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Entries in Hashemi Rafsanjani (15)

Saturday
Jul312010

Iran Analysis: Looking Back on the 1980s (Verde)

In recent weeks, one of the effects of the post-election crisis in Iran has been a look back at the early history of the Islamic Republic. In June, Mostafa Tajzadeh wrote an open letter asking for forgiveness for actions taken by reformists in the 1980s. This week, Mir Hossein Mousavi --- before his 1988 resignation letter as Prime Minister was published on the website of former President Abolhassan Bani Sadr --- issued an statement to disclose his version of events during the Iran-Iraq War.



Mr Verde explains the significance:

No one in the Iranian public knows anything about the decisions taken by politicians and military commanders during the Iran-Iraq War. There has never been any public scrutiny of the decisions taken. There is no independent information available about the actual events.

On the regime side, the narrative is this: “Backed by both the West and the East, Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in order to destroy the revolution, hence the war is called 'jang-e tahmili' (imposed war). The army of Islam fought heroically, hence the war being referred to as 'defa’-e moghddass' (Holy Defence). The whole world supported Saddam and eventually we were forced to accept the ceasefire, which Ayatollah Khomeini referred to as a chalice of poison.”

I am not saying this narrative is entirely false. Of course, Saddam started the war and the Iranian forces fought heroically against the odds on many occasions. My point is that the narrative is tainted by official propaganda. That is far from unexpected, but the problem is that there is no independently verifiable information, with the excuse that this is a "holy" matter, about the official thinking and decisions beyond the propaganda. Some people may be reluctant to question issues regarding the war, because it may appear that they are disrespecting the many servicemen, volunteers, and civilians who were killed during it.

However, this crisis and infighting within the Islamic Republic is producing an unexpected result. The recent revelations were spurred by the claims of Mohsen Rafighdoost, who was Minister of the Revolutionary Guard from 1982 to 1989. He makes it sound like the war was used as a tool for internal in-fighting of the regime: “Mr Hashemi [Rafsanjani, who had been put in charge of the war by Ayatollah Khomeini] told me: go and sit in your Ministry, I want to throw the ball into the court of the Government. He then gave an order that Mr Mousavi [then Prime Minister] became the head of the war effort, Mr Behzad Nabavi became the logistical deputy, and Mr [Mohhammad] Khatami became the propaganda deputy.”

Rafighdoost's implication is that Rafsanjani, knowing that the war effort was in bad shape, wanted to put Mousavi in charge so that once Iran had to accept the United Nations ceasefire resolution --- an acceptance which soon occurred --- Mousavi would be blamed for the failures. Rafighdoost also says that the government of Mousavi was hindering the war effort.

Mousavi responds that when he was put in charge, Iran was indeed in a very bad shape. He claims that in the first War Council meeting that he chaired, the regular Army and Revolutionary Guard commanders told him that Iran would certainly lose the Khuzestan Province to an Iraqi attack. He claims that the bulk of Iranian forces were massed around an unimportant height in Kordestan Province at the time, and even there they were in danger of being outflanked by the enemy.

As for management of the war, Mousavi claims that it had been handled badly since 1982.

At this stage it is impossible to know whose account to believe (maybe a combination of the two?).

A few years ago, after a public quarrel with Mohsen Rezaei, Revolutionary Guard commander in the 1980s, Rafsanjani published a secret message from Khomeini, in which the Ayatollah detailed his reasons for accepting the ceasefire. Unexpectedly Khomeini’s main reason for accepting the ceasefire was a letter from IRGC commander Rezaei. That letter said that Iran did not have any attacking capabilities for at least another five years. Even after that, it would only be possible to win the war if Tehran had hundreds of new planes and tanks and other modern weaponry such as laser-guided missiles and atomic bombs and if foreign powers were stopped from exerting influence in the region. Ayatollah Khomeini said that the Government was unable to support the war effort to this extent and everyone else except Rezaei was of the opinion that the war should be stopped.

I cannot help getting the feeling that officials are using nationally important information for their personal or factional gain, yet one effect of these disclosures is that they will further erode the Islamic Republic's historical foundations. In this crisis, the regime’s important days being tarnished: Qods [Jerusalem] Day in became “not Gaza, Not Lebanon” day, 13 Aban [in November] was a day when the regime's commemoration was so heavily guarded that it looked as if its marchers were prisoners, 16 Azar [National Students Day in December] became an occasion on which universities across the country voiced their protests, the funeral of a Grand Ayatollah Montazeri in the holy city of Qom turned into an anti-Khamenei demonstration, the religious celebration of Ashura [27 December] became a day on which the regime murdered its own citizens on the street, 22 Bahman [11 February] saw Iranian cities turned into military camps, and 14 Khordad [4 June] saw the humiliation by regime insiders of the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini on the anniversary of his death.

Now the carefully guarded regime-backed version of the Iran-Iraq War is being disputed by regime insiders.

Next chapter to come soon?
Saturday
Jul242010

The Latest from Iran (24 July): Reviewing the Situation

2210 GMT: The Re-Appearing Fatwa? But for eyebrow-raising, this wins the prize....

Rah-e-Sabz claims that the Supreme Leader's "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa, which appeared on Tuesday but then receded from Iranian state media, is now back --- unfortunately, the website doesn't link to the supposed location.

NEW Iran Analysis: Rafsanjani Bowing Out? (Abedin)
UPDATED Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
Iran Interview: Detained US Hiker’s Mother “I Wish I Could Hear Her Voice”
Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
The Latest from Iran (23 July): Receding Authority


2200 GMT: Bazaar Developments. We close this evening with some eyebrow-raising news.

It looks like there has been an attempted reconcilation between the President and officials of the conservative Motalefeh Party, who have been a traditional power behind the Bazaar. On Thursday Ahmadinejad met Habibollah Asgharowladi, Asadollah Badamchian, and Mohammad Nabi Habibi.

Friction between the President and Motalefeh had been stoked by the dispute over control of Islamic Azad University, with members of the party criticised by Ahmadinejad supporters for their defence of Parliament's position.

Meanwhile, Rah-e-Sabz posts photos of a large fire in Kerman Bazaar. The cause is unclear.

2145 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alert. Ali Vakili, the managing director of Pars Oil and Gas Company, says that investment in Iran's South Pars gas field has increased by 120 percent in the current Iranian year. Vakili said the rise was the result of the issuance of 3 billion Euros in foreign currency bonds and $3.014 billion in national participation bonds.

There was no reported comment from Vakili on how bonds could assure completion of projects when foreign companies were withdrawing from South Pars.

1830 GMT: The Interrupted Memorial. Footage of the memorial for poet Ahmad Shamlou, disrupted by security forces (see 1640 GMT), has been posted.

1810 GMT: Labour Front. Operators at the Kermanshah Telecommunication Company staged a protest in front of the Kermanshah Governor’s mansion on Thursday.

1750 GMT: Picture of Day. One of a set of photographs of former Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohsen Armin after his release from detention on $200,000 bail:



1745 GMT: Video of Day. Footage has been posted of poet Shams Langroudi reciting his work at the memorial for Amir Javadifar, killed in post-election conflict last year.

1730 GMT: A Demotion for the Supreme Leader? Reporting on a meeting of the Supreme Leader with his office staff, Rah-e-Sabz refers to "Mr Khamenei".

1653 GMT: Refugees in Germany. The first of 50 post-election Iranian refugees have arrived in Germany after they were granted asylum. The refugees, most of whom are reported to be dissident journalists, had been in Turkey.

1645 GMT: Karroubi Goes After the Guardians. Mehdi Karroubi, in a letter to Guardian Council member Ayatollah Mohammad Momen, has criticised the  Council for "institutionalizing fraud" and offering a "double-standard interpretation" of the constitution.

Karrubi alleged that the Council has become an "instrument for securing and maintaining power for a particular political faction".

1640 GMT: Blocking the Poet's Memorial. Parleman News reports that security forces have forced the cancellation of a memorial at the grave of Ahmad Shamlou, one of Iran's great contemporary poets, on the 10th anniversary of his death.

1405 GMT: Talking Tough. For Revolutionary Guard Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari, all this Government in-fighting is irrelevant: leaders of the "uproar" will be dealt with in a timely fashion.

1400 GMT: More Larijani v. Ahmadinejad. The Speaker of Parliament is in fighting mood: he has accused the Government of violating the Constitution over subsidy cuts.

1330 GMT: Parliament v. President (and It's in State Media). Press TV and the Islamic Republic News Agency breaks their usual silence on the Parliament's growing conflict with Mahoud Ahmadinejad, highlighting the issue of $2 billion for the Tehran Metro.

Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is quoted, "Executive bodies are obliged to enforce this law after its communication. They cannot refrain from enforcing it. According to the Constitution, the president must communicate any law within a specific period of time. If a legislation is not communicated in due time the Majlis speaker will communicate it."

The Government has refused to sanction the $2 billion, possibly because of a political battle with Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf. (Former Vice President Massoumeh Ebtekar has just made this point in Rah-e-Sabz.)

1245 GMT: Academic Corner. Peyke Iran claims 13 professors at Al-Zahra University have been dismissed and students have advised to study China and Russia.

1240 GMT: Offside. The sports daily Goal has been banned for three months.

1200 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Mohsen Armin has been freed on bail of about $200,000.

An appellate court has upheld the 9 1/2-year sentence imposed on human rights activist Bahareh. Hedayat. The 7-year term of Milad Asadi has also been upheld.

1105 GMT: Parliament v. President. Another MP, Mus al-Reza Servati, has declared that the Ahmadinejad budget lacks ministerial signatures and is therefore illegal.

1045 GMT: Culture Corner. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has reiterated that censorship of books and films is necessary.

1005 GMT: We have posted a separate analysis, "Rafsanjani Bowing Out?"

1000 GMT: Economy Watch. Peyke Iran claims that up to 85% of workers now have temporary employment contracts.

0925 GMT: The Universities Conflict. Raha Tahimi, writing for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, posts a useful overview of the dispute over control of Islamic Azad University and the "temporary ceasefire" between former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and President Ahmadinejad.

0915 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. On Wednesday Mehdi Karroubi visited Narges Mohammadi, the women's rights activist who was recently released from detention.

Mohammadi continues to suffer from poor health and the lack of treatment provided when she was in prison.

0735 GMT: Cyber-Watch. Ali Aghazadeh of Parliament's National Security Commission has reportedly declared that "countless new sites need more control" by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

0730 GMT: Conspiracy Theory. It wasn't all cheer and sending a man into space in the President's speech on Friday (see 0649 GMT).

Ahmadinejad "revealed plans by the United States and Israel", announcing, "They [Washington] have decided to attack two of the regional Arab states, which are our allies, with the help of the Zionist regime to create fear of decision-making in Iran."

The President teased the audience by not revealing which two Arab states are under the gun. Instead, he turned to another concern, chastising Russian President Dmitry Medvedev over remarks on Tehran's nuclear programme. Ahmadinejad regretted that Medvedev had "become the mouthpiece for the plot by the enemies of Iran."

The President did say that he maintained hope for relations with Moscow.

0700 GMT: Road to Nowhere. Iranian Students News Agency claims that the Ministry of Transport owes billions of dollars to construction companies, with 500 road and rail projects unfinished. Parliament has asked the Minister of Transport not to accept plans for construction proposed after the President's recent tour of the provinces.

0655 GMT: The Supreme Leader's Back-Room Politics. Amidst the intrigues this week over Ayatollah Khamenei's "I am the Rule of the Prophet Fatwa", Rah-e-Sabz offers an analysis of the Supreme Leader's advisors, including chief of staff Asghar Hejazi, the mysterious "Mr Vahid", and Khamenei's son Mojtaba.

0649 GMT: Mahmoud Looks to the Stars. Speaking at the National Festival of Iranian Youth on Friday, President  Ahmadinejad said Iran plans to launch its first manned shuttle into space by 2019.

Ahmadinejad added that the project was scheduled for 2035 but that the launch date was reviewed in a Cabinet meeting this week. He did not offer the reason for the sudden 16-year advance in his Ministers' calculations.

0645 GMT: Energy Posture. Iranian 1st Vice President  Mohammad Reza Rahimi has said that Iran is considering the removal of the dollar and the euro from its oil trade transactions: "In our oil transactions, we will use any currency that is to our benefit.”

Reports indicate that Iran and China may start using the yuan, the Chinese currency, to settle their oil transactions. An Iranian official has also suggested the dirham, the currency of the United Arab Emirates, for business.

Following the latest UN and US  sanctions, Iran has been experiencing difficulties in carrying out its international trade deals in dollars and euros.
Thursday
Jul222010

The Latest from Iran (22 July): Confusing Regime

2125 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alert. Iran's police chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam has declared that there is no smuggling of gas and oil across Iran's borders.

Then again, maybe all is not well: despite there being no smuggling, Ahmadi-Moghaddam has said the budget for border defence is inadequate.

2115 GMT: Religious Difficulties. Mohammad Nasser Saghaie Biriya, the President's religious advisor has resigned, allegedly because of divisions over the enforcement of hijab.

Saghaie Biriya is a disciple of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who has been seen as Ahmadinejad's religious mentor.

NEW Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verd
The Latest from Iran (21 July): Khamenei Rattled?


2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Detained student activist Arsalan Abadi has been sentenced to six years in prison by an appellate court. Abadi, arrested during the Ashura protests on 27 December, had originally been given a nine-year term.

2055 GMT: Regime v. Rafsanjani. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami has tried to put former President Hashemi Rafsanjani in his place, saying that his position is still the same as it was on 19 June last year, when the Supreme Leader tried to close off debate over the result of the Presidential election. Khatami said Rafsanjani's s future depends on Ayatollah Khamenei's decisions and the elections for the head of Expediency Council, the position Rafsanjani currently holds.

1945 GMT: Prohibiting Remembrance. Back from a break to catch up with this news from Wednesday....

The National Front of Iran has announced that security forces pressured the organisation into cancelling its public events. The head of the National Front was that any gathering in 7th Tir Square and boarding the bus to travel to Baboyeh Cemetery is prohibited.

On 21 July 1953, demonstrators protested the dismissal of the nationalist Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, and were killed inby security forces of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The victims were laid to rest in Baboyeh.

1310 GMT: Scattering the Students. Rah-e-Sabz reports that Tehran University's dormitories will be evacuated this summer, with students distributed across the city.

1245 GMT: Economy Watch. Reformist MP Mohammad Reza Khabbaz has declared that excessive imports will break the back of domestic production.

1000 GMT: (Refuting the) Rumour of the Day. MP Qodratollah Alikhani identifying the mis-information put out by Javan, the newspaper linked to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, dismisses its latest tale that Green leaders met in a hotel sauna.

0954 GMT: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Film Expert. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has announced that a High Council for Cinema, led by the President, has been established.

An EA correspondent ponders, "What would be the titles of the films considered by this Council?"

0945 GMT: Education Corner. The licence of the Islamic Association at the University of Kashan has been revoked by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education is reportedly sending religious missonaries to 3000 girls' schools in Tehran.
0855 GMT: Sanctions. MP Mohsen Nariman has challenged the Government's official line: "Claiming that sanctions have no effects is political propaganda."

0810 GMT: Staying on Point. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is continuing to ensure that his credentials on foreign policy are not in question, saying on Wednesday that the Iran-Brazil-Turkey declaration on a uranium swap is the only solution to the nuclear issue and adding that sanctions are sure to result in failure.
0805 GMT: Getting the Right Clerics in Place. According to Rooz Online, Seyed Reza Taghavi, the head of policy for Friday Prayers, has said 60 Friday Prayer clerics will be "retired" this summer.

0705 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Azam Visemeh after her release from detention yesterday:



0700 GMT: In the Bazaar. Nejat Bahrami, writing for insideIRAN, analyses, "Bazaari Criticism of Ahmadinejad Bursts into the Open":
Another factor that can bring the bazaar and the opposition closer to each other is the role of the government. Mistakes made by the government and their impact should never be underestimated. Continuation of failed economic policies by the Ahmadinejad administration and further pressure on Iran by the international community can further intensify the economic crisis in Iran and alienate some parts of this important, influential group of merchants.

0655 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Two overviews of interest this morning....

Shayan Ghajar writes in insideIRAN, "Sanctions Open Iran to Russian, Chinese Firms", while Ardalan Sayami's analysis in Rooz Online is that "Sanctions Turn the Government to the Private Sector".

0635 GMT: A Clue on the Fatwa? Personally, I believe that the first audience for the Supreme Leader's supposed fatwa on Tuesday was the senior clerics of Qom, some of whom have been unsettled throughout the post-election crisis and many of whom were roused to anger by the June attacks on Seyed Hassan Khomeini and on the houses of Grand Ayatollah Sane'i and the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. (Using this line of reasoning, a possible reason for the "disappearance" of the fatwa is that it was not received well by those clerics.)

Support for this interpretation comes in Rah-e-Sabz, which posts a provocative account of Ayatollah Khamenei's recent journey to Qom and his meetings with the clerics.

0605 GMT: Perhaps the most spirited response to our coverage since Tuesday of the Supreme Leader's alleged fatwa --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- has come from a reader who say, "Nothing new, he has simply reiterated the meaning of the velayat-e-faqih [clerical supremacy] as originally articulated by the late Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini....It is not always good to murky the water as you like doing here."

With respect, I beg to differ. While the content of Ayatollah Khameini's declaration has its precendents, it has not taken on the form of a fatwa, at least not under this Supreme Leader. And, as always, the distinction lays in timing, context, and developments: Why now? To what end? And what has happened to the fatwa, which has "disappeared" from many Iranian state outlets?

Mr Verde takes another look in an analysis.

Meanwhile....

Mousavi's Latest

Almost lost in the confusion over the Supreme Leader's statement --- did he or didn't he? --- was Mir Hossein Mousavi's intervention in a meeting with professors.

Mousavi, unwittingly intersecting with the presentation of and uncertainty over Khamenei's words, condemned “fabrication” and “distortion” of truth by the Government and stressed that “systematic lies” are the signs of the “decline” of a system. He said the media of the Green Movement should make every effort to “unravel” these lies and counter the “ominous phenomenon": “We must provide our people with a truthful analysis of every situation that the government represents through lies; even though our possibilities are not as much as the authoritarian government.”

Mousavi also spoke about the recent bombings in southeastern Iran, declaring that the problems of the ethnic groups in the border regions must be a priority and maintaining that terrorism can only be confronted through “development coupled with justice".

Power Crisis

Tabnak reports that electricity prices for farmers will increase 10-fold.
Wednesday
Jul212010

Iran Special: Khamenei's "I Am the Rule of the Prophet" Fatwa --- Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

First, a summary of what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed in his fatwa on Tuesday:

*Khamenei is claiming that he is a cleric of the highest rank who possesses all the required credentials to hold the position of “velayat-e-faqih” (Supreme Leader).

LATEST Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
Iran Analysis: Voices Raised — Removing the Supreme Leader (Verde)


Many Shia clerics and scholars, including the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, believed in 1989 that Khamenei did not have the required religious credentials to permit him to hold the position of Supreme Leader. Other regime officials have said that Khamenei has the credentials, but such claims were made in political speeches. This time the claim is made in the name of a religious edict and by Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that his rule is a direct succession to that of the Prophet and the Shia Imams.

During recent months, as he has been trying to cope with the fallout of the crisis within the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has repeatedly compared himself to the first Shia Imam and his opponents to the Imam’s enemies. Now he is claiming that he is not only the successor of the Imams, but of the Prophet too.

*Khamenei is claiming that he is the ruler of the Muslim of the world.

In the regime's past, political declarations claimed that the Supreme Leader is the leader of all of the world’s Muslims. This time Khamenei is claiming it himself.

The issue? Around 90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis. Sunni Islam does not recognize Shia Grand Ayatollahs and the Islamic Republic’s principle of religious jurisprudence. This declaration will not go down well with the Sunnis, especially as it comes from Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that obeying his orders is compulsory.

Since very early days of the Islamic Republic, the assumption has been that the order to the Supreme Leader must be obeyed. More than three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has seen the need to remind everyone of that fact.

(Note: some religious scholars believe that, due to his limited religious credentials, Khamenei does not have the authority to issue fatwas. We will ignore these concerns for now.)

The obvious significance of this fatwa is that Khamenei is saying that his orders must be carried out without failure. This fatwa will make it easier for Khamenei to insist that his wishes are carried out by all factions of the Islamic Republic, for example, in complicated situations like the recent Islamic Azad University crisis. It will be easier to fire officials to be sacked or disqualify candidates from elections. All that will be required is reference to this fatwa.

The not-so-obvious significances?

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic the Supreme Leader is the highest authority in the country. During the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and since Khamenei came to power, it has always been assumed that the Supreme Leader’s orders must be carried out.

A dramatic demonstration of this was during the reformist-dominated Sixth Majlis (2000-2004). The Parliament was debating a new law that would have revoked the draconian press controls which had been passed by the Fifth Majlis. Khamenei wrote to the Parliament asking for the liberalized press law to be halted, and Mehdi Karroubi, who was then the Speaker, stopped the passage. He cited the order from Khamenei and said it must be obeyed.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to intervene in his capacity as Supreme Leader in many instances. The latest episode came only yesterday with the revelation that two Siatan and Baluchistan MPs, who resigned in protest of the government’s inability to provide effective security for the province, withdrew their resignation on Khamenei’s orders.

Another example: after the vote of confidence over Ahmadinejad’s cabinet last summer, then Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar revealed the Khamenei had ordered MPs to vote Yes, saying that otherwise many ministers would not have obtained the required support. In that instance, even after Khamenei’s intervention, three proposed ministers did not get the vote of confidence.

And another example: the Majlis investigation into allegations of corruption against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi were blocked by an order from Khamenei.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to act more as a senior administrator of the Islamic Republic than as a Supreme Leader who is supposed to preside over state affairs. His need yesterday to remind everyone that orders must be obeyed points to an uncertainty he might have about the effectiveness of that administration.

This could mean that Khamenei’s authority is not as solid as it was in the past. For example, last summer President Ahmadinejad refused to follow Khamenei’s order and remove his ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai from the post of First Vice President until the order was made public by the Supreme Leader’s office. From the other side of the political spectrum, despite Khamenei’s insistence that the 2009 presidential elections were fair and the elections issue is over, the reformists are refusing to back down and have at times not only disobeyed the Supreme Leader but mocked him too. Then there is the Parliament vote to block the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution decision on Islamic Azad University, asserting the President's control. That vote was in direct contravention of Khamenei’s (and, before him, Khomeini’s) statements that the Majlis should not interfere in the decisions taken by the SCCR.

Over the past year Khamenei has struggled to assert his political authority within the regime. He is being defied by senior figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. He has been criticised by politicians like Hashemi Rafsanjani and by clerics like Ayatollah Dastgheib. He has found it hard to force them into obeying him.

The same can be said about the general public. During street demonstrations, there have chats of “Death to Dictator” and “Death to Khamenei”. The Supreme Leader has not been able to persuade all of his people to accept his decisions. He has instead been forced into using brute force and detention against his opponents. The regime’s security forces, with naked and gruesome violence, cleared the streets of demonstrators last year, and the intelligence forces have jailed many members of the opposition.

The resulting problem is that Khamenei has not been able to demonstrate that he has any real authority in Iran beyond the use of force by his security personnel. Any seemingly minor incident thus has the potential to become a spiralling crisis. Furthermore, many opposition figures who are in jail are now taking any possible opportunity to challenge his authority (Examples include recent statements by Isa Saharkhiz and Ahmad Ghabel). The regime’s authority is no longer that of its positive qualities, but that of its muscle, and that muscle may be starting to get tired.

On the conservative side there problems too. The conservative-dominated Majlis voted in the case of Islamic Azad University and the SCCR case in contravention of Khamenei’s views. That forced the Supreme Leader to give out two separate orders to Azad University and SCCR and to set up a panel to look into the case.Even the estalbishment of the panel suggests that Khamenei’s opinion is not strong enough for regime insiders to accept his decisions. Leading MP Ali Motahari has said that although he follows the Supreme Leader, he will voice his disquiet about issues too, and another conservative, Morteza Nabavi, has said that many of his colleagues are giving up.

Add to this the failure of the Ahmadinejad Government to cope with many of the problems in the country and, in some cases, its "success" in making matters worse. On 19 June 2009, Khamenei said clearly that he considers Ahmadinejad closer to him than even his decades-old friend Rafsanjani. The starting point of  the incompetence of the Ahmadinejad administration is the demonstration that the Supreme Leader is not able to choose the right people for the right job.

On the religious front, the clerics in Qom have refused to publicly back Khamenei’s post-election decisions. This has led to the Supreme Leader calling them imperceptive confidants and criticising them regularly. In contrast, after the 4 June humiliation of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the clerics were effusive with their support for Hassan's grandfather, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and praised his personal and religious qualities.

In recent months some criticism of Khamenei has been taken to a new level. Last year most of the criticism was directed at specific actions or decisions, but now some of the criticism has become personal to the point of demanding Khamenei’s removal from the post of Supreme Leader --- examples include statements by  (example: statements by Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saharkhiz, and Ghabel.) This criticism is coming not from an foreign-based opposition that has no allegiance to the Islamic Republic but from former regime insiders with substantial revolutionary credentials.

And the fatwa may not check the criticism. Many high-ranking Shia clerics will probably be upset because Khamenei is saying that, during the age of absence (of the 12th Shia Imam Mahdi), he is the rightful successor of that Imam. Doing so, he is usurping the claim of legitimacy of the Grand Ayatollahs,  that they are here to guide the faithful while the 12th Imam is hidden. And many Shia scholars do not accept the rule of the Jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih) during the age of absence. They assert that any claim of rule by an Islamic state during the period that the 12th Imam is hidden is a false pretence, since a true Islamic state can only be set up by him. Others who try to take this role are impostors.

Last year, the main talk was ofthe  illegitimacy of the Ahamdinejad as president. Now the issue seems to be shifting to the unsuitability of Khamenei for the post of Supreme Leader. This new fatwa may be an attempt at countering the challenges against the Supreme Leader himself. But one is left wondering if it will not backfire as did Khamenei’s message of condolence for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s death last year or his fatwa trying to ban Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Fiestival) in March.

But note the difference: if this declaraton backfires, the consequences will be far more dramatic.
Monday
Jul192010

The Latest from Iran (19 July): Criticisms and the Leader

1845 GMT: Academic Corner. A follow-up to our stories that 30 Tehran University professors were being "retired", ostensibly because they had completed their period of service....

Professor Rouhollah Alami said he suddenly received news about his dismissal from Tehran University officials. He had been at the university for 22 years but had 14 years left to retirement.

1735 GMT: Pressing the Government. Reformist MP Darius Ghanbari has noted, "Apparently some ministers have 'special immunity'," since the Minister of Interior, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, did not reply to his question from April and did not appear even once in the Majlis.

1725 GMT: After the Bombings. Iran has closed the Taftan post on the Pakistan border, about 55 miles southeast of Zahedan, the site of last Thursday's double suicide bombing. Reports indicated this has caused significant supply problems for inhabitants.

NEW Iran’s Made-Up Stories: Fars News Busted by “Zionist” Journalist Ghazi
NEW Iran Analysis: Voices Raised — Removing the Supreme Leader (Verde)
Iran’s New Guidance: Good, Good Lovin’ (But Only at Night)
Change for Iran: Why Twitter Has Made a Difference
The Latest from Iran (18 July): Bazaar Resolutions?


1640 GMT: Reformist Rift? MP Ahmadreza Dastgheib of the Imam Khomeini Line has blamed reformists, especially non-academics, for not spreading their ideas throughout society. Dastgheib said that "we" should have explained our theories to all sectors of society but that this is obviously impossible today.

The MP added that a "big mistake" was that former President Mohammad Khatami, given his recognition in Iran, did not run for the presidency in 200.

1625 GMT: Pictures of the Day (2). Mehr News, which is far from an anti-Government site, posts a series of photographs illustrating the effect of power outages on Iranian industry:



1620 GMT: Picture of the Day. Filmmakers Mohammad Nourizad and Jafar Panahi are reunited. Both were released this spring on bail, Nourizad after six months in detention, Panahi after three.


1500 GMT: Challenging the Supreme Leader. Fereshteh Ghazi offers an analysis of journalist Isa Saharkhiz's statement in court --- covered in our opening update (0555 GMT) and a separate analysis --- refusing to offer a defence and challenging the authority of Ayatollah Khamenei.

1455 GMT: Watching Larijani. OK, here's what Larijani said publicly today in Geneva after his meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon: "We need a new plan [on Tehran's nuclear programme] in which Iran's rights are completely supported....The problems of Iraq and of Afghanistan after occupation, which have caused an increase in the production of illicit drugs and led to the spread of terrorism, are the result of wrongful US policies and actions. “

Yeah, yeah. But what did Larijani say in private?

1450 GMT: We've posted a feature in which Fereshteh Ghazi exposes the made-up news of Fars and gets called a "Zionist" for her efforts.

1340 GMT: Sanctions Front. The Wall Street Journal, citing "Western officials", targets the European-Iranian Trade Bank AG (EIH) for helping Iran to get around international sanctions.

The officials allege that EIH has been "conducting euro-denominated transactions on behalf of Iran's Bank Sepah", involving business with Iran's Defense Industries Organization, the Aerospace Industries Organization and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

The newspaper also carries an interview with India's petroleum secretary, who says "the latest round of U.S. sanctions against Iran could complicate the activities of Indian state-controlled companies that are looking to invest in Iran's oil and gas sector".

Elsewhere, a memorandum, signed by Turkish Public Works & Housing Minister Mustafa Demir and Iranian Minister of Housing & Development Ali Nikzad in Tehran, envisages cooperation in the construction sector. The memorandum commits to exchange of information and experience, cooperation in public housing projects, research and training of experts, production of construction materials, and use of products of latest technology.

1335 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Faezeh Hashemi, the daughter of Hashemi Rafsanjani, has given a lengthy interview about her views on the political and legal situation. Amidst that discussion, she reiterated that her father would not return to lead Tehran Friday Prayers until there was political reconciliation. (Rafsanjani's last Friday Prayer was 17 July 2009.)

In another passage of the interview, Hashemi rebutted charges that she was accumulating private wealth: "I am a normal woman. My husband provides for me and I have no income."

1215 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? In a speech broadcast on state TV, President Ahmadinejad told industrialists in northern Iran, "[The US] adopts a resolution to force a dialogue, but this cowboy logic has no place in Iran."

Ahmadinejad continued with the defiance, "They say we have intelligence that Iranians will most likely build one atomic bomb. Well, this is a lie, but let's say it is true. How many atomic bombs do you have? The Americans themselves say 5,000 plus....Is someone who has 5,000 fourth and fifth generation atomic bombs, with very advanced launchers, afraid of one bomb? They are not afraid of one, not of a hundred, not of a thousand (bombs). They are afraid of the collective awakening of the Iranian soul."

Yet --- and forgive me if I am reading too much into Mahmoud's rhetoric --- there may have been a glimpse that Ahmadinejad would like to get back to last autumn's discussions: "We are for negotiations, but to do so you have to sit down like a good boy."

1050 GMT: Claim of Day. An Iranian cleric explains, "We have made swimming pools and Jacuzzis in Evin for prisoners."

0950 GMT: Iran's Networks. Dr. Gholamreza Kashi, speaking in a conference about social networks and identity at Iran's Strategic Center, has said that the "first (older) generation" are not represented in media and the "second generation" has no possibilities to make its views known.

0945 GMT: Power Outage. Ebrahim Jamili of the Iran Chamber of Commerce has demanded that the Ministry of Energy pay for the heavy losses of private companies due to power shortages. He noted that Iran's claims to be the leading power in the region do not fit with "putting production in chains".

0940 GMT: Parliament v. President (cont.). More counter-attacks against the Government and media seen as its supporters....

Tehran Emrooz claims that insults against Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, in demonstrations in front of the Majlis, were instigated by editors of Hemmat magazine. Tehran Emrooz adds that some of those editors were arrested recently after attacking Hashemi Rafsanjani, senior clerics, and Seyed Hassan Khomeini.

Azam Taleghani, former MP and head of the Society of Islamic Revolution Women of Iran, has said that some hardliners have finally realised they cannot continue without co-operation with reformists.

Leading MP and Government critic Ahmad Tavakoli is reportedly gathering votes against a Government order that all governmental advertisements are given to the daily newspaper Iran.

0935 GMT: The Zahedan Bombings. With the toll from last Thursday's double suicide bombing at 27 dead and 311 injured, Abbas Ali Noura, one of three MPs from the Zahedan area who have resigned, says that people of the area expect the dismissal of the Minister of Interior.

0924 GMT: Parliament v. President. MP Hassan Ghafourifard has accused the Government of violating the principles of the Constitution by not presenting its legal decisions on the budget, saying the Majlis will not approve the economic plan if these decisions are not presented. MP Shahabeddin Sadr adds that the claims of the President's office are untrue, and the Parliament has not received the decisions.

Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani adds in a letter to Ahmadinejad that payments to managers of Free Trade zones are illegal.

0920 GMT: Shifting Politics. An intriguing story in Khabar Online, linked to Ali Larijani....

Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf has reportedly started his campaign for the next Presidential elections, due in 2013. The kick-off was in Zanjan and --- here's a twist --- it was staged by a committee of "reformist" hardliners.

Now is Khabar implicitly backing Qalibaf and this notion of "reformist hardliners" --- as an alternative to the not-so-reformist hardliner who is currently President --- or damning Qalibaf through such an association?

0915 GMT: The Nuclear Scientist/Non-Scientist Defection/Abduction Story. Rooz Online, from an "informed source", claims Shahram Amiri is being held in security quarantine after his return to Iran from the US.

0900 GMT: Not-at-All Hypocritical Headline of Day. Press TV: "Iran Slams Canada on Human Rights".

But it gets "better" in the body of the story, which is the continuation of an Iranian campaign against Ottawa over its handlings of protests at the G20 summit earlier this month:
Speaking to reporters on Monday, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said, "Canadian officials should provide a response to all questions and ambiguities regarding human rights violations in their country."

"Such instances of brutal and deadly approach by the Canadian police, the interference of security forces in the private lives of citizens and violations of rights of the native people have recurrently happened during this Canadian administration," Mehmanparast noted.

The Iranian spokesperson went on to criticize Canada for its illegal and brutal approach toward protestors during a recent summit in Toronto, arguing that "The issue of human rights is an international commitment and countries should not brush aside such matters by resorting to political justifications."...

"Repeated violations of citizenship rights and assaults against protesters are not an issue that one can keep silent on," he further stressed.

0750 GMT: We have now posted an analysis by Mr Verde, "Voices Raised --- Removing the Supreme Leader".

0625 GMT: Labour Watch. HRANA summarises regime pressure on unionists, from the retrial of Mansur Osanloo to other detentions and intimidations.

0555 GMT: We begin this morning with two pointed critiques of "legitimacy".

Journalist Isa Saharkhiz, detained 13 months ago, appeared in court yesterday. A copy of the full text of his statement has been brought out and published: it is a rousing denuncation of those who have crushed "democracy", "free elections", "human rights" and the "republic", and it pays special attention to one man. "Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei has trampled the Constitution."

It is unknown whether Saharkhiz was able to read the statement in court, but we do have a picture as he left:



Prominent academic Sadegh Zibakalam cannot be quite so direct in his criticisms --- after all, he is a public figure who is not detained --- but his latest interview is still pretty sharp. He points to a "brain drain" and division of clergy in governmental and non-governmental roles. The power of legal forces like Parliament and the judiciary has been diminished, while the power of "irresponsible forces" on the rise.

And Zibakalam considers that the worst result of the post-election dispute has been an irreversible collapse of legitimacy, asking, "Is it possible to bring people back to vote?"