, and they have not been willing to break the law to defy the Islamic Republic of Iran. This restraint has kept some of the ongoing protests from being larger in scale and scope.

Last Monday was a change in this pattern. For the first time in 20 months, Karroubi's party released a statement that the people did not need a permit to demonstrate. Protests were larger and more intense than they have been in at least a year. Yesterday, both leaders called for protests on Sunday, 20 February (1 Esfand), to honor the memory of those killed on 25 Bahman. To our knowledge, they have not applied for permits.

The Regime, the Reformists, and the Opposition Movement: All Teetering on the Edge

Arguably, the stakes in Iran are higher now than they have been at any time since the first weeks after June 2009's disputed election. People on the ground and the reformist leaders, inspired by the other pro-democracy protests in the region, see an opportunity that they have not had fpr some time. There is momentum on the side of the people on the ground, but so far this has not produced any positive change: The regime is not giving ground to the demands of the protesters or the reformists. In fact, with both Mousavi and Karroubi under house arrest without having been officially charged with any crimes, the regime has stepped up its unconstitutional persecution of dissenters.

The regime knows that it must contain Mousavi and Karroubi. Karroubi and Mousavi know that they have to increase pressure on the regime. The people know that they must march. Yesterday's call for more protests finally hint that neither Mousavi or Karroubi are in a mood to compromise; the rhetoric to prosecute or execute the reformist leaders indicate that the regime is unwilling to negotiate.

Someone is going to fall off this tightrope. Someone is going to concede ground, or charge ahead further than they have ever gone. If this happens, expect widespread unrest and chaos in the streets, because this will be the minute the opposition moves from dissent to rebellion.

EA's James Miller is also the man behind the Dissected News blog.

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