Afghanistan Opinion: Why The Country is a Dimming "Light in the Distance" (Hamidi)

Editor's note. The article's author is Sajad Ahmad HAMIDI, not "Hamdi." Apologies to the author.

Casualty in Kabul Attack, 19 AugustSajad Ahmad Hamidi writes for EA:

Last month, President Obama declared that he will reduce the number of American troops in Afghanistan and said “Although the situation is not good, there is a light in the distance.”

The question is why after 10 years, the service of more than 100,000 soldiers, the cooperation of 40 countries, and a cost of half a trillion dollars, America is merely satisfied with a “light in the distance”.  Why should US gains in Afghanistan, after 10 years of effort and great cost in lives and dollars, amount to merely this? Is it possible to change this “light in the distance” into a brighter situation?

Most Americans had never noted Afghanistan before 11 September 2001 and what many of them now know comes only from news reports which detail only the frequent attacks and problems facing the country. But for those familiar with Afghan society and those who have lived in the country or worked with Afghans, it was obvious that in the first years after Taliban, there was hope for a better future amongst the Afghan people. This hope for a better future might have led to the establishment of a more stable government and society. However, mistakes made by the Afghanistan government and international powers have wiped out that hope and created an environment where the Taliban could increase their power and influence. Today, with the power of the insurgency growing, withdrawal of international troops would lead to the re-establishment of the power of the Taliban as well as international terrorists and their regional supporters. The “light” that President Obama sees in the distance would be snuffed out.

How have we come to this?

Probably the first and most important factor is the high level of corruption and instability in the regime. This has caused the Afghan people to distrust the workings of their government and to lose hope about the future of their country. In a corrupted, infirm system, people do not see any visible change in their everyday life.

Experts believe that, for a country like Afghanistan, the primary aim must be investment in infrastructure as the basis for future development. But as the results of these kinds of projects are not visible in the short term, the government must put a proper share of effort and investmentinto small projects which lead to immediate results and visible changes in the lives of the people. This strategy catches public attention and increases citizens' hope, motivation, and ultimately their participation in the development process. Unfortunately, during the ten years after the Taliban, there have been difficulties with the construction of large infrastructure projects such as dams, power plants, main roads, and railways. Nor were there adequate small, low-cost projects in cities and villages to assure people about the honesty of the government and the international powers.

Unfortunately, most government officials have been chosen not because of their ability and experience, but through political bargaining. These officials seem incapable of using the opportunities available for development. According to annual reports, a great portion of the budget from international support is returned because the Afghanistan government cannot use it. Meanwhile, the income of executives and advisors can be even higher than that in a rich country like America. This level of income often came from corrupt dealings and transactions and has encouraged opportunists to come to Afghanistan to fill their pockets and then return to the countries from which they came.  With this government and these types of leaders, the result has been pervasive corruption, the futility of any developmental changes, and public discontent. This has further eroded government legitimacy and empowered the Taliban.

In the traditional economy of an undeveloped country like Afghanistan, it has been impossible to track the possessions and investments of the country’s leaders and their relatives, but most of the money which came out of the country during recent years could have easily been traced in a modern system. These assessments would further the aim of reducing corruption and thereby increasing the trust of people in government and its international supporters.

Another important weakness in the plans regarding Afghanistan is the lack of attention placed on nation-making. Without a national identity and solidarity, it is not possible for a country to attain peace and a state of development. If some groups in a society feel they are second class citizens or that they are marginalized, they will gradually lose their motivation for working towards the national good and may try undemocratic ways to gain what they consider to be their rights. The lack of national identity also creates a fertile situation for regional powers to influence different ethnic or religious groups, using them for their own goals. Therefore, it must be a priority of the Afghan government to avoid every kind of behavior which could be considered as hegemony of a specific group. The international society must also take this seriously.

Another considerable weakness of the Afghan government in the supposed effort against the Taliban and terrorist groups is an inconsistent response  to their recruitment, propaganda, and attacks. Instead of meeting the demand of people for strong action against those who disturb their everyday life, President Karzai calls the Taliban “brothers”, in recent years ordering the release of arrested Taliban members, allowing them to go back and continue their attacks instead of receiving their due punishment. This makes the country unsafe.

And the final obstacle in solving the Afghanistan problem is the Pakistan-oriented policy of American diplomacy. During the Soviet invasion, western countries supported the insurgent mojahedin via Pakistan, so Islamabad had the opportunity to pursue its strategic goals in Afghanistan including the destruction of infrastructure and setting up politicians and groups whom Pakistan believed it could control. Support and empowerment of the Taliban by Pakistan from the 1990s was effectively ignored by Western powers. Warnings about the potential outcome on the West weree not taken seriously before 11 September 2001.

Unfortunately, even after 9-11, with the presence of American troops in Afghanistan, this Pakistan-oriented diplomacy still continued --- this deference to Islamabad hindered the attempts of President Obama's envoy Richard Holbrooke, with the Afghanistan issue taking second priority to the relationship with Islamabad. Even after Osama Bin Laden was found and killed in Pakistan and in spite of increasing demand for stronger talk and action against the Al Qa'eda presence inside the country, there is no indication that this approach will change.

While the current situation in Afghanistan is not good, there is much that can be done to correct it.  However, if Washington and the regime in Kabul do not  address the serious problems built up rather than resolved over the last decade, President Obama’s “light in the distance” may fade into night forever.