New US, New Middle East? The Syria Initiative

The major follow-up to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Middle Eastern trip has come not in Israel and Palestine, where there is too much uncertainty for any American move, but in Damascus. On Saturday two US envoys, Jeffrey Feltman of the State Department and Daniel Shapiro of the National Security Council, sat down with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem. They were accompanied by the senior American official in Damascus and two other Syrian advisors for 3 1/2 hours before Feltman and al-Moallem had a private discussion.

The meeting on its own is significant, as the US has no Ambassador in Syria. Expectations are even higher, however, because Damascus could be the lynchpin for an Obama strategy. The core success of Israeli-Syrian talks would be complemented by Syria's distancing from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, giving the US greater room for manoeuvre on the Israel-Palestine negotiations and an advantage over Tehran in Washington's conception of the new battle for the Middle East.

After the meeting, Feltman was kind in tone toward Syria, “The Syrians have concerns with us as well. I’m sure the Syrians will be looking at choices we will be making in the future just as we will be looking at choices Syria is making,”. However, he was non-committal on specifics beyond the platitude, “We found a lot of common ground today."

The Syrians also gave nothing away. In particular, there is no sign that Damascus, in return for economic aid and an American "balance" on direct discussions with Tel Aviv over issues such as the Golan Heights, offered up the concessions that Washington wants on the bad guys in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Tehran. So the most that can be said is that yesterday's event, while of symbolic importance, is only the opener in a long process.

There has been surprisingly low-key coverage of the meeting in the US press. CNN has a report, but The New York Times recycles a downbeat Associated Press story, "Amid Low Expectations, American Officials Hold Talks in Syria", and The Washington Post overlooks the event altogether.

Syrian specialist Josh Landis offers excellent coverage on his blog, featuring Rami Khouri's upbeat (overly upbeat, in my opinion) assessment of a fundamental shift in US policy:

What we have going on, I suspect, is that the two leading proponents of Western arrogance in the form of colonialism and neocolonialism - the United States and the United Kingdom - have recognized that their approach has failed, and that they are better off having normal diplomatic talks and negotiations with the three leading centers of resistance to them, namely Iran, Syria and Hizbullah.

Ms Clinton's Wild Ride: A US "Grand Strategy" on Israel-Palestine-Iran?

Related Post: Iran, Missile Defense, and a Clinton Power Play?
Related Post: Ms Clinton’s Wild Ride: Is Dennis Ross in the Saddle on Iran?


"What is the broader strategy for the Obama Administration if it is re-engaging with the Israel-Palestinian process and the region beyond? There are three issues to consider: 1. The pursuit of a "two-state" Israel-Palestine settlement; 2. The contest between Hamas and Fatah for political leadership in Gaza and the West Bank; 3. The US relationship with Iran."

The easy part first: the significant development at the Gaza Donors Conference this week was not the declaration of $5.2 billion in aid for the area. It might have been a feel-good measure and good PR for some of the countries putting up their symbolic numbers, but it means nothing unless 1) Israel relents on its choke-hold on any aid to Gaza; 2) Hamas agrees to let the Palestinian Authority carry the aid and the credit. The first condition is doubtful with the current interregnum in the Israeli Government and the prospect of a Netanyahu Administration; the second is a non-starter.

Nope, if you wanted a meaningful headline, it's this: "US Promises $300 Million to Gaza; $600 Million to Palestinian Authority and West Bank". That's right: at a conference which was supposedly to arrange relief for Gazans suffering from long-term deprivation and the short-term assault by Israeli forces, two-thirds of the American commitment went elsewhere.

Which, of course, is no accident: Washington's clear priority is to prop up the PA and Fatah Party of Mahmoud Abbas as the proper faction to lead the Palestinian cause. But there's more....

Yesterday's New York Times, that US newspaper of record, did not lead with the aid announcement. Instead, it chose another pronouncement by the Secretary of State, this one made "privately" to an Arab foreign minister: "Clinton Pessimistic on Iran Outreach". So, at a conference supposedly devoted to the immediate problems of Gaza, the American delegation --- which immediately fed Clinton's Iran statement to the press --- was not solely concentrated on Israel and Palestine but looking hundreds of miles away to Tehran.

This all begs the question: what is the broader strategy for the Obama Administration if it is re-engaging with the Israel-Palestinian process and the region beyond? There are three issues to consider:

1. The pursuit of a "two-state" Israel-Palestine settlement;
2. The contest between Hamas and Fatah for political leadership in Gaza and the West Bank;
3. The US relationship with Iran.

Let's assume that the first issue is the long-term priority for the Obama Administration. That is the declared purpose of the President's designation of an envoy, George Mitchell, and it was restated in Clinton's speech at the Donors Conference and after her meetings with Israeli leaders yesterday.

That doesn't mean, however, that this is the immediate objective of US officials. Instead, their focus is on getting the right answer on Issue 2 --- that "proper" Palestinian leadership --- before proceeding with the negotiations for the two-state settlement.

And this is where Washington lowered the boom this week. It's not just a question of repeating the preconditions for Hamas to be "acceptable" in the political process: renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and adherence to 2005 agreements on border crossings. The US just handed out a $200 million lifeline to the Palestinian Authority so it can pay its employees and promised another $400 for unspecified "projects", but presumably ones where Abbas and Fatah will take credit. And, beyond that, there's the small matter of Washington funding the PA's security forces, as a New York Times puff piece illustrated this week:

One year ago, this 18-acre campus built with $10 million of American taxpayer money was another piece of Jordan Valley desert, and Palestinian guardsmen slept on flea-bitten mattresses and took meals on their laps. Along with a 35-acre, $11 million operations camp a few miles away, also American-financed, it is a real step forward in an otherwise moribund process of Palestinian state-building.

“These guys now feel like they’re on a winning team, that they are building a Palestinian state,” said Lt. Gen. Keith W. Dayton, the American who has been overseeing the training of Palestinian forces, as he watched exercises on Thursday. “And I wouldn’t stay if I didn’t think they were going to do it. I have complete confidence in the Palestinian leadership, and I’m convinced the new administration is serious about this.”

That's the nice spin on the US effort. The not-so-nice possibilities are that these security forces may be more concerned about stopping political dissent in the West Bank than they are about stopping attacks on Israel. And, oh yes, those forces could always be used --- as occurred in 2007 --- in a de facto civil war with Hamas.

This US support of the Palestinian Authority, and its corresponding effort to isolate and undermine Hamas, is far from new. Indeed, it was part of the December war in Gaza. However, when the effort to re-install the PA failed, there was a window of possibility --- through private talks or communications via a third party --- for Washington to "engage" Hamas with a view to bringing it into the peace process.

Clinton and the US money this week signalled that this is no longer on the table. It may be that the possibility never existed. Or it may be that the Obama Administration has calculated that, with visions of Benjamin Netanyahu, promotion of the PA is the only way to get the next Israeli Prime Minister to accept any two-state possibility.

That, however, is only the first part of the story. The second is the apparent decision of Washington to bring the Iran variable back into the Israel-Palestine calculation. Clinton's statement of her pessimism on engagement with Tehran was accompanied by the leak to the New York Times of the US offer to Russia to trade missile defence for Moscow's abandonment of the Iranian nuclear programme.

So, only six weeks after the Obama Inaugural prospect of engagement with an unclenched fist and four after his Vice-President's speech at Munich further pointed to a possible dialogue (as well as meetings behind the scenes), US officials have chosen to highlight their get-tough stance.

One explanation for this shift is the long-awaited entry of Dennis Ross, who has long advocated "Diplomacy Then Pressure", into the State Department. Another is that the Obama Administration is in a muddle, with different folks putting out different positions on the Iran question.

However, the conjunction of the setting of the Donors Conference and Clinton's declaration raises a grander possibility: the US relationship with Tehran is now a bargaining chip in the US manoeuvres on Israel-Palestine. So does Clinton's statement yesterday after talking to the Israelis that Hamas is "a client of Iran".

Put bluntly, the US may anticipate that Netanyahu will be insisting on a withdrawal from engagement with Iran if there is to be an engagement with the Palestinian Authority and the two-state process; indeed, he may have already make that clear to the Americans.

The folly of the Obama Administration sacrificing any thought of an opening with Iran is clear. Even if Israel-Palestine is a "core" issue, it's not the only one in town. Indeed, you could argue that Afghanistan has also become a "core" issue for the future of US foreign policy and Iran, which is as focused on Central Asia as the Middle East, is a key player which could assist the American efforts. By throwing up a wall to Tehran, the US Government protects its position in one vital area only to give it away on another.

Unfortunately, that is an easy sacrifice to make, at least with respect to the US relationship with Israel and American domestic politics. And the long-term costs remain, well, long-term.

So the Obama team will press on, possibly oblivious to other consequences of their shift. Consider, for example, another piece of the puzzle: the US relationship with Syria. In the vision of a two-state Israel-Palestine process in which the Palestinian Authority would be promoted, Damascus can and should be brought in from the cold. No coincidence, then, that Clinton announced that two US envoys, Jeffrey Feltman and Daniel Shapiro, would visit Syria this week --- the highest-level US contacts with Damascus since January 2005.

Of course, that US approach will be seeking a Syrian detachment from Iran and a commitment to let Hamas dangle in the wind. So what happens if the Syrians refuse or simply stall on giving an answer to Washington? Does Washington shake a fist, possibly threatening the consequences of the tribunal on the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri? Or does it accept that other countries may not follow the American script?

I fear we are on the verge of witnessing yet another huge strategic choice --- and error --- to accompany the choice/error that has been in Afghanistan and Pakistan.