Iran Special: The US Nuclear "Experts" at ISIS --- When Propaganda Replaces Analysis

EA Video Analysis: How to Become An Expert on the Iranian Nuclear Programme

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ISIS Founder David AlbrightThe Institute for Science and International Studies is one of the leading players in the presentation of the conflict over Iran's nuclear programme. Its founder, former arms inspector David Albright, and analysts provide the sound-bites of interpretation in many articles, especially from US-based outlets. ISIS is so well-connected to Government sources that any "confidential" report of the International Atomic Energy Agency will appear on its website within days, sometimes hours, of publication.

Now there is nothing wrong with attention to the nuclear issue. Indeed, it is vital amid the tension and talk of war that both information and considered analysis is brought to as wide a public as possible. That is especially so because most of what passes for reporting on Iran's nuclear programme --- from Washington, from London, from Tehran --- is re-packaging of the "spin" put out by Governments and unnamed diplomats and intelligence services.

The problem is that ISIS, far from challenging that process of propaganda, is part of it.

Consider this week's episode in which Albright and three colleagues put out a "major study", "Iran's Evolving Breakout Potential". The dramatic synopsis soon raced across media:

Iran would be unlikely to “breakout” and dash to manufacture weapons grade uranium for a nuclear bomb over the next year, because it would be detected well in time and face war....However, without a confidence building measure that could reduce anxieties over Iran’s 20% enrichment activities and put time on the clock for nuclear negotiations, Iran’s trajectory could put it on a path that makes military confrontation more likely.

The Wall Street Journal, always primed to declared an imminent Iranian Bomb, jumped on the back of the "independent authority", "Iran Closer to Weapons-Grade Fuel, Experts Find".

So what's wrong with the picture? Well, if you examine the detail of the ISIS report, "closer" in fact is still quite far away from any Iranian military programme for its uranium:

Minimum breakout times [of 2-4 months for the Signifacant Quantity of Weapons Grade Uranium] assume Iran would aim to produce only one SQ of WGU.  The simulations show that producing one SQ as fast as possible would use up a considerable amount of Iran’s stored 3.5 and near 20 percent LEU [Low Enriched Uranium]. If Iran wanted multiple SQs ,it could use its LEU more judiciously, but as a consequence it would require more time for the first SQ.  With its August 2012 stockpiles, ISIS estimates that Iran could make relatively quickly only two SQs of WGU using the Fuel Enrichment Plant with its currently configured single cascades. It could produce those two SQs in a minimum of 4.6-8.3 months.

Afterwards, Iran would have enriched uranium leftover from the process that it could recycle to make more WGU, but the next SQ would take longer to produce than each of the first two. If the cascades were reorganized into tandem pairs at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, Iran could make two SQs somewhat faster --- in 3.9-6.9 months --- and would retain enough stored LEU to make two additional SQs, for a total of four, using the LEU stocks as of August 2012. These four SQs could be produced in 8.9-12.8 months.

If Iran were to deplete its supply of stored LEU in a breakout scenario, it would have to resort to a much slower pace to continue producing WGU. After depleting its LEU reserves, it would need 9.5-17 months to produce each additional SQ from natural uranium at the Natanz site.

So 1) if the Iranian regime wanted to pursue a military programme --- never established in the report; and 2) if it re-organised its uranium enrichment facilities for a military programme, rather than any non-military use; and 3) if it used up all its uranium stock, which is urgently needed for medical isotopes and to support a civilian nuclear programme --- then it can produce military-grade uranium which might be enough for four warheads between August and November 2013.

And, if the Islamic Republic pursued this all-out programme, it would not be able to produce another warhead until some time between June 2014 and April 2015. That would make a total of five nuclear weapons at most versus an estimated Israeli stock --- as of October 2012 --- of 200.

The ISIS does not follow its text to this conclusion. Instead, it substitutes a far different paragraph:

Iran’s current trajectory at [the second enrichment plant at] Fordow is increasing the chance of a military confrontation, particularly given growing concern about the relatively short breakout time at this facility once the plant is fully operational and once Iran has accumulated significantly more near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride. To reduce the tensions caused by Iran’s increasing stocks of near 20 percent LEU and by the Fordow facility, a priority in the short term should be obtaining confidence building measures which would cap Iran’s enrichment of uranium to five percent and limit the number of enriching centrifuges at the Fordow site to no more than a few hundred. It is in the interest of all concerned to avoid escalation of the Iranian nuclear crisis, first by negotiating such confidence building measures and then by negotiating more lasting agreements which ensure Iran will not build nuclear weapons.

That is not an analysis based on the ISIS's own assumptions --- it is a jump, beyond any citation of evidence, to a political recommendation.

More on this in a moment, but the ISIS "analysis" has an even more damaging flaw: because it is based on speculation and computer modelling, it ignores critical information in the IAEA report that it claims to examine --- information that shatters the assumptions behind an Iranian Bomb.

On the same day that the ISIS put out its analysis, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz had a far different story, "Iran Slowed Progress on Nuclear Weapons Program by Eight Months":

Iran has diverted much of its enriched uranium to scientific research, an aspect in the International Atomic Energy Agency's lastest report that Israeli policy makers are giving greater emphasis to.  The new emphasis ostensibly justifies a delay in Israel's timetable for possible military action against Iran's nuclear program.

Although the data were included in the IAEA's August report, defense sources say additional information has been received that clarifies the report's conclusions.  The report, which the Israeli intelligence community considers highly reliable, states that on a number of occasions in the recent past, Iran has allocated uranium enriched to 20 percent for another purpose: the manufacture of fuel rods for a research reactor in Tehran, where isotopes can be manufactured for cancer treatment.

The critical numbers from the IAEA: of its 189 kilogrammes of 20% uranium, Iran was converting 98 kilos to plates for scientific and civilian use. And as Arms Control Now notes, the remaining 91 kilos is "not...enough material" for even one warhead.

While the ISIS briefly notes the 91-kilo figure, it never mentions the Islamic Republic's conversion of more than half its 20% stock into fuel plates. Instead, it posts an ominous assumption --- "If Iran chose to break from its obligations under the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and expel IAEA inspectors, the stored LEU would become available for weapons production" --- and jumps into its break-out speculation.

So why, if it is pursuing rigourous analysis, did the ISIS ignore the vital piece of information that even Israeli defence officials are reportedly acknowledging?

The answer lies in another claimed "analysis" --- this one by Mark Fitzpatrick, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, for The National newspaper: "Iran's Refusal on Concessions Renews the Threats of War":

Fitzpatrick's article is the political complement to the nuclear calculations of the ISIS report. It portrays negotiations since the spring in which the genuine offers for resolution have come only from the 5+1 Powers (US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China) and never from Tehran:

As interim confidence-building measures, the E3+3 [5=1] asked Iran to reduce the immediacy of the threat by stopping production of 20 per cent enriched uranium, shipping out the accumulated 20 per cent product and shutting down the deeply buried enrichment facility at Fordow. If Iran indicated it could go along with the "three Ss" --- to "stop, ship and shut" --- then maybe half of the six powers would argue for lifting some sanctions....

The artful characterisation by some Iranians, such as former Iranian negotiator Hossein Mousavian, that the E3+3 offer amounts to seeking to trade "peanuts for diamonds" is a mirror image. It is Iran's offer to suspend 20 per cent enrichment in exchange for the lifting of all sanctions that better fits the peanuts-for-diamonds metaphor.

While both sides have contributed to years of frustration and collapse in negotiations, Fitzpatrick's portrayal in this case is a double distortion.

If you read Fitzpatrick's words carefully, the 5+1 are demanding the concession by Iran of a suspension of 20% enrichment, the closure of the Fordow plant, and shipment of uranium outside the country --- and then the 5+1 might lift some sanctions.

Some might see "Stop, Ship, and Shut" as a one-sided demand that Tehran give up its fundamental position before any consideration of a US and European response. Not Fitzpatrick --- this is "interim confidence-building".

Then Fitzpatrick rewrites the Iranian position. In June's talks in Moscow, Iran put forward a nine-step plan in which moves towards suspension of 20% enrichment would be matched by easing of sanctions. At the end of the 9th step --- and only at the end --- there would be the full suspension of the 20% process in return for the lifting of the major economic measures against Iran, for example, its financial and oil sectors.

When Moscow brought no progress, the Iranians went farther. They presented the plan to journalists at the United Nations. This autumn, they have signalled again that they wish to pursue it.

Fitzpatrick waves all of this away by referring to the endpoint, "Iran's offer to suspend 20 per cent enrichment in exchange for the lifting of all sanctions", as Tehran's starting position. And then he substitutes his own narrative:

Iran has been dragging out talks until it is known who will be in the White House come January. Iran's lack of interest in meaningful compromises is why there has not been a full meeting with the E3+3 political directors since the dismal talks in Moscow in mid June.

The political mission behind all of this? Fitzpatrick's position, beyond the caricature of "negotiations", is the non-negotiable that there should be no Iranian enrichment at any level:

Dealing with just the 20 per cent level would leave in place the up to 5 per cent enrichment work that has been at the core of the nuclear crisis since the beginning. With the lower level of enrichment, Iran could get to the bomb in only a slightly longer time than if it started with a 20 per cent product. The threat posed by lower level of enrichment is getting worse every day.

And so back to the ISIS report. If the Institute admitted any evidence that Iran is not on the verge of weapons-grade uranium --- indeed that Iran has been converting a good part of its uranium to non-military uses --- then it would undermine the demand of the US and European powers that Tehran has to shut down its enrichment, close down its plant, and ship out the 20% stock.

That cannot be entertained when analysts are committed to "Stop, Shut, and Ship". Thus the ISIS report is not just an error in analysis. With its assumptions, its speculations, and its ignorance of vital evidence, it is propaganda in support of a political quest.