Iran: Karroubi Responds to Government Threats "Bring. It. On."

Iran: The Latest on Mehdi Karroubi
The Latest from Iran (15 October): Restricting the Movement
The Latest from Iran (13 October): Government Threatens Karroubi

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Enduring America, 14 October: "We’re wondering, 'Does Karroubi back down?', and we’re thinking, 'No.' His response to the Government’s ham-fisted warning, which following similar threats over the last two months — may not come today, but I would look for a clear signal from the cleric by the weekend."

We were wrong. Karroubi did not wait until Saturday or even the Iranian weekend on Friday. He has welcomed the promise of Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, Iran's General Prosecutor, to “take [Mir Hossein] Mousavi and Karroubi to court when the time is right”, with the unsubtle hint that he can now bring out some very heavy evidence (English summary via Facebook page linked to Mousavi):

I very much welcome this event so that if during... these years due to some considerations I have not raised some issues, I could do so in detail.

Unfortunately in these years the authorities who, according to Imam Khomeini should be the servants of the nation, have not paid any attention to this advice. Instead of being responsible and taking fair positions, they have confirmed the positions of extremist media to hide their unjust behaviour and also insult and falsely accuse others who do not have any media [to defend themselves].

This time not only I am not concerned about the “trial” but also I very much welcome it so that by this means I can emphasise my concerns that arise from national and religious beliefs of the Iranians and Imam Khomeini’s ideas, and clearly reveal those who are oppose to these concerns.

The Latest from Iran (13 October): Government Threatens Karroubi

NEW Latest Iran Video: The Shiraz Protest Against Ahmadinejad (12 October)
NEW Video: Protest at Tehran Azad University (13 October)
Iran: The Politics of the Death Sentences
The Latest from Iran (12 October): Green Shoots?

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1915 GMT: The Internet is buzzing over the story that Narges Kalhor, the daughter of President Ahmadinejad's advisor for cultural and media affairs, has applied for asylum in Germany. Kalhor made the application after showing her film The Rake at the International Human Rights Film Festival in Nuremberg. The movie condemns the use of torture in Iranian prisons and the totalitarianism of Iran's authorities.

The filmmaker Hana Makhmalbaf has conducted a video interview with Kalhor.

1810 GMT: Everyone's piling in to mention the Iranian Government's threat to prosecute Mehdi Karroubi for "lies" about the abuse of detainees. Iran's Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie has added to the earlier warnings from his Tehran counterpart, Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi: "They [Clerical Court] have been tasked with hearing cases raised against the clergy and [you can] be sure that they will deal with this issue."

1700 GMT: We've posted a set of videos from today's protests by students at Tehran Azad University.

1625 GMT: Yes, A Rafsanjani Signal. EA's Mr Smith checks in to tell us that the interview with Hossein Mar'ashi of the Kargozaran party is even more significant than we thought (1000 GMT):

Mar'ashi is a close relative of Rafsanjani and served as his point man in the Khatami administration (1997-2005). The full text of the interview was published on the youth wing website of Kargozaran, and they explained that the interview had been previously published in censored form by the Etemaad daily due to "heavy pressures". One can surmise that it was Rafsanjani that gave the green light to the publication of the full text to send the message that he is aware of what's going on in the country.

The most significant snippet of the interview is the part in which Mar'ashi states that the regime wishes to have Hashemi "fall on his knees" and they want to make a "Jannati out of him", alluding to the puppet-like stance of the head of the Guardian Council [Ayatollah Jannati] vis-a-vis Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader. He also claimed that "senior leaders" of the IRGC want to arrest the reformist leaders.

1615 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi has posted another set of information about the latest condition of detainees.

1600 GMT: Back from an afternoon of teaching with some most interesting inside information. An EA source with excellent links inside Iran tells us of President Ahmadinejad's trip to Shiraz yesterday.

The vast majority of students who turned out protested against the visit, in which Ahmadinejad reportedly arrived late and left early.

At the same time, Ayatollah Dastgheib, a vocal critic of the Government, gave an important speech to a small audience. The speech has not yet been published but, according to the source's information, Dastgheib went even further in his questioning of the legitimacy of Ahmadinejad's authority and also challenged the position of the Supreme Leader.

1145 GMT: No Worries About Corruption/Mismanagement Allegations? Really? This is the current lead story on the Islamic Republic News Agency website: "Not even one rial [Iranian currency] of oil revenue has been lost. The Ahmadinejad Government is a clean government." The claim comes from a "parliamentary deputy" on the Supreme Audit Court.

1100 GMT: Turning Up the Pressure. Here's the regime response to Mehdi Karroubi's recent renewal of his claims -- expressed through the letter sent by his son to the head of Iranian state broadcasting and his Saturday meeting with Mir Hossein Mousavi --- on abuses of detainees and, more broadly, flaws and injustices in the system. Tehran's Prosecutor-General, Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi, has said that a special clerical court is leading an enquiry into whether Karroubi broke the law when he accused security forces of rape and other abuses. (English-language summary available via the Los Angeles Times)

This is not yet a prosecution, more of a "final final warning". EA readers will recall last month when Ali Larijani was despatched, probably by the Supreme Leader, to tell Karroubi to maintain a low-profile silence and when the Government raided Karroubi's offices. Karroubi still joined the Qods Days marches, and his renewed statements have been matched by a restored Web presence.

So the ball is back in Karroubi's court but I fully expect him to play another shot. Game on.

1000 GMT: A Rafsanjani Signal? Hossein Mar'ashi, a high-level official in the Kargozaran party, has said: "Today I believe devoutly that this trueborn way which is presented by Mr. [Mir Hosssein] Mousavi as the "Green Path of Hope", implemented by the ...people in the framework of a movement. The power establishment cannot stand against it in the long-term neither structurally nor legally and has to accept the people's will sooner or later."

Kargozaran has been linked to Hashemi Rafsanjani since its formation in the 1990s, though it is a matter for discussion whether he is associated with this latest move. The Facebook site associated with Zahra Rahnavard, Mousavi's wife, is hopeful, calling the party "close to Rafsanjani".

0945 GMT: So What is This "Ground Resistance Force"? It's a genuine question, as we can't quite get our hands around the significance of this declaration by the head of Iran's armed forces, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi:

After two years of study we decided to change the IRGC [Islamic Revolution Guard Corps]’s structure, for the Basij to work in areas such as software work and the propagation of the Basiji culture in society, and to delegate the tasks, duties and mobilization of Basij units to a new called the IRGC Ground Resistance in order to increase expertise among the units.

The easy read is of a merger of the Basiji militia into the military organisation, but what does mean in terms of the control of those forces? Is this an effective IRGC expansion of authority, accompanying the possibility of its widening political influence? And, in the short term, what does this means for operations against the Green opposition and other demonstrators?

0615 GMT: Little breaking news out of Iran so far today. The New York Times runs instead a context article on "dozens of reporters, photographers and bloggers who have either fled Iran or are trying to flee in the aftermath of the disputed June presidential election", featuring interviews with two of the photographers, one who is still in the country. Mowj-e-Sabz looks forward to the 4 November demonstrations, "reminding the coup government that the issue of the elections is far from over".

Arguably, the most significant development on Monday was the Parliamentary passage of Government cuts in subsidies for energy and food. (Subscription required, but the full article can be accessed via Google Search using title and author.) Of course, the action risks public opposition, particularly as President Ahmadinejad has based his electoral appeal on helping the lower classes of Iran, but as the Minister of Economy told Parliament, "Under the current circumstances about a third of the country's income is directly or indirectly paid in subsidies," the cost of which has risen to $100 billion/year.

Is the Government on rocky economic ground that could cause political shifts? Far too soon to tell, of course, but a sign of nerves comes in Press TV's coverage. Ignoring the subsidy story this morning, its website prefers the reassurance of a natural gas deal between Switzerland and Iran.

EA readers have been paying attention to the economic aspects of the current crisis for several days, including a telling exchange last night, "Why people are taking it so much?" Iran specialists with whom I have been corresponding believe that the initial cuts in subsidies are manageable --- for example, households still get the full discount on purchases to fuel to a certian level, and then pay a "full price" which is amongst the cheapest in the world. However, there may be a cumulative effect. Add the Government measures to non-payment of wages in certain sectors and, in particular cases, strikes.

Despite the quiet, the situation is far from settled, and money and politics could be a combustible mix.

Iran: So Who Controls the Islamic Republic?

The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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UPDATE 12 October 0845 GMT: EA's Mr Smith offers his reading of the Foreign Affairs analysis:

"I do not see what this adds to what we knew already. Besides making the silly mistake of identifying Mesbah Yazdi with Mohammad Yazdi, and stating that the former was head of Iran's judiciary (in reality his real influence and authority are, until proven otherwise, rather limited to "spiritual guidance" of Ahmadinejad), the rest are allegations that have been fed to him after having floated on the Web for months. The Taeb-Jalili-Khamenei trio was floated by Roger Cohen [of The New York Times] in one of his dispatches from Tehran.

The only tidbit that would be interesting, if verified, is the purge of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and the removal of pro-Mousavi Guardsmen before the elections. That would make sense, and it would be interesting to have real statistics on that.
--
Earlier this week Foreign Affairs published an article by Jerry Guo on "the rise of a new power elite" of "the Revolutionary Guard and its allies" in Iran. The article raised points which have been discussed by Enduring America readers for several weeks, considering politics, the military situation, and the battle for control of key sections of Iran's economy. In addition to Guo's attention to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, notice his inclusion of Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council, and the Supreme Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, amongst the "coalition of power".

Letter from Tehran: Iran's New Hard-Liners

The headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are in a European-style palace, replete with Greek columns and a grand staircase, in the eastern suburbs of Tehran. From here, the IRGC orchestrated the crackdown that followed Iran's disputed presidential vote in June, beating protestors on the street and torturing those behind bars. More ominously, the IGRC and other extreme hard-liners have sidelined fellow conservatives in the Iranian government, carving out their own power base in a regime that is becoming increasingly insular, reactionary, and violent.

So far, much of the analysis of the emerging Iranian power struggle has focused on the clash between the country's conservatives and reformers, pitting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his patron, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, against Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, two thwarted presidential candidates, and Mohammad Khatami, a former president. (Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president and seasoned kingmaker has eased toward the reformists in the election's aftermath.)

The real struggle, however, is the conflict among the hard-liners themselves, many of whom operate behind the headlines in unseen corners of the state machinery. Although Iran's opposition movement has witnessed an unprecedented surge in public support, the election and its aftermath mark a radicalization of the system not seen since the early days of the Islamic revolution.

In the reformist era of Khatami, and to some extent during Ahmadinejad's first term, the country's conservative theocrats and technocrats -- such as Ali Larijani, the speaker of the parliament, and Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ejei, the ousted intelligence minister who criticized the state's use of forced confessions -- held much of the power over the executive and legislative branches. Although they were entrenched status quo forces, these pragmatists believed in the dual nature of the Islamic Republic's statehood -- a country with religious and political legitimacy.

But now such figures are losing their influence to a new breed of second-generation revolutionaries from Iran's security apparatus known as "the New Right." They are joined in the emerging power structure by ultraconservative clerics and organizations such as the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran. These neo-fundamentalists call for the "re-Islamization" of the theocracy, but their true agenda is to block further reform to the political system in terms of reconciling with both domestic opponents and the West.

This coalition includes Hassan Taeb, the commander of the Basij, the paramilitary branch of the IRGC; Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council and the country's chief nuclear negotiator; and Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader's second son, a man so feared that his name is not often uttered in public.

Hard-line figures such as the younger Khamenei and the IRGC leadership are granted religious legitimacy through the support of the most radical mullahs in the theocratic establishment: Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, the committee that certified the election tallies, and Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, a former head of the judiciary and Ahmadinejad's spiritual adviser. Yazdi is affiliated with an underground messianic sect called the Hojjatieh Society, which hopes to quicken the coming of the apocalypse. Democratic reforms, the Majlis (parliament), and elections are mere annoyances under this radical Islamic worldview.

It is not surprising, then, that Yazdi issued a fatwa shortly before June 12 that gave authorities tacit approval to fudge the vote. Indeed, the clerics seem to have gotten the intended result: after the election, a number of employees at Iran's Interior Ministry released an open letter stating that "the election supervisors, who had become happy and energetic for having obtained the religious fatwa to use any trick for changing the votes, began immediately to develop plans for it."

Yazdi's influence on Ahmadinejad became pronounced in the early days of the president's first term, when Ahmadinejad declared that the return of the apocalyptic 12th imam would come within two years. Now, his second term will likely be marked by even more radical behavior: in a meeting with Yazdi in June to discuss his domestic agenda, Ahmadinejad promised to Islamize the country's educational and cultural systems, declaring that Iranians had not yet witnessed "true Islam." Then, in August, amid calls to purge reformist professors, a presidential panel began investigating university humanities curricula deemed to be "un-Islamic." Several progressive students told me that they have been barred from returning to campus this semester, including a top law student at Tehran University. "I was going to continue the protests with my law degree in a more effective manner," he said. "But now I am just a simple pedestrian."

But ideology remains secondary in the struggle to maintain and consolidate control within the fractured regime. It is becoming increasingly clear that Ahmadinejad and his associated faction of neo-fundamentalists no longer aim to take on the mantle of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary ideals. As Khamenei's representative to the IRGC put it, "Some people are sticking to Imam Khomeini's ideas ... [but] the situation has changed." Accordingly, religion and revolutionary ideology have become convenient means to an end, but not the end themselves. Purges of un-Islamic faculty and students are meant to target the organizers of mass protests; the arrests and subsequent trials of political opponents, meanwhile, act to shield the financial interests of the IRGC and its hard-line partners.

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Iran: English Text of Mousavi-Karroubi Meeting (10 October)

Iran: So Who Controls the Islamic Republic?
The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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Translated on the Facebook page associated with Mir Hossein Mousavi:

Yesterday (Oct 10, 2009) Mir Hossein Mousavi visited Mehdi Karroubi in his home to talk about the post-election events. In this meeting both presidential candidates by pointing out the efforts of the IRIB (the state-run TV and radio channels) to diminish the reform movement, emphasised on their legal rights and demanded to appear on TV/radio to defend themselves and reply to the false accusations made against them on the “national” stage.

At the beginning of this meeting Mehdi Karroubi said that the recent presidential election was a great opportunity, and the establishment could have used this opportunity to strengthen its position in the international community. Noting that the behaviour of the government after the election was far from the status and ideas of the system that was founded by Imam Khomeini, Karroubi strongly criticised the illegal arrests of Alireza Beheshti, Morteza Alviri and Ebrahim Amini (senior advisors to Mousavi and Karroubi) as well as the other political prisoners who have sacrificed a lot for the revolution and the country.

Karroubi, the Secretary General of the Etemade Melli party, called the treatment of the students and revolutionary figures by the government as “odd and strange” and by reminding the events that happened during Shah’s time when the military forces attacked the university, called these kinds of behaviours obscene and that after all these years there was no one who could defend such acts and that he considered these as signs for all the officials to be careful with their actions so that so that future generations would have a good memory of them.

Mehdi Karroubi pointed out the recent letter by the Tehran Governor’s office that prohibits the members of Tehran’s City Council from comforting and meeting with the family members of the victims of the recent events, calling this behaviour “very uncivilised”. Karroubi also  pointed out the recent remarks made by Mohseni-Ejei (the new Prosecutor General) in which he had said that the country was in a combat situation, Karroubi stated that these words were to create fear from the revolutionary courts (show trials) and asked why these kinds of statements are made: why one should pretend that the country is in the military mode and everyone should keep quiet and be silent? Noting that some of the military leaders such as the General Commander of the Revolutionary Guards are accusing the reformists of providing topics for the foreign media, Karroubi asked them who is truly providing topics for the foreign media. “Is it us or you? Do we make harsh statement or you? Who is behaving roughly, you or us?”

Karroubi also pointed out the Qods Day rallies. He stated that the position regarding Israel has not changed and that the Qods Day is a day to support the people of Palestine and condemn the violation of their rights by Israel, but he added:

We should be thankful to the many people who attended these rallies. Most of those who participated in these rallies in response to our invitation were chanting slogans about Iran and their country and were concerned about their fate. We cannot ask people to be ignorant about their country, and although the main propose for this day was Palestinian people, I ask the authorities to explain what has happened in the country that suddenly on Qods Day people are split in two groups and some express their concerns in the slogans they were chanting.

At the end of his remarks, Karroubi stressed that some are talking about the presidential elections as if nothing has happened and are telling people that there has been no fraud in the election. He asked, "Why are the Government telling people these lies as if people don’t know what has happened to them? If that is true then what are all these protests?"

Karroubi added that the authorities are claiming that Ahmadinejad had 300,000 votes in 10,000 ballot boxes, while Karroubi did not even have a single vote in those boxes....

This is despite the fact that some of the observers at the polling stations say that in a ballot box I had 100 votes but they counted only one for me. At least say something that people won’t laugh at you over it. If you are telling the truth then in response to tens of hours of denying the fraud on the “national” media and putting pressure on the innocent detainees to obtain false confessions from them, give us some airtime too so that we also present our evidence and reasons.

Mehdi Karroubi believes that the public opinion and their trust is the greatest resource of the system. Karroubi said:

The greatest resource of Imam [Khomeini] was the public trust and had said so himself several times. Therefore the trust in the system should not be destroyed and no one should move in that direction. Some of these gentlemen knowingly or unknowingly are moving in that direction and are constantly preparing material for the foreigners. Let’s make a right move to come out of this situation. Let’s announce the real statistics. IRIB, which has become a biased and destructive media with every day destroying its credibility more, should follow the right course and should try to win the trust of the people again.

Mir Hossein Mousavi, pointing out the events after the election, strongly criticised the behaviour of the government. He said that it is a bitter irony that the revolutionary figures who were active from the very beginning of the revolution are today in prisons: “I don’t know why these events are happening and why they are doing this to the religious and revolutionary figures.”

Mousavi believes that these actions are causing wounds to the people’s souls and spirits that will not be easily treatable in future. He pointed out the show trials for the reformists, staged with a lot of propaganda, and asked: “What did you gain from this show? Are you seeking to hold inquisition courts? Do you understand the downfalls of such actions in the society?”

Mousavi referred to the great number of revolutionary figures who have been pushed aside and said:

In the past four years, many wrong actions have taken place that have made the revolutionary figures either go to the sidelines or lose their enthusiasm for working. Have a look and see how many ministers, members of the Parliament, and revolutionary figures were eliminated. The sidelines of our revolution have now become greater and more important than its core. How many Presidents we have, how many ministers we have [who have been marginalised]. We have members of the Parliament, managers, leading intellectuals who have all been pushed to the sidelines. Why are all these talents eliminated?

Pointing out his warnings over the past year, Mousvi expressed sorrow over the abuse of the county’s financial resources by some of the power centers, such asthe questionable transfer of telecommunications to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and the methods of financing the $8 billion cost.

Mousavi then referred to the accusations [by the Government] of "velvet revolution" and said: “Unfortunately these days from every podium, there is a remark being made to destroy the revolutionary figures. The holy podium of the Friday Prayer is now specific to a party and the hardliners are using any means to eliminate everyone who has a different opinion from them.”

Mousavi, pointing out the history of Russia and the Communist period, said that in an era some people took power that tried to eliminate those who were active in that revolution by removing the images of them from books and pictures and by forging the history to deceive their people and the people of the world, but [eventually] their government was overthrown and historians wrote the real history. He emphasised:

The few should not think that the events of the beginning of the Revolution and the years after that are gone from people’s minds. Recently, one of the gentlemen who had a position in my cabinet and then resigned over some differences has made comments that make you wonder. It is three or four months that he is spreading lies at IRIB and his media against me, Mr. Karroubi, and people who have supported us and tried to destroy our characters. Don’t we have the right to defend ourselves on “national” TV too?

Recalling the meeting with Ayatollah Hashemi-Shahroudi (the former Head of the Judiciary), Mousavi said:

Mr. Shahroudi called me and asked if I could go to his office. I went there. Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani (the Head of the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council) was there too, but I was not originally informed about his presence. We talked about the events that happened after the election and then Mr. Shahroudi asked me what I would do. I said that we were clear and that they should give us time so that we could also defend ourselves in live broadcast from the national media in that environment of destruction. Prior to that Mr. Larijani had also asked me if I would go to the television and I said yes. In the meeting with Mr. Shahroudi, he suggested a legal gathering and I accepted. Right then he called the High Commission of National Security, they spoke and they agreed too. Then they told us to write a request. We prepared a request [for a gathering] signed by me and sent it. A few days later we received a note from the High Commission of National Security that they had rejected our request according to some article and it was also signed by some managers.

Mir Hossein Mousavi, criticising the extent of lying among some officials, added:

They are constantly giving false information to the public and think that people will believe them. How many times have the number of people killed after the election changed? Then they claim that the fraud in election is a lie. There are people who are determined to pretend that there was no fraud in the election. This was repeatedly propagated from the television.

Well, if you are certain of your action, why are you worried of our presence on television or why are you preventing the presence of our experts there? If you are truthful, then establish a roundtable with the presence from our experts so that both sides could put their views.

Mousavi, pointing out the restricted vironment that has been created, said: “Today the environment is in such a way that no one can criticise the administration. Anyone who says something [against the administration], even if he is one of their own people, is linked to the enemy, is said to be against Imam [Khomeini], and will have false accusations made up against him.”

Mousavi reiterated: “I asked them why you, who voided 700 ballot boxes during the sixth parliamentary election so that you could get one specific figure elected to the parliament, don’t open a hundred ballot boxes in a live television broadcast so that people can see how many ballot papers without a serial number are in there?”

At the end Mousavi expressed hope that the devotees of the system think and resolve the problems that have been created. In his opinion it is impossible to ignore the public’s awareness and to ask the students to be quiet, as they are sons and daughters of this people and demand an answer.