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Entries in David Petraeus (11)

Saturday
Jan312009

And on the Eighth Day: Hopes and Fears over The Obama Foreign Policy 

Whatever else is said about Barack Obama, you cannot accuse him of being slow off the mark. A day after the Inauguration, he issued the order closing the Guantanamo Bay detention camp and CIA “black sites” and ending torture by American agencies. Two days later, he revoked the Reagan directive banning funding for any organisation carrying out abortions overseas. On 26 January, he ordered a new approach to emissions and global warming, as the State Department appointed Todd Stern to oversee policy on climate change.



Last Monday, Obama launched his “reach-out” to the Islamic world with a televised interview, his first with any channel, with Al Arabiya. Two envoys, George Mitchell for the Middle East and Richard Holbrooke for Afghanistan and Pakistan, have been appointed; Mitchell is already in the region searching for diplomatic settlements. All of this has occurred even as the Administration was pushing for approval of its economic stimulus package and engaging in fierce inter-agency debates over Iraq and Afghanistan.

The media, rightly but ritually, hailed Obama's symbolic renunciation of his predecessor George W. Bush. Much more substantial was this Administration's attention to methods. The American global image would not be projected and its position assured, as in the Dubya years, through military strength; instead, the US would lsucceed through a recognition of and adherence to international cooperation, a projection of tolerance, and a desire to listen. While the term “smart power”, developed over the last two years in anticipation of this Administration, is already in danger of overuse, it is the right expression for the Obama approach.

Yet, even in Obama's more than symbolic announcement, there were seeds of trouble for that “smart power”. The President had hoped to order the immediate, or at least the near-future, shutdown of Camp X-Ray, but he was stymied by political opposition as well as legal complications. The interview with Al Arabiya was a substitute for Obama's hope of a major foreign policy speech in an Arab capital in the first weeks of his Administrat. The Holbrooke appointment was modified when New Delhi made clear it would not receive a “Pakistan-India” envoy; Mitchell's scope for success has already been constrained by the background of Gaza.

Little of this was within Obama's power to rectify; it would have been Messianic indeed if he could have prevailed immediately, given the domestic and international context. The President may have received a quick lesson, however, in the bureaucratic challenges that face even the most determined and persuasive leader.

Already some officials in the Pentagon have tried to block Obama initiatives. They tried to spun against the plan to close Guantanamo Bay, before and after the Inauguration, with the claims that released detainees had returned to Al Qa'eda and terrorism. That attempt was undermined by the shallowness of the claims, which were only substantiated in two cases, and the unexpected offense that it caused Saudi Arabia, who felt that its programme for rehabilitation of former insurgents had been insulted. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates finally and firmed quashed the mini-coup by declaring on Wednesday that he fully supported Obama's plans.

On other key issues, however, the President faces tougher, higher-ranking, and more persistent opposition. Within a day of Obama's first meeting on Iraq, Pentagon sources were letting the media know their doubts on a 16-month timetable for withdrawal. And, after this Wednesday's meeting, General Raymond Odierno, in charge of US forces in Iraq, publicly warned against a quick transition to the Iraqi military and security forces. This not-too-subtle rebuke of the President has been backed by the outgoing US Ambassador in Iraq, Ryan Crocker, and I suspect by the key military figure, head of US Central Command General David Petraeus.

The future US strategy in Afghanistan also appears to be caught up in a battle within the Administration, with a lack of resolution on the increase in the American military presence (much,much more on that in a moment). And even on Iran, where Obama appears to be making a overture on engagement with Tehran, it's not clear that he will get backing for a near-future initiatives. White House officials leaked Obama's draft letter to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a British newspaper, but State Department officials added that such a letter would not be sent until a “full review” of the US strategy with Iran had been completed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Still, all of these might be minor irritants, given the impact both of Obama's symbolic steps and of other quieter but important steps. For example, after the outright Bush Administration hostility to any Latin American Government that did not have the proper economic or political stance, Obama's State Department immediately recognised the victory of President Evo Morales in a referendum on the Bolivian constitution, and there are signs that the President will soon be engaging with Havana's leaders with a view to opening up a US-Cuban relationship. In Europe, Obama's phone call with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was quickly followed by Moscow's announcement that, in return for a more productive US stance on missile defence (i.e., Washington wasn't going to roll out the system in Eastern Europe), Russia would not deploy missiles on the Polish border. There are even signals of an advance in the Middle East through a new US-Syrian relationship, although this is probably contingent on some recogntion or acceptance of Hamas by Washington.

So why am I even more concerned about the Obama foreign-policy path than I was a week ago, when I wrote of my conflicted reaction to the Inauguration? Let me introduce to the two elephants in this room, one which he inherited and one which he seems to have purchased.

Unless there is an unexpected outcome from George Mitchell's tour of the Middle East, Obama's goodwill toward the Arab and Islamic worlds could quickly dissipate over Gaza. The military conflict may be over, but the bitterness over the deaths of more than 1300 Gazans, most of them civilians, is not going away. And because President-elect Obama said next-to-nothing while the Israeli attack was ongoing, the burden of expectation upon President Obama to do something beyond an Al Arabiya interview is even greater.

Whether the Bush Administration directly supported Israel's attempt to overthrow Hamas and put the Palestinian Authority in Gaza or whether it was drawn along by Tel Aviv's initiative, the cold political reality is that this failed. Indeed, the operation --- again in political, not military, terms --- backfired. Hamas' position has been strengthened, while the Palestinian Authority now looks weak and may even be in trouble in its base of the West Bank.

And there are wider re-configurations. Egypt, which supported the Israeli attempt, is now having to recover some modicum of authority in the Arab world while Syria, which openly supported Hamas, has been bolstered. (Those getting into detail may note not only the emerging alliance between Damascus, Turkey, and Iran but also that Syria has sent an Ambassador to Beirut, effectively signalling a new Syrian-Lebanese relationship.)

Put bluntly, the Obama Administration --- with its belated approach to Gaza and its consequences --- is entering a situation which it does not control and, indeed, which it cannot lead. The US Government may pretend that it can pursue a political and diplomatic resolution by talking to only two of the three central actors, working with Israel and the Palestinian Authority but not Hamas, but that is no longer an approach recognised by most in the region and beyond. (In a separate post later today, I'll note a signal that even Washington's European allies are bowing to the existence of Hamas.)

The Israel-Palestine-Gaza situation is not my foremost concern, however. As significant, in symbolic and political terms, as that conflict might be for Washington's position in the Middle East and beyond, it will be a sideshow if the President and his advisors march towards disaster in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

On Wednesday, the New York Times had the red-flag story. White House staffers leaked the essence of the Obama plan: increase US troop levels in Afghanistan, leave nation-building to “the Europeans”, and drop Afghan President Hamid Karzai if he had any objections. On the same day, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told Congressional committees that the US would continue its bombing of targets in northwest Pakistan. (Not a surprise, since the first strikes of the Obama era had already taken place , killing 19 people, most of them civilians.)

So much for “smart power”. Leave aside, for the moment, that the rationale for the approach to Afghanistan --- Gates saying that the US had to defeat “Al Qa'eda” --- is either a diversion or a flight for reality, since the major challenge in the country (and indeed in Pakistan) is from local insurgents. Consider the consequences.

What happens to Obama's symbolic goodwill in not only the Islamic world but worlds beyond when an increase in US forces and US operations leads to an increase in civilian deaths, when America walks away from economic and social projects as it concentrates on the projection of force, when there are more detainees pushed into Camp Bagram (which already has more than twice as many “residents” and worse conditions than Guantanamo Bay)? What happens to “smart power” when Obama's pledge to listen and grasp the unclenched fist is replaced with a far more forceful, clenched American fist? And what has happened to supposed US respect for freedom and democracy when Washington not only carries out unilateral operations in Pakistan but threatens to topple an Afghan leader who it put into power in 2001/2?

This approach towards Afghanistan/Pakistan will crack even the bedrock of US-European relations. In Britain, America's closest ally in this venture, politicians, diplomats, and military commanders are close-to-openly horrified at the US takeover and direction of this Afghan strategy and at the consequences in Pakistan of the US bombings and missile strikes. Put bluntly, “Europe” isn't going to step up to nation-build throughout Afghanistan as a mere support for American's military-first strategy. And when it doesn't, Obama and advisors will have a choice: will they then criticise European allies to the point of risking NATO --- at least in “out-of-area” operations --- or will it accept a limit to their actions?

Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe the lack of agreement in the Obama Administration so far on a defined number of US troops means the President might not be in accord with the approach unveiled in the New York Times. Maybe the Administration will pursue an integrated political strategy, talking to groups inside Afghanistan (and, yes, that includes “moderate Taliban”) and to other countries with influence, such as Iran. Or maybe it won't do any of this, but Afghanistan won't be a disaster, or at least a symbolic disaster --- as with Iraq from 2003 --- spilling over into all areas of US foreign policy.

Sitting here amidst the grey rain of Dublin and the morning-after recognition that “expert thought” in the US, whatever that means, doesn't see the dangers in Afghanistan and Pakistan that I've laid out, I desperately hope to be wrong.

Because, if the world was made in six days, parts of it can be unmade in the next six months.
Friday
Jan302009

Today's Obamameter: The Latest in US Foreign Policy (30 January)

Current Obamameter Reading: Neutral

5:15 p.m. So you want to know the direction of US strategy in Afghanistan? Here's a big clue: the next American Ambassador to Afghanistan is not a diplomat. It's Lieutenant General Karl Eisenberry, who has done two tours of duty in the country, including a 18-month stint that ended in 2007.

This is the first time in my memory that a serving military officer has been appointed as an ambassador, and it effectively means that the military has locked down the key posts in the Afghan theater. Eikenberry will be working with the head of the Central Command, General David Petraeus, the US commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, supported in Washington by General James Jones, the National Security Advisor.

5 p.m. The Pentagon is beginning to define the escalation of US troops in Afghanistan. A combat brigade of 3700 troops deployed east of Kabul this week. Five more brigades, including one for training of Afghan forces, could eventually be sent out this year, and the orders for three of those brigades, including a Marine task force, may be issued next week.

With the already-deployed brigade, the three to be deployed, and 5000 support forces, the US will be adding 25,000 troops to the Afghan theatre by mid-summer. That is an increase of about 60 percent in the American troop level: currently there are 19,000 soldiers under American command and 17,000 in NATO's International Security Assistance Force.



1:30 p.m. The US has called North Korea's rhetoric towards South Korea (see 7 a.m.) "distinctly not helpful".

1 p.m. The US Government has expressed scepticism over a deal for power-sharing in Zimbabwe between current President Robert Mugabe and the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai: ""What is important here is actions and not words. We want to see real, serious power-sharing by the Mugabe regime."

7 a.m. (Washington time): North Korea is not exactly in line with President Obama's "reach-out" strategy, scrapping all accords with South Korea. "There is neither a way to improve (relations) nor hope to bring them on track," stated the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, "Inter-Korean relations have reached the brink of a war."

CNN, meanwhile, is paying close attention to the row between Turkey and Israel at the Davos Economic Forum. Ali Yenidunya has posted an analysis for Enduring America.

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has said at Davos that Tehran is ready to work with President Obama. We're keeping a close eye on this, as there is talk of a secret US-Iran meeting next week --- we'll be posting on that later.

Trying to close one of the notorious chapters in the Iraq War story, Baghdad has refused to renew the license of the US security company Blackwater.
Thursday
Jan292009

Battles within Obama-land: The Foreign Policy Disputes on Iraq and Iran

Two major stories on US foreign policy, highlighting two critical policy choices on Iraq and Iran:

The New York Times features "On Iraq, Obama Faces Hard Choices".  (Since I wrote that, the Times has gotten to the point: "Obama Seeks Accord With Military on Iraq.) That rather obvious headline is followed by a detailed description of the tension within the White House, a tension we have been highlighting for a week.



Obama's campaign promise for a 16-month withdrawal of all combat troops from Iraq is now being confronted --- publicly and blatantly --- by military commanders. General Raymond Odierno, the US commander in Iraq, indicated yesterday that "it may take a year to determine exactly" when US forces can be withdrawn. Although he said there would be a reduction this year, he pointedly used the word "slowly" when describing the transition from counter-insurgency to stability operations.

Describing last week's National Security Council-military meeting as "a very elevated conversation" does nothing to reduce the suspicion of a battle between the President and the military. Nor does sniping from the sidelines by former Dubya advisors like J.D. Crouch III, who was instrumental in pushing General David Petraeus and Odierno to their current command positions.

Meanwhile The Guardian splashes a Page 1 exclusive on a draft Obama letter to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, replying to Ahmadinejad's congratulations to Obama in November on his election. The letter could signal the opening of US engagement with Iran, but if you read further, it seems that this too may be the start of a battle within the Administration:

The letter is being considered by the new secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, as part of a sweeping review of US policy on Iran. A decision on sending it is not expected until the review is complete.



Obama may be saved in this case, however, from an immediate conflict because of timing. Ahmadinejad faces re-election this spring, and the US decision may be to hold off on an approach until then. Then again (and this has not been noted by the media), if the US is planning to "surge" in Afghanistan, it would seem prudent to open some discussion with Tehran, which has significant influence in the west of the country.

Morning update ( 12:05 a.m. Washington): The significant overnight news is what was not said by President Obama.

A week after his National Security Council first sat down with military commanders, Obama had a two-hour meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the generals yesterday. His statement afterwards was leading but vague, ""We are going to have some difficult decisions that we are going to have to make, surrounding Iraq and Afghanistan most immediately."

As far as that can be read, it's an indication that there will be troop increases in Afghanistan in the next few months and there will be some decrease in Iraq. The numbers in each case, however, are still up for grabs, as is the strategic approach --- military-first? with or without Afghan President Hamid Karzai? with or without US efforts at nation-building? --- in Afghanistan. Put bluntly, the battles at the moment are not overseas, but within the Administration.

For a clue as to the next development, look for "spin" in The New York Times and The Washington Post in forthcoming days.

Meanwhile, Obama envoy George Mitchell moves to the West Bank today to talk with Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas.
Wednesday
Jan282009

The Other Shoe Drops: Obama Prepares for War in Afghanistan

Update: In a sign of division in the Obama White House, officials are back-pedaling away from this morning's story. A White House official, dropping the Karzai-must-accept line and the military-only approach, said, "President Barack Obama will press Afghan President Hamid Karzai to extend government control beyond the capital and fight corruption under a new U.S. policy with a "significant non-military component." He added, with respect to the Times article, "There is no purely military solution to the challenge in Afghanistan so there will be a significant non-military component to anything that we seek to undertake." A Pentagon spokesman added, ""That story, to me, seemed to suggest that we had some sort of view on the specific outcome of the election in Afghanistan. I don't believe that to be true."

Regular readers know that our primary concern with the Obama Administration is the foreign-policy priority of a military-first approach to Afghanistan.



Well, the White House spinners have now used The New York Times to set out the plans, and it's worse than we thought. Not only will there be war, but the US Government is prepared to push aside Afghan President Hamid Karzai if he has anything to say about it:

President Obama intends to adopt a tougher line toward Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, as part of a new American approach to Afghanistan that will put more emphasis on waging war than on development, senior administration officials said Tuesday.

Mr. Karzai is now seen as a potential impediment to American goals in Afghanistan, the officials said, because corruption has become rampant in his government, contributing to a flourishing drug trade and the resurgence of the Taliban.

Among those pressing for Mr. Karzai to do more, the officials said, are Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Richard C. Holbrooke, Mr. Obama’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan.



Indeed, the approach appears to be a replication of General David Petraeus's model for Iraq, "with provincial leaders as an alternative to the central government". And, in case you thought Obama was going to at least complement the military strategy with a political and social approach to the turmoil in much of Afghanistan, the White House aides emphasised:

[We will] leave economic development and nation-building increasingly to European allies, so that American forces [can] focus on the fight against insurgents.



Obama advisors appear to be so clueless --- sorry, but that seems to be the appropriate word --- that they are replacing all local considerations with a sweeping portrayal of "us v. Bin Laden" as the central issue: “What we’re trying to do is to focus on the Al Qaeda problem. That has to be our first priority.”

Beyond the military question --- can you really defeat the Taliban and other insurgents head-on, rather than trying to build up a base of support in the villages through development of infrastructure and social programmes? --- Obama may be shattering a fragmented country. The "ditch Karzai" approach may have merit in light of the corruption and inefficiency allegations, but if it effectively sets aside a national government --- which the US threatened but never did in Iraq --- then what hope of a unified long-term campaign against insurgency?

And no amount of extra US soldiers --- 20,000 or 30,000 or 100,000 --- is going to offer a magic answer to that question.
Tuesday
Jan272009

Update: Obama's Challenge? Curbing the Pentagon

A hat tip to our colleague Giles Scott-Smith, who wrote for us on 29 November: "The possibilities for improving the US standing in the world are equally great.. ..To make the changes required, however, Obama faces his challenge: curbing the Pentagon."

Scott-Smith's prediction was already being fulfilled this week in tussles from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay. However, his wider point --- that the Department of Defense is trying to seize some control of "information", US economic assistance, and even diplomacy --- is backed up in a New York Times editorial by Gary Schaub, an assistant professor at the Air War College. This is Schaub's opening declaration:

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS, not Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, will shape American engagement with the Middle East for years to come. While Mrs. Clinton prepares to put together the State Department, the military is already reconsidering American policy in critical regions. The politically savvy General Petraeus has both a plan and the resources to see it through.





Schaub identifies the mission of Petraeus' Central Command not only "to provide security" but to "help nations in the region govern effectively [and] build their economies" and "to communicate America’s foreign policy intentions clearly". Rather than support the lead of other agencies who normally carry out these duties, military commands should co-opt civilian employees to implement their plans.

Of course, one could suggest this is Schaub's personal wild ride in How to Make US Foreign Policy, rather than the intentions of Petraeus or Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. It is a bit discomforting, however, especially as the nightmare of Pentagon-State Department battles in the Dubya years and amidst some evidence of the military's unease with Obama, to see this splashed across The New York Times.