Iran Election Guide

Donate to EAWV





Or, click to learn more

Search

Entries in Mohsen Rezaei (5)

Wednesday
Sep302009

UPDATED Iran: So What's This "National Unity Plan"?

The Latest from Iran (29 September): The Forthcoming Test?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis


IRAN FLAGUPDATE 1800 GMT: A reader usefully interjects, "I would like to just remind you that "The Unity Plan' is not from Rafsanjani and it is from 'Pro-Government people seeking truce.'"

It's a fair point, but the reason that this Plan was linked to Rafsanjani was because of widespread chatter, some of it fuelled by Rafsanjani allies, that the former President was the driving force behind the initiative for political reconciliation. Mehdi Karroubi's letter, published in a separate entry, also works from that assumption.

The overriding point is that we don't know Rafsanjani's role in this plan.

UPDATE 1650 GMT: My apologies for a slip-up in the previous entry. There are only eight names listed for the 9-member committee. That is because the 9th spot is for a representative of "political opposition (Mousavi)"


UPDATE 0650 GMT: The names of the proposed nine members of the top Committee in the "draft" of the Plan: Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani (“hard-line” cleric), Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi (former head of Judiciary), Ali Akbar Velayati (former Foreign Minister), Aboutorabi Fard (Deputy Parliament Speaker), Mahmoud Doai (Head of Etalaat News and former Ambassador to Iraq), Hassan Rohani (Rafsanjani stalwart), Masih Mohajeri (editor of Jomhuri Eslami newspaper), Habibollah Asgharowladi (leader of the Motalefeh Party).

It is claimed that the "draft" was written by Habibollah Asgaroladi, M.Mirsalim, M.Bahonar (Deputy Parliament Speaker), M.Nabavi, H.Mozafar, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel (former Parliament Speaker).

UPDATE 30 September 0640 GMT: No further political developments but events at Fars News indicate that this was an early draft of a plan which the paper, either through poor journalism or an attempt to cause mischief, initially presented as a final, agreed proposal. After posting and then withdrawing several stories overnight, Fars eventually put up a version which explicitly refers to the Plan --- similar in its provisions to what we set out below --- as a "draft".

URGENT UPDATE 2015 GMT: There have been curious twists in the story. Fars had now modified its story of the document, saying that it is a "draft" from the Expediency Council. There is no date, no stamp, and no signature. (Note: within the last 30 minutes, the modified Fars story has been pulled from the website.)

This would still match up with a narrative, prominent in recent days, that the Expediency Council, chaired by Rafsanjani, had taken the initiative in producing a plan for political resolution to be considered by the Assembly of Experts. Yet, assuming the document is authentic, the story stops there. What happened to it when it was considered by the Assembly? Is the Expediency Council in charge of the process? What role does the Supreme Leader play in this political game?

Yet, the more one goes into the detail of the document, the more tenuous even this scenario becomes. The plan of a 9-person committee overseeing subcommittees to consider issues from electoral fraud to abuse of detainees is cumbersome, to say the least, but the prospects are almost fantastic. Would this complex set of committee and subcommittees dare overturn the Guardian Council's upholding of the original Presidential result or threaten widespread prosecution of security forces or government officials?

Even more striking is the document's deliberate slight of certain political figures. The repeated references to the inclusion of a representative from an "opposition candidate" (singular, not plural) and the equally repetitive naming of Mir Hossein Mousavi could not be clearer in its intent to split the Green opposition. So, if this is a plan for "National Unity", it rests upon a blunt attempt to cause disunity.

Indeed, the snub of Mehdi Karroubi (and, beyond the Green movement, Mohsen Rezaei) is so blatant that the document has a feel of "disinformation". However, if it were a false plan, one would expect it to be disowned very quickly by Mir Hossein Mousavi and, possibly, Rafsanjani. So far neither has spoken.

The other leading possibility is that this is an early draft of a plan floated by someone or some group. But whom? There the trail stops, for now.

What can be said tonight is that a purported plan for political resolution has actually provoked more division. The draft may explain why Karroubi wrote his second letter to Rafsanjani yesterday and why the tone was sharply critical. In effect, "Hashemi, why have you betrayed us?", both with a plan dividing the opposition (arguably co-opting Mousavi into the "establishment") and with the conversion of the Assembly of Experts into a body to close ranks against legitimate protest.

We're working on a full analysis of the National Unity Plan, as printed in Fars News this afternoon, but to be honest, it is so potentially dramatic in its provisions that we need time to work through the dynamics. So here's how our snap analysis unfolded. If you follow the path, you'll probably see that we think there is a convergence of forces which brings Mir Hossein Mousavi into the "acceptable" negotiations and shuts out Mehdi Karroubi. What this means for the Supreme Leader (how much influence has he lost by handing over "resolution" to a Truth Commission?) and President Ahmadinejad (is the Plan/Commission with him or against him?) is far less certain:

1550 GMT: We are working on an analysis of the "National Unity Plan" published in Fars News this afternoon but here's the headline:

The authors, who call themselves the delsoozan ("those whose hearts are aching" over the post-election conflict) have declared, "Let's join hands and fix the nezam (system)." Because of "the rise of some uncertainties in the political arena", the "elders and devotees...after several meetings have decided a plan for national unity that would enable a --- way out of the present situation".

The plan appears to be inclusive in its recommendation for a "national unity committee", with representatives from all parties including one from Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign.

1610 GMT: Sting in the Detail. But, if the National Unity Plan proposes a committee with at least one representative from the Green opposition, it also offers a big-time slap in the face to somebody:

In reality, what was witnessed after the elections was a vast effort and movement of a political entity that was against the legal institutions and pillars of the system. This went as far as the fact that during Qods Day, the sayings of the Imam and the Revolution went under attack by this group.

So was this destructive "political entity" the Green Wave?

1615 GMT: Another Cryptic Passage from the Plan. "Truth seeking commission must put the word 'end' to the current situation in the country."

1619 GMT: And, for what's it worth, an EA correspondent answers the question racing around the Internet, "Is This Rafsanjani's Plan?": "It's a Hashemi-laden letter. You can almost see his fingerprints."

1622 GMT: The Proposed Truth Commission? One representative of the marjas [senior clerics], one representative from Assembly of Experts, one representative from Interior Ministry, one rep from Majlis [Parliament], one representative from Judiciary, one representative from Expediency Council, one representative from Guardian Council, one representative from the "House of Parties", and one representative of the "protesting candidate (Mousavi)".

1628 GMT: So Who Got Left Out of the Plan? Take a look at that Commission membership again. No representative of the "other" defeated Presidential candidates, Mohsen Rezaei and Mehdi Karroubi.

1635 GMT: And while you're getting your heads around Who's In, Who's Out and Why, consider this from an EA correspondent: "The mere acceptance of this Plan by Supreme Leader would be quite something as he would have to implictly recognise that he has not been able and will not be able to cope with the situation alone and so he needs ad hoc help from 'friends and family'."
Tuesday
Sep292009

The Latest from Iran (29 September): The Forthcoming Test?

NEW Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Backs Himself into a Corner
UPDATED Iran: So What’s This “National Unity Plan”?
NEW Latest Iran Video: More University Demonstrations (29 September)
UPDATED Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Scott Lucas in La Stampa (English Text)
NEW Text: Mousavi Statement to His Followers (28 September)
NEW What is Iran’s Military Capacity?
The Latest from Iran (28 September): Signals of Power
Latest Iran Video: The Universities Protest (28 September)

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

KARROUBI32100 GMT: We have posted an emergency update of our story on the National Unity Plan. To be blunt, this has turned into a giant mystery which we can lay out but not solve this evening, and there are likely to be further developments (even though it is early morning in Tehran) for our first update on Wednesday.

1700 GMT: We've split off our snap analysis updates on the National Unity Plan into a separate entry.

1545 GMT: A steady stream of reports indicate there are smaller but still significant gatherings of demonstrators in Tehran today. This is in addition to the sizable protest at Sharif University.

1455 GMT: Fars News have just published a copy of the National Unity Plan. We'll be back within the hour with an analysis.

1430 GMT: Back from a teaching break to find tension growing over the privatisation of Iran's state telecommunications company, with 51 percent going to a consortium linked to the Revolutionary Guard. It is reported that the Telecommunications Trade Council will review the deal, with the possibility of cancelling it because of concerns over a "monopoly".

1100 GMT: I sense a debate emerging, given our readers' comments, over the latest move of Mehdi Karroubi with his letter to Hashemi Rafsanjani. Tehran Bureau takes the line that this is a Karroubi criticism, rather than a plan worked out with the former President:

1) Karroubi criticises Rafsanjani for his failure to launch an investigation into the election during his chairmanship of the Assembly of Experts session;

2) Karroubi criticises Rafsanjani for being absent during the final meeting, with its declaration praising the Supreme Leader and framing the events after the election as riots and a conspiracy;

3) Karroubi criticizes Rafsanjani for not asking the Assembly to investigate how the military is taking control of the economy, as in the recent purchase of a 51% share in Iran's state telecommunications firm;

4) Karroubi criticizes Rafsanjani for not calling on the Assembly to review Iran's foreign policy.

0930 GMT: We've just posted video from today's demonstration at Sharif University. It is reported that Minister of Science Kamran Daneshjoo was prevented from reaching the Central Library.

0905 GMT: Tabnak reports that Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has distanced himself from his brother Mohammad Javad Larijani, a high-level official in the Judiciary, after the latter's criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson Hassan, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mohammad Khatami.

0900 GMT: It Wasn't Just Tehran. An account has been posted of University demonstrations on Monday in Shiraz.

0835 GMT: President candidate Mohsen Rezaei has made a significant intervention with a call for a "national election commission independent of the three branches of Government".

Rezaei's proposal, building upon earlier criticism of the Guardian Council for its handling of the Presidential vote, presents a political challenge to President Ahmadinejad moving beyond a simple "reform" of the system. His interview with Ayande News is the closest he has come to alleging electoral fraud, and he is critical of a number of individuals.

0740 GMT: We've posted the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's Monday statement to his followers: "Qods Day showed that [our] network is like a toddler who is growing incredibly quickly."

0725 GMT: Parleman News has now posted a summary report of yesterday's student demonstrations.

0715 GMT: Fars News tries to pour cold water on the Rafsanjani plan for a political settlement, featuring the comments of a "hard-line" member of Parliament, Ranjbarzadeh, that the plan is unacceptable because it gives concessions to the losers of the election.

0625 GMT: Iran's Nuclear Offer. The head of Iran's nuclear programme, Ali Akhbar Salehi, has laid out Tehran's line in an interview with Press TV. Iran "will soon inform the International Atomic Energy Agency of a timetable for inspection". The plant will produce enriched uranium of up to 5 percent, consistent with a civilian nuclear energy programme, and it is being constructed within the framework of the IAEA regulations. Salehi emphasised, "It is against our tenets, it is against our religion to produce, use, hold or have nuclear weapons or arsenal. How can we more clearly state our position? Since 1974 we have been saying this."

It is 48 hours until Iran's meeting with the "5+1" powers in Geneva.

0555 GMT: Karroubi's second letter to Rafsanjani (0535 GMT) takes on a added sense of urgency because of the Government's decimation of  websites connected with Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi. The Etemade Melli/Saham News site, the Kalemeh site (which had replaced Mousavi's hacked Ghalam News site), and Tagheer are all down. Mowj-e-Sabz, however, is still up, featuring Mousavi's latest statement cautioning the movement against violence.

0535 GMT: A couple of interesting shifts within the Establishment. The long-anticipated change at the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting has been made, with Ezatullah Zarghami replaced by Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli. What is more interesting is the framing of the move, with Zarghami blamed for "the poor performance of the IRIB" during and after the election. Meanwhile, Fazli is portrayed as an ally of the Larijani brothers and a critic of President Ahmadinejad.

Contrary to our update yesterday, university classes have not been suspended for seven days because of "swine flu" (or Monday's demonstrations). The headline in Mehr exaggerated the story, which was simply that provisions were in place to order a suspension if fears of flu arose. Still, the

But the most important development by far came from the opposition. While Mir Hossein Mousavi, considering his next move, tried to reassure his followers that Qods Days was a success, Mehdi Karroubi may have taken the bull by the horns (or, in this case, the shark by the gills). His second letter to Hashemi Rafsanjani was not quite, "Are you with us or against us?", but it has asked the former President to come forth on the plan circulated at the Assembly of Experts. Put bluntly, Karroubi wants to know if the rumoured "political resolution" will take heed of opposition demands or sell out the protestors.
Friday
Sep042009

The Latest from Iran (4 September): A Friday Pause?

NEW Neda Update: The Appeal for Her Detained Fiance, Caspian Makan
NEW Iran: Satire Becomes “News” – Ahmadinejad’s Ayatollah and Prisoner Rape
Latest Iran Video: The Ruholamini Memorial (3 September)
The Latest from Iran (3 September): Ahmadinejad Gets His Cabinet

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

RUHOLAMINI

2015 GMT: Being a Detainee is Jolly Nice. Fars News has run an "interview" with Saeed Hajjarian in which the reformist politician expresses “his satisfaction about his condition in prison.” Hajjarian denies “being hospitalized, being subjected to harsh forms of torture or given mind-altering drugs.”

Hajjarian's daughter Zeinab offers a different picture, writing Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili, that her mother is under severe pressure from Government interrogators and that her father has told the authorities, “I have followed your dictates and announced that my situation in prison is satisfactory. Why don’t you leave my family alone?”

1405 GMT: There Goes My Visiting Professor Post at Tehran University. At Friday prayers in Tehran, Ayatollah Mohammad Emami Kashani has declared that the study of the humanities is very important but the subjects should be not be taught in "the Western style".

Reuters' take on the address is that Kashani tried to turn attention away from Iran's legitimacy crisis towards its influence overseas: "It is now the time to export the revolution...it is not the time to treat each other like this. Such remarks cause damage to the Islamic society and prevent the export of the revolution."

1355 GMT: Making Supreme Lemonade out of Cabinet Lemons. Full credit to Press TV and Fars News for their conversion of potential criticism of yesterday's vote of confidence into high praise for the Supreme Leader.

Here was their challenge. The Vice Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, has revealed that up to 9 of the 21 Ministers nominated by President Ahmadinejad were not winning over the Parliament, "If we had not received the Leader's recommendations, eight or nine ministers would have failed to win the vote of confidence. It would not have been a good start for the government."

Hmm....that's not high praise for Ahmadinejad's people, and it seems to indicate the Supreme Leader interfered in a Parliamentary process. But wait. Press TV sticks that admission in the 7th paragraph, far below the "right" interpretation:
Iran's vice speaker, Mohammad-Reza Bahonar, has hailed the Leader of the Islamic Revolution for providing Parliament with "friendly" guidance on clearing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's nominees for his cabinet.

Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei "recommended that the government should start working at the earliest and with fullest capacity at the time when the country is faced with domestic and international crises and issues," Fars News Agency quoted Bahonar as saying on Thursday.

Well played, sir. Very well played.

1335 GMT: A full list of the 72 people whose deaths have been confirmed in post-election violence has now been posted on the Internet.

1325 GMT: After a quiet morning, some items of interest are emerging. Khabar carries an interview with a Revolutionary Guard member describing the capture of leading reformists such as Saeed Hajjarian and the methods used to make them "confess".

1040 GMT: The Holy Shrine of Imam Khomeini has announced the cancellation of all forthcoming events during Ramadan. Former President Khatami was due to speak at the shrine next week, with Green movement activists discussing a rally in support.

1035 GMT: Mohammad Reza Bahonar, a Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, has claimed that the Supreme Leader's intervention was necessary for the approval of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and five other ministers (oil, industry, trade, cooperatives, and transport).

1030 GMT: We've just posted a warning about running too quickly with "news" on Iran, documenting how a satirical piece on Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi authorising rape of prisoners turned into "reality".

0930 GMT: Still very quiet on news front, so we'll happily note that Josh Shahryar's excellent dissection of the "pro-Ahmadinejad" argument on the Iranian election --- which we posted on Tuesday --- has now made it to The Huffington Post.

0730 GMT: With news slowing after yesterday's events in Parliament, we've taken the time to write an extended analysis of the current and future political and economic situation, "Has Ahmadinejad Won?" Thanks to all our readers, whose comments yesterday were invaluable.

Away from Parliament, the "40th day" memorial ceremony for Mohsen Ruholamini (pictured), who died in detention in Evin Prison, took place yesterday at Vali-e Asr Mosque in Tehran. Since Ruholamini's father, Abdolhossein Ruholamini, is a prominent "conservative" political activist and advisor to Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, the authorities posed no obstacle, as they have been with other memorials for slain protestors. We've posted the video in a separate entry.
Friday
Sep042009

Iran: OK, The Cabinet's In, Has Ahmadinejad "Won"?

The Latest from Iran (4 September): A Friday Pause?
The Latest from Iran (3 September): Ahmadinejad Gets His Cabinet

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

AHMADINEJAD2Today, on Iran's "weekend", should be a political catch-your-breath day after the culmination of Parliament's approval of 18 of 21 proposed Ministers for the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. News slowed to a standstill last night, and there is almost nothing of significance this morning. There are Friday prayers in Tehran, but no sign that they will produce the headline statements of the last three months, from the Supreme Leader's 19 June drawing of the post-election line to Hashemi Rafsanjani's 14 July intervention to President Ahmadinejad's hard-line anti-opposition pitch last week.

The President's immediate victory, with one unexpected minor setback (the loss of his proposed Minister of Energy), does not mean that the battle is over. Far from it. However, to appreciate the tensions, contests, and manoeuvres, you have to read far beyond "mainstream" coverage, especially outside Iran.

Most of the Western press have pretty much lost the plot. That's why, to our obvious frustration, almost all (with the notable exception of The New York Times) offered simple and misleading reviews of the final Parliament act yesterday. For some, the vote was the signal to move the focus to Iran's nuclear programme. For some, it was the quick grab headline of the Islamic Republic's first woman minister or Mr Most Wanted (Ahmad Vahidi, for a 1994 bombing in Argentina) becoming the Minister of Defense. For others, it was a "white flag" moment for the opposition, as Iran's "hardliners" had united behind the President. Game over.

Wrong. To be honest, I found yesterday's discussion by readers on our updates far more fascinating and useful than the press summaries. (Thanks, by the way, to all who have contributed.) Have a look, because it is here that the next steps of Hashemi Rafsanjani --- who dropped out of the non-Iranian narrative of events --- are considered. It is here that the important matter of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, and its relationship with the President and the Supreme Leader, is in play.

And it is here that attention is paid to those conservative and principlist elements who continue to dislike and even move against Ahmadinejad, even if they did not make their stand yesterday. What now for the Larijanis --- Ali still as Speaker of the Parliament, Sadegh as head of judiciary --- and their allies? What now for high-profile MPs like Ali Motahari and Ahmad Tavakoli, who have bitterly challenged the President and his inner circle since mid-July? What now for those who saw the in-fighting at Ministries like Intelligence as an attempt by Ahmadinejad (and the IRGC) to expand their control and who didn't take too kindly to it?

(And, lest we forget, our question from last week is not resolved, despite Ayatollah Khamenei's open intervention to assist with confirmation of the Cabinet, "What now for the Supreme Leader?")

For us, the post-election crisis has never been a matter of a single, dramatic showdown between the regime and its opponents but a series of waves, inside and outside the Government. There was the immediate wave of mass demonstrations (which were renewed at points throughout July), the wave of resistance to Ahmadinejad's inauguration, the wave of response to the detentions and trials, fed both by Mehdi Karroubi's initiatives and by conservative/principlist disquiet, and the wave that led up to yesterday's vote.

Clearly, the wave of resistance to an Ahmadinejad Cabinet is now dissipated. Indeed, I think it is now fair to drop the label "post-election crisis". Despite all those who will never believe that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the 12 June vote, he has now gone through all the bureaucratic motions of re-assuming office. However, there is still a "legitimacy crisis". Just because you're President doesn't mean that folks accept your authority.

In part, that "legitimacy crisis" may not be as prominent because the Green wave is in a bit of a lull. Ramadan plays its part here, as well as battle fatigue and the disruption of the opposition's organisation. The leadership of Mir Hossein Mousavi in particular is now primarily on Facebook pages, given the shutdown of his websites, the detentions of some of his top advisors, and restrictions on his movements.

But, whether as an outcome of these difficulties or as a measured strategy, the Green movement has now set out its next resurgence. On 18 September, Qods (Jerusalem) Day, the plan is to assemble as Hashemi Rafsanjani speaks at Friday prayers in Tehran.

OK, but that's two weeks away, and there's no guarantee that the movement will produce a mass show of resistance (or even that Rafsanjani, given his withdrawal from prayers in mid-August, will appear), right? Of course, but that scepticism in turn discounts that tensions continue within the regime.

At the risk of repeating our "Iranians love chess" cliche too often, one strong move does not mean checkmate. And the President and his allies still have a glaring weakness in their defences. Look at the list of waves above. The one that has always been crashing ashore since mid-July has been the criticism of the post-election crackdown through detentions, beatings and abuses, confessions, and trials. And that wave was not put out to sea with the Parliament vote.

It is possible that Ahmadinejad has come through the worst of this. There was a signal this week that the post-election criticism of Mohsen Rezaei, despite the death of his campaign advisor's son in detention, may be muted by putting Rezaei at the head of State broadcasting. The Supreme Leader may be satisfied that he made his point when he "closed" Kahrizak prison. Sadegh Larijani may be content to take his place at judiciary and not challenge the continuing trials; alternatively, Ahmadinejad and the IRGC may accept that they should now curb the crackdown and let proceedings take a lower profile, with releases of some prisoners and "moderate" sentences for others. Ayatollah Khamenei may even announce an end-of-Ramadan "amnesty" for iconic detainees such as Saeed Hajjarian and Mohammad Ali Abtahi.

But, as of now, we don't know. And there's a twist in the tale.

Actually, it's not a twist. It's a storyline that has been here all the time. As EA's Chris Emery and our sharp-eyed/sharp-minded readers have noted, post-election events have added to the strains on the Iranian economy. The post-election crisis brought Government to a standstill and exposed problems in Iran's infrastructure. Of course, Ahmadinejad and his new Cabinet may try to stabilise or even jump-start the economy, but the President's record in this area hasn't been too good.

And that is where "post-election crisis" turns into "legitimacy crisis". It's one thing for an activist to get angry over a stolen vote; another for a "non-activist" to get angry because transport doesn't work, food is more expensive, housing isn't assured, and the lights go out.

If that is the case, if there is a wave of resentment over the economy that happens to arise at the same time as the ongoing waves over the political authority of the President and his allies (and I write that in full cognizance of the opinion of EA colleagues and some of our readers that the Revolutionary Guard has shown its muscle in recent weeks).....

Welcome back to the storm.
Tuesday
Sep012009

The Latest from Iran (1 September): The Ripples of Debate Continue

UPDATED Iran: Law & Politics – Misinterpreting Mortazavi
NEW Iran Special: Taking Apart the Regime’s Defenses (Shahryar v. Afrasiabi)
The Latest from Iran (31 August): The Debate over the Cabinet

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

RUHOLAMINI

2010 GMT: On a relatively quiet evening, the Comedy Moment of the Day comes in. The Supreme Leader's representative to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Hojatoleslam Ali Saeedi, explained that the reason for the "quick confessions" of political detainees was the “humane and Islamic” behaviour of the Revolutionary Guard.

1810 GMT: Scoop of the Day. The Times of London "Terror suspect Saeed Jalili set to become Ahmadinejad's Defence Minister". (Saeed Jalili is the secretary of the National Security Council. The nominee for Defence Minister is Ahmad Vahidi, who is wanted by Interpol for alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish centre in Argentina.)

1720 GMT: During this lull before tomorrow's votes of confidence, here's one story, originally in Farda News, to make you go Hmmm.....
Mohsen Kouhkan, a spokesman for the Majlis governing body, said lawmakers were asked to turn down any dinner invitation other than those coming from parliament or the presidential office until after the vote-of-confidence session for the 10th cabinet has taken place.

“As minister designates and lawmakers may be invited to Iftar [breaking of the daily Ramadan fast] parties held outside Parliament, the Majlis governing body has sent a text message to all lawmakers asking them to refrain from participating in any dinner parties outside of parliament and the presidential office,” he said.

1705 GMT: The office of Mehdi Karroubi has published an open letter declaring that Saeed Mortazavi, then Tehran Chief Prosecutor and now Iran's Deputy Prosecutor General, is responsible for any suffering of abused detainees or their families. Karroubi has written the director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting asking for airtime for his representative to present evidence of abuse.

1655 GMT: One disturbing story to note. As Iranian universities prepare for the start of the academic year, Gooya reports that dozens of Tehran University students have been summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence for questioning.

1630 GMT: We're back after an afternoon break for an EA staffer's birthday but, to be honest, there's very little to update on the domestic front, since the votes of confidence on Cabinet appointments will be tomorrow rather than today. Instead, the two stories causing chatter amongst "mainstream" media are on the international front: the Iran Government's announcement that President Ahmadinejad will attend this month's United Nations General Assembly (which isn't news at all, since he was always intending to go) and the declaration by the Government that it has "prepared an updated nuclear package" for Wednesday's meeting of the "5+1" countries (US, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany) in Frankfurt on Wednesday.

And to be honest, while the nuclear proposal will dominate media headlines over the next 24 hours (since US media, in particular, find the script easier with the Nuclear Threat story than with the complex politics inside Iran), it isn't news either. The Iranian Government has been sending out signals for a few weeks that it might like to sit down and chat about the nuclear programme, not as much as a response to Western threats of sanctions as much as a diversion from internal conflict.

1040 GMT: The BBC reports, "[Nominee for Minister of Defence] Ahmad Vahidi faced no opposition from MPs on the third day of a debate on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's choices for his new cabinet."

1030 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has met with the three-member panel appointed by the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, to discuss his evidence of detainee abuse. The Judiciary First Deputy Chief Ebrahim Raeesi, in a subsequent interview, assured that Larijani had ordered all laws and judiciary regualtions upheld" in a full investigation which ensured the rights of detainees.

0930 GMT: Reports are emerging of secret meetings last week between Ahmadinejad's office, pro-Government senior clerics, and "principlist" MPs. Allegations are being made that the President's camp has been using bribery to assure votes of confidence in his Cabinet nominations.

0900 GMT: An Urgent Correction. Press TV's report (see 0640 GMT) is wrong: Marziyeh Vahid-Dastjerdi did NOT get a vote of confidence as Minister of Health. All voting will take place tomorrow.

0830 GMT: In addition to the Ruholamini death-in-detention story (see 0535 GMT), featured from The New York Times to CNN, international media are featuring the testimony of a woman ("Minoo") about rape in prison. France 24 carries the story and video.

0640 GMT: Press TV reports that Marziyeh Vahid-Dastjerdi has been given a vote of confidence as Minister of Health. The approval came despite reports of widespread opposition to all of Ahmadinejad's three female nominees. Fars News also concentrates on the remarks of Vahid-Dastjerdi to the Majlis.

0535 GMT: We are now caught in a period, with displays of mass opposition constrained during Ramadan, of trying to look below the ripples on the surface of the regime. Once again, today's first place of observation will be the Parliament, where discussions of individual Cabinet nominees are due to end in votes of confidence. However, as the complications of the appointment of Saeed Mortazavi and the speculation over the statements and initial actions of Sadegh Larijani have illustrated (see separate entry and yesterday's updates), significant (if still inconclusive) changes are occurring in locations like the judiciary.

There were actually signs of a reconciliation yesterday between the Supreme Leader and the President, through the rhetoric of a war against "soft power". The nominee for Minister of Intelligence, Heydar Moslehi, put the case for a new strategy and instruments to the Parliament yesterday. As long as this does not descend into renewed, specific arrests against supposed planners of "velvet revolution" --- measures that the Supreme Leader warned against last week --- but remains at the level of vigilance against opposition, there may be an emerging compromise between Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad.

Do not mistake this, however, for a resolution. Detentions, confessions, and abuses are still the political Achilles heel of this regime. Many in the media this morning are headlining yesterday's leaked confirmation that Mohsen Ruholamini (pictured), the son of a key "conservative" advisor to the Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, died from beatings in detention rather than "meningitis". Behind those headlines are a much more significant story: Ruholamini's death galvanised opposition to Ahmadinejad from within the Establishment. Further revelations or even suspicions may ensure that the President can never be secure in his claim of authority.