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Entries in Gaza (25)

Tuesday
Mar312009

Burying Gaza: How Israel's Military Put Away the Oranim Revelations

Related Post: The Israeli Military and Gaza’s Civilians - Returning to The Oranim Transcripts

israel-soldiers21I was working yesternoon afternoon when the news came through, via the Jerusalem Post, that the Israeli military had categorically dismissed accounts --- all but two from the graduates of military course at Oranim College ---of the abuse and killing of civilians in the Gaza War.

I was struck by how quickly the Israel Defense Forces threw out the claims, noted by nine Israeli human rights groups: ""The speedy closing of the investigation immediately raises suspicions that the very opening of this investigation was merely the army's attempt to wipe its hands of all blame for illegal activity during Operation Cast Lead."

Even more blatant, however, was the disconnect between the military's "findings" and the actual statements of the Oranim soldiers.

For example, the Post noted the IDF's conclusion report on "Aviv", who "claimed to have known of a soldier who had been given orders to fire at an elderly Palestinian woman. During his interrogation, Aviv admitted he had never witnessed such an incident and that he'd based his statement on a rumor he had heard."

In fact, it is unclear from the original testimony "Aviv" never claimed in his testimony, reprinted in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz and on this website, whether he witnessed the order by a company commander to a sniper squad to kill the woman, who was walking in a prohibited area. It is clear, however, that he was under orders to use deadly force to ensure "that we wouldn’t get hurt and they wouldn’t fire on us":
[We were] to go into a house. We were supposed to go in with an armored personnel carrier..., to burst through the lower door, to start shooting inside....From above they said it was permissible, because anyone who remained in the sector and inside Gaza City was in effect condemned, a terrorist, because they hadn’t fled.

Significantly (and unnoted in the Post article, "Zvi" follows the testimony of "Aviv" with the clarification that this was "force protection" and not the deliberate murder of civilians:
Aviv’s descriptions are accurate, but it’s possible to understand where this is coming from. And that woman, you don’t know whether she’s … She wasn’t supposed to be there, because there were announcements and there were bombings. Logic says she shouldn’t be there. The way you describe it, as murder in cold blood, that isn’t right.

Put bluntly, the Israeli military invaded one of the most densely-populated areas in the world and marked off parts of it as "prohibited", with shoot-to-kill orders against anyone who trespassed. The Israeli military could have stated this: inevitably civilians were going to die in a war.

Even this, however, could not be admitted. Instead, the Oranim testimony had to be discredited: "A claim made by a different soldier, Ram, who had supposedly been ordered to open fire at a woman and two children, was also found by the probe to be false."

This was a blatant distortion of the testimony of "Ram", who made clear that it was not he but a sharpshooter who killed the woman and children after a breakdown in communication:
There was a house with a family inside. Entry was relatively calm. We didn’t open fire, we just yelled at everyone to come down. We put them in a room and then left the house and entered it from a different lot. A few days after we went in, there was an order to release the family. They had set up positions upstairs. There was a sharpshooters’ position on the roof. The platoon commander let the family go and told them to go to the right. One mother and her two children didn’t understand and went to the left, but they forgot to tell the sharpshooter on the roof they had let them go, and it was was okay and he should hold his fire and he … he did what he was supposed to, like he was following his orders.

In the Gaza War of public opinion, Israel's effort was to ensure that it always held the higher moral ground. That, however, is difficult when Israel and not Hamas had overwhelming force, and that force --- inevitably --- was being used against civilians. In recent weeks, reports by bodies such as the United Nations and Human Rights Watch had detailed the humanitarian costs, but the Oranim revelations were even more damaging. They came from within Israeli ranks.

So Tel Aviv had to step up its "information" campaign. Reporters were summoned to a briefing by an armoured unit commander, Colonel Roi Elkabets, to give "examples of what he said were the dilemmas they faced". Ethan Bronner of The New York Times wrote accordingly, "Officers are stepping forward, some at the urging of the top command, others on their own, offering numerous accounts of having held their fire out of concern for civilians, helping Palestinians in need and punishing improper soldier behavior".

And the campaign, far more effectively than the military invasion of Gaza, worked. Today's British and American media faithfully cite the IDF's findings on Oranim, "The Israeli military on Monday rejected allegations that its soldiers committed atrocities against Palestinians in Gaza" (CNN); "Brig. Gen. Avichai Mendelblit, the IDF's advocate general, found no evidence to support the most serious accusations, including alleged instances in which civilians were shot without cause" (Washington Post); "The military police found that the crucial components of their descriptions were based on hearsay and not supported by specific personal knowledge" (New York Times).

None of those reporters referred to the original Oranim transcripts.

War is about winning, not about the truth. So one can set aside last week's commentary by Larry Derfner, ironically in the same Jerusalem Post that moved quickly to put the military's "findings2:
We can refuse to think about this, we can tell ourselves that Oranim is a hotbed of left-wingers, we can bury this so the anti-Semites and The Hague don't use it against us. Or we can admit the truth and decide that we have to change.

We can be loyal to Israel's image. Or we can be loyal to our sons.
Monday
Mar302009

The Israeli Military and Gaza's Civilians: Returning to The Oranim Transcripts

Related Post: Burying Gaza - How Israel’s Military Put Away the Oranim Revelations

israel-soldiers2"In effect, we were supposed to go up floor by floor, and any person we identified - we were supposed to shoot."

The Israeli military has now completed its investigation of the claims made by graduates of the Yitzhak Rabin pre-military preparatory program, held at Oranim Academic College, of abuses by the Israeli Defense Forces during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. According to the Jerusalem Post:
The Military Police completed its official investigation into the accounts on Monday and concluded that they were categorically false and based on rumors....The probe also concluded that the stories of the soldiers who participated in the conference were purposely exaggerated and made extreme, in order to make a point to the participants at the conference. The IDF Advocate-General Brig.-Gen. Avihai Mandelblit decided to close the case in the wake of the findings.

We will comment on the "investigation" in a separate blog. For the moment, here are the extracts from the soldiers' accounts, as they appeared in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz:

Danny Zamir: "I don't intend for us to evaluate the achievements and the diplomatic-political significance of Operation Cast Lead this evening, nor need we deal with the systemic military aspect [of it]. However, discussion is necessary because this was, all told, an exceptional war action in terms of the history of the IDF, which has set new limits for the army's ethical code and that of the State of Israel as a whole.

"This is an action that sowed massive destruction among civilians. It is not certain that it was possible do have done it differently, but ultimately we have emerged from this operation and are not facing real paralysis from the Qassams. It is very possible that we will repeat such an operation on a larger scale in the years to come, because the problem in the Gaza Strip is not simple and it is not at all certain that it has been solved. What we want this evening is to hear from the fighters."

Aviv: "I am squad commander of a company that is still in training, from the Givati Brigade. We went into a neighborhood in the southern part of Gaza City. Altogether, this is a special experience. In the course of the training, you wait for the day you will go into Gaza, and in the end it isn't really like they say it is. It's more like, you come, you take over a house, you kick the tenants out and you move in. We stayed in a house for something like a week.

"Toward the end of the operation there was a plan to go into a very densely populated area inside Gaza City itself. In the briefings they started to talk to us about orders for opening fire inside the city, because as you know they used a huge amount of firepower and killed a huge number of people along the way, so that we wouldn't get hurt and they wouldn't fire on us.

"At first the specified action was to go into a house. We were supposed to go in with an armored personnel carrier called an Achzarit [literally, Cruel] to burst through the lower door, to start shooting inside and then ... I call this murder ... in effect, we were supposed to go up floor by floor, and any person we identified - we were supposed to shoot. I initially asked myself: Where is the logic in this?

"From above they said it was permissible, because anyone who remained in the sector and inside Gaza City was in effect condemned, a terrorist, because they hadn't fled. I didn't really understand: On the one hand they don't really have anywhere to flee to, but on the other hand they're telling us they hadn't fled so it's their fault ... This also scared me a bit. I tried to exert some influence, insofar as is possible from within my subordinate position, to change this. In the end the specification involved going into a house, operating megaphones and telling [the tenants]: 'Come on, everyone get out, you have five minutes, leave the house, anyone who doesn't get out gets killed.'

"I went to our soldiers and said, 'The order has changed. We go into the house, they have five minutes to escape, we check each person who goes out individually to see that he has no weapons, and then we start going into the house floor by floor to clean it out ... This means going into the house, opening fire at everything that moves , throwing a grenade, all those things. And then there was a very annoying moment. One of my soldiers came to me and asked, 'Why?' I said, 'What isn't clear? We don't want to kill innocent civilians.' He goes, 'Yeah? Anyone who's in there is a terrorist, that's a known fact.' I said, 'Do you think the people there will really run away? No one will run away.' He says, 'That's clear,' and then his buddies join in: 'We need to murder any person who's in there. Yeah, any person who's in Gaza is a terrorist,' and all the other things that they stuff our heads with, in the media.

"And then I try to explain to the guy that not everyone who is in there is a terrorist, and that after he kills, say, three children and four mothers, we'll go upstairs and kill another 20 or so people. And in the end it turns out that [there are] eight floors times five apartments on a floor - something like a minimum of 40 or 50 families that you murder. I tried to explain why we had to let them leave, and only then go into the houses. It didn't really help. This is really frustrating, to see that they understand that inside Gaza you are allowed to do anything you want, to break down doors of houses for no reason other than it's cool.

"You do not get the impression from the officers that there is any logic to it, but they won't say anything. To write 'death to the Arabs' on the walls, to take family pictures and spit on them, just because you can. I think this is the main thing in understanding how much the IDF has fallen in the realm of ethics, really. It's what I'll remember the most."

"One of our officers, a company commander, saw someone coming on some road, a woman, an old woman. She was walking along pretty far away, but close enough so you could take out someone you saw there. If she were suspicious, not suspicious - I don't know. In the end, he sent people up to the roof, to take her out with their weapons. From the description of this story, I simply felt it was murder in cold blood."

Zamir: "I don't understand. Why did he shoot her?"

Aviv: "That's what is so nice, supposedly, about Gaza: You see a person on a road, walking along a path. He doesn't have to be with a weapon, you don't have to identify him with anything and you can just shoot him. With us it was an old woman, on whom I didn't see any weapon. The order was to take the person out, that woman, the moment you see her."

Zvi: "Aviv's descriptions are accurate, but it's possible to understand where this is coming from. And that woman, you don't know whether she's ... She wasn't supposed to be there, because there were announcements and there were bombings. Logic says she shouldn't be there. The way you describe it, as murder in cold blood, that isn't right. It's known that they have lookouts and that sort of thing."

Gilad: "Even before we went in, the battalion commander made it clear to everyone that a very important lesson from the Second Lebanon War was the way the IDF goes in - with a lot of fire. The intention was to protect soldiers' lives by means of firepower. In the operation the IDF's losses really were light and the price was that a lot of Palestinians got killed."

Ram: "I serve in an operations company in the Givati Brigade. After we'd gone into the first houses, there was a house with a family inside. Entry was relatively calm. We didn't open fire, we just yelled at everyone to come down. We put them in a room and then left the house and entered it from a different lot. A few days after we went in, there was an order to release the family. They had set up positions upstairs. There was a sharpshooters' position on the roof. The platoon commander let the family go and told them to go to the right. One mother and her two children didn't understand and went to the left, but they forgot to tell the sharpshooter on the roof they had let them go, and it was was okay and he should hold his fire and he ... he did what he was supposed to, like he was following his orders."

Question from the audience: "At what range was this?"

Ram: "Between 100 and 200 meters, something like that. They had also came out of the house that he was on the roof of, they had advanced a bit and suddenly he saw then, people moving around in an area where they were forbidden to move around. I don't think he felt too bad about it, because after all, as far as he was concerned, he did his job according to the orders he was given. And the atmosphere in general, from what I understood from most of my men who I talked to ... I don't know how to describe it .... The lives of Palestinians, let's say, is something very, very less important than the lives of our soldiers. So as far as they are concerned they can justify it that way."

Yuval Friedman (chief instructor at the Rabin program): "Wasn't there a standing order to request permission to open fire?"

Ram: "No. It exists, beyond a certain line. The idea is that you are afraid that they are going to escape from you. If a terrorist is approaching and he is too close, he could blow up the house or something like that."

Zamir: "After a killing like that, by mistake, do they do some sort of investigation in the IDF? Do they look into how they could have corrected it?"

Ram: "They haven't come from the Military Police's investigative unit yet. There hasn't been any ... For all incidents, there are individual investigations and general examinations, of all of the conduct of the war. But they haven't focused on this specifically."

Moshe: "The attitude is very simple: It isn't pleasant to say so, but no one cares at all. We aren't investigating this. This is what happens during fighting and this is what happens during routine security."

Ram: "What I do remember in particular at the beginning is the feeling of almost a religious mission. My sergeant is a student at a hesder yeshiva [a program that combines religious study and military service]. Before we went in, he assembled the whole platoon and led the prayer for those going into battle. A brigade rabbi was there, who afterward came into Gaza and went around patting us on the shoulder and encouraging us, and praying with people. And also when we were inside they sent in those booklets, full of Psalms, a ton of Psalms. I think that at least in the house I was in for a week, we could have filled a room with the Psalms they sent us, and other booklets like that.

"There was a huge gap between what the Education Corps sent out and what the IDF rabbinate sent out. The Education Corps published a pamphlet for commanders - something about the history of Israel's fighting in Gaza from 1948 to the present. The rabbinate brought in a lot of booklets and articles, and ... their message was very clear: We are the Jewish people, we came to this land by a miracle, God brought us back to this land and now we need to fight to expel the gentiles who are interfering with our conquest of this holy land. This was the main message, and the whole sense many soldiers had in this operation was of a religious war. From my position as a commander and 'explainer,' I attempted to talk about the politics - the streams in Palestinian society, about how not everyone who is in Gaza is Hamas, and not every inhabitant wants to vanquish us. I wanted to explain to the soldiers that this war is not a war for the sanctification of the holy name, but rather one to stop the Qassams."

Zamir: "I would like to ask the pilots who are here, Gideon and Yonatan, to tell us a little about their perspective. As an infantryman, this has always interested me. How does it feel when you bomb a city like that?"

Gideon: "First of all, about what you have said concerning the crazy amounts of firepower: Right in the first foray in the fighting, the quantities were very impressive, very large, and this is mainly what sent all the Hamasniks into hiding in the deepest shelters and kept them from showing their faces until some two weeks after the fighting.

"In general the way that it works for us, just so you will understand the differences a bit, is that at night I would come to the squadron, do one foray in Gaza and go home to sleep. I go home to sleep in Tel Aviv, in my warm bed. I'm not stuck in a bed in the home of a Palestinian family, so life is a little better.

"When I'm with the squadron, I don't see a terrorist who is launching a Qassam and then decide to fly out to get him. There is a whole system that supports us, that serves as eyes, ears and intelligence for every plane that takes off, and creates more and more targets in real-time, of one level of legitimacy or another. In any case, I try to believe that these are targets [determined according to] the highest possible level of legitimacy.

"They dropped leaflets over Gaza and would sometimes fire a missile from a helicopter into the corner of some house, just to shake up the house a bit so everyone inside would flee. These things worked. The families came out, and really people [i.e., soldiers] did enter houses that were pretty empty, at least of innocent civilians. From this perspective it works.

"In any case, I arrive at the squadron, I get a target with a description and coordinates, and basically just make sure it isn't within the line of our forces. I look at the picture of the house I am suppose to attack, I see that it matches reality, I take off, I push the button and the bomb takes itself exactly to within one meter of the target itself."

Zamir: "Among the pilots, is there also talk or thoughts of remorse? For example, I was terribly surprised by the enthusiasm surrounding the killing of the Gaza traffic police on the first day of the operation: They took out 180 traffic cops. As a pilot, I would have questioned that."

Gideon: "There are two parts to this. Tactically speaking, you call them 'police.' In any case, they are armed and belong to Hamas ... During better times, they take Fatah people and throw them off the roofs and see what happens.

"With regard to the thoughts, you sit with the squadron and there are lots of discussions about the value-related significance of the fighting, about what we are doing; there is a lot to talk about. From the moment you start the plane's engine until the moment you turn it off, all of your thoughts, all of your concentration and all of your attention are on the mission you have to carry out. If you have an unjustified doubt, you're liable to cause a far greater screw-up and knock down a school with 40 children. If the building I hit isn't the one I am supposed to hit, but rather a house with our guys inside - the price of the mistake is very, very high."

Question from the audience: "Was there anyone in the squadron who didn't push the button, who thought twice?"

Gideon: "That question should be addressed to those involved in the helicopter operation, or to the guys who see what they do. With the weapons I used, my ability to make a decision that contradicts what they told me up to that point is zero. I dispatch the bomb from a range within which I can see the entire Gaza Strip. I also see Haifa, I also see Sinai, but it's more or less the same. It's from really far away."

Yossi: "I am a platoon sergeant in an operations company of the Paratroops Brigade. We were in a house and discovered a family inside that wasn't supposed to be there. We assembled them all in the basement, posted two guards at all times and made sure they didn't make any trouble. Gradually, the emotional distance between us broke down - we had cigarettes with them, we drank coffee with them, we talked about the meaning of life and the fighting in Gaza. After very many conversations the owner of the house, a man of 70-plus, was saying it's good we are in Gaza and it's good that the IDF is doing what it is doing.

"The next day we sent the owner of the house and his son, a man of 40 or 50, for questioning. The day after that, we received an answer: We found out that both are political activists in Hamas. That was a little annoying - that they tell you how fine it is that you're here and good for you and blah-blah-blah, and then you find out that they were lying to your face the whole time.

"What annoyed me was that in the end, after we understood that the members of this family weren't exactly our good friends and they pretty much deserved to be forcibly ejected from there, my platoon commander suggested that when we left the house, we should clean up all the stuff, pick up and collect all the garbage in bags, sweep and wash the floor, fold up the blankets we used, make a pile of the mattresses and put them back on the beds."

Zamir: "What do you mean? Didn't every IDF unit that left a house do that?"

Yossi: "No. Not at all. On the contrary: In most of the houses graffiti was left behind and things like that."

Zamir: "That's simply behaving like animals."

Yossi: "You aren't supposed to be concentrating on folding blankets when you're being shot at."

Zamir: "I haven't heard all that much about you being shot at. It's not that I'm complaining, but if you've spent a week in a home, clean up your filth."

Aviv: "We got an order one day: All of the equipment, all of the furniture - just clean out the whole house. We threw everything, everything, out of the windows to make room. The entire contents of the house went flying out the windows."

Yossi: "There was one day when a Katyusha, a Grad, landed in Be'er Sheva and a mother and her baby were moderately to seriously injured. They were neighbors of one of my soldiers. We heard the whole story on the radio, and he didn't take it lightly - that his neighbors were seriously hurt. So the guy was a bit antsy, and you can understand him. To tell a person like that, 'Come on, let's wash the floor of the house of a political activist in Hamas, who has just fired a Katyusha at your neighbors that has amputated one of their legs' - this isn't easy to do, especially if you don't agree with it at all. When my platoon commander said, 'Okay, tell everyone to fold up blankets and pile up mattresses,' it wasn't easy for me to take. There was lot of shouting. In the end I was convinced and realized it really was the right thing to do. Today I appreciate and even admire him, the platoon commander, for what happened there. In the end I don't think that any army, the Syrian army, the Afghani army, would wash the floor of its enemy's houses, and it certainly wouldn't fold blankets and put them back in the closets."

Zamir: "I think it would be important for parents to sit here and hear this discussion. I think it would be an instructive discussion, and also very dismaying and depressing. You are describing an army with very low value norms, that's the truth ... I am not judging you and I am not complaining about you. I'm just reflecting what I'm feeling after hearing your stories. I wasn't in Gaza, and I assume that among reserve soldiers the level of restraint and control is higher, but I think that all in all, you are reflecting and describing the kind of situation we were in.

"After the Six-Day War, when people came back from the fighting, they sat in circles and described what they had been through. For many years the people who did this were said to be 'shooting and crying.' In 1983, when we came back from the Lebanon War, the same things were said about us. We need to think about the events we have been through. We need to grapple with them also, in terms of establishing a standard or different norms.

"It is quite possible that Hamas and the Syrian army would behave differently from me. The point is that we aren't Hamas and we aren't the Syrian army or the Egyptian army, and if clerics are anointing us with oil and sticking holy books in our hands, and if the soldiers in these units aren't representative of the whole spectrum in the Jewish people, but rather of certain segments of the population - what are we expecting? To whom are we complaining?

"As reservists we don't take relate seriously to the orders of the regional brigades. We let the old people go through and we let families go through. Why kill people when it's clear to you that they are civilians? Which aspect of Israel's security will be harmed, who will be harmed? Exercise judgment, be human."
Thursday
Mar262009

Hamas' Khalid Meshaal on Relations with Israel, US 

meshaal21Hamas political director Khalid Meshaal spoke for three hours last week with Paul McGeough, an Australian journalist who has written a book about the rise of Hamas and Israel's attempts to kill Meshaal. In the interview, Meshaal talked about relations with Israel (“Hamas has declared it’s acceptance of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories; we have joined the political process; we have entered short-term truces with Israel - this is the reality that the world needs to deal with" and relations with countries outside the region ("We’re willing to open a new page with the US and Europe....But they have to be serious about dealing with us on Palestinian rights.”), and the political prospects of the organisation (“If the Palestinian people were gamblers, they would bet on Hamas").

This is McGeough's summary, reprinted from Syria Comment:

DAMASCUS: The tea-cup stops short of his lip, as Khalid Mishal pauses to consider the ironies of trench warfare in the Middle East - a lurch to the political right has anointed as Israel’s next prime minister the man who, 11 years ago, sent Mossad agents on a bizarre mission to assassinate Mishal.

It is late Wednesday evening - March 18 - and Mishal sits deep in a plump armchair, in a second-floor reception room. “Netanyahu…,” he asks, returning to his cup of tea. “Its fate, God’s destiny, but we can’t set policy on the basis of personal grudges.”

The Palestinian resistance leader, whose suicide bombers and assassins have taken their own toll on Israeli life over the years, then declares his would-be-killer to be a man of straw. “We’ve already experienced Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel, so Palestinians are not afraid of him second time round,” Mishal vouches.

“After the battle of Gaza [in December-January] and the steadfastness of our people in the face of the Zionist war machine, do you expect a single Palestinian to be scared of this man? It doesn’t matter if he tries again to kill me, because he’s already killed my people.”

At the time of the 1997 attempt on his life, Mishal was an unlikely target - a mid-level Hamas operative, based in Amman, the capital of Jordan.

These days he is the supreme leader of Hamas, hunkering in a bunker set against a scrabbly hillside in the southern suburbs of the Syrian capital, deep inside a secure enclave which is reserved for high officials of the Damascus regime, foreign diplomats and the staff of foreign NGOs.

It is an unmarked, nondescript apartment block that doubles as jihad headquarters and as Mishal’s family home, where his teenage children are just as likely to wander in, taking a seat for the most intense discussions on Hamas operations.

Festooned with swivelling security cameras, the building also is watched over by an outer ring of leather-jacketed security men who juggle firearms and walkie-talkies as they prowl the pavement.

A Hamas car collects select visitors from city hotels - only by prior arrangement. When discretion is needed, one of a fleet of heavy black Mercedes Benz sedans is wheeled out - black curtains are drawn behind the tinted glass.

When greater discretion is required, the Hamas driver jumps the car on to the pavement, easing to a halt under an outstretched awning that hangs from the perimeter wall of the Hamas HQ. The house guards, moving with practised precision, then seize the loose ends of two bunched canvas flaps suspended from the awning, and draw them quickly out to the edge of the pavement, enveloping vehicles as they arrive, before some of Mishal’s more mysterious callers dare to alight.

The arrival of an outsider is an emergency event for Mishal’s suit-and-tied inner security ring. These men frequently speak into microphones concealed in the cuff of their jacket sleeve. Their thoroughness reveals an understanding that their boss is a constant target for a determined enemy.

Beyond an airport-like, walk-through security scanner and up a set of stairs with a dog-legged turn, a heavy, double-bolted door leads into a hallway, from which a visitor is escorted through a set of big double doors into Mishal’s diwan, or meeting place.

Armchairs line the long walls and the décor is various shades of Hamas green. But upon entering, it is a wall of mostly gaunt faces that locks the attention of a visitor - arranged in a honeycomb pattern; they are 20 Hamas leaders, fighters and bomb-makers, all victims of Israel’s campaign of targeted assassination. It is a sobering achievement in life that Mishal has reached age 53 without his visage being added to this wall of death.

The Hamas leader holds forth expansively, negotiating the tripwires of the diplomatic and political minefields that he inhabits daily, with certainty and a confidence that verges on bombast, as he lectures a fast-changing world on how it should respond to his movement - not than the reverse.

This is the first interview in which Mishal, designated a terrorist by Washington and Europe, makes his first detailed response to the outcome of transformative elections in the US and Israel; the Gaza war; and the imminent return to power in Israel of his would-be assassin - Benjamin Netanyahu.

Mishal starts, on what he genuinely seems to believe is a conciliatory note. However, in the corridors of power in Washington and the other capitals of the Middle East Quartet, they likely will be heard as a challenge.

“We’re willing to open a new page with the US and Europe,” he says through an interpreter, daring President Barack Obama to chart a radical change of course in the Middle East as an acknowledgement of decades of failed US policy in the region. “He’ll continue to repeat the mistakes of those who went before him, unless there is a marked change.”

But as Mishal expanded on his ‘new page’ theme, it soon emerges that what he really means to say is that Hamas requires the US and the European Union to open a new page with the Palestinian Islamist movement.

“I don’t mean that Hamas will take a new [policy] position. I’m talking about a readiness on our part to deal with Washington and Europe. But they have to be serious about dealing with us on Palestinian rights.”

Arguing that Washington and its European allied need to abandon their policy of isolating Hamas until the movement folds to conditions set by the Middle East Quartet, Mishal lectures: “They’ve been trying the wrong way and the wrong approach.”

Then he takes apart what he sees as early signs that nothing has changed in Washington since George W. Bush departed the White House in January.

There is little value, Mishal says, in appointing the experienced Northern Irish peace-broker George Mitchell as a US envoy to the Middle East, if he is not authorised to talk to Hamas. “Would he have succeeded in Belfast if he was ordered to ignore the IRA?”

Mishal is derisory of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s ready acceptance of the Bush Administrations’ insistence that Hamas accede to Quartet demands that the Islamists renounce violence, recognise the state of Israel and abide by all previous undertakings on behalf of the Palestinian people.

He belittles Clinton’s warning that international donations for the reconstruction of Gaza had to be kept out of the “wrong hands.” And he ridiculed the seeming contradiction in her invitation to Iran to attend a regional conference on the future of Afghanistan, at the same time as she shunned Hamas on the grounds that not only was it a terrorist group, but “increasingly it was a client of Iran.”

“So despite a new presidency, it’s the same attitude in Washington,” Mishal says. “We expected real change from Obama - not just talk about change.

“They refused to accept the results of the Palestinian election because Hamas won - that failed. They resorted to imposing a siege on the Gaza Strip - that failed. Then they went to war against the Palestinians - and that failed.

“Despite all this, Hamas has advanced and grown, [so] within the logic of real politick, it is Washington that must reconsider its position if they want to achieve an outcome that is not failure.

“The US and Europe have become accustomed to insisting, that the change they demand of the Arabs will be that which is demanded by Israel, [but] the Israeli vision of peace creates only war and chaos.”

The bulk of the Hamas leader’s critique is aimed at Washington’s conduct of what Mishal calls the Palestinian file. And he denies there can be any reason for concern in Hamas at the Obama Administrations dramatic departure from the other policies of its predecessor in the region - its efforts to engage Tehran and Damascus, which could expose Hamas to uncertainties about its future.

Washington is seeking a thaw in its relations with Syria. At the same time it has asked Russia to intervene with Iran, hoping Moscow middlemen might persuade the Iranian regime to back away from its nuclear program. But Syria and Iran are Hamas’ principal sponsors in the region.

Mishal concedes that these indeed are significant events unfolding around his movement. But he prefers to cast them as Obama’s admission of the errors of the Bush II era, or as he puts it, “Washington having to deal with parties that have proved themselves on the ground.”

There’s more lecturing on this theme before he will address the question - which is about the risk that Hamas might become a sacrificial small-fry in any big-picture horse-trading between Washington and Damascus and or Tehran. Mishal inches up to the issue, warning that the U.S. should not seek to “isolate certain parties at the expense of other parties.”

Finally he bites in terms of the position of Hamas. “We’re not worried,” he says. “Hamas is not a card in anyone’s hand. We play an effective role, even in times of dramatic change. Nothing is going to happen in this region until the Palestinian issue is properly addressed - and many countries in the region, including Iran and Syria, hold a principled commitment to the Palestinian cause.”

As much as Mishal criticises Washington, he also pitches a quick plea that it not accept an argument in some quarters that perhaps the U.S. should seek achievable goals elsewhere, while leaving the Palestine-Israel diplomacy to regional players - like Cairo and an increasingly assertive Istanbul. “Israel doesn’t listen to the regional players. The only party that has the power to pressure Israel and to dictate terms to it is Washington.”

Does Khalid Mishal have any regrets about the extent of the damage Israeli forces inflicted on Gaza in December-January - about 1300 Palestinians dead, thousands injured and thousands of homes and other buildings damaged and destroyed? The assault came after Hamas refused to renegotiate a truce, on the grounds that Israel had consistently violated what Hamas understood to be the terms of the six-month ceasefire.

Reminded that the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had publicly acknowledged that had he known the ferocity of the Israeli retaliation when it invaded Lebanon after the abduction of three Israeli soldiers in 2006, he would not have taken the soldiers, Mishal insists that Gaza and Hamas are different cases.

“The 2006 captures were an option, a choice for Hezbollah; so they are entitled to assess the validity of what they did in terms of the consequences for Lebanon. But for the Palestinians, Gaza wasn’t a question of choice.

“Israel was supposed to end the siege and open the border-crossings in return for a halt to the rockets - the rockets stopped, but the siege remained and the crossings stayed closed. It’s unfair to ask Palestinians if they want to die slowly under siege, or quickly under fire.”

Hamas senses a thaw in its isolation. Mishal’s visitors on the day he is interviewed, include parliamentary delegations from Greece and Italy. A few days previously, they came from the British and European parliaments.

These MPs come in a wave of publicity, challenging their governments to engage Hamas. But the trail-blazers came earlier - analysts from American and European think-tanks who decided the time had come to make discrete efforts to understand the Hamas mindset.

These are small, non-government delegations. But they are signs of different times for Hamas, of feelers being extended from corners of the world that till now have gone along with the US-led campaign to keep Hamas snap-frozen. And they are in marked contrast to the cold shoulder Israel is feeling around the world in the aftermath of its ferocious assault on Gaza, a chill that is billed in Israel as the country’s worst diplomatic crisis in two decades.

As Israel increases its PR spend in a bid to arrest its plummeting stocks internationally in the aftermath of Gaza, Hamas is buoyed by confirmation from Britain that, notwithstanding consternation in Washington, it is moving to ease its isolation of Hezbollah, Hamas’ counterpart in Lebanon, by agreeing to talk to its political wing.

London says the move is justified because Hezbollah joined a government of national unity. Given that national unity talks are on foot in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, an argument is being formulated in Hamas that it should be granted the same dispensation by London.

France too has intimated a willingness to open dialogue with Hamas and a growing army of former government officials and international peace negotiators is urging that Hamas be given a seat at the table. Led by former US president Jimmy Carter, who has visited Mishal in Damascus, it includes the likes of former British Prime Minister Tony Bair and the head of Saudi intelligence, Prince Turki Bin Faisal.

Despite, or perhaps because of the carnage in Gaza, the mood in the Hamas bunker is upbeat - support for the Islamist movement among Palestinians rose markedly after the January hostility, just as it fell for the US-backed Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and his enfeebled Fatah faction, whose writ is confined to the West Bank.

“More and more, the US and Israel and others in their camp understand that they cannot implement their agenda against us - because of the strength that we have acquired,” Mishal says. “Netanyahu destroyed the peace process the last time he was prime minister and his plan now for Palestinians to be limited to some kind of economic independence will fail too.”

Pressed on what policy changes Hamas might make as a gesture to a new regional order, Mishal offers little, arguing: “Hamas has already changed - we accepted the national accords for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and we took part in the 2006 Palestinian elections. Where is the response by Washington and the others? All we got was hostility and negativity.”

In particular, Mishal refuses to entertain rewriting Hamas’ offensive charter, despite the chance that such a move could alter perceptions of the movement at the same time as it might serve to protect the movement’s underbelly from sniping by its critics.

In 2005, the Hamas had appointed a committee to review its controversial 1988 Charter - with its offensive language, its anti Semitism, its incitement to battle and is calls for the elimination f the state of Israel. In a costly fit of pique over being consigned to the sinbin by the US and others after its election win, Hamas shelved the review.

Policy changes by Hamas have rendered much of the document redundant. But the continued inclusion of the call for the destruction of Israel has exposes Hamas to regular atacks.

Revealing that the pique of 2006 is just as potent today, Mishal says: “They didn’t give us a chance after we won the election, irrespective of what we might have done.” Will the charter be rewritten - “not a chance.”

“The message to us from the world was absolute rejection of the election outcome, because the result was not acceptable to the US and to corrupt elements of the Palestinian community [read Fatah].

“Our approach is not by means of changing the charter, a document written in 1988, but by virtue of our policy program today. Judge us by what we do today - not by what was written more than 20 years ago.

“Hamas has declared it’s acceptance of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories; we have joined the political process; we have entered short-term truces with Israel - this is the reality that the world needs to deal with. You say people use the Charter as a weapon against us - well, let them.”

For now, at least, Mishal’s public face is that Hamas is prepared to engage the world - but on his terms.

He becomes irritable when questioned about a letter from Hamas to President Obama, which reportedly was passed to US Senator John Kerry during a recent visit to Israel and Gaza.

“I don’t want to talk about it,” he says. Pressed, he claims that the letter was on behalf of an individual - not the movement.

“If Hamas wishes to communicate with the US Administration, it will do so in a different way - at the right time; in the appropriate manner. Up to now, the Americans have rejected any communication with us. Hamas knows itself well and those who reject it today will find themselves compelled to deal with it tomorrow,” he says.

“In the meantime, Hamas will communicate with Washington through its actions on the ground - I’m talking about all our activities; about our weight and effectiveness; our social welfare and our resistance.”

If that’s how he feels about talking to Washington, what about direct talks with Israel?

Neither side likes to admit it, but Israel and Hamas have demonstrated that they actually can negotiate and in some circumstances, achieve outcomes that are acceptable to each other.

For all the squabbling over how the Gaza truce was breached and by which party, they did agree to a six-month ceasefire last summer - which Hamas held to, despite its view that Israel did not stick to its side of the deal.

There was no agreed text. This was an indirect understanding, arrived at through talks by negotiators for Hamas and Israel who met separately with Egyptian middlemen.

Israel believed that Hamas had agreed to stop the rain of rockets fired from Gaza into nearby Israeli communities. Hoping to breathe some life back into the strip’s comatose economy, Hamas understood that in exchange, Israel would end its year-long siege of Gaza.

Figures quoted by The New York Times, indicate that the rocket-rate was reduced by as much as 80-90 per cent as Hamas curbed its own fire and that of the lesser militia groups in Gaza.

But in comparison, the number of trucks entering Gaza increased only marginally. By closing its border crossings into Gaza, Israel can stop the movement of goods, fuel and people, often allowing a trickle of movement that imposes a level of hardship that amounts to total economic collapse.

Under the June deal, the daily rate of trucks entering Gaza did increase - but only from about 70 a day to about 90 which, according to the figures quoted in The New York Times - well short of a pre-siege delivery-rate of 500-600 trucks a day.

In light of that experience, would Hamas negotiate directly with Israel, to produce documented deals that might allow third parties to more accurately verify compliance or violations?

“Direct or indirect is not the point,” Mishal says. “What really matters is will Israel be truly ready to recognise Palestinian rights and to end the occupation? When Israel is ready to accept this,” he goes on, “we will decide what to do … but we’ll not give them a platform for useless negotiation, for trying to improve their image internationally [because] they always try to buy time and to create new facts on the ground.”

When the shooting stopped in Gaza earlier this year, there were more indirect talks. But Hamas refuses to buckle to Israel’s terms and as Mishal describes it, rather cumbersomely, “the situation is not war like it was in January … and it’s not a state of calm.”

At this point, the Hamas leader stubbornly refuses to acknowledge a more colourful description of events on the ground by one of his colleagues, who told reporters in February, “the [smuggling] tunnels are still operating and rockets are still being fired.”

Mishal refuses to take the question. Pressed to explain, he says: “I am a leader. From my position as leader, I describe and express myself in a manner which I deem to be best when I speak about the situation.”

“But the tunnels are open and rockets are firing, aren’t they?” he is asked. At this point, Mishal becomes Delphic: “You know my way of talking. There is an Arab proverb -‘every situation has its way of being expressed’!”

Mishal insists that it is the Israelis who must explain why the latest truce negotiations collapsed - including their failure to agree terms for the release of the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. But in what Israel will read as a threat, he warns there is a risk that more Israeli troops will captured by Hamas - to increase the pressure for Israel to agree to Hamas’ demand for the release of as many as 1400 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.

Asked about reports the accuracy of reports that Hamas is seeking freedom for 1400 prisoners, Mishal explains the calculus of the negotiations - from Hamas’ perspective.

In the most celebrated exchanged in the past, three Israeli soldiers were swapped, in 1985, for 1150 Palestinians - almost 400 Palestinians for each Israeli.

Asked how Hamas now could demand more than three times that many Palestinians in return for Shalit’s freedom, he says: “Israel’s prisoner numbers were relatively low in ‘85 - 1150 would have been most of those they held. The number we are seeking for Shalit is only one-tenth of today’s number of Palestinians in Israeli jails.

“The Israelis just don’t learn. When they refuse to release Palestinians, it forces the Palestinians to resort to other means to gain their release - and inevitable this incudes the capture of more Israeli soldiers.”

In the March 18 interview in Damascus, Mishal recommits Hamas to the electoral process in the Occupied Territories - despite Israel rounding up and jailing more than 30 of Hamas’ West Bank MPs in the aftermath of the 2006 election. And in the days after the interview, taking in 10 senior Hamas figures in the West Bank, including four MPs, who Israel described as ‘terror operatives’ - reportedly in a bid to pressure Hamas to accept Israel’s terms in the haggling over Shalit.

Underlying Mishal’s analysis is Hamas’ determination to avoid what it sees as the pitfalls, for the Palestinian side, of the years that followed the 1993 Oslo Accords.

Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the Fatah movement and the PLO renounced violence as a weapon and recognised the state of Israel, but achieved little in endless rounds of so-called peace talks as Israel continued to carve up the Occupied Territories to suit its own needs. Since Arafat’s death at the end of 2004, his successor Mahmoud Abbas has made no headway either.

Finishing up, Mishal lays out the pieces of the geopolitical puzzle and he laughs. Despite Islam’s prohibition on gambling, he concludes: “If the Palestinian people were gamblers, they would bet on Hamas.”
Wednesday
Mar252009

Full Text: Human Rights Watch Report on Israel's Use of White Phosphorous

Related Post: UN Human Rights Council Report on Israel’s Human Rights Violations in Gaza

hrw-rain-of-fire

Update: CNN and Al Jazeera have now picked up on this report and run summary stories.

Two days after investigators for the United Nations Human Rights Council documented Israeli violations of human rights in the Gaza War, Human Rights Watch has released a 71-page report with "witness accounts of the devastating effects that white phosphorus munitions had on civilians and civilian property in Gaza".

The report contends:
White phosphorus munitions did not kill the most civilians in Gaza – many more died from missiles, bombs, heavy artillery, tank shells, and small arms fire – but their use in densely populated neighborhoods, including downtown Gaza City, violated international humanitarian law (the laws of war), which requires taking all feasible precautions to avoid civilian harm and prohibits indiscriminate attacks.

The unlawful use of white phosphorus was neither incidental nor accidental. It was repeated over time and in different locations, with the IDF "air-bursting" the munition in populated areas up to the last days of its military operation. Even if intended as an obscurant rather than as a weapon, the IDF's repeated firing of air-burst white phosphorus shells from 155mm artillery into densely populated areas was indiscriminate and indicates the commission of war crimes.

Rain of Fire: Israel's Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza

I. Summary

This report documents Israel's extensive use of white phosphorus munitions during its 22-day military operations in Gaza, from December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009, named Operation Cast Lead. Based on in-depth investigations in Gaza, the report concludes that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) repeatedly exploded white phosphorus munitions in the air over populated areas, killing and injuring civilians, and damaging civilian structures, including a school, a market, a humanitarian aid warehouse and a hospital.

White phosphorus munitions did not kill the most civilians in Gaza – many more died from missiles, bombs, heavy artillery, tank shells, and small arms fire – but their use in densely populated neighborhoods, including downtown Gaza City, violated international humanitarian law (the laws of war), which requires taking all feasible precautions to avoid civilian harm and prohibits indiscriminate attacks.

The unlawful use of white phosphorus was neither incidental nor accidental. It was repeated over time and in different locations, with the IDF "air-bursting" the munition in populated areas up to the last days of its military operation. Even if intended as an obscurant rather than as a weapon, the IDF's repeated firing of air-burst white phosphorus shells from 155mm artillery into densely populated areas was indiscriminate and indicates the commission of war crimes.

The dangers posed by white phosphorus to civilians were well-known to Israeli commanders, who have used the munition for many years. According to a medical report prepared during the hostilities by the ministry of health, "[w]hite phosphorus can cause serious injury and death when it comes into contact with the skin, is inhaled or is swallowed." The report states that burns on less than 10 percent of the body can be fatal because of damage to the liver, kidneys and heart.

When it wanted an obscurant for its forces, the IDF had a readily available and non-lethal alternative to white phosphorus-smoke shells produced by an Israeli company. The IDF could have used those shells to the same effect and dramatically reduced the harm to civilians.

Using white phosphorus in densely populated areas as a weapon is even more problematic. Human Rights Watch found no evidence that Israeli forces fired ground-burst white phosphorous at hardened military targets, such as Palestinian fighters in bunkers, but it may have air-burst white phosphorous for its incendiary effect. Fired from artillery and air-burst to maximize the area of impact, white phosphorous munitions will not have the same lethal effect as high-explosive shells, but will be just as indiscriminate.

The IDF's deliberate or reckless use of white phosphorus munitions is evidenced in five ways. First, to Human Rights Watch's knowledge, the IDF never used its white phosphorus munitions in Gaza before, despite numerous incursions with personnel and armor. Second, the repeated use of air-burst white phosphorus in populated areas until the last days of the operation reveals a pattern or policy of conduct rather than incidental or accidental usage. Third, the IDF was well aware of the effects white phosphorus has and the dangers it can pose to civilians. Fourth, if the IDF used white phosphorus as an obscurant, it failed to use available alternatives, namely smoke munitions, which would have held similar tactical advantages without endangering the civilian population. Fifth, in one of the cases documented in this report – the January 15 strike on the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) headquarters in Gaza City – the IDF kept firing white phosphorus despite repeated warnings from UN personnel about the danger to civilians. Under international humanitarian law, these circumstances demand the independent investigation of the use of white phosphorus and, if warranted, the prosecution of all those responsible for war crimes.

The IDF at first denied using white phosphorus in Gaza, and then said it was using all weapons in compliance with international law. It now says it is conducting an investigation, reportedly run by a colonel, into the use of white phosphorus. Given the IDF's record on previous internal investigations, and the relatively low rank of the reported investigation leader, the inquiry's objectivity remains in doubt.
White Phosphorus Use in Gaza

White phosphorus is a chemical substance dispersed in artillery shells, bombs, rockets, or mortars, used primarily to obscure military operations on the ground. When released upon ground contact or air-burst, it emits a dense white smoke that militaries use to screen the movement of troops. The smoke also interferes with infra-red optics and weapon-tracking systems, thus protecting military forces from guided weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles. Its use in open areas is permissible under international law, but air-bursting white phosphorus over populated areas is unlawful because it places civilians at unnecessary risk and its wide dispersal of burning wedges may amount to an indiscriminate attack.

White phosphorus can also be used as a weapon against hardened military targets, such as bunkers. However, it may not be used as an anti-personnel weapon when a weapon less likely to cause unnecessary suffering is available.

White phosphorus is not considered a chemical weapon and is not banned per se. But like all weapons its use is restricted by the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law: it must be used in a manner that adequately distinguishes between combatants and civilians, and it may never target the latter.

In Gaza, the IDF most frequently air-burst white phosphorus in 155mm artillery shells. Each air-burst spread 116 burning white phosphorus wedges in a radius extending up to 125 meters from the blast point, depending on conditions and the angle of attack.

White phosphorus ignites and burns on contact with oxygen, and continues burning at up to 1500 degrees Fahrenheit (816 degrees Celsius) until nothing is left or the oxygen supply is cut. When white phosphorus comes into contact with skin it creates intense and persistent burns, sometimes to the bone. Infection is common and the body's absorption of the chemical can cause serious damage to internal organs, as well as death.

In its Gaza operations, the IDF apparently used white phosphorus in three ways. First, on at least three occasions the IDF air-burst white phosphorus in densely populated areas. In the crowded Gaza City neighborhood of Tel al-Hawa, for example, Israeli forces on January 15 fired air-burst white phosphorus directly over homes and apartment buildings where civilians were living or taking shelter, killing at least four civilians from one family. On that day, white phosphorus shells struck the al-Quds Hospital and its administration building run by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, setting parts of the hospital on fire and forcing the evacuation of about 50 patients and 500 neighborhood residents who had taken refuge there.

Also on January 15, at least three white phosphorus shells struck the main UNRWA compound in the Rimal neighborhood of central Gaza City, wounding three and starting fires that gutted four buildings and destroyed more than US$3.7 million worth of medical supplies. According to UNRWA officials, they had been speaking with IDF officers throughout the morning as the shells landed progressively closer to the compound, asking them to halt fire. About 700 civilians were sheltering in the UN compound at the time.

At another well-marked UN facility – a school in Beit Lahiya sheltering roughly 1,600 displaced persons – the IDF air-burst at least three white phosphorus shells on January 17, the day before the cessation of major hostilities. One discharged shell landed in a classroom, killing two brothers who were sleeping and severely injuring their mother and a cousin. The attack wounded another 12 people and set a classroom on fire. As with all of its facilities in Gaza, the UN had provided the IDF with the GPS coordinates of the school prior to military operations.

In the attacks on the UNRWA compound and the UN Beit Lahiya school, Human Rights Watch's investigation revealed no military justification for using white phosphorus as an obscurant because Israeli forces were not on the ground in those areas at the time of the attacks. When queried by Human Rights Watch by letter about these incidents, the IDF declined to respond, citing its ongoing investigation.

Second, the IDF used air-burst white phosphorus on the edges of populated areas, perhaps as an obscurant to mask the movement of its forces. In some of these cases, such as in Siyafa village near Beit Lahiya on January 4 and Khuza'a village east of Khan Yunis on January 10 and 13, substantial amounts of white phosphorus landed up to a few hundred meters inside residential areas, killing at least six civilian and wounding dozens. The use of white phosphorus in these residential areas violated the obligation to take all feasible measures during military operations to minimize civilian harm.

Third, the IDF apparently used air-burst white phosphorus in open areas along the 1948 armistice line separating Israel and Gaza, perhaps to screen troop movements and to burn shrubs and trees that might serve as cover for Palestinian armed groups, as well as to set off landmines and improvised explosive devices. Human Rights Watch was not able to investigate whether this use resulted in the destruction of civilian objects in excess of the expected military gain because security concerns prohibited travel to the area.

In all of these cases, if smoke-screening was the intended aim, then the IDF possessed alternatives to the highly incendiary white phosphorus; namely, 155mm smoke projectiles, which produce the equivalent visual screening properties without the incendiary and destructive effects. Smokescreens generated by smoke artillery can be deployed more easily over a wider area than white phosphorus with no risk of fires or burns to civilians. Israel Military Industries (IMI) manufactures such shells. While smoke shells do not block infra-red optics and weapon-tracking systems, the IDF consistently used white phosphorus during the day, obviating the need to block night vision, and Human Rights Watch found no evidence that Hamas fired anti-tank guided missiles. Even if Israeli soldiers or armor in need of cover had been on the ground in the areas where white phosphorus was used, air-bursting the munition creates a less effective smokescreen than ground-bursts because the smoke is more widely dispersed. Ground-burst white phosphorus, targeted properly, is less likely to harm civilians because the burning wedges stay more contained.

The consistent use of air-burst white phosphorus instead of smoke projectiles, especially where no Israeli forces were on the ground, strongly suggests that the IDF was not using the munition for its obscurant qualities, but rather for its incendiary effect. Indeed, Human Rights Watch is not aware of the IDF using its white phosphorus in Gaza before, despite numerous incursions with personnel and armor.

In order to explain the high number of civilian casualties from the fighting in Gaza, Israeli government and IDF officials have repeatedly blamed Hamas for using civilians as "human shields" and for fighting from civilian objects. In the cases documented in this report, Human Rights Watch found no evidence of Hamas using human shields in the vicinity at the time of the attacks. In some areas Palestinian fighters appear to have been present, such as in Khuza'a and the Tel al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City, but this does not justify the indiscriminate use of white phosphorus in a populated area.

Human Rights Watch has long criticized the IDF for firing 155mm high explosive shells into or near densely populated areas as indiscriminate attacks in violation of the laws of war. Using the same artillery to fire air-burst white phosphorus munitions, which send burning phosphorus wedges 125 meters in all directions, is similarly unlawful when used in populated areas.

The total number of Palestinians killed and injured by white phosphorus is not known and will likely remain so. Hospitals in Gaza were unable to provide statistics on white phosphorus casualties because they lacked the diagnostic tools to determine the cause of burns. Medical records from the time are also poor because hospitals were overwhelmed by the numbers of injured and dead.

Still, the serious impact on civilians and civilian objects is clear. In the six cases documented in this report alone, which represent a selection of white phosphorus attacks in Gaza, white phosphorus shells, burning white phosphorus wedges, or the resulting fires killed 12 civilians, including three women and seven children, one of them a fifteen-month-old baby. Dozens were wounded by burns or smoke inhalation. Human Rights Watch encountered cases of civilians who were injured from stepping on white phosphorus remains up to 12 days after major hostilities had stopped.

Palestinian and foreign doctors who treated burn victims told Human Rights Watch about seeing intense and very deep burns. On some occasions the wounds began to burn again when cleaned, which is consistent with white phosphorus igniting on contact with oxygen. "For the first time I'm seeing strange kinds of burns, very deep to the bone," one doctor at al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City told Human Rights Watch. "And they cause a bacterial infection unlike anything else."

Some seriously burned patients were evacuated to Egypt for treatment, especially if they needed skin grafts, because Gazan hospitals could not offer proper care. "We have a lot of burns, actually chemical burns," a doctor in Cairo treating Gazans told Human Rights Watch. "Most are third degree burns, which look like chemical burns and not ordinary burns. There is no skin and sometimes even no muscle."

During eleven days of research from January 21 to 31, 2009, Human Rights Watch researchers found 24 spent white phosphorus 155mm shells in civilian areas of Gaza, apparently in the places where they had fallen, including in homes and on streets in residential neighborhoods. The shells and the canisters they contained were colored a distinctive light green, which identifies them as having held white phosphorus.

Palestinian de-miners showed Human Rights Watch an additional 48 shells that they said they had removed from civilian areas, although the precise location where they found these shells is unclear. It is unlikely that the de-miners collected any of these shells from open areas near the Gaza-Israel armistice line due to the security concerns of entering those areas; Israeli forces have repeatedly opened fire on anyone who gets within a few hundred meters of Israeli territory.

Human Rights Watch also found canister liners and dozens of burnt felt wedges containing white phosphorus on streets, roofs, private courtyards, and the UN school in Beit Lahiya. Many of them reignited when kicked or prodded, thereby exposing the white phosphorus to oxygen. When lit and smoking, they emitted a strong odor similar to garlic, which is typical of white phosphorus.

All of the white phosphorus shells that Human Rights Watch found came from the same lot manufactured in the United States in 1989 by Thiokol Aerospace, which was running the Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant at the time. In addition, on January 4, 2009, Reuters photographed IDF artillery units handling projectiles whose markings indicate that they were produced in the United States at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in September 1991.

Israel's willingness to investigate its use of white phosphorus is welcome, but history suggests that the likelihood of an objective examination is slim. Previous IDF investigations have failed to look objectively at alleged laws of war violations by Israeli soldiers and commanders. In the case of Operation Cast Lead, military investigators have already suggested that soldiers and commanders did no wrong, even before the investigations are complete.

"Commanders during the fighting shouldn't be losing sleep because of the investigations," said Col. Liron Liebman, who became head of the IDF's international law department after the major fighting ended in January. "It's impossible not to make mistakes in such a crowded environment, under pressure."[1] Colonel Liebman added that war crimes charges brought against Israeli soldiers and commanders are "legal terrorism."

The United States government, which supplied Israel with its white phosphorus munitions, should also conduct an investigation to determine whether Israel used it in violation of international humanitarian law.
Methodology

During major military operations, from December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009, Israel banned access to Gaza for all media and human rights monitors. Access via Rafah in Egypt was also blocked. Unable to enter Gaza, Human Rights Watch researchers spent time on the Israeli side of the 1948 armistice line with northern Gaza. On January 9, 10 and 15, they watched IDF artillery repeatedly fire air-burst white phosphorus above civilian areas, including what appeared to be Gaza City and Jabalya. Israeli forces fired these shells from a 155mm artillery battery east of Highway 232 in Israel. The distinctive burst, sending burning wedges down, was consistent with media photographs taken since the start of the ground invasion on January 3. Barred by Israel from entry into Gaza, the researchers were unable to determine precisely where the white phosphorus landed and what effect it had on the civilian population.

Human Rights Watch researchers entered Gaza via the Rafah border crossing with Egypt on January 21, three days after major military operations had ceased, and spent the next 10 days investigating many of the sites where white phosphorus had been used, and the resultant harm to civilians and civilian objects. During this time, Human Rights Watch researchers conducted 29 interviews with the victims and witnesses of white phosphorus use, as well as with ambulance drivers and doctors who treated people with burns. Interviews with doctors who treated burn patients, as well as with another witness of a white phosphorus attack, were conducted in Cairo, Egypt on February 9 and 10.

On February 1, 2009 Human Rights Watch submitted a list of detailed questions about white phosphorus to the IDF, provided as an appendix to this report. On February 15 the IDF replied by letter, also an appendix, that it could not provide answers within the requested time-frame of two weeks. "The IDF has established an investigative team in the Southern Command to look into issues which you have raised, and our reply will be made on the basis of their findings," the letter said.
II. Recommendations
To the Government of Israel

* Immediately appoint an independent commission of inquiry to investigate all credible allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law by Israeli forces in Gaza between December 27 and January 18, including the use of white phosphorus. The investigation's findings should be made public and should include recommendations for disciplinary measures or criminal prosecutions, as appropriate.
* Order the IDF to cease any use of white phosphorus munitions in populated areas, in Gaza and elsewhere.
* Ratify the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), of the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
* Provide victim assistance and compensation for deaths, injuries, and property damage and destruction caused by the IDF's unlawful use of white phosphorus in populated areas of Gaza.
* Allow entry into Gaza for medical experts and specialized medical supplies and equipment needed to treat persons injured by white phosphorus.
* Facilitate the evacuation out of Gaza of white phosphorus victims for whom proper treatment is not available there. Help provide treatment for these people in Israel or elsewhere.

To the United Nations

* Examine the use of white phosphorus by the IDF as part of UN investigations into the conduct of hostilities in Gaza by the Human Rights Council and the Secretary General-appointed Board of Inquiry, as well as any future inquiries.
* Make public the results of all UN investigations into the conduct of the armed conflict in Gaza and southern Israel.
* The UN Security Council or Secretary-General should appoint an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate credible allegations of violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza and southern Israel by the IDF and Hamas forces between December 27, 2008 and January 18, 2009, including the use of white phosphorus. The commission should establish key facts and recommend mechanisms to hold violators accountable and provide compensation to victims.

To the United States

* Investigate whether Israel used U.S.-manufactured white phosphorus in Gaza in violation of international humanitarian law or any arms transfer agreements or policies.
* Cease all transfers of white phosphorus munitions to Israel until the above investigation is complete.

III. What is White Phosphorus?

White phosphorus is a chemical substance that ignites and burns on contact with oxygen, generating a dense white smoke that lasts about seven minutes, with a distinctive garlic-like odor.

Militaries use white phosphorus munitions primarily as an "obscurant" to provide visual cover for ground operations, masking the movement of troops and armor. It can also be used as an incendiary weapon to burn or "smoke out" enemy personnel or to set fire to military targets. White phosphorus can be dispersed by artillery shells, bombs, rockets, or grenades.

White phosphorus is not banned by international treaty, as is mustard gas and anti-personnel landmines. It is not considered a chemical weapon, but an incendiary munition – one that causes fires.

When set to burst in mid-air, the 116 white phosphorus-coated felt wedges in a typical 155mm artillery shell can fall over an area up to 250 meters in diameter. In total, one air-burst shell releases 12.74 pounds (5.78kg) of burning white phosphorus.

When white phosphorus comes into contact with people or objects, it creates an intense and persistent burn, emitting heat and absorbing liquid. It is soluble in organic material and fat, but not in water, which neutralizes it by cutting off the oxygen supply.

In addition to causing intense burns, white phosphorus can also penetrate the body and poison internal organs. According to a report prepared during the recent fighting by the office of IDF chief medical officer, "kidney failure and infections are characteristic long-term outcomes." The report concludes that "a wound caused by explosive ordnance containing phosphorus is potentially extremely destructive to tissue."[2]

A report by the Israeli Ministry of Health is equally stark in its assessment of white phosphorus's medical risks. Entitled "Exposure to White Phosphorus," the report states that "[w]hite phosphorus can cause serious injury and death when it comes into contact with the skin, is inhaled or is swallowed." It continues: "[b]ecause it is very soluble in fat, it quickly penetrates the skin from the surface or from an embedded fragment. Most of the tissue damage is cause by the heat accompanying the continuing oxidation of the phosphorus, and from the product of the oxidation – phosphoric acid." The report also mentions the "systemic poisoning" that can result:

In addition to its "usual" burn effects, white phosphorus is poisonous, and has serious consequences that intensify the effects of the injury. Many laboratory studies have shown that burns covering a relatively small area of the body – 12-15% in laboratory animals and less than 10% in humans – may be fatal because of their effects on the liver, heart and kidneys. Additional effects include serious hypocalcemia and delayed healing of wounds and burns.[3]

Israel's Use of White Phosphorus

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has used white phosphorus in the past, notably in the wars in Lebanon in 1982 and 2006.[4] The IDF uses indirect-fire systems to launch white phosphorus munitions, meaning that the firing unit does not see the target, but relies on spotters to provide targeting information. To fire white phosphorus in Gaza, the IDF used 155mm artillery shells and 120mm mortar shells; Human Rights Watch researchers found the remnants of both in Gaza, many of them in residential areas. The use of air-burst white phosphorus delivered by 155mm artillery shells in populated civilian areas caused the casualties and damage that is the focus of this report.

Each 155mm shell contains a light green canister marked "WP CANISTER" that holds four metal liners. The liners hold the 116 felt wedges soaked in phosphorus. When air-burst, the canisters explode in mid-air, ejecting the felt wedges from the shell casing and scattering them over a wide area, leaving the empty shell casing to land separately. When exposed to oxygen, the wedges ignite. Human Rights Watch researchers found shell casings, unexploded white phosphorus canisters, canister liners, and felt wedges from inside the canisters in multiple sites in the Gaza Strip. Researchers saw felt wedges igniting when agitated or exposed to oxygen up to two weeks after they had landed.

All of the white phosphorus shells Human Rights Watch found in Gaza are from the same lot, manufactured in the United States and marked: THS89D112-003 155MM M825E1. THS89D is the manufacturer identification code denoting that the shells and contents were produced in April 1989 by Thiokol Aerospace, which operated the Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant at the time; 112-003 are the interfix and sequence numbers, which denote that several lots of the same ammunition were being produced simultaneously; 155mm stands for the caliber of the artillery shell. M825E1 is the US military designation for an older remanufactured M825 white phosphorus shell that has been brought up to the current M825A1 standard.[5]

Additionally, Reuters news agency photographed an IDF artillery unit in Israel near Gaza handling M825A1 projectiles on January 4, 2009 with the lot number PB-91J011-002A, indicating that these shells were produced in the United States at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in September 1991.

One alternative to using white phosphorus as an obscurant is 155mm smoke projectiles, which also produces equivalent visual screening properties without incendiary and destructive effects.[6] Moreover, smokescreens generated by smoke artillery can be deployed more easily over a wider area than white phosphorus. The IDF possesses smoke artillery; Israel Military Industries (IMI) manufactures the M116A1 155MM shell.[7]

In some cases documented in this report, the evidence suggests that the IDF air-burst white phosphorus for its incendiary effect, perhaps to detonate Hamas arms caches or improvised explosive devices.

Human Rights Watch interviewed one IDF soldier who participated in Operation Cast Lead as a medic on reserve duty and had served in Gaza for more than two years prior to disengagement in 2005. He spent the last eight days of the operation in Gaza, he said, based near Zeitoun, southeast of Gaza City.

Regarding white phosphorus, the soldier, who requested anonymity, said that he saw the IDF air-burst it at an angle of about 30 degrees from 155mm artillery above houses that they suspected of being booby-trapped, based on intelligence.

"I don't know why the angle was low, but it was used to burn a house," he said. "We were told it was an empty house. We knew it was mined. It blew up [after being hit with the white phosphorus] and there were several explosions [perhaps of weapons stored there].[8]

He continued: "I also saw conscripts using white phosphorus in Zeitoun. It was used there too at low angles. There was no specific briefing about it. But as part of our medical training we did go through the scenario of how to deal with it."

The use of air-burst white phosphorus to destroy houses suspected of having weapons or booby-traps is highly questionable when the IDF possess more effective precision weapons designed to minimize collateral damage, such as the GBU-39, a 250-pound (113 kg) guided bomb.
Hamas's Alleged Use of White Phosphorus

On January 14, Israeli police claimed that Hamas had fired a single mortar shell with white phosphorus from Gaza into Israel. Police spokesman Micky Rosenfeld said the shell had landed in a field near Sderot that morning, causing no injuries or damage.[9] Haaretz newspaper reported that it hit an open field in the Eshkol area in the western Negev.[10]

A Human Rights Watch researcher went to Sderot the next day to investigate, but local authorities said they were unaware of the attack. One Sderot resident said he had heard about a mortar shell, possibly with white phosphorus, landing in a field outside of town, but he did not know where. When asked for details, police spokesman Micky Rosenfeld told Human Rights Watch that "all I have is what's in the press release."[11]
IV. White Phosphorus Attacks in Populated Areas

Human Rights Watch investigated six cases in Gaza where the IDF used white phosphorus munitions in populated areas. Two of these were in villages near Gaza's armistice line with Israel: in Siyafa, in the north, and Khuza'a, in the south. As the IDF escalated its ground campaign, it fired white phosphorus shells into even more densely populated urban areas, including in the Rimal and Tel al-Hawa neighborhoods of Gaza City, as well as central Beit Lahiya.
Attacks on Urban Areas
Tel al-Hawa Neighborhood, Gaza City

The Tel al-Hawa neighborhood in southeastern Gaza City is a relatively affluent residential area with wide streets and multi-story apartment buildings inhabited mostly by professionals and their families-what one resident called "a secular stronghold." IDF air strikes hit select sites in the area, such as a ministry of interior administrative building and a facility used by the customs department of the ministry of finance, since early in the operation. Ground fighting commenced when IDF troops began to enter the neighborhood from the south for limited periods around January 11, reportedly facing heavy mortar and gunfire from Palestinian armed groups.[12]

The fighting intensified around midnight on January 14-15, when Israeli forces advanced into Tel al-Hawa with troops and tanks, their furthest push towards the city's center to date. According to residents and media reports, they took up positions in parts of the neighborhood, with tanks positioned on Industrial Street, after more armed encounters with Hamas. Around 7 a.m. on January 15, the IDF began to fire high-explosive and white phosphorus artillery shells in the area. According to three local residents, interviewed separately, the shelling lasted for approximately three hours, and during that time white phosphorus killed four civilians, all members of the same family who were traveling in a car. The shelling resumed early the next morning, at approximately 1:15 a.m., and lasted until at least 10 p.m. that day.

Human Rights Watch visited the area on January 22 to examine where white phosphorus had been used. On the roof of a residential apartment building, researchers saw a hole where a shell had struck and penetrated the building. On that roof, and in an open area across the street, lay eight pieces of phosphorus-soaked felt, which residents had covered with sand to stop the burning. When uncovered and kicked, the pieces reignited and released a pungent smoke. When asked, residents showed two spent light green 155mm white phosphorus artillery shells in the apartment of Fathi Sabbah, 46, a journalist for Al-Hayat newspaper. Both came from the same lot, produced in 1989 by Thiokol Aerospace at the Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant. A third shell with the same marking was located one block away in an open lot, as was a light green canister from a white phosphorus shell marked in red lettering "WP CANISTER," and dozens of pieces of felt.

Residents of the neighborhood told Human Rights Watch what occurred when the shells exploded on January 15. According to Fathi Sabbah, multiple explosions around 7 a.m. startled his family as they slept in their second-floor apartment. About three hours later, a shell exploded over their building, he said, followed by fire and smoke. He explained:

I woke up at 7 a.m. to the sound of heavy bombing in the area. The shells were falling around once a minute. I was watching and I saw white smoke and flames all over the sandy road, for a distance of 200 meters. When we saw the shelling was heavy we asked the residents of the building to go downstairs, women in the basement and men on the second floor. At around 10 a.m. a shell hit this building. After ten minutes the owners of the apartments on the top floors went up to inspect. Two apartment owners on the south side said shells had hit their apartments. After an hour we smelled something. We went up later and found that a bedroom on the fifth floor was on fire. We called the fire department and the ICRC. They said the IDF was not allowing them to come.[13]

At that point, Sabbah said, neighbors came to the building to ask for help: a family was trapped in a car that had caught fire in the most recent shelling. Another neighborhood resident interviewed separately, 55-year-old Muhammad al-Sharif, a paint factory owner, told Human Rights Watch what he knew about the burning car:

My daughter told me there was a car on fire with people in it. I looked out and saw a young man who had lost control of himself trying to push his way into the burning car. When I got to the car he had fallen down and he was on fire. The shelling was ongoing and I dragged him to an alley and tried to talk to him, but he couldn't talk. One of his eyes had burned away and he was horribly injured.[14]

According to al-Sharif, he and the man were stuck in the alley for 90 minutes as the shelling continued, and because they feared Israeli snipers in the area. Once the shelling subsided, he and two young men carried the wounded man to a neighbor's car and then drove him to al-Shifa hospital. At 2:30 p.m. al-Sharif returned to the car and found that it had partially melted and the gas tank had exploded.

Around that time, Fathi Sabbah also arrived at the car, where he met a neighbor and an ambulance that had come to take the dead bodies away for burial. In the smoking wreckage, he said, they found only a few bones of the four occupants. A piece of a skull and some teeth lay next to the vehicle, al-Sharif said.

Those killed were:

'Uday al-Haddad, 55, branch manager for Palestine Bank

Ihsan, 44, ('Uday's wife)

Hatim, 24, accounting student at Islamic University ('Uday and Ihsan's son)

Ala`a, 14, pupil ('Uday and Ihsan's daughter)

The wounded man who tried to push his way back into the burning car was another of 'Uday and Ihsan's sons, Mohammad al-Haddad, 25. Human Rights Watch spoke to al-Haddad in the burn unit at al-Shifa Hospital on January 27, and he corroborated the facts as presented by Sabbah and al-Sharif.

According to Mohammad al-Haddad, the IDF started shelling Tel al-Hawa at 7 a.m. on January 15. He and his family waited in their home on Islamic University Street until 11 a.m., he said, when Israel announced it would begin a temporary unilateral ceasefire. At that point, they got into their gray 1996 Volkswagen Golf. He explained what happened next:

We drove about 100 meters to the intersection at the end of our street, when we were hit. The power of the explosion threw me from the car. I lost consciousness, but then I went back to the car, and that's where Mr. al-Sharif said he found me. After that I woke up in the hospital.[15]

In addition to losing his left eye, al-Haddad suffered third-degree burns to his legs, hands and forehead, and a broken jaw. The only other surviving member of his immediate family, his younger brother Salam, 18, had left the family's house at 10 a.m., before the ceasefire began.

Dr. Nafiz Abu Sha'baan, head of the burn and plastic surgery unit at al-Shifa Hospital, treated Mohammad al-Haddad upon arrival. Dr. Abu Sha`baan said that he had not treated any white phosphorus wounds prior to Operation Cast Lead and that the hospital did not classify injuries as caused by white phosphorus due to a lack of diagnostic tools to make that assessment. However, Dr. Abu Sha'baan told Human Rights Watch that Mohammad's injuries appeared consistent with wounds caused by white phosphorus. "We think it's from white phosphorus because the burns are very deep," he said. "We already excised burnt tissue and now his wounds are getting worse. When we saw him the first time the wounds were more superficial than they are now. We've got to operate again tomorrow to excise more tissue."[16]

On January 28, Human Rights Watch inspected the remains of the al-Haddad family's vehicle, which still lay on the street where it had been struck. The car's metal frame and interior were thoroughly burned, the wheels had melted off, and the metal around them was deformed. The rear of the car had been blown open, apparently by the force of the exploding gas tank.

The IDF shelling of Tel al-Hawa with white phosphorus continued early the next morning, January 16, although civilian casualties are not known. "Pieces of something hit the kitchen window and burned through the glass, starting fires," the journalist Fathi Sabbah said he saw around 1:15 a.m. "We threw water on them but they would not stop burning so we pushed them out the window." White smoke billowed in, he said, filling the apartment and choking the family: "We did not know what to do. We were afraid the area was under attack and so we took refuge in the center of the building, at the elevator, thinking it was the safest place because it was away from the windows." Eleven members of the family stood choking as smoke poured up the central staircase that wound its way around the elevator. "We feared to leave the building even though there was no fighting so I called the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] on my radio but they couldn't come as ambulances were barred from the area by the IDF," he said. According to Sabbah, the fire burned for several minutes and then dissipated. "When I went to the roof it was covered with burning embers, as were the streets." he said.
Al-Quds Hospital, Tel al-Hawa Neighborhood, Gaza City

The January 15 shelling of Tel al-Hawa also struck the compound of the al-Quds Hospital, run by the Palestine Red Crescent Society. The hospital was treating about 50 patients at the time, and sheltering roughly 500 local residents who had gone there to seek shelter from the fighting.

The administration building and top two floors of the main hospital building were gutted by fire caused by air-burst white phosphorus munitions. The hospital is clearly marked and there does not appear to have been fighting in that immediate area at the time, although the IDF was present in Tel al-Hawa.

The IDF had been shelling in the area throughout the morning of January 15, and at 9 a.m. the administration building started smoking. "I saw pieces of flaming shrapnel falling," Muhammad Abu Musabbih, 28, the Director of Disaster Management Services for the hospital, told Human Rights Watch. He said:

Flaming pieces fell one and a half meters from the oxygen station; many fragments fell around the compound. More flaming fragments fell near the electricity generator where we store 20,000 liters of fuel. We used water and sand to put the fires out. We feared that if the fire spread to the oxygen and fuel it would lead to an explosion.[17]

Medical personnel began to fight the fire in the administration building along with members of the hospital's emergency medical team, using bucket brigades to relay water and sand. They found that fire extinguishers made the fire worse, so they tried to create a firebreak by cutting in two a second-story walkway that linked the administration building and the hospital. Shortly thereafter, another white phosphorus shell hit the hospital itself and the roof burst into flame. The hospital staff abandoned the administration building and focused on the hospital. Several tank shells also hit the hospital, including one that struck the pharmacy on the second floor at around 9:30 a.m., but the fire was the staff's most pressing concern. Two hours later, the civil defense and firefighters arrived and began to fight the fires spreading from the roof of the hospital to the floors below.

"As firefighters contained one area and moved to another the wind would reignite the fire and they had to rush back to places they had already finished," Abu Musabbih said. "It was not until 6 a.m. the next day that the fire was completely extinguished." He added that the fire destroyed two ambulances and a medical storage area about 200 meters from the hospital's main building.[18]

With the hospital on fire, doctors decided to evacuate the building. According to Abu Musabbih and Dr. Jamal al-Safadi, 36, an orthopedic surgeon, the hospital called the ICRC to coordinate an initial evacuation of the approximately 500 residents from the neighborhood who had taken refuge in the hospital from the fighting.[19] That group could move more quickly than the hospital's roughly 50 patients, hospital staff thought, and it would take time to prepare the wounded. At around 3 p.m., two ICRC vehicles arrived to lead a convoy of civilians, who relocated to a nearby UNRWA school. The ICRC told the hospital that it was not possible to coordinate another move with the IDF until the next day.

Dr. al-Safadi told Human Rights Watch that, at the time, the hospital was treating 40 injured adults, seven newborns in incubators, and four patients in intensive care. While the local residents were evacuated from the hospital, hospital staff relocated approximately 30 patients to the hospital operating rooms, which they considered safer.

Between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m., according to Abu Musabbih and Dr. al-Safadi, another shell believed to be white phosphorus exploded near the hospital, causing more flaming fragments to land on the roof. As fire broke out again, the hospital director Dr. Khalid Jouda and director of emergency services, Dr. Bashar Murad, decided everyone must be evacuated.

One of those evacuated from the hospital was Tariq al-Baradei, 24, an information technology student at the Islamic University, who said he was in the hospital getting treatment for multiple fractures and shrapnel wounds he had sustained from an air strike on his home in Tel al-Hawa on January 4. The same strike killed his 12-year-old brother, Omar, he said.

During the evacuation of al-Quds Hospital, al-Baradei said he lay on a gurney in an ambulance. He described the drive to al-Shifa hospital:

I got into an ambulance with an 8-year-old girl who was bleeding from the head. I looked out the window and saw a group of injured people walking on the street; there were so many. I could not recognize the streets of Gaza. I saw it burning but I didn't believe it could be the hospital building.[20]

According to Dr. Safadi, the girl died after transit to al-Shifa hospital.

Human Rights Watch surveyed the damage at al-Quds hospital and found physical evidence consistent with personal accounts of a white phosphorus attack. The top two floors of the hospital's main building were gutted by fire, and a third was severely damaged. Extra patient rooms on the fourth floor, not occupied during the attack, were charred on the ceilings and walls. The fifth floor children's playroom was totally destroyed, with charcoal beams littering the jungle-gym and small merry-go-round. The sixth floor gymnasium was also burned and was open to the sky when Human Rights Watch examined the site.

About 100 meters down the street to the south, separated by a low building, stands the hospital's six-story administration office. This entire building was gutted by fire and all that remained were the walls. On the exterior, windows had black smoke stains extending upwards.

Human Rights Watch examined two light green 155mm white-phosphorus shell casings in the office of the hospital director. Hospital officials said one of the shells had been removed from the top floor of the hospital's main building and another had fallen adjacent to the hospital. The tops of the shells had blown off, removing the markings, but the shells were clearly the same as the other white phosphorus shells that Human Rights Watch found throughout Gaza, with their signature light green paint.
UNRWA Headquarters Compound, Gaza City

The UNRWA compound covers roughly four hectares at the edge of Gaza's wealthiest neighborhood, Rimal, enclosed by concrete walls at least three meters high. The compound contains the headquarters for all of UNRWA's operations throughout the Middle East and its field office for Gaza operations, including logistical facilities such as warehouses and garages.

Around 7:30 a.m. on January 15, IDF artillery shells started landing near the compound, despite calls to IDF officers from UNRWA staff, asking the IDF to stop. At approximately 10 a.m., six shells landed in the compound, at least three of which contained white phosphorus, as well as shrapnel from at least one high explosive artillery round. Three people were wounded and the white phosphorus caused extensive fires. About 700 civilians were sheltering in the compound at the time.[21]

According to an UNRWA statement, "Shells of white phosphorus – a highly incendiary material – set ablaze the [vehicle] workshop and two vast warehouses containing humanitarian food and medical supplies."[22] The densely packed sacks of flour continued to burn for 12 days, until January 27.

Human Rights Watch visited the UNRWA compound on January 28 and saw four buildings-two large warehouses, a vehicle bay, and a workshop-that were destroyed by fire. UNRWA staff said that rebuilding and re-supplying the warehouses would cost US$10 million, including US$3.7 million for medical supplies that were burned.[23] The fire also destroyed blankets, mattresses, hygiene kits, tinned meat and bags of wheat flour. Three vehicles were completely burned and 15 were damaged.

According to UNRWA, the attack wounded one UN worker and two civilians who had sought shelter in the compound.[24]

According to Israel, the IDF opened fire at the UNRWA headquarters only after Hamas had attacked its soldiers from within the compound. "We do not want such incidents to take place and I am sorry for it but I don't know if you know, but Hamas fired from the UNRWA site," Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, who was visiting Israel at the time of the attack. "This is a sad incident and I apologize for it."[25]

UNRWA's Gaza director John Ging adamantly denied that any Palestinian fighters had entered the compound, let alone fired from it at IDF soldiers.[26] UN officials said they made dozens of increasingly frantic phone calls with IDF officers as the shells got closer, asking them to stop, and the IDF did not warn UNRWA about Hamas activity in or near the compound. "They should tell us if there are militants operating in our compound or in our area," Ging said. "The fact that they don't, we take that as indicative of the fact that there wasn't."[27]

Muhammad Abu Shamla, 46, arrived for his job as an UNRWA security guard at 7:30 that morning. He told Human Rights Watch that he heard explosions from artillery from shortly thereafter until 9 a.m.:

At first I didn't know where the shells were falling but the walls were shaking. After about 30 minutes we moved [to another building] because we thought it would be safer there. Then a colleague told us there was fire inside the compound threatening fuel trucks. We went out to help. The smell was terrible, like garbage. There was fire in the garage. We started moving the cars that hadn't caught fire. There were clouds of black smoke everywhere. I saw one shell in the ground that hadn't exploded. I didn't sleep at all that night; I kept running around to fight the fire. The fires were still raging on and off when I left the compound the next morning at 9 a.m.[28]

UNRWA Gaza Field Administration Officer Scott Anderson told Human Rights Watch that he was in the compound when the shelling started:

I don't know when exactly the first shell hit us, but the shells were getting close by 8 a.m., and I called the IDF coordination unit at Erez to try to get them to stop it. The pattern of shelling was that it started over the Gaza Training College, in the western part of the UNRWA compound, and then the shelling moved to the west and walked its way over the whole compound. It was hitting the compound itself for around an hour.[29]

Anderson, a retired US Army officer, speculated that the IDF was "walking" the artillery fire across the area – firing shells along an arc at evenly spaced intervals. He showed Human Rights Watch researchers three spent artillery shell casings, all of them light green to indicate white phosphorus, which he said had landed in the compound, as well as six impact holes inside the compound, apparently where the spent shells had landed.[30] Human Rights Watch recorded four of the six impacts: one through a warehouse roof; one through a metal wall and fence; one in a manhole in the parking lot; and one in the corner of the parking lot.

According to Anderson, the shell that hit the parking lot manhole failed to explode, leaving the canister with white phosphorus still inside. A UN de-mining team later removed the shell from the area, he said.

Human Rights Watch also viewed photographs of the spent artillery shells and unexploded ordnance that the UN reportedly recovered at the UNRWA compound after it had been struck. The light green 155mm shells were correctly marked for white phosphorus. According to the photos, white phosphorus wedges also landed inside the compound, as had shrapnel from at least one high explosive artillery shell.

Anderson had no doubt that white phosphorus had hit the compound. "It looked like phosphorus, it smelled like phosphorus, and it burned like phosphorus," he said.

According to Anderson, the main concern just after the attack was that the compound's 100,000-liter diesel fuel depot[31] and six fuel tanker trucks, two of them full at the time, might catch on fire:

Two of the fuel tankers were parked right next to the wall of one of the warehouses that caught fire. I saw a burning fragment land under one of the trucks, and I and a colleague ran out with fire extinguishers, thinking we could put it out, but we couldn't. So we had to bat it away from under the truck with sticks. We figured we'd be dead anyway if the truck went up. Then there was another shell, I saw that one myself, right overhead, and the shell landed just at the end of the parking lot. After that we evacuated everyone, and we drove the fuel trucks around 800 meters down the road to an empty lot that had already been shelled. The people here only had light injuries, we were lucky.

Human Rights Watch saw a small crater, which Anderson said was made by a spent artillery shell, roughly 10 meters from where the fuel tanker trucks had been parked.

According to Claire Mitchell, UNRWA field legal officer, five senior UNRWA staff made dozens of phone calls to the IDF during the attack, and she compiled a log of UNRWA's communications with the IDF at the time.

"Scott [Anderson] started calling at around 8 a.m. to Major Aviad Silberman at Erez [crossing]," she said. "Aidan O'Leary making calls regularly from shortly before 9 a.m. to Uri Singer and [retired Brigadier-] General [Baruch] Spiegel [head of the IDF's Humanitarian Coordination Cell] in Tel Aviv."[32]

Anderson confirmed the multiple phone calls to the IDF. "I was calling the IDF guys at Erez all the time," he said. "They said they were trying to stop the shelling. It looks like there was nothing they could do." He added, "I know that in the US Army it would not take that long to get the artillery fire to stop."

UNRWA Gaza director John Ging said that he too had spoken with the IDF at the time of the attack.[33] He and other UNRWA staff said they had given the IDF the GPS coordinates of all UN installations in Gaza before Operation Cast Lead began. Speaking at a press conference on January 15, Ging said that after the first shells hit the compound, UNRWA alerted the IDF of the exact location of its fuel trucks. He insisted that "there were no militants in the compound; there was no firing from the compound."[34]

According to the IDF's chief spokesman, Brig. Gen. Avi Beneyahu, the IDF has started an investigation. "If it becomes clear that we returned shots at the source of fire, we will say so, and if it turns out we operated by mistake, we will not hesitate to confess," he said.[35]
Beit Lahiya UNRWA School

Around 6 a.m. on Saturday, January 17, the IDF starting firing at least three artillery shells, which Human Rights Watch determined to be white phosphorus, over and in the immediate vicinity of a UN-run elementary school in Beit Lahiya. At the time, the school was housing roughly 1,600 people, who had sought refuge there from neighboring areas. Human Rights Watch found no indication that IDF units or Palestinian armed groups were operating in the area at the time.

The attack killed two young brothers when an already-detonated white phosphorus shell landed in a classroom on the top floor of the school; the shell also severely injured their mother and a cousin. The shelling also spread burning white phosphorus wedges all over the school and surrounding area, wounding 12 other people, setting fire to a classroom where displaced persons were sheltering, and damaging a nearby market.[36] Human Rights Watch visited the site on January 23, six days after the attack, and saw white phosphorus wedges still burning when children dug them out of the sand.

According to two witnesses, around 3 a.m. the IDF began firing shells that appear to have been white phosphorus some 600 meters north of the school. Nimr al-Maqusi, 50, an unemployed civil servant who lives across the street from the school, said he saw the shells explode above northern Beit Layiha every few minutes. "Wherever the pieces of the shells landed, fires would suddenly ignite," he recalled, reckoning that the shells were coming from the southeast.[37] Yusuf Daoud, 45, an unemployed electrician who lives on the same street, also across from the school, was watching the same explosions. Interviewed separately, he told Human Rights Watch: "None of us at home were sleeping. We were all afraid of the shelling that was coming in."[38]

Around 6 a.m., for unknown reasons, Israeli forces started shelling the Beit Lahiya UN school. According to three witnesses – the two men who live across the street from the school and another man who was inside the school at the time – no IDF forces were in the area at the time. All of the witnesses said they saw at least three shells explode above the school.

'Ali al-Shamali, 46, who works as an attendant at the school and is also a volunteer with the local committee for displaced persons, said he saw a shell crash through the school roof and land in a classroom on the top floor. "Less than ten minutes later, another phosphorus[39] shell hit the school, and we rushed upstairs," he said. "Then another three or four white phosphorus shells hit, and one hit the market next to the school."[40]

The shell that hit the classroom immediately killed two young brothers and severely wounded their mother, al-Shamali said. The Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, based in Gaza City, identified the two children as Bilal al-Ashqar, 5, and Muhammad al-Ashqar, 4.[41] According to a relative of the victims, Azhar al-Ashqar, the boys' mother, Nujud, 28, was wounded in the head and right hand, which was later amputated at the hospital. The boys' cousin Mona, 18, was wounded in the leg and had it later amputated.[42]

Dozens of burning wedges landed in the courtyard and a classroom on the second floor caught on fire, all of the witnesses said. On January 23, Human Rights Watch saw the scorched classroom with burned clothes and other personal items inside.

The attack continued as ambulances and a fire engine arrived at the scene, the witnesses said, while the displaced persons who had been staying in the school escaped to the streets and nearby homes. Yusuf Daoud said he watched as more shells exploded over the school, causing pieces of debris and flaming fragments to land on his balcony. "The smoke was white with some yellow, and the odor was awful," he said. "It seems to affect little children and older people, especially."

According to Nimr al-Maqusi, some shells landed in the school while others landed in the street nearby. "The scene was beyond description," he recalled. "The people in the school were running around in a panic. They had left their homes and sought shelter in the school but now this shelter, too, was not immune. Some of the people were on fire and parts of their bodies were melting away."

A fourth witness, Ra'fat Shamiyya, 34, arrived at the scene approximately 50 minutes after the shelling began to help evacuate the wounded. "I got there and there were pieces of phosphorus around in the courtyard," he said. "There was one shell that hit the bathroom area after I arrived."[43] He shared with Human Rights Watch the videos that he said he had recorded of the incident on his mobile phone, beginning at 6:55 a.m. The videos show dozens of burning wedges around the school compound, producing heavy smoke, as well as the second-floor classroom on fire. The sound of a powerful crack is audible, apparently from a spent shell hitting the school. According to al-Shamali, the last round in the attack hit the bathrooms of the school.

Many of the air-burst shells also sent flaming wedges onto the market next to the school, the witnesses said. The market was badly damaged when Human Rights Watch visited the site on January 23.

Al-Shamali told Human Rights Watch that no Palestinian fighters were present in the school. "No one holding any weapon is allowed into the school. Even in regular circumstances, civilian cars are not allowed inside the compound," he said. "I know about the school. That's my job. No shooting was coming from the school."

As with all the UNRWA sites that came under Israeli attack, the UN had transmitted the GPS coordinates of the Beit Lahiya school to the IDF before the military operation began.

"The Israeli army knew exactly our GPS coordinates and they would have known that hundreds of people had taken shelter there," said UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness. "When you have a direct hit into the third floor of a UN school, there has to be an investigation to see if a war crime has been committed."[44]

To Human Rights Watch's knowledge, the IDF did not conduct ground operations in the vicinity of the school at any time during Operation Cast Lead. Human Rights Watch's investigations in the area did not uncover any physical evidence to suggest a confrontation with Palestinian armed groups, such as bullet holes, bullet casings or tank tracks.
Attacks on Outlying Communities
Siyafa Village, Beit Lahiya

Israeli forces had bombed the open areas in Gaza's north since the military operation began on December 27, but they had not struck any of the residential areas north of Beit Lahiya, including the village of Siyafa, just north of Atatra. Residents there, who mostly work the nearby fields, say they stayed in their homes, not fearing much for their safety because of the absence of Palestinian armed groups. Some of them had regular contact with Israelis, with whom they traded strawberries and other goods.

Siyafa village became more dangerous on January 3, when the IDF intensified its shelling and aerial bombing in the north, in apparent preparation for the ground offensive that was to begin that night. According to a local resident and chairman of the Agricultural Cooperative for Farmers of Strawberries, Vegetables and Flowers, Mahmoud Khalael, "they were sending a message to evacuate."[45] According to other residents, the IDF dropped leaflets from the air warning civilians to leave the area, but residents did not leave because, they said, there were no fighters in the area and they thought they would be safe.[46]

According to Khaleal, at around 10 pm that night he got a telephone call from an Israeli officer named Balad, whom he knew from business-related coordination with the IDF. Balad told him to warn the residents of the area to evacuate, especially the al-Ghoul family and Bedouins in the area.[47] IDF tanks began to approach shortly thereafter, Khaleal said, under air cover. Around 1:30 a.m. on January 4, he said, the IDF fired three missiles at the northern end of his house. Human Rights Watch researchers who inspected the house on January 23 saw extensive damage to its northern end that was consistent with a missile strike, although how many missiles was unclear. According to Khaleal, the Israeli officer Balad called him again around 7 a.m., telling everyone not to leave the area, but rather to stay in their homes.

The shelling and bombing in the open areas around Siyafa continued throughout the day, and also further south as IDF forces approached the village of Atatra about 500 meters away, which they eventually occupied. Residents of Siyafa told Human Rights Watch that they sheltered in their homes, hoping the attacks would stop, and that they neither saw nor heard any Palestinian fighters in the area.[48] Among them were 14 members of the Abu Halima family, who gathered in the home of Sa`dallah and Sabah Abu Halima, mostly in the central hallway.

The house, visited by Human Rights Watch on January 23, was the second structure in from open fields, from which one has sweeping views of Beit Lahiya and the Jabalya refugee camp. Visible tank tracks and dug-up berns indicated that IDF tanks had positioned themselves in the nearby field between 100 and 120 meters from the Abu Halima house after the family left the area on January 4.

In separate interviews, three members of the family told Human Rights Watch what happened that afternoon, around 4 pm, when an artillery shell containing white phosphorus directly hit their house, killing five members of the family and wounding five. The testimony is consistent with accounts given to journalists and the Israel-based human rights group B'Tselem.

Ahmad Abu Halima, the 22-year-old son of Sa`dallah and Sabah Abu Halima, who was inside the house at the time of the attack, told Human Rights Watch what he saw:

I was talking with my father when the shell landed. It hit directly on my father and cut his head off. The explosion was large and the smell unbearable. It caused a big fire. The pieces [from the shell] were burning and we could not put them out… We ran outside, the four of us who were unharmed. My brother's wife and daughter, Ghada and Farah, came down with no clothes [because they were burned off]. My brothers Yusif and Ali too. Yusif was burned on his face and Ali on his back[49]

Ahmed's brother Omar Abu Halima, 18 years old, was next door at his uncle's house when the shell struck:

I heard the sound of an explosion. We ran into the street and saw that it had hit our house. We ran upstairs and when we arrived I found my father and four others dead. We took them out and then dealt with the four wounded.

The stairs were very smoky. We went inside and it smelled very strange. We had never experienced that before. It was difficult to go forward. First I saw my mother with burns coming out of the house. We found her at the entrance. She told us to go in and get my injured brothers. But when we got inside we saw nothing because of the smoke and dust, and we couldn't breathe. We found my brother's wife, Ghada, she was burning in flames, and also her daughter Farah, also burning. There were also my brothers Yusif and Ali. All of them were burning badly; their clothes were melting. They were all burned but Abd al-Rahim and my father had their heads cut from their bodies too. We took the wounded in two tractors, with my mother in the first one. We tried to call an ambulance but they said they couldn't come.[50]

Those killed in the attack are:

Sa'dallah Abu Halima, 45, father (husband of Sabah)

'Abdel Rahim, 14, son

Zeid, 11, son Hamza, 10, son

Shahid, 15 months, daughter.

Those wounded are:

Sabah Abu Halima, 44, mother (wife of Sa'dallah)

Yusif, 16, son

'Ali, 5, son

Ghada, 21, wife of son Mohammad

Farah, 2, daughter of Ghada and Mohammad

On January 23, Human Rights Watch investigated the Abu Halima house. In the ceiling above the hallway where the family said it had been sheltering, researchers saw a hole approximately one meter in diameter, apparently caused by the shell. The hallway beneath was badly charred and the remaining furniture burnt. The rooms around the hallway had black burns on the walls and the plastic light switches and electrical outlets had melted. The wood around the doors and windows of the house was charred. On the wall in one bedroom, someone had written in lipstick, in Arabic with some misspellings: "From the Israel Defense Forces, we are sorry."[51] Residents do not know if IDF forces entered the houses of the neighborhood because they all fled, but the tank positions about 100 meters to the east of the Abu Halima house indicate that the forces were nearby.

Amid the debris of the family's possessions, Human Rights Watch found two 155mm artillery shell fragments, painted the light green color that militaries use to identify white phosphorus shells, as well as the base plate from the shell. Two canisters of the sort used to hold white phosphorus in artillery shells were found outside the house. Another white phosphorus shell and canister were found about 20 meters to the west of the house, and a third shell was about 50 meters from the house in the same direction. Human Rights Watch does not know if any of the shells struck at precisely those spots or whether they had been moved.

The following day, Human Rights Watch visited Sabah Abu Halima, the mother, who was being treated for serious burns at al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Sabah Abu Halima had her feet and right arm bandaged. She was visibly in shock and Human Rights Watch did not seek to interview her. "They're taking my children," she kept repeating. Earlier, however, she had spoken with the media about what happened to her family. "The children were screaming, 'Fire! Fire!' and there was smoke everywhere and a horrible, suffocating smell," she told the New York Times. "My 14-year-old cried out, 'I'm going to die. I want to pray.' I saw my daughter-in-law melt away."[52]

Human Rights Watch spoke with Dr. 'Alaa 'Ali from the al-Shifa Hospital burn unit, where Sabah Abu Halima was getting care. He said that she had been admitted on January 4 at 5:05 p.m., and he showed hospital entry records confirming that date and time. "Sabah had very deep burns that reached the bone, and in some places even burned the bone," he said.[53]

Seventeen days later, at the military hospital in Cairo, Human Rights Watch interviewed another member of the family, Mohamed Abu Halima, 24 years old, who was accompanying his badly burned wife Ghada and daughter Farah. His account of what happened on January 4 was consistent with the accounts of his brothers. "The attack on my house was all of a sudden, they hit the neighbor and then us," he said. "We're farmers and there were no fighters around."[54]

According to Mohammad Abu Halima, his wife Ghada was burned on 40 percent of her body and his daughter on 45 percent. Doctors at the hospital did not allow Human Rights Watch to see Ghada or Farah because they were still getting treatment in the intensive care unit but photographs of the two patients taken at the hospital revealed extensive burns on Ghada's back and on Farah's chest and legs. According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, which is following this case, Sabah Abu Halima was also transferred to Egypt for medical care in mid-February, because al-Shifa Hospital could not properly care for her wounds.[55]

In testimony given to B'Tselem on January 8 from al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, Ghada Abu Halima gave details of the attack that were consistent with what her relatives later told Human Rights Watch. She also said that the first ambulance taking her and Farah to the Rafah border crossing with Egypt had come under fire by the IDF. "The driver was slightly wounded in the face and he drove back to the hospital," she said.[56]

The shelling of the Abu Halima family with white phosphorus was not the end of the family's ordeal. According to Omar, Ahmad and Mohammad Abu Halima, as well as three other witnesses from the area interviewed separately, Israeli forces fired on the family as they tried to evacuate the wounded and dead to the hospital on tractors and in a car, killing two cousins, Mohammad and Mattar.
Khuza'a Village

Situated to the east of Khan Yunis, approximately 500 meters from the Israel-Gaza armistice line, the village of Khuza'a is one of the closest Palestinian residential areas to Israel, in sight of IDF watchtowers. Open fields separate it from the armistice line.

In a series of ground incursions between January 11 and 13, Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters, apparently killing three of them. At the same time, local officials said, 16 civilians died and dozens more were wounded, many by smoke inhalation from the extensive use of white phosphorus.[57] On two separate occasions the IDF heavily used air-burst white phosphorus, artillery fired, killing one woman and injuring dozens of others, including one boy who burned his foot on a buried white phosphorus wedge 12 days after the attack.

Residents and local human rights activists told Human Rights Watch that Palestinian fighters were active in the area, and an Islamic Jihad commander told the media that about one dozen fighters had directly engaged the IDF in Khuza'a.[58] But these engagements appear to have been minimal, with the fighters mostly retreating whenever Israeli forces advanced. Even with the presence of these fighters, the IDF's extensive use of air-burst white phosphorus in a populated area was unlawful due to the munition's indiscriminate effects. In addition, if the purpose of the white phosphorus was to mask approaching troops, it is unclear why the IDF air-burst the white phosphorus over the neighborhood instead of ground-bursting it, which causes a denser smoke.

The IDF's assault on Khuza'a began around 9:30 pm on January 10, with an intense artillery barrage in the area, including white phosphorus shells bursting over the al-Najjar district, inhabited primarily by a family of that name.[59] According to three residents, interviewed separately, white phosphorus shells exploded above private homes, showering the area with burning wedges. Some homes in the area caught on fire, and neighbors helped each other to extinguish the flames.

Local resident Iman al-Najjar, 30, told Human Rights Watch how white phosphorus shells struck around her house:

That night, starting around 9:30, they began to fire phosphorus randomly. Almost all the houses here got their share… We thought it was fog but it was smoke. It was hard to breath. We tried to put out the fire. The whole neighborhood came out… Two phosphorus pieces landed in my house and it was on fire. People were choking, so we went to the neighbor's house.[60]

A few hundred meters from Iman al-Najjar's house, a shell burst through the roof of a house, killing Hanan al-Najjar, 47, and injuring her four children inside. Based on Human Rights Watch's inspection of shell remnants found in the house, it was a white phosphorus shell.[61]

Hanan's husband, Majid al-Najjar, was in an adjacent house when white phosphorus wedges began falling in the area, setting some structures on fire. He left the house where he was staying to help an elderly couple escape the flames, he said, and at that point he saw an artillery shell strike his house:

First the phosphorus pieces landed. We evacuated the old couple and then the shell hit the house… I saw and I heard the sound of the shell so I went back. I saw the children and men coming out, some of them were injured. My little girl Aya got burned and her right arm was broken. My son Ahmad burned his right foot. My other son Moaz scratched his wrist and head – he is 12 years old.[62]

When Majid al-Najjar went inside his house he saw that a shell had struck his wife Hanan directly in the chest. He showed Human Rights Watch a photo of Hanan that he had taken on his mobile phone, in which her chest had been cut open. Human Rights Watch also saw his injured daughter Aya, who had a cast on her right arm.

"We took them to Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis," Majid al-Najjar said. "The ambulance came after one hour. We were 10 people in the ambulance, and my dead wife too."

Human Rights Watch examined the house on January 24 and saw the hole in the roof where the shell had entered. Although Hanan al-Najjar was apparently directly hit by the empty shell, evidence of white phosphorus lay all around. Burn marks apparently from white phosphorus wedges stained some outside walls and the ground around the house. On the roof lay a white phosphorus canister and the remains of unburned wedges, which ignited when kicked.

The day after the attack, January 11, IDF forces moved into the al-Najjar district of Khuza'a for the first time. From approximately 5 a.m. to 11 p.m. they stayed on the edge of the village, residents and local human rights activists said, and several homes were bulldozed. The IDF returned around 3 a.m. on January 12 and destroyed some more homes, but withdrew again around noon.

The next assault took place around midnight on January 13, with heavy shelling, including the extensive use of air-burst white phosphorus. Ismail Khadr, a 50-year-old farmer, described what happened during the attack. "When the phosphorus landed we were on an island of smoke," he said. "Fires were everywhere and reached waist high. The pieces were like foam. Some of my farm was burned."[63] Khadr showed Human Rights Watch a small onion field next to his home, where he had buried some white phosphorus wedges to stop them from burning. When exposed to air, they reignited and produced a garlic-smelling smoke.

In the residential area around Majid al-Najjar's house, Human Rights Watch found extensive and irrefutable evidence of white phosphorus use, although it was not clear if the wedges had landed on January 10 or 13. Shell remains marked THS89D112-003 155MM M825E1lay inside a burned multi-story home with a hole in the ceiling next to a mosque. In another burned home, lay a white phosphorus canister and the base of a white phosphorus shell. A white phosphorus shell marked THS89D112-003 155MM M825E1 was found between two homes, one of which was completely burned. Lastly, the house of Abdul Hadi Qudeh, 88 years old, had a hole in the roof where a shell had apparently entered. A white phosphorus canister lay inside and felt wedges were on the roof. Three canister liners were outside, as well as more white phosphorus felt wedges.

The widespread use of white phosphorus in the area caused many injuries from smoke inhalation, residents and local human rights activists said. This was confirmed by Dr. Yusuf Abu Rish, the director of Nasser Hospital in nearby Khan Yunis, where many of the wounded were taken. He told Human Rights Watch that the hospital received more than 150 patients on January 13, and most of them were suffering from smoke inhalation. "Even the ambulance bringing the victims was full of a foul odor," he said. "Many of the victims suffered from a shortness of breath, hysteria and muscle spasms."[64] Twelve patients arrived at the hospital dead that day, Dr. Abu Rish said, but that was from all attacks in the Khan Yunis area and not just from white phosphorus.

Human Rights Watch reviewed the hospital's records and found that on January 13 doctors there had treated 13 persons for what the hospital called chemical burns. Two of these patients required transfer to Egypt for treatment. Dr. Abu Rish also showed Human Rights Watch seven samples of white phosphorus in glass jars, which he said a resident of Khuza'a had collected on January 13.
V. Israel's Shifting Statements on White Phosphorus

Since the media first reported the IDF's use of white phosphorus in Gaza on the tenth day of military operations, the IDF and Israeli government have shifted their public positions on the issue, from outright denial, to justifying its use, to announcing an internal investigation.

The Times of Londonfirst reported white phosphorus use in Gaza on January 5. The next day, an IDF spokesman contacted by Human Rights Watch at first said the IDF was using white phosphorus to mark targets and then denied that white phosphorus was being used.[65] He claimed that the media had mistakenly identified a shell used to mark targets as white phosphorus. The denials to the media continued. On January 7, an IDF spokesman told CNN, "I can tell you with certainty that white phosphorus is absolutely not being used."[66]

Reporters inside Gaza and in Israel quickly contradicted the IDF's claim. On January 8, the Times published photographs of white phosphorus munitions on pallets next to IDF artillery batteries outside of the Gaza Strip.[67] Based on these images, Human Rights Watch identified the munitions as M825A1 white phosphorus artillery shells. On January 9 and 10, 2009, Human Rights Watch researchers on the Gaza-Israel armistice line just south of Sderot observed multiple air-bursts of artillery-fired white phosphorus over what appeared to be the Gaza City/Jabalya area. On January 10, Human Rights Watch issued a press release, calling on Israel to "stop using white phosphorus in military operations in densely populated areas of Gaza."[68]

Media photographs of what appeared to be air-burst white phosphorus made the IDF's denials increasingly untenable. Still, on January 13, IDF Chief-of-Staff Lt.-Gen. Gabi Askenazi told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that "[t]he IDF acts only in accordance with what is permitted by international law and does not use white phosphorus."[69] That same day, however, other IDF officials began to backtrack on their position, ceasing to deny the use of white phosphorus and claiming that the IDF "uses weapons in compliance with international law."[70]

Also on January 13, an Associated Press report quoted Peter Herby, head of the Arms Unit at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as saying that white phosphorus use to create a smokescreen or illuminate a target is not prohibited under international law, and that the ICRC had "no evidence to suggest it's being used in any other way."[71] Two days later, on January 15, following news reports that the IDF had hit the UNRWA compound in Gaza City with white phosphorus shells, Israeli government spokesperson Mark Regev used the ICRC's statement to justify the IDF's attack. "I would point you to the statement yesterday of the International Committee of the Red Cross," he told CNN. "After looking into the issue [of whether the IDF was using white phosphorus], they found absolutely no wrongdoing on Israel's part."[72]

On January 17, however, the ICRC publicly disputed this interpretation of its position. "We have not commented publicly on the legality of the current use of phosphorus weapons by Israel, contrary to what has been attributed to us in recent media reports," Herby said in an official statement.[73] Nevertheless, the Israeli government continued to misstate the ICRC's position to justify its use of white phosphorus.[74]

In response to media requests, the ICRC further clarified its position. "The fact that International Humanitarian Law does not specifically prohibit phosphorous weapons does not imply that any specific use of weapons containing this substance is legal," Peter Herby told the Christian Science Monitor in early February. "The legality of each incident of use has to be considered in light of all of the fundamental rules I have mentioned. It may be legal or not, depending on a variety of factors."[75]

According to the newspaper, Herby also said: "The use of such white phosphorous weapons against any military objective within concentrations of civilians is prohibited unless the military objective is clearly separated from the civilians. The use of air-dropped incendiary weapons against military objectives within a concentration of civilians is simply prohibited. These prohibitions are contained in Protocol III of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons."

In the face of ongoing criticism about the IDF's use of white phosphorus, on January 19 IDF Chief-of-Staff Ashkenazi announced that he had requested the Military Advocate General to investigate allegations that the IDF had used white phosphorus in Gaza. "In response to the claims of NGOs and claims in the foreign press relating to the use of phosphorus weapons, and in order to remove any ambiguity, an investigative team has been established in southern command to look into the issue," an army statement said.[76] According to Haaretz, the army appointed an artillery officer, Col. Shai Alkalai, to investigate a reserve paratroop brigade that might have fired white phosphorus into crowded areas of Beit Lahiya. The brigade fired about 20 such shells in the densely populated area of northern Gaza, the newspaper said.[77]

On January 23, The Times quoted Yigal Palmor, an Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman, as saying, "Yes, phosphorus was used but not in any illegal manner. Some practices could be illegal but we are going into that. The IDF is holding an investigation concerning one specific incident."[78] An unnamed Israeli defense official told the newspaper that, "at least one month before [white phosphorus] was used a legal team had been consulted on the implications."[79]

In response to written questions about white phosphorus use in Gaza from Human Rights Watch, the IDF said on February 15 that it had "established an investigative team in the Southern Command to look into issues which you have raised, and our reply will be made on the basis of their findings."

VI. Legal Standards

International humanitarian law-the laws of war-does not ban white phosphorus munitions either as an "obscurant" to hide military operations or as an incendiary weapon. Its use nonetheless remains regulated by laws-of-war rules on the conduct of hostilities, restrictions that limit the use of all weapons in order to minimize harm to civilians and civilian property. Moreover, particular aspects of white phosphorus munitions-its incendiary effect that causes horrific burns and its wide dispersal when air-burst-raises additional international law concerns.

Human Rights Watch's investigation of Israel's use of white phosphorus munitions during the recent Gaza hostilities determined that, in violation of the laws of war, the IDF generally failed to take all feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm when using white phosphorus, and that, in specific cases, the IDF used white phosphorus in an indiscriminate manner causing civilian death and injury. Individuals who plan, order or conduct indiscriminate attacks willfully-that is, deliberately or recklessly-are responsible for war crimes. The widespread and repeated use of white phosphorus in an unlawful manner-air-burst over densely populated areas when the alternative of non-lethal smoke was available-is indicative of criminal intent.
White Phosphorus Use and the Conduct of Hostilities

The conduct of hostilities in the Gaza Strip is regulated primarily by customary international law, as expressed in the First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) and the 1907 Hague Regulations.[80] Most of the relevant provisions of both treaties are considered reflective of customary international law, rules of law that are based on established state practice and are binding on all parties to an armed conflict, whether they are states or non-state armed groups, such as Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups.

International humanitarian law places restrictions on the means and methods of warfare by parties to an armed conflict and requires them to respect and protect civilians and captured combatants. The fundamental tenets of this law are "civilian immunity" and "distinction,"[81] While humanitarian law recognizes that some civilian casualties are inevitable, it imposes a duty on warring parties at all times to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and to target only combatants and other military objectives. Deliberate attacks against civilians are prohibited.[82] Civilians lose their immunity from attack when and only for such time that they are directly participating in hostilities.[83]

International humanitarian law also protects civilian objects, which are defined as anything not considered a military objective.[84] Prohibited are direct attacks against civilian objects, such as homes, apartments, places of worship, schools, and hospitals-unless they are being used for military purposes.[85] Should a hospital be used for military purposes, it may still only be attacked after a warning with a reasonable time-limit has been issued and gone unheeded.[86]

The laws of war prohibit indiscriminate attacks. Indiscriminate attacks are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. Examples of indiscriminate attacks are those that are not directed at a specific military objective or that use weapons that cannot be directed at a specific military objective. Thus, if a party launches an attack without attempting to aim properly at a military target, or in such a way as to hit civilians without regard to the likely extent of death or injury, it would amount to an indiscriminate attack. Prohibited indiscriminate attacks also include area bombardment, which are attacks by artillery or other means that treat as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in an area containing a concentration of civilians and civilian objects.[87]

Also prohibited are attacks that violate the principle of proportionality. Disproportionate attacks are those that are expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack.[88]

Humanitarian law requires that the parties to a conflict take constant care during military operations to spare the civilian population and to "take all feasible precautions" to avoid or minimize the incidental loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects.[89] These precautions include doing everything feasible to verify that the objects of attack are military objectives and not civilians or civilian objects,[90] and giving "effective advance warning" of attacks when circumstances permit.[91]

International humanitarian law does not prohibit fighting in urban areas, although the presence of civilians places greater obligations on warring parties to take steps to minimize harm to civilians. Forces deployed in populated areas must avoid locating military objectives near densely populated areas,[92] and endeavor to remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives.[93] Belligerents are prohibited from using civilians to shield military objectives or operations from attack. "Shielding" refers to purposefully using the presence of civilians to render military forces or areas immune from attack.[94] However, even if one party considers opposing forces responsible for having located legitimate military targets within or near populated areas, it is not relieved from the obligation to take into account the risk to civilians when conducting attacks.
White Phosphorus and Law on Incendiary Weapons

Protocol III to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) regulates the use of incendiary weapons.[95] The protocol defines incendiary weapons as "any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target."[96] White phosphorus is an incendiary weapon.[97]

The primary innovation of Protocol III is to prohibit the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons against military objectives located within a concentration of civilians.[98] Customary laws of war also prohibit the anti-personnel use of incendiary weapons so long as weapons less likely to cause unnecessary suffering are available.[99]

Israel is a party to the CCW but not Protocol III. However, a 1998 Israeli military manual states:

Incendiary arms are not banned…. Nevertheless, because of their wide range of cover, this protocol of the CCW is meant to protect civilians and forbids making a population center a target for an incendiary weapon attack. Furthermore, it is forbidden to attack a military objective situated within a population center employing incendiary weapons. The protocol does not ban the use of these arms during combat (for instance, in flushing out bunkers).[100]

Human Rights Watch opposes any use of incendiary weapons that would result in unnecessary suffering.[101]
Israel 's Use of White Phosphorus under International Law

Israel's use of white phosphorus munitions during the armed conflict in Gaza violated international humanitarian law in two distinct ways. First, the IDF's general use of air-burst white phosphorus as an apparent obscurant in densely populated areas of Gaza violated the obligation to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians and to civilian objects. Second, the IDF's use of air-burst white phosphorus in specific incidents causing civilian casualties violated the prohibition against indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks.

The use of white phosphorus as an obscurant in densely populated areas of Gaza violated the requirement under international humanitarian law to take all feasible precautions to avoid civilian injury and loss of life. This concern is amplified given the method of use observed by Human Rights Watch and evidenced in media photographs of air-bursting white phosphorus projectiles. Air-bursting spreads burning wedges in a radius up to 125 meters from the blast point, thereby exposing more civilians and civilian objects to potential harm than a localized ground burst.

In incidents investigated by Human Rights Watch, Israeli forces used white phosphorus munitions in an indiscriminate or disproportionate manner in violations of the laws of war. In these incidents, even if the intended use of the white phosphorus was as an obscurant, it had the effect on the ground as a weapon. The rationale for an obscurant seems doubtful because there were either no Israeli forces in the vicinity to screen or such forces were for a considerable period in a stationary deployment. And if the purpose was to obscure military maneuvers, the IDF could have achieved similar obscuring effects through use of smoke artillery without causing the same degree of civilian harm. Israel has not asserted that it used white phosphorus as a weapon, but the apparent absence of nearby Hamas fighters in cases investigated by Human Rights Watch, as well as the legal limitations placed on the use of white phosphorus weapons in populated areas, would not justify its use in this manner. That would remain true even if Hamas forces were deployed among civilians or using civilians as "shields," as Israel has asserted, because Israel would still have a duty to attack Hamas in a more discriminate way so as to minimize civilian casualties.

In the cases investigated, Israeli forces fired air-burst white phosphorus munitions from 155mm artillery. Human Rights Watch has long criticized the IDF's use of high explosive M107 shells in densely populated areas as being indiscriminate.[102] During the recent fighting in Gaza, as in the past, the IDF fired an Israeli modified version of the US M109A3 howitzer called the Doher. It is normally fired as an indirect fire weapon, that is, out of the line of sight. M107 shells have an expected casualty radius between 100 and 300 meters.[103] Air-burst white phosphorus munitions are similarly indiscriminate in their wide dispersal-an area between 63 and 125 meters in radius, depending on the altitude of the burst. The fact that white phosphorus is not as lethal as high explosive M107 shells is irrelevant to the question of whether or not they are being used in an indiscriminate manner in violation of the laws of war.

The IDF's use of white phosphorus munitions may also have violated the prohibition on attacks that are expected to cause civilian harm which is excessive compared to the expected military gain. In cases investigated by Human Rights Watch, the military value of white phosphorus fired as an apparent obscurant appeared to be minimal given the absence of Israeli forces in the vicinity. By comparison, the expected harm to civilians and civilian objects by using white phosphorus was often high, and thus disproportionate in violation of the laws of war. As the incendiary effects of white phosphorus on civilians are well known, the civilian harm caused by white phosphorus use in populated areas was foreseeable.
White Phosphorus Use in Populated Areas and Individual Criminal Responsibility

Serious violations of international humanitarian law committed willfully, that is deliberately or recklessly, are war crimes, and give rise to individual criminal responsibility.[104] War crimes include intentional or indiscriminate attacks on civilians, as well as attacks in which the expected civilian loss is disproportionate compared to the anticipated military gain. Individuals may also be held criminally liable for attempting to commit a war crime, as well as assisting in, facilitating, and aiding or abetting a war crime. Responsibility may also fall on persons planning or instigating the commission of a war crime. Commanders and civilian leaders may be prosecuted for war crimes as a matter of command responsibility when they knew or should have known about the commission of war crimes and took insufficient measures to prevent them or punish those responsible.

Even if intended as an obscurant rather than as a weapon, the IDF's firing of air-burst white phosphorus shells from 155mm artillery into densely populated areas was indiscriminate or disproportionate, and indicates the commission of war crimes.

The IDF's deliberate or reckless use of white phosphorus munitions is evidenced in five ways. First, to Human Rights Watch's knowledge, the IDF never used its white phosphorus munitions in Gaza before, despite numerous incursions with personnel and armor. Second, the repeated use of air-burst white phosphorus in populated areas until the last days of the operation reveals a pattern or policy of conduct rather than incidental or accidental usage. Third, the IDF was well aware of the effects white phosphorus has and the dangers it can pose to civilians. Fourth, if the IDF used white phosphorus as an obscurant, it failed to use available alternatives, namely smoke munitions, which would have held similar tactical advantages without endangering the civilian population. Fifth, in at least one of the cases documented in this report – the January 15 strike on the UNRWA compound in Gaza City – the IDF kept firing white phosphorus despite repeated warnings from UN personnel about the danger to civilians. Under international humanitarian law, these circumstances demand the independent investigation of the use of white phosphorus and, if warranted, the prosecution of all those responsible for war crimes.
Wednesday
Mar252009

Full Text: UN Human Rights Council Report on Israel's Human Rights Violations in Gaza

Yesterday, we reported on the presentation of a report to the Human Rights Council of a report by UN investigators on Israel's operations in Gaza. We have finally found an advance copy of the report into the human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories. We publish it in full below without further comment. You can also download a pdf copy of the report at the HRC's website.


A

ADVANCE EDITED
VERSION

Distr.
GENERAL

A/HRC/10/22
20 March 2009

Original:  ENGLISH

Human Rights Council
Tenth session
Agenda item 7

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN PALESTINE AND OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB
TERRITORIES

Combined report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict,
the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, the
Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to
an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context,
the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the right to education
and the independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty

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CONTENTS

Paragraphs Page
I.  INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………. 1 – 8

II.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK ………………………....................................... 9 – 25

A International humanitarian law ……………………………………….  9 – 18
B  Human rights law …………………………………………………….. 19 – 23
C  The continued application of human rights law during
armed conflict ………………………………………………………… 24 – 25

III.  CONTRIBUTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL MANDATE-HOLDERS ……….. 26 – 98

A.  Independent expert on the question of human rights and
extreme poverty ……………………………………………………….. 26 – 36
B.  Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of
the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to
non-discrimination in this context …………………………………….. 37 – 44
C.  Special Rapporteur on the right to food ……………………………….. 45 – 53
D.  Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health ……… 54 – 63
E.  Special Rapporteur on the right to education ………………………….. 64 – 73
F.  Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes
and consequences ……………………………………………………… 74 – 79
G.  Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights
of internally displaced persons ………………………………………... 80 – 88
H.  Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary
Executions …………………………………………………………… 89 – 98

IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS ………………………………………………… 99 – 105

Annex :  Special report on Gaza and southern Israel prepared by the Special
Representative of the secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.

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Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-9/1 of 12
January 2009 in which the Council requested all relevant special procedures mandate-holders, in
particular the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
human rights of internally displaced persons, the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in
this context, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
arbitrary or summary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the right to education and the
independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty, to urgently seek and
gather information on violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people and submit their
reports to the Council at its next session.

The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967 has submitted a separate report to the Council (A/HRC/10/20). The present
report is submitted by the other above-mentioned mandate-holders, and includes individual
sections submitted by each one as well as a joint introduction, legal analysis and set of
recommendations.  The section submitted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for Children and Armed Conflict.

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I INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-9/1 on the
grave violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly due to the
recent Israeli military attacks against the occupied Gaza Strip.

2. In its resolution, the Council requested all relevant special procedures mandate-holders, in
particular the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
human rights of internally displaced persons, the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in
this context, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the right to education and the
independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty, to urgently seek and
gather information on violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people and submit their
reports to the Council at its next session.

3. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967 has submitted a separate report to the Council (A/HRC/10/20). The present
report is submitted by the other above-mentioned mandate-holders, and includes individual
sections submitted by each one as well as a joint introduction, legal analysis and set of
recommendations. The section submitted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for Children and Armed Conflict is annexed to the report. Following her visit to the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and Southern Israel from 2 to 6 February 2009, the information submitted
was compiled by the inter-agency working group on children and armed conflict on the ground, in
accordance with Security Council resolution 1612 (2005)..

4. The mandate-holders solicited information from concerned parties, including relevant
Governments, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, and received a
significant number of submissions. They extend their sincere thanks for the cooperation they

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received in gathering information. In view of the extremely limited time available, brief report
cannot do justice to the large volume of information received.

5. The special rapporteurs on violence against women, on the right to education, on the right
to food, on the right to the highest attainable standard of health and the independent expert on
extreme poverty requested to visit the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Gaza, and to
discuss with the relevant Israeli authorities the issues covered by their mandates.

6. The Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly the Gaza Strip, has been affected by
protracted conflict and occupation policies for decades. On 27 December 2008, the Israeli military
launched a large-scale operation against Hamas in response to rockets fired at populated areas in
Israeli territory. According to available estimates, a total of 1,453 people were killed.  Of these,
1,440 were Palestinian, including 431 children and 114 women.  A total of 13 were Israelis,
including three civilians and six soldiers killed by Hamas, and four soldiers killed in friendly fire
incidents.1 This operation also resulted in a dramatic deterioration of the living conditions of the
civilian population. At the onset of the recent military operation, the population of the Gaza Strip
was already rendered vulnerable following a 20-month-long blockade, which severely restricted
the movement of people and goods and the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance.
In addition, the discriminatory legislation and policies of the occupying Power in, inter alia, access
to housing, health care, food and water systems, have governed for decades the institutional set up
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, thus aggravating the situation of its residents. An estimated
80 per cent of the population in Gaza, particularly women and children, was already dependent on
humanitarian assistance before the recent military operation.

7. Targeted and indiscriminate attacks on public facilities, including medical facilities, water
and sanitation networks, Government and municipal buildings, electricity, gas, transportation,
agriculture, fisheries and industries further eroded people’s access to basic services and goods.
Combined with the decreasing ability of the authorities to manage basic public services and the
collapse of the local economy, the recent military operation exacerbated the situation of the 1.5
million Gaza residents whose rights, including the rights to education, food, health and housing

1
In addition to the 1,440 killed, the Palestinian Ministry of Health lists 5,380 Palestinians injured, including 1,872
children and 800 women. In addition to the 13 killed, the Magen David Adom lists 518 Israelis injured, including 182
civilians and 336 soldiers. For additional data on children, see Annex. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs,  The Humanitarian Monitor, Occupied Palestinian Territory, No. 33, January 2009.

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and to be free from violence could not be protected. The conflict further exacerbated the desperate
situation of those living in poverty in Gaza and pushed even more people into a life of poverty.

8. Even after the ceasefire was declared on 18 January 2009, restrictions on movement of
people and goods as well as humanitarian assistance continued, thus hampering efforts for
recovery and return to normalcy.

II   LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. International humanitarian law

9. The most relevant conventional international humanitarian law standards binding Israel are
set out in the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War of 1949. In addition, Israel is bound by the customary rules of international humanitarian law,
which are applicable in the present context.  The State’s responsibilities in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory as the Occupying Power are set out in this Convention as well as in the
Hague Regulations, which have become part of customary international humanitarian law.2 The
International Court of Justice has concluded that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in
the Palestinian territories, which before the 1967 conflict lay to the east of the Green Line and
which, during that conflict, were occupied by Israel. This is also the case for the Gaza Strip
despite the unilateral withdrawal by Israel of its forces from the Strip in 2005, as the continuing
occupation has been confirmed repeatedly since then by the General Assembly and the Security
Council.3

10. Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups are bound by the obligations of Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and by the applicable rules of customary international
humanitarian law, concerning, inter alia, the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of civilians
and other protected persons.   In the text of the National Unity Government programme delivered
by then Prime Minister Ismail Haniya before the Palestinian Legislative Council on 17 March

2
In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories of 2004, the International Court of Justice recalled that, while Israel was not a party to the Hague
Convention of 18 October 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of War and Land (Convention IV), to which the
Hague Regulations are annexed, the provisions of the Hague Regulations had become part of customary international
law.
3
See General Assembly resolutions 62/181, and 63/98, and Security Council resolution 1860 (2009).

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2007, Hamas accepted that it was bound by as it has confirmed its commitment to respect
international law and international humanitarian law.

11. The most relevant rules of customary international humanitarian law applicable to the
conduct of hostilities in the present context relate to the principles of distinction, proportionality
and precaution.4 These obligations are cumulative; an attack must comply with all of the rules in
order to be lawful.

12. First, under the principle of distinction, the parties to a conflict must, at all times,
distinguish between civilians and combatants; attacks may be directed only at military objectives,
defined as those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in
the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage. The only circumstance in
which civilians may be targeted is for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. Thus,
attacks on civilian objects are unlawful unless at the time of the attack they were used for military
purposes and their destruction offered a definite military advantage.

13. Indiscriminate attacks are similarly prohibited. They are those that (a) are not directed at a
specific military objective; (b) employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a
specific military objective; or (c) employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law; and consequently, in each such
case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction. Attacks by bombardment which treat a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in an urban area or rural village as a single military objective are
prohibited. The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks must not only determine the strategy adopted
for a particular military operation but also limit the use of certain weapons in situations where the
civilian population will be affected.

14. Second, under the principle of proportionality, attacks on legitimate military objectives
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to

4
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law, J-M. Henckaerts
and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2005 ICRC Study).  The study was prepared at the request
of States at the twenty-sixth International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in December 1995 and is
based on an extensive analysis of State practice (e.g. military manuals) and documents expressing opinio iuris. Rules,
6-9, 11-13, 15-24, 97.

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civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated, are prohibited.

15. Third, the parties to a conflict must take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event
to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. This
obligation is two-fold. Precautions must be taken when planning and conducting attacks. A
number of specific precautionary measures are prescribed by humanitarian law, inter alia, the
determination of the military character of the objective and the evaluation of compliance with the
principle of proportionality. In addition, parties to a conflict are required to give effective advance
warning of attacks, which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

16. Parties to a conflict must also take precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects
under its control from the effects of attacks; this includes avoiding placing military objectives
within or near densely populated areas and keeping civilians away from military targets. The use
of human shields is also prohibited. Contrary to the general principle of precautions against the
effects of attacks, this prohibition must be understood to require the specific intent to use civilians
to immunize otherwise legitimate military objectives from lawful attack.

17. A violation of the obligation to take precautionary measures vis-à-vis the civilian
population or their use as human shields by one side to a conflict does not change the obligations
incumbent on the other party to the conflict to evaluate what constitutes an excessive attack in
relation to concrete and direct military advantage.5

18. With regard to the treatment of protected persons in the occupied territories, article 33 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention forbids collective punishment of civilians for crimes they have not
personally committed. The provision of assistance to protected persons and civilian property also
benefit from specific protections. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the
destruction by the occupying Power of private or public property unless rendered absolutely
necessary by military operations. In addition, articles 55 and 59 provide that the occupying Power
shall ensure food and medical supplies of the population and at the very least agree to relief
schemes on behalf of the population of an occupied territory, and shall facilitate them by all the
means at its disposal, if the whole or part of this population is inadequately supplied. Articles 23

5
Article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention specifies that the presence of a protected person may not be used to
render certain points or areas immune from military operations.

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and 59 further provide that all contracting parties shall permit the free passage of these
consignments and guarantee their protection.6

B. Human rights law
19. Israel is party to the major human rights treaties relevant to the current situation7.

20. As regards the territorial scope of application, article 2 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights obliges each State party to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized within it.8  In particular, in relation
to the responsibilities Israel under its international human rights treaty obligations with regard to
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in its advisory opinion on the Wall, the International Court of
Justice concluded that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
were applicable.9 United Nations human rights treaty bodies also underscore that, as a State party
to international human rights instruments, Israel continues to bear responsibility for implementing
its human rights conventional obligations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, to the extent that
it continues to exercise jurisdiction there.10 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women contain no provisions limiting their application to
the territory of States parties.  In this respect, the International Court of Justice also noted that the

6
In resolution 1860 (2009), the Security Council called for the unimpeded provision and distribution throughout Gaza
of humanitarian assistance, including food, fuel and medical treatment.
7
TheY include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
Optional Protocol thereto on the involvement of children in armed conflict.
8
The Human Rights Committee has clarified that “a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if not situated within the territory of
the State party”.  General comment No. 31 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13), para. 10.
9
In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories of 2004, the International Court of Justice recalled that, while Israel was not a party to the Hague
Convention of 18 October 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of War and Land (Convention IV), to which the
Hague Regulations are annexed, the provisions of the Hague Regulations had become part of customary international
law.
10
An examination of the concluding observations of different United Nations treaty bodies confirms this view: In its
concluding observations of 2003, the Human Rights Committee reiterated that the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provisions apply “to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories for all conduct by the
State party’s authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant”.
Similarly, in its 2003 concluding observations, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights reaffirmed its
view that “the State party’s obligations under the Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its effective
control” (E/C.12/1/Add.90). The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination  drew a similar conclusion in
its concluding observations of March 2007 (CERD/C/ISR/CO/13), para. 32.

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obligations of Israel under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
include an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where
competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities. The unilateral disengagement from the
Gaza Strip by Israel, which was formally completed on 12 September 2005, does not dispense
Israel from complying with its human rights obligations towards the population of that territory;
Israel remains bound to the extent that the measures it adopts affect the enjoyment of human rights
of the residents of the Gaza Strip.

21. The Palestinian Authority, as recognized in a number of public undertakings whereby the
Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian
Legislative Council have declared their commitment to respect international human rights law, is
also bound to abide by international human rights obligations.11

22. With respect to Hamas, it is worth recalling that non-State actors that exercise
government-like functions and control over a territory are obliged to respect human rights
norms when their conduct affects the human rights of the individuals under their control.12

23. Although the full body of human rights law is applicable in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, the particular relevance of some human rights norms stands out in the current context,
namely the right to life and freedom of movement, as well as a number of economic and social
rights, particularly the right to an adequate standard of living, including the rights to food and to
adequate housing, the rights to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health, the right to work, the rights to education and to the prohibition of discrimination as
enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These rights
impose obligations on State parties: the obligations to respect protect and fulfil, which in turn
incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide.13

11
PLO chairman Yasser Arafat repeatedly stated that he and his Government were committed to respecting to
all international human rights standards, for instance, to representatives of Amnesty International on 2 October 1993
and 7 February 1996.
12
For example, in a joint report on Lebanon and Israel, a group of four special rapporteurs concluded that: “Although
Hezbollah, a non-State actor, cannot become a party to these human rights treaties, it remains subject to the demand of
the international community, first expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that every organ of society
respect and promote human rights … It is especially appropriate and feasible to call for an armed group to respect
human rights norms when it exercises significant control over territory and population and has an identifiable political
structure.” (A/HRC/2/7),  para. 19.
13
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 13 on the right to education.

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C. The continued application of human rights law during armed conflict
24. Human rights law, which consists of the full range of economic, social and cultural rights
as well as civil and political rights, does not cease to apply in times of war; only certain
derogations which are in accordance with precise provisions relating to times of emergency are
permissible.14

25. More specifically, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
international human rights instruments allow for the possibility, in circumstances that threaten the
life of the nation, to derogate from some of its guarantees provided that the measures are strictly
necessary and are lifted as soon as the public emergency or armed conflict ceases to exist.15
Certain guarantees, in particular the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or the right to life, are non-derogable16. Israel remains in the state of public emergency
proclaimed on 19 May 1948, four days after its declaration of establishment.17  With regard to
economic, social and cultural rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights does not explicitly allow for derogations in time of public emergency, but the guarantees of
the Covenant may, in times of armed conflict, be limited in accordance with its articles 4 and 5
and because of the possible scarcity of available resources in the sense of article 2, paragraph 1.18

III. Contributions by individual mandate-holders

A. Independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty

26. In situations of armed conflict, the poor always suffer disproportionately. In the specific
case of Gaza, the recent conflict and, in particular, the impact that Israeli military operations have
had on the infrastructure and the economy have pushed even more people below the poverty line.
Poverty has been a long standing concern in Gaza. Even prior to the recent conflict, 78.9 per cent

14
International Court of Justice, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”, advisory opinion of 8 July
1996, ICJ Reports 1996 (I), para. 25; advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a wallin the
Occupied Palestinian Territory; para. 106; “Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda)”, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 219 (finding substantive violations of human rights law during an
armed conflict). See also concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the second periodic report of
Israel, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No.  40 (A/58/40), vol. I, para. 11.
15
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, para. 1: see also Human Rights Committee, general
comment No. 29 (2001), para. 3.
16
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, para. 2.
17
CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2, para. 71.
18
See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 14 (2000), paras. 28-29.

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of Gaza residents were already living below the official poverty line.19 The recent conflict, the
occupation and the 19-month blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza have exasperated this situation
and had a devastating effect on the economy and the infrastructure and a profound pervasive
impact on the lives of Palestinian people, particularly the poor.

27. While the blockade is the primary cause of poverty in Gaza, the situation has been further
exacerbated by the limitation of aid in 2006, insufficient access for humanitarian organizations
and the deterioration of the internal security situation owing to the escalation of intra-Palestinian
violence. A full assessment is still under way. However, there is no doubt that the three-week
military offensive by Israel has compounded the already catastrophic humanitarian situation of the
Palestinian people and led to a range of human rights violations.

28. The military operation launched by Israel on 27 December 2008 has not only forced more
people into a life of poverty, but also exacerbated the miserable situation of those already living in
poverty by creating a need for urgent, massive humanitarian efforts to secure basic rights and
minimum standards of living. The almost complete dependency on external aid and reliance on the
informal market has further exposed the population to political manipulation affecting the poor
disproportionately.

29. The independent expert expresses her grave concern at the fact that poverty in Gaza is a
direct consequence of systematic violations of a wide range of civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights against Gazan residents, and that poverty in Gaza has also led to specific
violations of human rights. Many of these violations are described in other sections of the present
report and all are relevant to assessing the situation of the poor. In particular, the poor have
suffered greatly from violations of the right to education, food, housing and health, which are
described below in detail by other mandate-holders.

1.  Cumulative and increasing destruction of livelihoods in Gaza

30. Reports received by the independent expert reveal that, over the years, the damage that the
blockade and military incursions by Israel has inflicted upon the land, the environment and

19
The official poverty line is 2.3 USD per person per day, this rates reflects household income. World Bank, Palestinian Economic
Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform, 22 September 2008, p.20. The figure set out here was recorded in 2007, no figures are
available for 2008.

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industrial infrastructure in Gaza has led to an escalation in unemployment and undermined the
ability of the Palestinian people to find basic means of subsistence. The World Bank estimates that
98 per cent of Gaza industrial operations were inactive as a result of the closures. Up to 70,000
workers are reported to have lost their jobs since 2007.20 In December 2008, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 18 months of closures had caused a 50 per
cent increase in unemployment. Women are particularly affected; the female participation in the
Gaza job market was only 11.5 per cent in 2007, one of the lowest rates in the world.21

31. The lack of regular payment of salaries caused mainly by the suspension of financial aid
and the discontinuation of the transfer of taxes and revenues as well as by the tensions between the
different political parties controlling services to the Palestinian population had caused a steady
deterioration in the living conditions of public sector employees that has left them vulnerable to
poverty. Restrictions imposed by Israel on the transport of currency have resulted in a liquidity
crisis. The lack of currency has seriously compromised the provision of basic social services,
including the payment of social allowances, thereby making the poorest to a fully dependent on
aid and informal arrangements to survive.

2.  Impact of the recent military operation on the poor

32. Preliminary assessments indicate that, during the recent military operations, health
facilities, water and sanitation infrastructure, land and cellular communication networks, schools,
universities, mosques, residential buildings, factories commercial enterprises and farms were
deliberately attacked and damaged as a result of fighting.22 This has had a disastrous impact on the
economy, the infrastructure and the enjoyment of human rights by the poorest Palestinian people.

33. It is reported that during the military intervention Israel deliberately obstructed the work of
humanitarian personnel leaving the poor without basic medical, food and other services in
violation of both international humanitarian and human rights law.23 After the cessation of
hostilities, reports suggest that the authorities in Gaza have also obstructed the distribution of

20
Ibid.
21
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People Mid-term Strategic
Framework for the period 2008-2011 (2008)
22
See UNRWA News, 16 January 2009; the Statement by Commissioner General Karen AbuZayd,  27 January 2009; International
Committee of the Red Cross, Operational Update of 25 January 2009; Field update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator,
24-26 January 2009; Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, “The collapse of Gaza’s water and waste water sector. Grave
breaches of international humanitarian Law and serious violations of international human rights law”, 2009, sections B, C and E.
23
See “WFP launches Operation Lifeline Gaza to get food to the hungry”, 10 January 2009; Zarocostas, J. ‘’Agencies call for
health workers in Gaza to be respected”, British Medical Journal, 7 January 2009 and “The Conflict in Gaza”, AI report, January
2009, section D.

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humanitarian aid to Gaza and imposed restrictions on the work of civil society organizations and
human rights defenders.24

34. For Gaza's economy to revive (offering opportunities to people to pull themselves out of
poverty) all of Gaza’s entry points must be opened to ensure freedom of movement for all, the free
inflow of industrial and agricultural inputs and cash and the export of products from Gaza25. There
is also an urgent need to ensure that there are sufficient quantities of fuel, spare parts for the
damaged infrastructure (e.g. the power plant) as well as cement, sand and other construction
materials.

35. Recovery will also require that Palestinians be provided with income-generating and work
opportunities, including access to work in Israel. Furthermore, Palestinians require access to
education at all levels and students and professionals, such as doctors and teachers, must be able to
receive education abroad. Special attention must also be paid to people who have been seriously
wounded or disabled; they must be provided with rehabilitation services and have the means to
live a dignified life and enjoying an adequate standard of living.

36. In addition to the above-mentioned measures, the independent expert stresses that, to
improve the lives of those living in poverty, psychosocial support for those in need, in particular
children, is urgently needed. The rights of the victims of human rights violations to have access to
remedy and reparations must also be respected.

B. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a component of the right to an adequate
standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context

37. Disregard for the right to adequate housing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory far predates
the recent military offensive. Overcrowding, lack of sanitation and other difficult living conditions
have been not only the result of demolitions and destruction of homes in the present and previous
military offensives, but a permanent urban condition that prevents the people of Gaza from having

24
See Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Special Reports, (February 2009), “Inter-Palestinian Human Rights Violations in the
Gaza Strip”, 3 February 2009
25
On 12 February, a single truck with nearly 50,000 flowers was reportedly allowed to cross out of Gaza through
Kerem Shalom for export. According to the same source, it was the first time since 18 January 2008 that Israel had
allowed any exports from Gaza; however, it remains unclear as to whether further exports will be allowed. The Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that, on 6 February, Israel allowed, for the first time since mid
December 2008, the transfer of NIS 170 million ($ 42 million) from banks in the West Bank to banks in the Gaza
Strip. The new supply would enable the Palestinian Authority to pay the salaries of some 70,000 Gaza-based
employees. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Situation Report, No. 21, February 2009.

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access to the acceptable minimal standards of adequate housing.

38. The Special Rapporteur on adequate housing has received reports from numerous sources
concerning the extensive destruction of homes and civilian property during the Israeli military
offensive in Gaza from 27 December 2008 to 24 January 2009. Initial estimates indicate that more
than 4,240 residences were destroyed and 44,306 were damaged, most of them rendered
uninhabitable without considerable rehabilitation.26  An estimated 2.6 per cent of homes in Gaza
were completely destroyed, an additional 20 per cent sustained serious damage,27 reportedly
forcibly evicting an estimated 80,000 to 90,000 people who have been rendered homeless, many
forced to live in open space.28  For buildings that are apparently still intact, it is unclear how much
of their internal structure was damaged, which may cause problems in the long term, including
collapse or fragility in the event of natural disaster.

39. The massive destruction and damage caused by the Israeli offensive to homes and
infrastructure, including roads, water stations and electrical facilities, and the continued
restrictions imposed on the urgent transport of reconstruction materials into Gaza could constitute
grave violations of the right to adequate housing and are the cause of a severe humanitarian crisis.

40. Reports indicate that Israeli attacks have not always complied with the principle of
distinction between civilians and combatants, and that some of the houses and properties attacked
did not meet the definition of military objectives.

41. Countless communities in Gaza have been rendered virtually uninhabitable.  In urban areas
and several refugee camps in the northern part of Gaza, entire neighborhoods have been flattened.
These acts seem to be contrary to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, in particular Article 53.29

42. The extensive damage to basic social services and infrastructures has severely eroded the

26
Rapid Shelter/NFI assessment, 11 February 2009.
27
United Nations, Gaza Flash Appeal, January 2009; and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
28
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions “European governments and citizens hold the key to imposing
accountability on Israel”, 12 January 2009; and Emergency Architects, information flash: “The foundation of
Emergency Architects helps with emergency re-housing in Gaza”, 18 February 2009.
29
“Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to
private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited,
except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”.

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ability of the people of Gaza to live according to the acceptable minimal standards of adequate
housing. Many water tanks used by individual homes were also damaged,30 causing 500,000
people to have no access to running water, and the rest of the population only sporadic access
during the hostilities.31 Thousands of people have been affected by damaged sewage networks and
pumping stations, owing to both repeated bombing and the scarcity of fuel supplies resulting from
the closure of the border.27 Unexploded ordinance has been discovered by civilians in residential
areas; property and water supplies have been contaminated by sewage spills and reports allege
further contamination by toxic remnants from munitions.32

43. At a time when international support for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of homes and
neighbourhoods is urgently needed, the Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned about persisting
impediments to the entry of reconstruction materials into Gaza, either through their outright
prohibition or protracted administrative delays.  In addition, she recalls that, according to the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, destruction of infrastructure and houses resulted in the
waste of approximately $1.9 billion in international aid dollars given by donors and the
international community.

44. The recent attacks have worsened the living conditions of the people of Gaza, who have
been confined for decades to a small territory, in overcrowded conditions, with poor housing and
sanitation conditions, problems that have been poorly managed to date. The Special Rapporteur is
particularly concerned that the scale of destruction bringing further destitution and the hardship
endured by the people of Gaza will only add to the cycle of violence.

C.   Special Rapporteur on the right to food

45. The right to food is realized when every man, woman and child has physical and economic
access at all times to adequate food or the means for its procurement. This right is violated on a
large scale, and on a routine basis, in the Gaza Strip, owing to both recent events and long-
standing trends. The breakdown of the food system in Gaza and the lasting damage, that has been
inflicted on the Gaza food production infrastructure, resulting in the loss of jobs and incomes for
many families, further aggravate a situation which, even before the recent military operation of

30
Aid Worker Diary: part 15, July 14 2009.
31
New York Times, “Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza”  11 July 2009
32
IPS “Unexploded bombs hold more deaths”,  24 January 2009.

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December 2008-January 2009, was intolerable. The chronic restrictions on the movements of
goods and people have also had a major impact on the right to food of the people living in Gaza.

1.  Destruction of property and means of subsistence

46. According to the Palestinian Centre for the Human Rights and the Integrated Regional
Information Network, farmland and greenhouses were bombed extensively in Gaza, which has had
a devastating impact on the ability of people to produce food for subsistence or trade purposes.
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated that 80 per cent of agricultural land and
crops was damaged during the recent hostilities, as evidenced by 395 impact craters resulting from
shelling.33 Arable land has been contaminated by spills of sewage and toxic munitions.34  The
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that extensive destruction debilitated
commercial enterprises and public infrastructure, including the largest flour mill and food
processing plants in Gaza. The Special Rapporteur considers that this constitutes a serious
violation of customary international humanitarian law, which prohibits attacking, destroying,
removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.35

2.  Closures and restrictions to free movement of goods, including food aid

47. Even before the recent conflict, recurrent closure of border crossings and other security
measures had impeded the passage and delivery of food assistance and of traded foodstuffs. The
consequences have been dramatic; for example, the closure of the Karni border crossing for over
46 days in the first quarter of 2006 resulted in severe shortages of food and the depletion of food
reserves, and most bakeries in the Gaza Strip were forced to close owing to shortages of flour and
fuel, leading to the rationing of bread. The prohibition of the export of agricultural products from
Gaza at the height of the harvesting season reportedly led to the waste of hundreds of tons of
tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers and strawberries and a loss of millions of dollars.36 Restrictions on
the entry of supplies essential for food production, such as fuel, fertilizers, plastics and seeds, have
also been imposed over the years by the Israeli blockade.

48. The complete closure of Gaza’s borders during the recent armed conflict affected both
family-level food production and public and commercial centres. In a situation report from the

33
UNOSAT damage assessment, 20 January
34
The Observer, “Gaza desperately short of food after Israel destroys farmland”, 3 February 2009.
35
ICRC study, rule 54.
36
A/HRC/4/30/Add.1, para. 37.

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Humanitarian Coordinator, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that
in early January, only nine bakeries remained operational, causing many people to wait from five
to six hours a day just to purchase a day’s supply of bread. According to the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, shortages of nutritious and affordable food have further
eroded food security for people in Gaza; meat and many vegetables are scarce and cost three times
their regular price.

49. According to the Palestine Monitor Factsheet of 18 December 2008, even before the
hostilities, approximately 80 per cent of families in Gaza relied on humanitarian food aid in order
to survive,36  this number had reached approximately 91 per cent by early February 2009.37 In this
context, obstacles to the delivery of urgently needed food aid during the recent hostilities caused
by fuel shortages and the closure of the borders resulted in violations of the right to food on a large
scale.  The continuous bombing of civilian areas further impeded aid agencies from having access
to hungry people, who were unable, or too afraid, to meet aid convoys;23  the number of hungry
people without access to basic food necessary for their survival soared as a result.  Normal
caseloads from the World Food Programme and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNRWA normal caseloads have therefore increased, bringing
the total number of people dependent on food aid from both organizations to 1,275,300.38

50. Even after the cessation of the hostilities, humanitarian aid convoys still met restrictions on
providing for the urgent food and nutritional needs of the population of Gaza, a violation of the
obligations of Israel as the occupying Power of the Gaza Strip.39 These obstacles to food aid were
further exacerbated by incidents of confiscation of food parcels destined for distribution to
beneficiary families reportedly by Hamas police personnel.40 While noting that these food parcels
were returned, the Special Rapporteur would like to recall that respecting the right to food entails,
inter alia, refraining from taking any measures that result in preventing people’s access to food.

37
Save the Children, children of the Gaza crisis, Fact Sheet, 27 January 2009.
38
Ibid., 9 February 2009.
39
“To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and
medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other
articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate” Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 55.
40
UN News, “UN suspends aid operation after second Hamas-Linked theft of supplies”, 6 February 2009.

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3.  Impact on the right to food

51. According to the Palestine Monitor Factsheet of 18 December 2008, rates of food
insecurity rose from 34 percent in 2006 to 38 per cent in 2008, as 75 per cent of Palestinians
reduced the quantity of food purchased and 89 per cent switched to less nutritious diets in 2006
and 2007. This has had a particularly severe impact on children, who are often the first victims of
malnutrition.41 The Palestine Monitor estimates that, in 2009, the rate of chronic malnutrition of
Palestinian children under two has reached 10 per cent.42 Close to half of children of that age
group suffer from anaemia. Two thirds of all children reportedly suffer from a lack of vitamin A.43
One in 10 girls and boys under the age of five evidence stunted growth in Gaza.44

52. Global food price increases have further driven the cost of food in Gaza far beyond the
purchasing power of most of the population. According to the Palestine Monitor Factsheet, the end
of 2008, food cost on average 23 per cent more than in 2007. The Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs reports that shops and markets continue to provide limited food supplies at
exorbitantly high prices. Shortage of currency further undermines access to food. Because
agricultural inputs are prohibitively expensive, many farmers have been unable to invest in the
2009 agricultural cycle. Livestock owners have reportedly been reducing their flock size. Fishing
has declined dramatically. The ability of these groups to feed themselves and their families is
seriously jeopardized.45

53. The destruction of food production capabilities, mounting scarcities and rising costs
together with obstructions to the delivery of aid constitute grave threats to the right to food. The
ability of the people of Gaza to provide for their food and nutritional needs is essential to
overcoming the underlying causes of conflict in the region and to ensuring a life of dignity.

41
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Gaza Strip Inter-Agency Humanitarian Fact Sheet, March
2008.
42
“Why the Gaza disaster is not three weeks old and has not stopped along with the bombs”, 22 January 2009.  See
www.palestinemonitor.org
43
See the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), “Aid for Gaza’s Children,”  11 January 2009, and Richard Falk,
“The Siege of Gaza,”  22 December 2008.
44
See Save the Children, West Bank and Gaza at www.savethechildren.org
45
See the FAO and emergencies page dedicated to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip at the FAO website
(www.fao.org)

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D.  Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health
54. The long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli military offensive launched on
27 December 2008 resulted in grave violations of the right to the highest attainable standard of
health in Gaza. According to article 24 of the Convention on the Rights on the Child, the right to
health encompasses not only access to health care, but also the underlining determinants of health,
such as access to clean water and sanitation, food and nutrition, adequate housing and a healthy
environment.

55. The prolonged conflict has seriously damaged the health infrastructure in Gaza, which has
greatly undermined public health and service delivery throughout the affected area. The health
situation has been further aggravated by the long-standing blockade imposed by Israel since June
2007. The blockade has prevented the passage of basic goods, including medical supplies, spare
parts and fuel necessary for the normal functioning of medical facilities.

56. The conflict and its exacerbation by the blockade and consequent lack of fuel has resulted
in severe electricity shortages. Hospitals were running on back-up generators, and medical
personnel worked under tremendous strain, as many of them worked consecutive 12 to 24 hour
shifts to attend to medical emergencies.23 The number of hospital beds has been insufficient to
cope with the mounting number of injured civilians, causing many health centres to have to send
gravely ill and wounded people home before completing the necessary treatment.

57. The lack of fuel has also affected water supplies, which left approximately a million people
without access to safe and potable water.46 Waste water pumps repeatedly stopped working,
threatening to cause grave environmental hazards. Monitoring and surveillance of water quality
has been suspended since the closure of the central public health laboratory on 3 January 2009,
thus seriously affecting an already deteriorating public health system.  Additionally, the lack of
access to clean water and the closure of waste water pumping stations has resulted in exposure to
numerous diseases.  Farmland and urban areas have been flooded with sewage, and the remains of

46
World Health Organization, Health Action Crisis, Highlights No. 245, 2-8 February 2009.

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a number of unrecovered bodies in advanced stages of decomposition has further exacerbated the
grave risks to public health in the Gaza Strip.

58. The obstacles faced by humanitarian medical efforts have particularly affected the most
vulnerable groups among the civilian population, namely children and women. The
discontinuation of preventive health care, including vaccination of children, has further threatened
the long-term health of the population in Gaza, rendering the population vulnerable to outbreaks of
highly infectious diseases such as measles, polio and hepatitis.47

59. Mental health represents an integral part of the right to the highest attainable standard of
health. The prolonged conflict, and in particular the latest offensive, has affected the psychosocial
well-being of the population and has been particularly challenging for women, children and
disabled persons.  The state of mental health of the population in Gaza has also been evidenced by
a dramatic increase in drug abuse, estimated to affect almost 10 per cent of the young population
in the region. Signs of extreme psychosocial distress and related psychosocial conditions have also
increased.48

60. The denial of access to medical treatment outside of Gaza Strip for seriously ill Palestinian
patients is a long-standing issue (see A/HRC/4/28/Add.1).  There are indications of a worsening
trend in the denial of access to healthcare, as evidenced by the decline in the percentage of
requests approved for medical permits for patients referred for treatment outside Gaza Strip, from
80 per cent in 2007 to 66 per cent in the first half of 2008.47

61. The Special Rapporteur notes that under international humanitarian law, all medical
personnel and facilities must be protected at all times.49

62. The Special Rapporteur strongly condemns the targeting of medical facilities and workers
by Israeli forces. For example, 16 medical workers were killed and 25 injured while on duty.
Furthermore, 15 hospitals, 43 primary health centres and 29 ambulances were destroyed. In early
February 2009, only 44 of 56 primary health care centres were functioning.  Use of primary

47
WHO, Health Situation in the Gaza Strip, 7 January 2009.
48
Integrated Regional Information Network, “Drug abuse on the Rise in Gaza – specialists”, 16 January 2009 at the
website www.irinnews.org
49
Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 20, and the International Committee of the Red Cross study, rules, 25, 28 and 29,

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health-care facilities has significantly declined since the military offensive; WHO estimates that
40 per cent of chronically ill patients no longer turn to public health-care centres for care.

63. The material damages caused by the recent hostilities, the border closures resulting in the
restricted entry of medical supplies and equipment and the denial of access to health care outside
the borders of Gaza constitute grave violations of the right to the highest attainable standard of
health.

E.  Special Rapporteur on the right to education
64. The blockade on Gaza imposed in June 2007 and the resulting restrictions on movement
and goods have resulted in serious violations of the right to education, which was further
exacerbated by the Israeli offensive on Gaza that began on 27 December 2008.  Consequently,
educational facilities have suffered extensive damage and destruction, their repair and
reconstruction has been obstructed and students have experienced significant psychosocial distress,
all of which pose great challenges to the creation of an environment conducive to the realization of
the right to education.

65. The Special Rapporteur on the right to education received numerous reports of Israeli
strikes on schools in Gaza, leading to major damage to seven public schools and partial damage to
an additional 236 schools (public, private and kindergarten) and to 36 UNRWA schools.50  Israeli
shells are reported to have hit two UNRWA schools and landed close to another, al-Fakhura
school in Jabaliya refugee camp, which were sheltering displaced families. According to the Save
the Children Alliance and UNICEF, these incidents resulted in the killing of 47 people, including
15 children.  On 17 January, the American International School of Gaza near the northern town of
Beit Lahiya was destroyed by aerial bombing, leaving its 220 students without a place to continue
their schooling.  Warplanes also hit the science and engineering laboratories of the Islamic
University in Gaza City, the territory's oldest and biggest facility for higher education, affecting
over 20,000 students.51

66. The Special Rapporteur deplores the targeting of schools during wartime, an act that
provided the schools are not military objectives- is explicitly prohibited under customary

50
OCHA, Rapid Needs Assessment Report (Education Cluster) 30 January 2009
51
Associated Press,  “Israel-Hamas war deals blow to schools in Gaza”,  3 February, 2009

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international law, 52  and notes that such an attack has been qualified as a war crime by the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court which, has been ratified by 108 States.

67. As often occurs during emergencies, educational activities ceased during the weeks of
heavy bombing and ground fire and the pervasive insecurity across the Gaza strip, causing
540,000 students of all educational levels to miss almost one month of classes27.  Following the
ceasefire, there were delays to the restoration of regular schooling, as insecurity persisted,
reconstruction was been impeded and numerous people continued to seek shelter in school
buildings after being displaced by the fighting.53

68. Continued restrictions on the entry of reconstruction materials into Gaza have also posed
serious threats to the right to education for Gaza children and youth, as construction materials
have repeatedly been denied entry into the region, and Israeli authorities have insisted on  case-by-
case approval of all reconstruction projects affecting schools, resulting in long administrative
delays.54

69. In addition to the particular violations of the right to education caused by the hostilities that
began on 27 December 2008, access to safe and adequate educational conditions in Gaza has faced
long-standing obstacles that far pre date recent events.  Overcrowding in the schools in Gaza had
already caused a restriction in the hours of schooling, in order to allow for morning and afternoon
shifts to accommodate the region’s 450,000 students51; this problem has particularly affected the
schooling of some 200,000 refugee children in Gaza, who have attended UNRWA schools in the
past year.55  Efforts by UNRWA to continue the regular school feeding programme have been
hampered by repeated restrictions on the entry of supplies.  According to UNICEF, power
shortages owing to restrictions on the entry of fuel caused students to gather in classrooms that
lacked heating and electricity, as well as light bulbs and other basic supplies, such as paper, chalk
and essential equipment for teaching, such as printers and overhead projectors.  Higher education

52
The targeting of civilian objects such as schools is prohibited by the general principle of distinction between civilian
objects and military objectives (see sec. II); in addition, customary law prescribes that special care must be taken in
military operations to avoid damage to buildings dedicated to education. ICRC study, rule 38.
53
“Displaced Gazans seek shelter from the cold”, at www.irinnews.org
54
Briefing by staff of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs based in Jerusalem, Inter-Agency
Consultation on Gaza, United Nations Office at Geneva, 21 January 2009.
55
“United Nations moves to counter deteriorating Gaza education levels”, 17 September 2007 at www.irinnews.org

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has also been affected, illustrated by the denial by Israel, in November 2007, of permission for 670
Palestinian scholars to leave Gaza in order to study abroad, including six Fulbright scholars.56

70. Another concern is the fact that, in August 2008, Gaza lost around half of its teachers in
Ministry of Education schools after they were fired for striking. Although new teachers have been
recruited and trained, public schools were still lacking maths, science and Arabic teachers for all
levels, resulting in fewer hours of teaching in these essential subjects. It is estimated that 250,000
students, more than half of Gaza’s student population, in 381 schools were affected by the strike at
that time.57

71. The Special Rapporteur notes with concern a 5.6 per cent decline in enrolment rates for
school grades 1 to 10 between 2000-2001 and 2006-2007.58  In September 2007, UNRWA
reported a failure rate of 80 per cent for grades 4 to 9, with rates of failure as high as 90 per cent in
mathematics. The protracted collapse of the economy of Gaza and mounting food insecurity has
further impeded the enjoyment of the right to education, as hundreds of children have been forced
to search for work in order to contribute to the basic needs of their families at the expense of their
schooling.59

72. The destruction of schools and restrictions on the entry of supplies necessary to guarantee
access to education, as well as the prolonged deterioration of Gaza educational infrastructure,
constitute violations of the right to education.  The Special Rapporteur recalls that, while
education is often interrupted in times of conflict, its restoration is an urgent priority.  It is
essential to generating a culture of mutual respect, breaking the cycle of hatred and prejudice
between the peoples of the region and establishing a lasting peace.

73. As pointed out in the Special Rapporteur’s first report, military occupations are an
appreciable curb on the human right to education, and the most egregious example is that of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict (E/CN.4/20005/50, para. 124). The recent events in Gaza provide an even
stronger illustration of the violations of the right to education in a conflict situation.

56
Human Rights Watch, “Israel Blocks 670 students from studies abroad”,  20 November 2007.
57
See Tamer Institute for Community Education, Fact Sheet August-October 2008, and Office of the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of Civilians Weekly Report No. 276, September 2008.
58
Agence France Press, “Gaza blockade threatens education crisis: UNICEF”, 1 February 2008.
59
Save the Children, “Crisis Deepens for the Children of Gaza”,  30 December 2008  and Oxfam America,
“Escalating Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza,” 11 March 2008.

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F.  Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences
74. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences,
expresses her grave concern at the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
witnessed during the recent Israeli military attacks against the Gaza strip. The scale of civilian
deaths, injuries and destruction during the offensive was unprecedented by all accounts. Among
the casualties, it is estimated that 114 women were killed and 800 suffered injuries.

75. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights stated that women suffered critical injuries from
bombs, artillery shells, rockets and live ammunition as well as from bombs believed to have
contained white phosphorous. The Special Rapporteur is particularly concerned by reports of
women being killed while inside their own homes trying to protect their children or attempting to
escape bombardment, sometimes after having been ordered to leave their houses by the Israel
Defense Forces.24 Some of the injuries sustained by women resulted in maiming, including
amputations conducted in inadequate medical facilities.

76. The denial of safe access to pregnant women to appropriate health care and hospitals
owing to the constant shelling constitutes a grave violation of human rights. In a press release
dated 14 January 2009, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) warned that the continuing
violence and displacement presented serious risks to more than 40,000 pregnant women in Gaza,
and reported on many cases of premature labour and delivery resulting from shock and trauma
from continuous bombing, and the exposure of premature and newborn infants to hypothermia
owing to the lack of electricity. UNFPA findings for the period during the crisis showed a 40 per
cent increase in cases of miscarriage admitted to maternities, a 50 per cent increase in neonatal
deaths and an important increase in the number of premature deliveries.  For example, on
10 January 2009, Wafa al-Masrai, 40 years old and nine months pregnant, left her home in Beit
Lahia in north Gaza with her sister, Rada, and attempted to reach her local hospital. While en
route to the hospital, she was struck by an Israeli rocket and critically injured. She gave birth to a
healthy baby after having one of her legs amputated.24 Given the primary role of women as
caregivers, such a disability will not only adversely reflect on the level and quality of care of
children and the family but it will also seriously undermine a woman’s “value” in society as a
whole.

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77. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights reported that women and children that had taken
shelter inside schools administered by UNRWA suffered shell attacks inside those protected areas.
The Special Rapporteur received alarming reports of entire families being hit by Israeli shelling. 60

78. In addition, the worsening food insecurity in Gaza following the military operation led to a
further deterioration in the health and nutritional status of the majority of Gazans, in particular
women and children, many of whom are already largely dependent on meagre humanitarian
assistance. In addition, the Special Rapporteur would like to highlight the disproportionate effects
of house demolitions on women, children and the elderly (see also sections A, C and D above).

79. In 2005, following her visit to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Special Rapporteur
concluded that the protracted conflict and occupation had contributed to creating an integrated
system of violence that had a profound impact on Palestinian women. This situation has been
aggravated by the recent military attacks.  A UNFPA survey of 8 February 2009 on the situation
of women in Gaza highlighted the immediate psychological problems endured by women, such as
extreme feelings of fear and insecurity, depression and sadness, the debilitating effects of which
often made them unable to fulfil their vital role as care-givers.  The extent of the destruction in the
latest military campaign, which took place in the wake of over a year and a half of severe blockade
that brought the Gaza economy to the brink of collapse and has yet again debilitated the coping
mechanisms of an already impoverished and traumatized population, will further increase the
degree and extent of oppression of the occupation. Without a lifting of the blockade, women will
continue to be prevented from having access to vital, sometimes life-saving medical treatment in
Israel or neighbouring countries, owing to restrictions on their freedom of movement and denial of
travel permits. In addition, women will continue to endure the burden of chronic shortages of basic
supplies such as food, fuel, electricity and safe drinking water, when having to provide for their
children and families. As highlighted in the Special Rapporteur’s mission report, this particularly
precarious and traumatic environment is likely to heighten women’s vulnerability to violence in
the private sphere as well.

60
In one case, 22 members of the Al-Sammoni family, including nine children and seven women, were killed in
Zaytoun, east of Gaza city on 4 and 5 January 2009. The majority of the victims were killed while sheltering inside a
house that collapsed after having been struck by three missiles launched by the Israel Defense Forces, see Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of Civilians Weekly Report, 16-20 January 2009.

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G.  Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of
internally displaced persons
80. The occupation policies and practices that Israel has pursued since the 1967 war have
infringed on the human rights of Palestinians and resulted in large-scale forced displacement of
Palestinians within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, even before the Israeli military incursion
into Gaza that began on 27 December 2008.61  Displacement is often caused by incursions and
military clearing operations, evictions and land appropriation, the illegal expansion of settlements
on occupied territory and related infrastructure, the illegal construction of the Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, violence and harassment by settlers, the revocation of residency
rights in East Jerusalem, discriminatory denial of building permits and house demolitions.62
Forced displacement is also caused by a system of closures and restrictions on the right to freedom
of movement through an elaborate regime of permits and checkpoints that make life untenable for
many residents in Palestinian enclaves and force them to leave.

81. The Israeli military incursion into Gaza resulted in further massive forced displacement of
Palestinians inside Gaza. On 14 January 2009, at the height of the crisis, the Under-Secretary-
General for the Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator estimated that up to
100,000 Palestinians could be displaced. The preliminary report of a shelter / Intern Development
Programme joint rapid needs assessment, conducted in 45 localities in Gaza several days after the
ceasefire of 18 January 2008, indicated that 71,657 displaced persons were staying with host
families.63

82. As border crossings into Egypt and Israel were closed, large numbers of civilians tried to
find refuge in other parts or sites of Gaza. At the height of the conflict, more than 50,000 displaced
persons sought refuge in UNRWA schools. Many were also displaced because their homes had

61
Estimates on the displaced population vary owing to differences in definitions and available date.  The non-
governmental organization Badil Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights estimated in a survey
of September 2007 that 115,000 Palestinians were displaced between 1967 and 2006.
62
The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory found that the route of the wall in the West Bank and its associated regime of
permits and restrictions was contrary to international law, including applicable norms of international humanitarian
law and human rights law. The court also reaffirmed that, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(including East Jerusalem) had been established in breach of international law. See also note 2.
63
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator, 30
January-2 February 2009.

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been destroyed or become uninhabitable, especially in rural areas.64 On a number of occasions, the
Israel Defense Forces also warned or ordered the civilian population to flee areas or sites, which
were often attacked shortly thereafter.

83. International law prohibits arbitrary displacement, a notion that includes displacement in
situations of armed conflict that is incompatible with international humanitarian law because it is
not warranted by the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons65.

84. The conduct of the hostilities exacerbated forced displacement within Gaza. The Israel
Defense Forces resorted to aerial bombardment and artillery shelling in densely populated areas of
Gaza, reportedly disregarding the above-mentioned standards and the general rules of international
humanitarian law concerning the targeting of objects (see para. 102 below). Incidents of
Palestinian combatants placing military installations close to civilians or civilian objects, thereby
increasing the dangers for the civilian population and triggering their displacement, were also
reported.

85. Displaced persons also became victims as a consequence of military attacks. On 6 January
2009, Israeli shelling is reported to have killed 37 persons and injured 55 outside a UNRWA
school in Jabalya that sheltered a large number of displaced persons at the time (see annex).

86. When the present report was finalized, thousands of persons remained homeless because
their homes had been destroyed or damaged during the fighting; the total number of displaced was
unknown. Most displaced persons are staying in poor, overcrowded living conditions with host
families who are already overstretched and face shortages of food, non-food items (such as
mattresses and blankets), water and electricity. Continuing an 19-month blockade of Gaza, which
had created a serious humanitarian crisis even before the military incursion began, Israel still
restricts access to Gaza for goods urgently required to address emergency humanitarian needs and
to permit rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. On 9 February 2009, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in a field update, reported that international agencies had
faced unprecedented denial of access to Gaza since 5 November 2008.

64
Initial estimates indicate that over 4,240 residences were destroyed and 44,306 were damaged, most of them
rendered inhabitable without considerable rehabilitation.
65
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2), principle 6, restating articles 12 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and customary international humanitarian law (ICRC study, rules
24 and 129 – 131). See also chap. II.

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87. Some of the recently displaced persons inside Gaza, especially in rural areas, are
Palestinians belonging to families from Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The remainder
are Palestinian refugees, who fled or were driven from their homes on the territory inside the State
of Israel or their descendants. The renewed displacement of Palestinian refugees inside Gaza
creates additional vulnerabilities for them.

88. The Representative underscores the fact that being displaced in one’s own country or
country of habitual residence is a factual state, that neither confers a special legal status under
international law nor alters a pre-existing special status. Palestinian refugees who suffered
secondary displacement inside Gaza retain all rights under international law, including the right of
return as reaffirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution 194 (III). Israel, as occupying
Power, and the Palestinian Authority must address the specific assistance and protection needs of
all recently displaced persons, whether they are internally displaced in the sense of the description
provided by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement or secondary displaced Palestinian
refugees.

H.   Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
89. All killings during the Gaza conflict that violated applicable human rights and
humanitarian law norms come within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions.  For that reason, the major focus is on the principle of
accountability.

90. According to available estimates, a total of 1,440 people were killed (see paras. 1-8). The
principal dispute concerns the proportion of the Palestinian men killed who can be classified as
civilians or combatants.  Israel has estimated that at least 700 Hamas fighters were among the dead,
while the estimate of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights is closer to 300.  The difference
relates in part to the status of those members of the civilian police force in Gaza whom were not
engaged in fighting, and who Israel apparently intentionally targeted.

91. There are strong and credible reports of war crimes and other violations of international
norms.  On the basis of the extensive information available, the great majority of observers have
concluded that systematic and impartial war crimes investigations must be undertaken.  To date, as

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described below, there is no indication of any credible moves in this direction at the national level;
on the contrary, all developments point in the opposite direction.

92. There are, however, also some who have sought to refute or discredit the information
gathered and the conclusions drawn in those reports. To take but one example, a group called
NGO Monitor in a report entitled “The NGO front in the Gaza war:  the Durban strategy
continues” of February 2009, called “entirely unfounded” a claim that Israel had committed
indiscriminate attacks against civilians, a claim that it attributed to Human Rights Watch, the
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Al Mezan and a range of other
groups.  This refutation is based on the argument that the Israel Defense Forces had ‘legal advisors
embedded with combat units making analyses prior to any military action.” The assumption is that
indiscriminate attacks could never occur given the role of these advisers.  Moreover, the Non-
Governmental Organization levelling these charges are said not to “possess military expertise,
detailed information on the dispersal of weapons by Hamas”, nor to be “privy to Israeli targeting
decisions”.  As a result, the report argues that they can make no “credible evaluation”.

93. This exchange goes to the heart of the issue.  No amount of legal input into decision-
making by lawyers can render post hoc accountability unnecessary.  Indeed, such assiduous
conduct should make a party more willing to be subject to scrutiny.  Similarly, the suggestion that
international monitors lack the expertise or the information required to evaluate compliance
precisely begs the question.  If accepted, such a critique would undermine the entire concept of
international accountability and leave States and others as the only ones qualified to judge their
own compliance.  Rather than the rule of law, this would be the law of the jungle.

94. While the Israeli military operation in Gaza was but one episode in a long-standing,
complex and highly contentious conflict, these characteristics make it more, rather than less,
imperative that there be full accountability in relation to alleged violations.  The alternative is de
facto impunity, which mocks the international legal order, makes hollow the international
obligations undertaken and reaffirmed by the parties, increases the likelihood of more flagrant
violations in the future, and poisons the prospects for an eventual solution to the conflict.

95. The accountability record to date of both sides should give the Council cause for deep
concern.  The Special Rapporteur has been requesting an invitation to visit the Occupied

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Palestinian Territory since June 2006.  In that year, the Palestinian Authority issued an invitation
but Israel has not done so, despite a series of follow-ups.  Specific incidents raised in the context
of communications from the Special Rapporteur addressed to Israel have generally drawn either
no response or an unsatisfactory one.

96. The responses at the national level to calls for accountability have also been disappointing.
Hamas, for its part, has given no indication of its willingness to investigate or respond to
allegations directed at it.  Israel has announced several inquiries into specific incidents but these
are being undertaken by the military authorities themselves, and the track record of the many such
inquiries launched in the past is consistently problematic.  During the conflict, Israel refused entry
to Gaza to journalists and representatives of international Non-governmental Organizations
seeking to monitor the conduct of hostilities.  At the end of the invasion, the Prime Minister of
Israel, Ehud Olmert, was widely quoted as having promised to provide “state protection” to
military personnel who might face foreign war crimes prosecutions, starting that Israel would
assist them on that front and defend them.  Foreign prosecutions would, however, be both
unnecessary and unsustainable if Israel were to honour its obligations to undertake credible
investigations and, where appropriate, undertake domestic prosecutions.

97. Several issues of concern that need thorough investigation were brought to the attention of
the Special Rapporteur. These include, inter alia, violations of the principles of conduct of
hostilities, the targeting of Palestinian police and members of the Hamas political wing not taking
part in hostilities, and the questionable use of certain weapons in densely populated areas,
including white phosphorous shells, 155 mm shells and flechette shells.  He is also concerned by
credible reports of extrajudicial executions of Palestinians attributed to Hamas security forces
during the conflict.

98. The above developments highlight the imperative need for the Israeli authorities and those
of Hamas to cooperate fully with international endeavours to establish accountability in relation to
the conflict.  Recognition of such accountability should also include facilitating a visit by the
appropriate special rapporteurs.

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IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS

99. The recommendations formulated by the mandates whose submissions are included
above have been compiled and merged in the section below.

100. The protection of civilians requires immediate action by all parties and the
international community.

101. All parties to the conflict should cease all actions violating international human rights
and humanitarian law. In particular, the occupying Power should:
(a) End the blockade on Gaza negatively affecting civilians;
(b) Allow unimpeded and safe passage and access to Gaza of humanitarian assistance,
including food aid;
(c) Allow the unrestricted imports of medical supplies, foodstuffs and agricultural inputs,
fuel and construction materials;
(d) Grant prompt permission for patients with medical referrals for treatment outside
Gaza, especially for expectant and nursing mothers;
(e) Ensure the free and unimpeded movement of civilians between Gaza and other parts
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

102. All parties should establish accountability mechanisms providing for law-based,
independent, impartial, transparent and accessible investigations of alleged breaches of
international human rights and humanitarian law in accordance with their respective
obligations. Such investigations must hold perpetrators to account and provide redress to
victims where violations are found to have occurred. Investigations should address, inter alia
the following issues:
(a) Violations of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution:  a
significant number of incidents have occurred where the circumstances and the large
number of civilians killed in a single attack raise prima facie concerns that the
attacks were carried out without respect for these principles;
(b) Targeting of Palestinian civilian police and members of the Hamas political wing:
Israel is accused of having intentionally targeted civilians and civilian objects
considered connected to Hamas, but not taking direct part in hostilities;

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(c) Use of human shields and placing civilians at risk:  there are credible reports of both
Israel and Hamas co-locating military targets near civilians and civilian objects.
There are specific reports that Hamas fired rockets and conducted other military
offensives from residential areas, and that Israeli soldiers took sniper positions from
within Palestinian homes, endangering the lives of residents;
(d) Extrajudicial executions by Hamas of Palestinian civilians;
(e) Unlawful use of incendiary weapons (white phosphorous artillery shells):  the use of
white phosphorous during a military offensive may be permissible where it is
intended to provide cover for troop movements.  There are, however, reports that
Israel used such weapons in densely populated civilian areas, with severe
consequences for residents. Unlawful use of artillery shells (155 mm):  there is
reliable evidence that artillery shells, which can have a casualty radius of up to 300
metres, were also used in densely populated civilian areas. Unlawful use of flechettes
(4 cm darts):  Israel is reported to have used 120 mm shells packed with flechettes in
populated residential areas;
(f) Attacks on medical personnel and ambulances as well as hospitals and denial of
medical treatment and access to treatment offered by the ICRC and the Palestinian
Red Crescent Society;
(g) Attacks on schools;
(h) Destruction of vital civilian infrastructure;
(i) Interference with the provision of humanitarian aid.

103. All parties must implement their obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human
rights, including, where necessary, by taking any measures needed to:
(a) Ensuring the protection of medical workers and facilities and facilitate rehabilitation
for seriously wounded patients, as well as psychosocial health support and treatment,
especially for children and youth;
(b) Enable the immediate resumption of regular educational activities, make schools
zones of peace and ensure that schools are protected from military attacks and from
seizure or use as centres for recruitment;66
(c) Promote education as a means to reduce psychosocial stress and build the conditions
for lasting peace;

66
See also the “Minimum standards for education in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction,” published
by the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies in 2004.

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(d) Facilitate the prompt repair of greenhouses, farms and centres of food production;
(e) Enable the repair of water and pumping stations;
(f) Enable the import of reconstruction materials needed to build or repair vital
infrastructure and housing, and facilitate the full reintegration in dignity and security
of the recently displaced (without prejudice to the right of return of Palestinian
refugees);
(g) Ensure access to liquidity and financial and other resources needed so that people
may resume normal livelihoods;
(h) Take carefully into account the needs of particular groups, including children,
women, persons with disabilities, refugees and those displaced by the recent violence.

104. United Nations entities should continue to assess the needs of the Palestinian people
with a view to contributing to the wide-scale reconstruction efforts of the international
community in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including by continuing its damage
assessment by compiling satellite imagery and other detailed data on destruction in Gaza.

105. The international community should actively promote the implementation of the
decisions, resolutions and recommendations of the Security Council, the International Court
of Justice and the United Nations human rights mechanisms, including treaty bodies and
special procedures. In this respect, the mandate-holders recall the obligation of States to
cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means to any serious breach of an obligation
arising from a peremptory norm of general international law.  They also recall the obligation
of all States to ensure respect for the provisions of international humanitarian law.

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Annex*
Special report on Gaza and southern Israel prepared by the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict

1. From the launch of “Operation Cast Lead” on 27 December 2008 until the ceasefire of 17
January 2009, the extensive Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) led air and ground operations within
Gaza 1,440 people were reported killed, including at least 314 children, as verified by the
inter-agency working group, and 5,380 injured, including 1,872 children; up to 200,000 people,
including 112,000 children, displaced and movement for the majority of the population
severely restricted.  In the closely built-up areas of Gaza it became increasingly difficult to
obtain accurate and updated information. At times during the 22 days of bombardment,
international and local media broadcasts were the only information available to humanitarian
or human rights agencies. In periods when there was a lull in air or ground attacks, there were
some opportunities for staff of human rights agencies to verify information being received.
Since the ceasefire, capacity to verify information has improved and this report is compiled
from reliable reports provided by the inter-agency Working Group member organisations. In
Southern Israel it is reported that 3 Israelis were killed and182 people injured, although
specific information on children is currently unavailable.

2. Civilian targets, particularly homes and their occupants appear to have taken the brunt of the
attacks, but schools and medical facilities have also been hit. This is despite the fact that, in the
case of UNWRA schools, GPS coordinates were provided to the IDF by UNWRA.

3. The intensity of Operation Cast Lead has resulted in many psychosocial difficulties for
children; so much so that UNICEF has made psycho-social support one of its emergency
priorities in Gaza.  This is also true in southern Israel, where the days of conflict resulted in a
high incidence of psycho-social complaints on the part of children there.

Children killed and injured

4. 56 percent of the 1.5 million population, of Gaza, are under the age of 18 years; the latest
conflict and preceding 18 months of almost total blockade has had a massive impact on a

*
Owing to time constraints, the annex is circulated as received.
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generation of young people.  The Palestinian Authority (PA) Ministry of Health (MoH) reports
that at least 431 Palestinian children have been killed since 27 December 2008; independent
monitors from the inter-agency working group have verified 314 cases of children killed to
date.   Work continues to verify final numbers.

5. Many children have been injured during the period of fighting and the PA MoH reports 1,855
children injured while independent monitors report at least 860 children have sustained
injuries.  Handicap International estimates that up to 50 percent of people injured have
sustained severe injuries that, without proper rehabilitation, could result in permanent
disability.

6. During this period, the Magen David Adom, the national emergency medical, disaster,
ambulance and blood bank service, reported that three Israelis were killed in Southern Israel
and 182 people were injured by rocket fire from Gaza. The Inter-agency working group
(working group) have been unable to verify this.  The lack of greater casualties is most likely
attributable to a very effective program of security awareness training in schools and an early
warning system by the Israeli authorities.

7. Violations were reported on a daily basis, too numerous to list: below are just a few examples
of the hundreds of incidents that have been documented and verified by the working group:

8. On 3 January, during an IDF operation in Gaza City at 6.30 AM a tank shell landed near a
family’s house; a father and his two young sons, both aged under 11 years, emerged to survey
the situation.   As they exited their home, IDF soldiers shot and killed them (at the entrance to
their house), with the daughter witnessing.  The IDF ordered the mother and daughter to leave
the house, refusing the request of the girl to move the bodies. Bulldozers commenced
destroying the house with the woman and child still inside; as they exited from the house the
woman sustained a broken hip. The mother and child then watched as their home was
destroyed; rubble and bodies being bulldozed together. Days later, the child was still in shock
and only moving her eyes; the mother has lost the ability to speak

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9. On 7 January, after several days of requesting safe passage to the above-mentioned area of
Gaza city, during a three-hour lull in  hostilities, an ICRC/Palestinian Red Crescent Society67
medical team was allowed on foot (without ambulances) into the closed military area to
evacuate any remaining survivors. According to the ICRC, in one house, the team found four
small children next to their dead mothers who were too weak to stand up on their own.  Due to
the limited time allowed, the ICRC/PRCS team was not able to reach all houses in the area. In
all, ICRC/PRCS evacuated by donkey cart 30 Palestinians including 18 wounded.  The IDF
restricted further access to the area, prompting the ICRC to issue a public statement
demanding urgent access and charging the Israeli army with failing to assist wounded
Palestinians.

10. On 15 January, as IDF tanks moved into Tal Al Hawa, south-west of Gaza City, families
moved from their apartments to the ground floor of the building, bringing bags or personal
belongings with them. IDF soldiers entered the building. A number of young people had their
wrists tied and eyes covered and were ordered to stand aside. Other children and older women
were made to stand on the other side of the room.  One of the boys (aged 11 years) was told to
open the bags one by one; one of the bags had a lock which a soldier shot at as the child
struggled with it, although the boy was uninjured. The boy was then made to accompany the
IDF for a number of hours during a period of intense operations. As the group of soldiers
moved through the town the boy was made to walk in front. When they entered the building of
the Palestinian Red Crescent Society the 11 year old boy was made to enter first, in front of
the soldiers.  Later while moving through the town the IDF met with resistance and were shot
at, the boy remained in front of the group. On arrival at the Al Quds Hospital the boy was at
the front but they released him at the entrance to the hospital. This appears to be in direct
contravention to a 2005 Israeli High Court ruling on the illegality of the use of human shields
and a violation of international law.

67
The Palestinian Red Crescent Society is the Red Crescent Movement in Gaza and is an
internationally recognized organization with medical functions.  It is the operational partner of the
International

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11. There have also been allegations of Hamas effectively using civilians as human shields. In
addition there have been reports of Hamas firing from densely populated places and near
protected areas.  The working group is currently investigating these reports.

12. On Monday 29 December 2008, at about 1:00am, an IDF missile struck Imad Aqel Mosque in
the centre of the densely crowded Jabalia camp, damaging the surrounding houses. A family
house was hit, and five sisters aged 4 - 17 years were killed in their sleep when their bedroom
was completely destroyed. Four children, aged 2 – 16 years, were injured in the same attack.

13. On 4 January, IIDF foot-soldiers moved members of one extended family, from different
houses, into a single residence, ordering them to stay inside. There were over 100 Palestinian
civilian family members in the house.  Approximately twenty-four hours later, IDF forces
shelled the home, killing twenty-three, including nine children aged 8 months - 17 years, and
seven women. Those who survived and were able walked two kilometres to Salah Ed Din road
before being transported to the hospital. An additional seven members of the same family,
including three children, were killed in the same area in separate incidents during the military
operation.

14. On 28 December 2008, one family was sitting around a fire in farmland near their home in al-
Zaitun village. The head of household asked his 7 year old daughter to fetch tea in their home
and, as soon as the girl entered the house, it was hit by a missile and reduced to rubble. Family
members outside all sustained shrapnel wounds and were transferred to Al-Shifa hospital to be
treated for broken bones, cuts and bruises. The young girl’s body was found only the next
morning, when rescue workers finished clearing the rubble.

15. On 2 January 2009, one 8-year-old boy, his brother (11), and a member of the extended family
(11) went to pick some sugar cane from an adjacent property in Al-Qarara. North of Khan
Younis, in southern Gaza.  Upon returning from the field, they were struck by a missile fired
from an Israeli drone aircraft. Two of the boys died at the scene, while the third boy died on
the way to hospital.

16. On 3 January 2009, Israeli soldiers entered a family house in the Zeitoun neighbourhood of
Gaza city. Standing at the doorstep, they asked the male head of the household to come out

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and shot him dead, without warning, while he was holding his ID, hands raised up in the air,
and then started to fire indiscriminately and without warning into the room where the rest of
the family was huddled together. The eldest son was shouting in vain the word “children” in
Hebrew to warn the soldiers. The shooting did not stop until everyone was lying on the floor.
The mother and four of the brothers, aged 2 - 12 years, had been wounded, one of them, aged
four, fatally.

17. On 18 January, the IDF fired artillery shells that hit a house located on Salah Ad-Din Street in
Jabalia Refugee Camp. The shelling killed 3 children, aged 14 - 17 years, and injured two
others from the same family.
Alleged use of white phosphorous weapons in civilians areas by the Israel Defense Forces

18. There have been allegations of white phosphorous being used during the IDF attacks in Gaza.
The use of weapons is governed by the general principles on the conduct of hostilities, ie. the
principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, as outlined in the legal framework
section. In addition, although not specifically banned in any treaty, the use of incendiary
weapons is limited by Protocol III68 of the 1980 Geneva Convention.69

19. The following are two reports on incidents that have been verified:
In Jabalia, on 10 January 2009, white phosphorous shells hit a family house which is located west
of the (former) Civil Administration building. Two children were seriously injured from burns
(two 16 year old boys). The first boy is in Shaifa Hospital and the other who is suffering from
third degree burns has been transferred to a hospital in Egypt.

68
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 10 October 1980.
69
Israel did not ratify the Third Protocol but its military manuals reflect restrictions on white phosphorus use (A 1998
Israeli military manual states: “Incendiary arms are not banned. Nevertheless, because of their wide range of cover,
this protocol of the CCW is meant to protect civilians and forbids making a population center a target for an
incendiary weapon attack. Furthermore, it is forbidden to attack a military objective situated within a population
center employing incendiary weapons. The protocol does not ban the use of these arms during combat (for instance, in
flushing out bunkers).”

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20. At 6:30am 18 January 2009, the IDF fired several shells – some of which appeared to be white
phosphorus– which landed in and around the UNRWA Beit Lahia Elem School that sheltered
displaced civilians. One shell struck a classroom, where civilians were sheltered. The shell
broke through the roof and exploded on the ground, spreading its shrapnel into classrooms.
Two children (5 and 7) were killed and their mother was injured. Total number of injuries
from this incident was 14.   Four of the injured indicated phosphorous burns (including one
child) UNWRA has stated that they have evidence of white phosphorous having being fired
into their installations, including the UNWRA school in Beit Lahia.  This is also supported by
video footage of phosphorous shells being used70.

21. The aftermath of the conflict has left many risks for children in the form of unexploded
ordinance, small arms and possible contaminated shrapnel which has already resulted in deaths
to children. On 20 January two children were killed by unexploded ordinance in Az-Zaitoun,
in the eastern part of Gaza City.  The boy (10) and girl (11) were playing in an area from
which the IDF had recently withdrawn.

Attacks on schools and health facilities

22. Seven Ministry of Education schools were destroyed and 157 schools were damaged by air
strikes and related bombardment in Gaza, in addition damage to 36 UNWRA schools.  In an
area where many Gazan schools already operate a double shift system, the provision of
education to children will be under exceptional strain.

23. On 6 January 2009, three shells landed outside the UNRWA Jabalia Prep C Boys School,
resulting in at least 37 fatalities, including 14 children (three aged 10, three aged 13, three
aged 15 and one each of 3, 11,14, 16 and 17 years of age).  There were at least 55 injuries
(including 15 children) of which 15 are reported to be in critical condition. Further
investigation is required to determine the exact location of where children were injured and
killed. The school was being used as a shelter for people fleeing hostilities.

70
Statement from the Times: The Israeli army has, however, launched an internal inquiry into whether white
phosphorus was used in some cases in built-up areas, having eventually admitted that it did use the incendiary
substance, which is not illegal as a battlefield smokescreen but is banned from being used in civilian areas. Camera
footage from one such attack shows what appears to be white phosphorous raining down on a UN school in Beit
Lahiya, where Red Crescent ambulances and their crews were stationed.

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24. In the same period, two schools in Ashkelon, southern Israel were damaged by rocket fire
from Gaza.  One “Grad” rocket hit the Tzvia school, a religious girl’s school and another hit at
the entrance to the Newe Dkalim school.  Due to preparations made in both schools there were
no casualties.

25. During the fighting, damage was reported in 14 of the 27 hospitals in Gaza and at least 38
clinics were damaged by IDF fire. Fata and Al-Wafa rehabilitation hospitals, managed by
NGOs, are the only rehabilitation hospitals in Gaza and both were severely damaged.
Additionally eight UNRWA health centres sustained light damage.  Of the 148 ambulances in
Gaza, at least 29 have been damaged or destroyed. Two ambulance stations (Gaza and Jabalia)
were also destroyed.

26. Al-Quds Palestinian Red Crescent Society Hospital in south Gaza City, was hit by direct IDF
fire. Soldiers surrounded the hospital during the early hours of 15 January and opened fire on
the hospital compound. The administrative building and pharmacy adjacent to the hospital
were hit and caught fire. Fearing an imminent explosion or the spread of the fire, hospital
authorities evacuated all patients to the hospital's ground floor and prepared for a complete
evacuation. At least 50 patients, 20 of whom were confined to their beds, waited several hours
to be evacuated. Fire-fighters and ambulances were prevented from evacuating the patients for
about five hours.  Between 27 December and 19 January, 16 health personnel were reported to
have been killed while on duty, and an additional 22 injured.

Denial of humanitarian access

27. The 20-month blockade of Gaza had already resulted in a scarcity of many goods and an
insufficiency of basic support services. This has impacted upon children in the decreased
availability of nourishing foods, and the compromised ability to provide essential services
such as health and education.  The blockage of basic provisions has not changed since the
crisis and continues to limit not only the normal development of children but now recovery
from the immense impact of the 22-day conflict.

28. Approximately 91 percent of Gaza’s population — some 1,275,300 people including 714,168
children — are now dependent on food assistance.  Despite the severity of the attacks and the

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immense humanitarian need, there have been no significant changes to access restrictions in
Gaza prior to that of 26 December 2008. From 27 December to 21 January 2009, the total
number of trucks that entered was an average 95 per day through Kerem Shalom and 56
through Karni, for a total average of 151 per day.  Aid experts cite that a minimum of 400
trucks per day are needed to satisfy critical humanitarian needs in Gaza, while emergency
reconstruction efforts would necessitate at least 1,500 trucks per day.

29. Without construction materials being allowed into Gaza there can be no significant recovery
for the communities.  The IDF continues to block the delivery of pipes and fittings, which is
having a deleterious impact on the access to safe drinking water.  On 25 January UNICEF was
informed that a solar refrigerator for vaccines destined for North Gaza was denied entry; this is
having a direct impact on children and pregnant women who are unable to receive vaccination
at their local Primary Health Clinic.

30. An estimated 3,300 babies were born during the conflict, during which there were reports of
premature labour and delivery due to the lack of access to healthcare. Also, primary health
care services were reported to have declined by about 90 percent, and many programmes such
as vaccination schemes and neonatal care stopped completely for significant periods.

31. Water, sewer, electricity and education infrastructure and services were also extensively
damaged and interrupted; almost certainly compounding obstacles to recovery and
rehabilitation for displaced children and their families. For example, at the height of the
conflict, nearly all of Gaza's population --including 793,520 children were without electricity,
and at any given time during the conflict, some 500,000 people were without water.  Around
30,000 babies — or three quarters of Gaza’s infants under 6 months of age — are not
exclusively breastfed, exposing them to a high risk of infection or malnutrition from using
breast milk substitutes prepared with potentially contaminated water.

32. At least 2,200,000 litres of sewage have leaked out of Gaza’s waste water system due to
damage from shelling, affecting at least 91,727 people, including 51,367 children, this now
poses serious health risks, and the impact on children has the potential to be significant.

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33. Until the Government of Israel allows an increased range of supplies into Gaza, including
construction materials, there can be no meaningful recovery for the children of Gaza.  School
and health facilities have been badly affected by the attacks. The education system was already
under severe strain and now an increased number of schools are without adequate resources to
provide education for children. In addition to construction materials, schools need paper for
text books, school stationary supplies, recreation and sports kits – all of which have been
denied access by the IDF since the end of the 22-day conflict.

Displacement

34. It has been estimated that 200,000 people were displaced, among them 112,000 children, at
some point during the conflict. At the peak of displacement on 17 January, UNRWA was
accommodating, 50,896 displaced persons in 50 UNRWA shelters. As of 25 January 2009,
510 people (88 families) remained housed in UNRWA run emergency shelters in community
based organisation and of the areas so far surveyed 66,000 people are living with host families
for a total of 66,510 people.

35. For example, on 04 January 2009 at 15.00hrs, fighting between militants and the IDF in Al
Zatioun resulted in approximately 5,000 persons fleeing their houses and taking refuge into
another area.  In another incident, on 05 January 2009 at 06:00 hrs, IDF armoured vehicles
advanced into the Customs Junction in Beit Hanoun and opened fire repeatedly into the nearby
neighbourhoods. About 80 households were forced to evacuate their homes, owing to the IDF
offensive, and take refuge in schools which UNRWA had opened to shelter them. Among
them were about 150 children. Later, Israeli troops advanced into the aforementioned area and
destroyed approximately 20 houses.

36. The situation for many families is now extremely difficult, with at least 4,100 residential
structures destroyed and another 17,000 severely damaged; forcing many of the residents,
among them thousands of children, to seek shelter elsewhere. The long term impact on
children of being homeless increases their vulnerability and decreases their capacity to recover
from the ordeal of the 22 days of attacks.

A/HRC/10/22
Page 44

Arrests and detention

37. Reports have been received that children under the age of 18 years have been arrested for
security offences along with adults by Israeli security forces in Gaza during the course of
Operation Cast Lead.  To date the working group has not been possible to verify this.

38. During the period of attacks in Gaza, lawyers have observed that the number of children
arrested in the West Bank increased and the number of children brought to the Israeli Military
Courts in pre-trial hearings in the first two weeks of January was twice as high as in the same
period in 2008.  During the first two weeks of January alone, DCI-Palestine’s legal department
received 10 new cases of children for legal representation in the Military Courts compared
with a monthly average of 10-15 new cases. Out of these 10 cases, eight were arrested from
the street or during demonstrations against the Gaza attacks. DCI-Palestine has not yet been
able to take statements from the children nor confirm if they were actively participating in
demonstrations.

39. From 19 – 29 January, six cases of children aged 12-13 arrested for throwing stones at the
Wall or in demonstrations, and taken to the Israeli Military Courts have been recorded.
Lawyers were unable to obtain their release. These six children are awaiting trial and are likely
to be sentenced and imprisoned.  Under Israeli Military Order 378, stone-throwing carries a
maximum sentence of 20 years, for adults and children. However, children usually serve 3-6
months in prison for throwing stones.

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