Iran and Russia: The State of the "Alliance" (Sanaei)

From Tabnak via Iran Review, which translated the interview:

TABNAK: Given the double standard applied by Russia to its diplomatic relations with various countries, especially its duplicity in relations with Iran and the United States, and also due to noncompliance of Russia with its commitments toward Iran, experts have both warned Moscow and called on the Iranian government to revise diplomatic relations with Russia.

This issue has been discussed with Dr. Mehdi Sanaei, professor of University of Tehran and member of Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, in the following interview.

Q: Recent measures taken by our northern neighbor have opened a new chapter in Iran-Russia relations. What is your opinion about present conditions?

A: Russia’s cooperation with Iran under present critical circumstances will not only serve as an important determinant of bilateral relations, but also influence future international equations.

Independent countries are growing in power and new players have entered international political scene. Therefore, the existing structure of the United Nations Security Council and international relations, which has led to dominance of a hegemonic system on the world, cannot provide solutions to all problems as that structure was suitable for conditions of past decades and is no good for a modern world. For example, crises in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan cannot be solved within that framework. Many countries have owned up to this weakness and even the US President has stated that the United States will not tackle all international problems single-handedly as it is not able to solve all of them alone.

Therefore, five permanent members of the Security Council are not able to solve international issues on their own and they should not only respect the will of other countries, but also take advantage of their potentials in international relations. The recent Tehran meeting, which introduced Turkey and Brazil as new variables to Iran’s nuclear case, meant to tell the world that there are many independent players which are willing to do their part in international relations and the way should be paved for them. Russia is now at a crossroads. There are two eagles in the national symbol of Russia which connote that Russia simultaneously looks to the east and the west.

Russia owes its power to its position between east and west. Therefore, anytime looking to the west has dominated the Russian policy the country has forfeited part of its international political clout. Cooperation between Russia and Iran is a very determining factor for both countries’ policies and the Islamic Republic expects Russia to cooperate with it in international scene. On the other hand, those relations are also of high importance to Russia. There are two possible scenarios to be followed here. Firstly, the rift between independent countries and big powers will not widen anymore, but the big powers will accept to make structural changes to international system and avail themselves of potentialities of independent states in solving international problems. In this state, Russia’s friendly relations with Iran and the Muslim world will increase its weight in international power game. The second possibility is that the aforesaid rift will further widen in which case geo-strategic position and identity of Russia will not allow the country to become too inclined toward the west.

All in all, it is very important for Russia to act in a balanced way in its foreign relations and policy. Just in the same way that cooperation between Iran and Russia has promoted both countries’ positions in international scene, it can continue on the same track without being affected by various external factors. It is true that Russia’s relations with the European Union and the United States have changed and those countries are trying to attract Russia as a strategic partner to put pressure on Iran. Of course, pressures exerted on Russia by the Zionist and other internal lobbies should not be ignored. None of those factors, however, obviate the need for Russia to have friendly relations with Iran as it is to its own interest to have independent states on its side.

Q: Unfortunately, Iran has indicated its dependence on Russia and supported that country’s international positions and performance in an exaggerated way during recent years as a counterweight to the west. Don’t you think that such behavior has spoiled Russians prompting them to ignore their commitments toward Iran including commissioning of Bushehr nuclear power plant or delivery of S-300 missile system? They have also completely ignored Iran’s part in the legal regime of the Caspian Sea.

A: Like other countries, there is no doubt that Russia gives the highest priority to its own national interests. The Russians also want to have maximum level of relations with other states. This is also true about us. Two points should be born in mind here. Firstly, a win-win game should be defined in international relations by strengthening foreign policy leverages. Many Russia experts have noted that in its relations with Russia, Iran should take advantage of various leverages as well as regional and international issues. Part of the problem is rooted in our foreign policy apparatus. We should not make other countries think that we desperately need to work with them. Having more leverage to use under such circumstances will be of great help in this regard. Russia is a big country in the region and cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has been not only to the avail of both countries, but also beneficial to the settlement of international disputes.

Q: To what extent interactions with Russia have been a function of Iran’s maximum interests, not out of coercion?

A: Relations with Russia have been influenced by our foreign policy goals. Some anti-west politicians encourage Russian ties while others, opposed them as they damaged Iran’s relations with the west. Different viewpoints govern the two countries’ attitudes. The Russian foreign policy seeks to promote international standing of that country, which is also an objective for Iran’s foreign policy. However, Russian foreign policy is also pragmatic and interest-based and this has been frequently announced by the Russian foreign policymakers.

Perhaps, some ambiguity surrounding Iran’s relations with Russia stems from different perceptions which shape each side of this relationship. Here, some politicians still think that Russia is a superpower and see Moscow in the context of the Cold War. This is not true. Although Russia is still of great weight in international developments, its capacities are very limited. There has been another group which encourages relations with the west because it considers Russia a country riddled with domestic problems. This is also an erroneous analysis because Russia has banked on energy policy and taken various measures to improve its international standing during the past decade. Part of this ambiguity is, perhaps, the result of different perceptions in two countries. While relations with Russia have been considered strategic in Iran during the past decade, no Russian analyst has ever considered their country’s relations with Iran strategic.

Q: The History of Iran abounds with bitter memories of Russia including imposition of Turkmenchai and Golestan treaties on Iran which led to separation of peripheral lands. There is also bitter memory of Russia’s invasion of Iran during World War II. Don’t you think that existing conditions have once more elicited past memories. How Russia will suffer after losing a strategic ally?

A: Given the importance of bilateral relations and Iranian’s mentality of past relations with Russia and in view of future international political equations, Russia is expected to speed up implementation of projects it has undertaken in Iran in order to build confidence. Relations between two countries are of critical importance and it is needed for the sake of confidence building that Russia complete Bushehr nuclear power plant as soon as possible and have no doubt about delivery of S-300 missile defense system since the related contract has been already signed. In nuclear case, it should not leave Iran and independent countries alone and while maintaining relations with both sides, it should use its influence for peaceful settlement of this issue.

Q: Since Russia and the west have reached an agreement on economic issues, do you think that such a will exists in Russia?

A: I hope so. Not only due to importance of bilateral relations, but careful study of forthcoming international developments also dictates that Russia will need to have Iran on its side.

The Latest from Iran (18 June): Hardliners Criticise Ahmadinejad

1510 GMT: Twitter and Civil Rights. We have posted a response to the latest attempt to set straight the relationship between social media and the post-election political situation in Iran.

1430 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Ebrahim Rashidi, who disappeared on Monday, has reportedly called his family from Ardebil's intelligence detention centre.

NEW Iran Request: Nonsense about “Twitter Revolution”. Please Stop.
NEW Iran Analysis: How Europe Can Help (Mamedov)
NEW Iran Document: The Tajzadeh Criticism and The Reformist Way Forward (Sahimi)
Iran Snapshot: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Master of Irony
Iran Overview: Striking Poses from Sanctions to Cyber-War to “Terrorism”
Latest from Iran (17 June): Clearing Away the Smoke

Journalist Hassan Etemadi has been given a two-year sentence, and journalist Shahin Zeynali has been handed a term of two years and 91 days.

The former mayor of Ghasr-e Shirin, Ghodrat Mohammadi, has been detained and transferred to a centre in Kermanshah. No reason for his arrest has been given.

1330 GMT: Through the Looking Glass on the Hijab. Reviewing today's Tehran Friday Prayer by Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, I think we are now caught up in a contortion of politics. Iran has suddenly become a place where defenders of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad praise him for "a relatively liberal government approach" and turn their fire upon the "hardliners", rather than the opposition.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tZ2a0_3sNw&feature=youtu.be[/youtube]

For the headline from Jannati's speech today, in contrast to his previous appearances, is not the threat of heavy punishment upon the opposition but his criticism of Ahmadinejad for raising the "cumbersome" issue of the "morality police" and their efforts to enforce "good behaviour" such as the wearing of the hijab.

Linking those who acted or dressed inappropriately to "drug traffickers" and "terrorists", Jannati said that women who defied the rules on proper clothing were "worse than poison". No one (he means you, Mahmoud) had "the right to tie the hands" of those enforcing the law.

1005 GMT: Ahmadinejad's Hijab Problem. It seems the President has got himself in a political tangle over his complaint about "morality police" cracking down on supposed social transgressions, including "bad hijab".

The Governor of Tehran, Morteza Tamaddon, has insisted that Ahmadinejad's directives are the basis for his officials' actions.

High-profile member of Parlaiment Ali Motahari has declared that the President has been adversely influenced by his chief aide, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

Ayatollah Alamalhoda, Mashhad's Friday Prayer leader, has asserted, "Unfortunately Ahmadinejad does not give the right attention to implementing religious rules."

Member of Parliament Mohammad Taghi Rahbar says he is ready to discuss the issue with Ahamadinejad on television.

0950 GMT: Today's Khabar Kick on the Government's Shins. Khabar Online, linked to Ali Larijani, has suggested that Vice President Mohammad Reza Mirtajoddini might have to resign because he wants to complete a Ph.D. dissertation.

The website, as reported by Peyke Iran, also points to 11 "suspicious" comments by the President in the last 76 days.

0945 GMT: Take Your Resolution and Stick It. Iran's National Security Council has issued a strongly-worded denunciation of the UN Security Council sanctions resolution on Tehran's nuclear programme:

Contrary to all expectations, the resolution has focused on Iran's nuclear program, without so much as a word about the Israeli regime's criminal activities and its attack on the Freedom Flotilla convoy carrying humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip only 10 days ago.

Also, the resolution brazenly ignores the 11 proposals put forward by Iran during Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which have been welcomed by world countries.

The council takes issue with the adoption of the resolution, particularly since it came despite constructive cooperation and the release of a new report by the International Atomic Energy Agency confirming the non-diversion of Iran's nuclear material for the 22nd consecutive time....

"This clearly shows that Washington's commitment to Israeli security will never allow UN Security Council to fulfill its obligations with regards to securing the safety and the rights of different nations....

The Islamic Republic of Iran will respond fittingly to any attempt to violate the legal and legitimate rights of the Iranian nation," the statement added.

0845 GMT: We have posted an analysis by Eldar Mamedov, "Iran: How Europe Can Help".

0840 GMT: Economy Watch. Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili has complained that people are still not informed about the Government's subsidy reduction plan.

0805 GMT: A Boast (and an Admission?). Tehran police chief Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, trying to wash away criticism of last year's attack on Tehran University's dormitories, has said, "We were prepared for the elections one week in advance." The dorm incidents were predictable because Communists and neo-Marxists following Mehdi Karroubi had come onto the streets.

Not sure if Ahmadi-Moghaddam realises this, but his statement gives indirect support to allegations of a manipulated election --- the security forces were preparing for violence because they knew in advance that there might be anger over an "adjusted" vote. (More on this on Saturday....)

Meanwhile, member of Parliament Elyas Naderan has kept up his pressure on the Government, saying that the Majlis never completed a full report --- despite its promises --- on the dormitory attacks: "Only parts of it exist and are in our minds."

0800 GMT: The Attack on the Clerics. Some more pressure on the regime: Ayatollah Abdolnabi Namazi, the Friday Prayer leader of Kashan, has said, "If attacks on marja in Qom become normal, the future is not predictable."  Hojatolelsam Mehdi Tabatabai asserts, "God will not forgive those who insulted the 14 Khordad [4 June] ceremony."

0645 GMT: The Attack on the Clerics --- An Apology? Hmm, wondering if this might be an important signal....

In a wide-ranging interview on Parleman News, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani makes the statement that "whoever does not respect the marja (senior clerics)... shows his worthlessness". Larijani asserts that the marja "are the pillars of nezam", the Iranian system, and "the Supreme Leader up to the chiefs of Iran's forces see them as such".

An EA correspondent gets to the point with the question, "Is this an indirect apology from Ayatollah Khamenei?"

0640 GMT: The Economic Squeeze. Reuters publishes a summary of foreign companies who have pulled back from operations inside Iran and those who continue to do business.

0550 GMT: A Victory in Britain. It is reported that actress and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights activist Kiana Firouz has been granted "leave to remain"' in the UK, removing the threat of deportation to Iran.

Firouz had been refused asylum on two previous occasions, prompting a campaign to prevent her return to Tehran.

0535 GMT: The Attack on the Clerics. It is reported that the website of the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has been filtered.

Kalemeh publishes a letter from Ahmad Montazeri, the son of the Grand Ayatollah, to senior clerics in Qom. Montazeri describes Sunday's attack on the Grand Ayatollah's home and offices and asks for a denunciation of the assault.

0515 GMT: Today's white noise starts out of Washington rather than Tehran, as the Obama Administration --- trying to hold back the tide of Congressional action on Iran --- plays up rhetorically to the legislators.

Speaking at a hearing on Thursday, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave the rationale for the adjusted approach of the White House to US missile defence:

One of the elements of the intelligence that contributed to the decision on the phased adaptive array (approach) was the realization that if Iran were actually to launch a missile attack on Europe, it wouldn't be just one or two missiles, or a handful.

"It would more likely be a salvo kind of attack, where you would be dealing potentially with scores or even hundreds of missiles.

An editorial aside:I wonder if and when the Administration will ever realise that this appeasement --- not of Iran but of Congress --- will never free up its approach towards Tehran but will limit and even undermine any hope of crafting a thoughtful policy towards the Iranian situation.

Meanwhile, getting back to significant developments, we catch up with this week's potentially important analysis by reformist Mostafa Tajzadeh. A Deputy Interior Minister in the Khatami Government and post-election detainee, Tajzadeh has published a lengthy consideration of today's Iran through a review of the past, apologising for the reformists' role in the detention and execution of political prisoners in the 1980s.

We've posted extracts from the Tajzadeh analysis, accompanied by interpretation for Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau.

Turkey Analysis: Which Way is Ankara Heading? (Yenidunya)

There seems to be a lot of fuss right now about whether Turkey is "turning its face towards the East".

The query, often simplistic, arises from a number of development. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is pursuing a "Zero Problem with Neighbours" policy based on dialogue, various economic agreements, and the lifting of visa requirement. The policy includes a close relationship with both Syria and Iran.

This policy has been part of the uranium swap deal with Iran, dismissed by the West; the friction with Israel, from the "low chair" crisis up tothe  nine deaths on board the Mavi Marmara in the Freedom Flotilla; warming relations with Russia, crowned with a nuclear settlement; and the veto of sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council.



Israeli officials reiterated, following the most recent crisis in high waters, that they view the region separated into two opposite camps. There are "moderates" such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine (West Bank), Jordan, and Israel, There are "extremists" such as Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and (Palestine) Gaza. Israel asks: which will Turkey choose?

That blunt enquiry has been accompanied by some incredibly naive arguments, lacking an apparent notion of the basic principles of international relations. Nuh Yilmaz wrote in Foreign Policy magazine:

"All options are on the table” is the best phrase to describe how Turkey feels about Israel’s attack on humanitarian aid flotilla carrying more than 600 activists from 32 countries... Israel will, most likely, no longer be seen as a friendly state nor an ally, but will be treated as a rogue state by Turkey.

When I say Turkey will imply that “all options are on the table,” I do not mean that Turkey will wage a war against Israel. However, more dangerously, Israel will be seen as a state against which one should protect itself and should consider any possible action because of its unlawful and rogue character.

Others placed Ankara's "adventurism" at the centre of Turkish-American relations. Steven A. Cook of Foreign Policy argued that Turkey had not only shifted its axis but had dared to a challenge the US:

It is hard to admit, but after six decades of strategic cooperation, Turkey and the United States are becoming strategic competitors -- especially in the Middle East. This is the logical result of profound shifts in Turkish foreign and domestic politics and changes in the international system.

Some tried to find a formula for Turkey's "shift". On Thursday, Turkish daily Hurriyet asked whether there would be a "Middle East Union" under Turkey's leadership in the future. This would build on a joint declaration signed among Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, seeking to lift visas and increase the level of cooperation in the fields of energy, health, agriculture, trade and customs.

Let me be blunt with you and with those who are wringing their hands. There has been no change in Turkey's axis.

Ankara's ultimate destination is still full membership in the European Union. Turkey's efforts and regional diplomatic initiatives are a part of its economic development and a part of its struggle to turn into a "strategic" mid-power which can help (re)shape the region.

The tension between a mid-power in Ankara and an American strategic partner --- a Middle East "spearhead" --- in Israel is the outcome of a power struggle between two allies at a time when the latter is under pressures and the benefits of "direct friendly support" of Washington are being seriously being questioned, inside and outside the US. The perception arises that Turkey is trying to fill the space Israel has left/will be forced to leave.

In the context of Turkey's economic boom and diplomatic manoeuvres to increase its credibility in the region, the  complicating factor is that its part to the European Union is currently blocked. Out of 34 chapters to be confirmed to accept Turkey as a part of the Union, only 12 chapters have been addressed so far. Of the other 22, 17 are being blocked by other countries --- eight alone by Cyprus.

The lesson to take from this dead end is crystal-clear: without political concessions on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, there will be no European Union in the future for Turkey. So Ankara is not only  trying to gain time by looking to its back garden but also trying to knock on Europe's door with an increased credibility.

At the end of the day, Ankara's manoeuvres are not a new invention but the reflection of an active political agenda. As the president of the Washington-based American-Turkish Council, retired Ambassador James Holmes, said, "Turkey is expanding its interests, rather than isolating itself."

The current international alignments are suitable to Turkey's interests, since Washington needs Ankara more than other countries. That is not because of the political swamp in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also because of the ongoing diplomatic track with Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Bush the Junior's imperial policies and Israel's perceived aggression in the region. Indeed, engagement and diplomacy is preferable to Washington rather than confrontations that could dynamite Obama's  "change", slapping aside unclenched fists and preventing a settlement between Israel and Ramallah.

There are limits to this political agenda. Although Ankara is ready with an economic surplus to deliver to its neighbours, it has not solved its own problems.

The weakest chain of the "Zero Problem" policy rattled in Turkey's relations with Armenia. Ankara couldn't break through long-standing fearsin the face of threats over energy supplies from the "little brother" Azerbaijan.

And, within Turkey, thousands of Kurdish children are in prisons and more officials of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) are arrested. Indeed, the war with the Kurdish separatist group PKK is accelerating day-by-day since the Erdogan Government see the Kurdish political movement as a "rival".

And, of course, there are always the Armenian "genocide" issue and the Cyprus problem...

Another limit is Israel . West Jerusalem still means more than a regional power to Washington, remaining and a "friend" and a nuclear "democratic" power. Indeed, Washington sorted out the most recent Flotilla problem and gave a green light to Tel Aviv for an internal inquiry into the violence on the Mavi Marmara. Israel is not discredited in the eyes of Washington just because of a few days, not when military/intelligence relations are indispensable for both sides.

Still, if Ankara can show progress in its Kurdish and Cyprus issues in the near future along with continuing diplomacy advances in the region and a move back from blunter discourse towards Israel, it can continue increasing both its credibility to use as leverage against the EU and to promote its strategic importance to Washington.

Iran Analysis: What's Most Important Today? (Hint: Not Sanctions)

We begin today with a special analysis from Mr Verde of last Friday's events, which become more rather than less significant with the passage of time: "4 June: The Day the Regime Will Regret".

Keep that, and the internal developments in Iran, in mind today as the international politicians and press run amok with the story of Iran's nuclear programme and the world's sanctions. After months of spin and manoeuvre, the UN Security Council will convene this morning in New York to adopt a US-led resolution for stricter financial measures. The Americans are now confident they will get passage, with Russia and China giving assent --- Washington is putting out the line that it will be a 12-3 vote with no vetoes.

Iran Analysis: 4 June “The Day the Regime Will Regret” (Verde)

The economic reality is that, to get Moscow and Beijing on board, the sanctions package has been diluted so much that the measures are marginal. (As EA has noted regularly, the behind-the-scenes effort to get foreign companies to disinvest from Iran is far more significant.) Politically, however, this will be the platform for tough-guy --- and tough-woman --- posturing with claims, "We have been vindicated."



The US and its allies will intone that this shows the world now realises the seriousness of Iran's threat. Russia and China will say very little, and what they say will be very guarded: we have supported the sanctions but the primary path to resolution should be diplomatic discussions. Turkey, which will probably vote No, will use that move to bolster its emerging claim as a defender of negotiation rather than punishment and, thus, as a country able to work both with the big boys like Washington and the smaller nations seeking recognition and respect.

And Iran's leaders will use the UN measure to their own advantage. Three days before the anniversary of the 2009 election, they will tell their people that this proves the hostility of foreign powers --- the same foreign powers who tried to undermine Iranian democracy by supporting the opposition movement and "regime change". They will insist that the vote in New York reminds those in Tehran, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Ahwaz that they cannot let up in their defense of "Iran" (i.e., the Supreme Leader, the President, and the Government).

In other words, they will use the nuclear-sanctions fuss as their saving distraction. It will be upheld over the arrests, sentences, and executions that continue and, in recent days, escalate. It will be given priority over the political disputes --- on the economy, on President Ahmadinejad's battle with Parliament over legislation, on the treatment of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson --- within the ruling establishment. It will be the shiny object held high so Iran's people can look away.

So, as the ink is spilt and trees die today for the rhetoric over the UN sanctions decision, the important spin-off will not be on any claimed effect on Iran's centrifuges and uranium. It will be this: will the political theatre 6121 miles away take over the stage in Tehran? Or will it be set aside --- not by Iran's leaders but by others --- for other, more significant shows?

UPDATED Turkey Inside Line: Parliament, President, and People Condemn Israel

UPDATE 1755 GMT: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan joins in: "Erdogan has told U.S. President Barack Obama that Israel is on the verge of losing its best friend in the Middle East due to its deadly raid on a humanitarian aid headed to the Gaza Strip earlier this week, according to a statement from Erdogan's office."

UPDATE 1635 GMT: Turkish President Abdullah Gul has said in a televised speech, "From now on, Turkish-Israeli ties will never be the same. This incident has left an irreparable and deep scar....[The raid] is not an issue that can be forgotten...or be covered up....Turkey will never forgive this attack."

Gul spoke as thousands gathered in the streets of Istanbul to pay their respects to the eight Turks and one Turkish-American killed in the Israeli assault.

Gaza Flotilla LiveBlog (3 June): Pressure on Israel Grows

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), released a joint declaration on Wednesday condemning Israel and calling on the government to reconsider its relations with West Jerusalem:

TBMM condemns fiercely and vehemently Israeli Defense Forces’ inhumane assault, on 31 May 2010, on the flotilla carrying humanitarian aid with citizens of 32 nations many of whom were Turkish; which led to the death and wounding of many innocent people. It offers its condolences to relatives of the ones who lost their lives and quick recovery wishes to the wounded people.

This attack is an explicit violation of international law.

TBMM expects UNSC to accept a resolution condemning Israel and considering sanctions against it. An independent international investigation committee should be formed in order to ascertain the full dimensions of this reprehensible attack.

Israeli government should officially apologize, make sure that the ones who are responsible are judged and pay compensation to the victims of this attack.

Turkey should apply to national and international judicial remedies. TBMM expects from the Turkish government to reconsider our political, military and economic relations with Israel and to take the necessary measures.

TBMM welcomes the righteous reactions of our people with respect against this attack.

TBMM believes that these reactions will not turn into a violence that can hurt our Jewish citizens.

TBMM, as always, is in solidarity with the Palestinian people and expects the inhumane blockade against Gaza to be lifted.