UPDATED Iran Debate: How Weak (or Strong) is Ahmadinejad?

The Latest from Iran (30 August): Parliament Discusses the Cabinet

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UPDATED 31 August, 0725 GMT: Enduring America's Chris Emery, formerly known as "Mr Jones", has now made his contribution to what is becoming, I think, one of the most important discussions in the post-election crisis --- see below. Mr Smith has offered a reply.

UPDATED 1145 GMT: Mr Smith has made another intervention in the debate.
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Over the weekend, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tough talking at Friday prayers in Tehran and as he was submitting his Cabinet choices to Parliament, we have been debating the President's position and future prospects. EA's Mr Smith and Mr Johnson are joined by Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau, whose column sparked the discussion, and Fintan Dunne.

SAHIMI: ....Such fabrications [like those in his Friday speech] are of course meant to present Ahmadinejad as a confident leader. But, in reality, he is weaker and more isolated than ever. True, the right wing is in control, but that control has been achieved first and foremost by the support of the high command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Otherwise, the base of support for Ahmadinejad among the population is extremely narrow, limited to at most 15% of the population.

At the same time,...glaring fissures which have emerged within the conservative and reactionary camp, which poses a growing threat to Iran’s political stability. Even Ayatollah Khamenei and the hardliners around him are well aware of the danger, which explains why they have been gradually retreating over the past few weeks.

First, they acknowledged some of the crimes that have taken place in the detention centers.

Second, they have retreated from linking the reformist leaders with foreign powers, notwithstanding Ahmadinejad’s tired accusations during Friday Prayers.

Third, Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the former judiciary chief, as a member to the powerful Guardian Council, in preparation for the departure of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the ultra-conservative secretary-general of the Council, and an ardent supporter of Ahmadinejad. At least compared to Jannati, Shahroudi is a relative moderate.

Fourth, Ahmadinejad’s appointment of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as the First Vice President was blocked. Mashai was even barred for two months from holding any governmental position, another tactic to put Ahmadinejad under control.

Fifth, many of the reformists and their supporters, if not their main leaders, have been released from detention.

Sixth, behind-the-scene efforts continue to reach some sort of reconciliation between the reformists and the conservative camp. So far these have failed because the main demand of the reformists, holding a new election, has been rejected.

Seventh, Saeed Mortazavi, the notorious Tehran Prosecutor General and the man implicated in many crimes was sacked.

At the same time, Iran’s uranium enrichment program has stagnated, either by design, or due to technical difficulties, or because of a lack of raw materials (yellow cake) needed for uranium enrichment. Iran has also become more flexible with the International Atomic Energy Agency, allowing more visits to its nuclear sites.....

All are signs of a very weak Ahmadinejad presidency ahead, not to mention his complete lack of legitimacy in the eyes of a large majority of Iranian people, even among those who may have supported him before the election.

Even more damaging for Ahmadnejad is that his chief clerical patron, Ayatollah Khamenei, has himself been greatly weakened. The Ayatollah has been openly challenged and strongly criticized by many important clerics. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the most important Shiite cleric in Iran, openly called him unqualified and his reign illegitimate. Ayatollah Khamenei has allowed himself to be reduced to the leader of one faction in the conservative camp by openly and unabashedly supporting Ahmadinejad. He can no longer pretend that he is above the political fray.

SMITH: [The Tehran Bureau article] lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line: Ahmadinejad is weak, is in trouble, is a lame duck already, etc.

While of course all of us wish that this was the case, the reality appears quite different, as we have seen no real thrust to wrestle him out of office. The Supreme Leader has only rebuked him frontally during the [former First Vice President] Mashai affair and he still has the rather remarkable opportunity of talking from official platforms such as Friday Prayers, saying things quite different from what the Supreme Leader says, and still walking out relatively unscathed.

Granted, he has the same amount, or more, difficulties than any executive leader in the world would have for forming a government, but I would be very cautious in calling Ahmadinejad a has-been and that days may be counted down to his demise. Sadly, I doubt this scenario will happen anytime soon.

We shouldn’t forget that the Supreme Leader, conservative critics of AN like the Larijanis, Ahmad Tavakoli (who happens to be the Larijanis’ cousin), and more have essentially agreed to accept the outcome of the Presidential election as announced by the Interior ministry. Hence, they are simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government, more than mounting a challenge that is really geared towards removing Ahmadinejad from power.

DUNNE: Muhammad Sahimi was too dismissive in describing of Ahmadinejad as "isolated and delusional", and he erred in reducing the regime to the person of the president.

But he was correct to describe Ahmadinejad as "weak". Professor Sahimi accurately catalogs the ongoing obstruction of the hardliners and the very public political fractures. Furthermore he shows the regime is now tellingly reliant on a narrow base of IRGC appointees to fill government posts.

Ahmadinejad/IRGC's core 'hard' support is as low as 12%, with a 'softer' support extending to up to 20% of the population. Because of this, the disputed president's public pronouncements are reductionist and defensive --aimed at his own supporters and the ill-informed. By contrast, most other voices in Iranian politics are addressing the remaining 80%+ of the population.

Despite their hard-line rhetoric, Ahmadinejad/IRGC are unable to crush the reformers. It is going to be far harder to violently suppress any mass public protests in the weeks ahead. And there is a dire political problem looming for this one-legged regime: it's the economy, stupid!

Even a government of national unity would be hard-pressed to dig the Iranian economy out of the mire against the backdrop of deteriorating global finances. A lame duck Ahmadinejad government comprising an ineffectual clique will certainly fail to turn things around. One shudders to contemplate the unspoken financial state of Iran. Currency problems and capital flight are doubtless significant.

As the weeks pass, the economy will join the stolen election as the twin key political issues for the populace. Imagine an opposition rally protesting the economic straits of the people as well as the stolen election. Imagine the regime trying to suppress such a rally.

That the reformers are not already in prison is a victory in itself. Now, a death by a thousand cuts threatens the Iranian regime. That reality explains the government's determined effort to halt such a slow slide by means of show trials --which have backfired.

The reformists could compromise by accepting the current status quo, on condition of substantive electoral reform overseen by a parliamentary process. But from their perspective it might be best to simply allow this regime to stew in their own economic juice until well roasted.

JOHNSON: I find Mr. Smith's assertion that Professor Sahimi's article "lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line" to be both inaccurate (many of Sahimi's statements have been have also been reported here in Enduring America as well as other news-sites), and rather unfair.

Mr. Smith states that there is no thrust to wrestle Ahmadinejad out of office. This statement only makes sense if Mr. Smith considers the reformist movement to be irrelevant. I think that there has been a major effort to wrestle Ahmadinejad out of office; and that effort is still going on. The fact that Ahmadinejad has not been able to imprison and/or neutralize the ringleaders of this effort (Khatami, Mousavi and Karroubi), even though he has explicitly demanded it in public, demonstrates the limitations that exist to his power.

Ahmadinejad's pre-Friday prayers speach seems to have a lot of significance for Mr. Smith. I think that it is rather strange that a strong and powerful and confident president of the Islamic Republic of Iran must choose the mid- to low-profile pre-Friday prayers speech, since many of the faithful participating in Friday prayers either eschew or arrive near the end of the speech, to address the country instead of using IRIB [state television]. Did IRIB not give Ahmadinejad broadcasting time? If so, what kind of a strong President is denied this?

Mr. Smith considers the fact that Ahmadnejad is "saying things quite different from what the Supreme Leader says, and still walking out relatively unscathed" as evidence for Ahmadinejad's power. I think this is more a statement of Khamenei's weakness than Ahmadinejad's strength. I think the replacement of [Tehran chief prosecutor] Mortazavi is the real litmus test. If Mortazavi's successor puts an end to the trials and somehow addresses the issues of torture and the secret burials, a tangible limitation of the President's power has been put in place. This would be the first step taken to abort Ahmadinejad's "velvet coup".

Mr. Smith also takes Ahmadinejad's parliamentary troubles lightly. I agree that conservative parliamentarians are "simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government". However I think that the rumblings and confrontations demonstrated by a sizable fraction of conservative MPs with regards to the President demonstrate that these MPs are convinced that: firstly, Ahmadinejad has no intention of giving them any kudoes and power; secondly, Ahmadinejad's plan may have also intended to weaken their power as well as that of the reformists; and thirdly, they may think that all the recent scandals (torture, unmarked graves, etc.) has turned Ahmadinejad into a political hot potato that must be dropped as soon as possibly.

The outcome of the presidential election was accepted by the conservatives in June. Not all of them are necessarily bound to continue to accept that now, especially if rejecting Ahmadinejad is equivalent to their political survival. The upcoming vow of confidence will be a demonstration of how the conservatives feel towards Ahmadinejad's policies.

SMITH: My assertions regarding Ahmadinejad were not so much related to his political "power", rather to his chances of political survival.

I don't deny that he is weak, has severe issues in forming his government, and is prey to all sorts of critics, both conservative and reformist. My considerations are focused, however, on whether Ahmadinejad will survive the storm in the short term and be able to stay in his place. I still believe he will, because the conservatives have too much to lose in terms of legitimacy after substantially endorsing the election results in June. No one, including the Larijanis, has contested the latter yet, and this is quite important in my view.

This is not to deny that friction between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei exists, but again not at boiling point level. Lastly, Ahmadinejad's appearing at Friday prayers was completely to be expected, as it is Government Week in Iran right now, and nearly all Presidents have appeared on the podium on this occasion.

EMERY: I wouldn't necessarily connect all the concessions detailed by Sahimi and Mr Johnson to Ahmadinejad's apparent isolation or weakness. Certainly the "stagnating" nuclear issue is not really evidence of a "very weak Ahmadinejad presidency ahea". I'm also not convinced that Ahmadinejad's inability to have Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and Rafsanjani locked up is, as Mr. Johnson suggests, a useful demonstration of the limitations that exist to his power. The absence of such dictatorial powers are inherent in the office of the presidency.

My position is somewhere in between those expressed by Mr Smith and Mr Johnson. I agree with Mr Smith that Ahmadinejad will probably survive attempts to remove him. However, my prediction is for a totally chaotic second term in which Ahmadinejad is unable to achieve anything substantial as the Parliament and judiciary acts increasingly independently from the government (perhaps already seen in the "moving" of Mortazavi and appointment of Ejeie to posts in the judiciary). Increasingly, the question of the Supreme Leader's succession will come to dominate back stage political manoeuvrings.

As such, the real question is not so much whether Ahmadinejad has lost his public legitimacy or whether the Larijanis have or have not questioned the election result. The immediate apparent legacy of the crisis is that the coordination required for an effective legislative program will be almost impossible to achieve. The still-unknown legacy is the extent of the compromises, principally in terms of Iran's justice system, that Khamenei offers to avoid further mass protests. I don't see Ahmadinejad as particularly significant in how that pans out, although the result of the current trials does seem a reasonable litmus test.

The wider point is that Ahmadinejad doesn't actually appear to have much in the way of policies at the moment. Nor does he appear to grasp the enormity of the task in front of him. Ahmadinejad's second term may hang on this failure as much as anything else. Of course, he will now find it much harder to pass the legislation and reforms he thinks will do something about it and his failures will undoubtedly be capitalised on by his opponents. But a lot does depend on the merit of his policies.

Frustration will be hard for Ahmadinejad to take because the economy is where he has exercised more control than any other President. He also believes he has a strong mandate for his economic "vision", for which the SL has publicly stated his broad agreement (again, more than for any previous President). The real test will thus be when Ahmadinejad tries to pass something fiscal.

If Ahmadinejad does appear increasingly irrelevant or lame, then another important question is how he will react. When he appeared almost invisible in the first few weeks of the crisis, he tried to claw back his bureaucratic authority by some high profile sackings and appointments. I think everyone (including the Supreme Leader) was surprised at how brazen he was in trying to re-assert his visibility. It seems he is now emboldened enough to publicly differ with the Supreme Leader on the trials as well.

I don't see the Supreme Leader as likely to publicly remove his patronage from Ahmadinejad, but it could be possible that he will move closer towards an informal triumvirate with the Larijanis. But Ahmadinejad still has some leverage. Any US-Iranian engagement will require his cooperation, in that he will have the ability to de-rail it or at least cause severe problems. The SL will also recognise that there may be a political price to pay, in terms of the overall authority of the regime, for damaging the office of the Presidency. Ahmadinejad's ouster could even bring the IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] onto the streets.

SMITH: I largely concur with Chris Emery on the unstable nature of AN's second term, although I would, once again, exercise caution as to the real extent of Parliamentary opposition to Ahmadinejad. This will become much clearer in the next few days, as the various ministers receive their votes of confidence.

I too can see many avenues of deadlock for Ahmadinejad in his second term, particularly if the reformists attempt to embark on a long-term route that will target the 2012 Parliamentary elections, as they will have to attack the current composition of the Guardian Council and hence try to chip away at the current conservative quasi-monopoly over state power.

I would also be wary to think that Ahmadinejad does not " grasp the enormity of the task in front of him". I haven't seen statements to this effect by him. His second speech in Parliament yesterday, which I followed via live TV, was actually quite well-constructed. He defended, inter alia, his cabinet changes by saying that reshuffles are necessary, or else cabinets could last 50 years and elections would be made worthless. And his points on women and the experience of other members of his cabinet are also quite interesting. My own experience in dealing with him over the years (I have also had the dubious privilege of shaking his hand and asking him a couple of questions during press conferences) leads me to believe that he is more wily and clever than his external appearance makes him out to be.

As to the judiciary, I think we really have to wait till the end of Sadegh Larijani's appointments to see what the state of play is. Mortazavi was shooed out and in the door again in the last few days and the rest of the appointees such as Ejeie are hardliners in their own right, opposed to Ahmadinejad but not really wishing to make concessions to the reformists.

I still remain convinced that the Supreme Leader will pull a stunt by the end of Ramadan and pardon the reformist bigwigs, after the latter have received long prison sentences. Should he be clever, he would arrange for all of them to be carted off to his palace and be offered the pardon there in front of TV cameras. It would discredit them and allow Khamenei to show off his magnanimity, for free.

The Latest from Iran (28 August): The President Prays

NEW Latest Iran Video: Khamenei Speech to Student Leaders (26 August)
Iran Video Exclusive: Ministry of Intelligence Proves “Velvet Revolution”

NEW Iran: Welcome to the “Velvet Revolution”

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1745 GMT: Ahmadinejad's Cabinet Woes. Press TV, from Iranian Labor News Agency, reports that the majority "principlist" bloc in Parliament is going to reject the three women among the President's 18 Ministerial nominations (albeit with some pretty weak excuses):

With regards to proposed health minister Marziyeh Vahid-Dastjerdi, [a bloc member] said that "certain reports about her business activities had reached the bloc which altered the opinion of the members about her".

The Principlist Majlis deputy, who sits on another bloc as well, said about Sussan Keshavarz, who has been offered the education portfolio: "We have heard that she was active in the campaign headquarters of Mir-Hossein Mousavi."...

The third candidate, Fatemeh Ajorloo, who was picked for the welfare post, was rejected because she "is too good". "It would be a shame if she becomes welfare minister," said the unnamed source, presumably because the ministry is due to be disbanded in the coming months.

Meanwhile, the reformist bloc of the Majlis has decided to vote in favor of Vahid-Dastjerdi.

1420 GMT: The Day's Big (Unseen) Story? I saw this floating around yesterday --- the storyinitially came out on the technology site of the Islamic Republic News Agency and then circulated on other Iranian websites --- but it is only with the help of EA's readers (see comments below) that I could put this together.

The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (Revolutionary Guard), which has become just as renowned in recent years for their role in Iran's economy as for their security function, are set to buy a major stakeholding in the Iranian Telecommunications Agency.

Since 2005, Iran had planned to float the shares of the state company, which is one of three operators in the country. One of the other two is owned by Hashemi Rafsanjani, but its reach is limited to Tehran and some smaller smaller cities. The Revolutionary Guard already have a stake in Iran Cell, so if they were successful in their bid for shares of ITA, they would be in a leading position in Iran's two major cellphone providers.

This is unlikely to be a case of the Guard showing up with chequebook in hand to buy the shares. Instead, as has been the case with other sectors such as pharmaceuticals and automobiles, the purchase will be made through a front company.

There is also an interesting international twist in this story. Earlier this summer, a Russian company was to be granted a license as the third national cellphone operator, but the process suddenly stalled last month (companies from the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait were also trying to get the license). The effective suspension is probably linked to the high process the Iranian Government was demanding, but it leaves the Revolutionary Guard in an even stronger position in the cellphone sector.

1400 GMT: In Case Anyone Really Cares. The actual address at Friday prayers in Tehran, as opposed to President Ahmadinejad's introduction, was delivered by Hojetoleslam Sadighi. His headline declaration was that the "world's exceptional crimes" are the crimes of Israel in Palestine.

1330 GMT: Today is turning into a contest of two statements and, in contrast to recent days, Western media are eagerly on top of the story. Former President Khatami's statement to reformist leaders is being juxtaposed with current President Ahmadinejad's speech at Friday prayers.

While there are a complex range of issues in this battle, from the legal issues of detentions/confessions/trials to the institutional challenges of who controls Iran's bureaucracy and security forces to the political showdown over Ahmadinejad's legitimacy, it is this sentence from Khatami that may represent the moment: "'The sacred Friday prayer podium has been given to those who...call for the punishment of prominent figures...while they are accused in the eyes of the public for committing treason themselves."

Even though Khatami was probably referring to Friday prayers past and addresses delivered by "hard-line" clerics such as Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, that sentence will be set next to Ahmadinejad's none-too-subtle call for the arrests of protest leaders.

To put an immediate question: 48 hours after trying to avert a showdown with his own statement, the Supreme Leader finds the confrontation ratcheted up several notches. What does Khamenei do now?

1200 GMT: More details are emerging of former President Khatami's statement in his meeting with leaders of the Reformist Front, via outlets such as Radio Farda and Parleman News. Khatami said that "the black cloud of worthlessness of people's votes under this regime should be eliminated" and that those who opened fire on the people on the streets should be prosecuted.

1150 GMT: Credit to Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times, who has just nailed the significance of this morning's events in his lead paragraph: "Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad demanded the prosecution of opposition leaders today, raising the nation's political temperature just a day and a half after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sought to cool tempers in a conciliatory speech."

1130 GMT: Fars News Agency have published a summary of Tehran's Friday prayers address by Hojetoleslam Sadighi.

1030 GMT: Press TV has now posted its English summary of the Ahmadinejad speech, featuring the call for the "severe punishment of the orchestrators of the post-election unrest" and its "painful" events.

The President is not backing away from the "velvet revolution" theme, saying that Iranian opposition leaders were "deceived by the enemy's schemes (and) did their best to undermine the high voter turnout in the election and to shake the foundations of the Islamic establishment".

The president said, "I call upon security and judicial officials to decisively and mercilessly act with those who committed inhumane acts in the guise of the friends [of the establishment] since they inflicted damage on people and tarnished the image of the establishment, security and police forces."

0915 GMT: Former President Mohammad Khatami, meeting members of the Reform Front, has emphasised the need for a stronger presence of the reformists in Iranian politics with continuation of their efforts for change.

0900 GMT: More on the Ahmadinejad Speech. Fars News Agency has posted its summary. The President followed long-established lines with his references to 85 percent participation in the Presidential election and the 25 million who voted for him. This was testimony to the "revolutionary values" and "originality" of Iran. Enemies were trying to separate the "Islamic" and "Republic" in this Iranian revolution; however, Ahmadinejad proclaimed that, "after more than two months", these enemies were "staggering and had lost their way home", failing in their media plans and political efforts.

There was one nice touch in the rhetoric, especially since the President needs to be careful with his references to a "velvet revolution" that the Supreme Leader has now denied. Apparently the British Foreign Minister [David Miliband] had said, when asked why Britain was involved in Iranian affairs, that otherwise work on the Islamic Republic would soon be completed.

0840 GMT: Oh, yes, Ahmadinejad also asked Parliament to show their trust with votes of confidence in his "strong, coherent, professional, and honest" Ministers.

0830 GMT: Mahmoud Speaks. And wow, what a way to begin the introduction to Friday prayers. The President has claimed that attacks on University dormitories just after the 12 June election were staged by "relatives" of students and protestors, complementing their disturbances on the streets.

These acts tried to discredit the Presidential vote, "a matter of genuine democracy unlike other staged elections in the world, where the outcome is predetermined".

0800 GMT: A stuttering start to the day. We were laid low by a server problem but there is still no breaking news to report. We're waiting for first accounts of President Ahmadinejad's introduction of Friday prayers in Tehran, which should include glowing references for his Cabinet nominees.

We've taken the time, during the server outage, to write up a special analysis on the regime's pretext of "velvet revolution" as the cause of the post-election conflict. This, of course, has been true since June, but it came home to us this week with the testimony of Iranian-American academic Kian Tajbakhsh during the 4th Tehran trial. Apparently some of our colleagues (and at least one EA staffer) are now amongst the velvet revolutionaries.

The "Western" media, from The New York Times to experts like Juan Cole, are now catching up with the last major development, the Supreme Leader's speech from Wednesday. (Unless it's The Washington Post, who apparently no longer care about Iran unless the story is about Tehran's nuclear threat; they are silent on Iran today.)

The Latest from Iran (22 August): A Pause for Ramadan?

The Latest from Iran (23 August): An Anti-Ahmadinejad Bloc?

Iran's Most Wanted: Defense Minister Vahidi and the Interpol Warrant
The Latest from Iran (21 August): Political Battles
Video: The Sohrab Protests (20 August)

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2150 GMT: Before shutting down for the night, one more foreshadowing of our analysis tomorrow on "The Anti-Ahmadinejad Compromise". An EA correspondent offers further evidence. Mir Hossein Mousavi, in a meeting at the house of Dr. Mohsen Mirdamadi (who has subsequently been arrested) with the families of some of the detainee, said, "Principalists that have a conscience are separating themselves from the power-hungry fraction."

2130 GMT: Rafsanjani - We Told You So. A few hours after declaring that Rafsanjani was "closing ranks" with the Supreme Leader, the National Iranian American Council has discovered what we knew all along: Rafsanjani and his party are maintaining their flexibility, especially with their challenge to President Ahmadinejad. The NIAC reveals from the Iranian site Javan-e Farda that Rafsanjani's party is backing Mehdi Karroubi's position on detainees (which we picked up from Rafsanjani's speech today --- see 1715 GMT):

The Executives of Construction has released a statement announcing full support of Mehdi Karroubi’s position on the harassment issue. “Karroubi’s bravery, courage, and his compassionate approach in rooting out the current corruption in the country’s security and judicial apparatuses, is not only worthy of attention and congratulations, but has brought about an invasion of repeated attacks by various people and groups in the name of ‘defending the system.’ These behaviors serve as evidence of the ridiculousness of trying to combat reality.”

1715 GMT: The Anti-Ahmadinejad Compromise. After an unexpectedly lively Saturday afternoon, tomorrow's analysis (which in fact is what we've been projecting for weeks) is shaping up: there is a convergence of disparate forces agreeing on the need to curb the President's authority. In part, that comes from a closer consideration of Hashemi Rafsanjani's statement (which, apart from its declaration of loyalty to the Supreme Leader, is actually pretty close to the recent statements of Mehdi Karroubi). In part, it comes from news such as this....

The "conservative" newspaper Jomhori Eslami has declared, "The abuse of  prisoners is undeniable," citing the Supreme Leader's closure of Kahrizak detention center. Furthermore, "bringing up issues such as velvet revolution" are "fanciful fairy
tales" that must not be repeated, since "these claims have no effect other than providing a service to Iran's enemies by implying that the USA is very strong and has a very strong influence upon Iranian internal affairs".

The newspaper suggests that both "reformist" and "conservative" blocs "must accept mistakes they have made before and after the election, as accepting these realities is a step towards solving the existing problems".

1650 GMT: Just In Case You Were Wondering What the Revolutionary Guard Would Say (Because You Had Been Asleep for Weeks). Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari, talking to Basij forces, "revealed" that foreign elements were behind the post-election unrest.

1645 GMT: And yet another reason. Parleman News has posted a summary of Rafsanjani's statement: the support for the Supreme Leader is in conjunction with a call for all to uphold the Constitution and follow guidelines in areas such as detentions. Violators should be punished.

1630 GMT: Another reason why Hashemi Rafsanjani's statement at the Expediency Council today should not be seen as a surrender (1530 and 1600 GMT): President Ahmadinejad was not at the meeting.

1620 GMT: The Regime Piles on Pressure? Our concern at a possible step-up in detentions of "reformists" (1245 and 1310 GMT) appears to be borne out. Mohammad Maleki, the 76-year-old former Dean of Tehran University, has been arrested.

1610 GMT: Oh, Please. Not even Press TV is buying this Government line, which comes out after reports noting that the nominee for Minister of Defense, Ahmad Vahidi, is wanted by Interpol for alleged involvement in a 1994 bombing of a Jewish centre in Buenos Aires (see separate story). Note the scare quotes in this opening paragraph:

Iran says the international reaction to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's nominee for defense minister is a “Zionist plot” to undermine the new Iranian administration.

“[Ahmad] Vahidi was a deputy defense minister and this is a very senior political position,” Ahmadinejad's press adviser, Ali-Akbar Javanfekr, told AFP [Agence France Presse]. "Therefore it seems that this is a new trick being planned and is basically a Zionist plot."

1600 GMT: In case you're wondering after our previous entry, Rafsanjani's website offers no mention, let alone commentary, on the former President's statement at the Expediency Council.

1530 GMT: Hashemi's Surrender to Khamenei? Not quite.

The National Iranian American Council is making a big deal of Rafsanjani's opening statement at the Expediency Council today, claiming, "it now appears that he is closing ranks with supreme leader Ali Khamenei". It based the analysis on an Agence France Presse reports, quoting from Iranian news agencies, "Powerful cleric Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani urged Iran’s warring political groups on Saturday to follow the orders of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for ending the present political turmoil."

Hmm....The actual statement from Rafsanjani, according to the story, was “the current situation needs everyone to observe the leader’s decrees and advice". That's both very general and far from out-of-line with his stance since 12 June. The former Rafsanjani has never come out in direct opposition to Khamenei; any fight he has is with President Ahmadinejad.

Especially given the setting, a gathering of one of Iran's most powerful bodies, Rafsanjani's statement is simply that he is not taking apart the system of ultimate clerical authority. It remains to be seen where he takes his next step against the political leaders in that system. One could just as easily say, "Rafsanjani is hoping supreme leader Ali Khamenei closes ranks with him."

1325 GMT: Another Symbol for the Movement? We are getting a lot of correspondence from readers today about the testimony of a 15-year-old boy, summarised in The Times of London today, who claims he was raped in detention "in a large provincial city".

As journalism, there has to be some caution about the story as it is offered anonymously --- The Times uses a pseudonym for the teenager --- and cannot be verified. As politics (and, more importantly, as a story of humanity and inhumanity), it has to be recognised. In the words of The Times, "Reza is living proof of the charges levelled by Mehdi Karoubi."

1310 GMT: Very Disturbing Signals. Reports are coming in via Twitter of political activists, including Mehdi Karroubi's son, being arrested and summoned to the Government workers' court. We are seeking confirmation.1300 GMT: Be Our Friend. If I were a cynic (which I am not), I would say the Ahmadinejad Government had motives beyond economic co-operation in this development:

Iran plans to offer the majority of stake in a liquefied natural gas (LNG) production project to European companies, says a top Iranian energy official.

Three European companies have voiced interest in buying 80 percent of Iran LNG project, Mehr news agency quoted Ali Kheirandish, the head of Iran LNG Company, as saying on Saturday.

I presume none of these companies are from "foreign countries" accused by other Iranian officials of fomenting velvet revolution.

1250 GMT: Alireza Beheshti, Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor, has extended Mousavi's recent comments about Election Day and its immediate aftermath. He claims that Mousavi’s campaign had meetings with the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, and the judiciary to resolve the issues from the Presidential vote, but there were no will to do so. According to Beheshti, the campaign had reports that Mousavi was ahead in the vote but had signals that there might be manipulation of the ballots as early as 2 p.m. on Election Day.

Beheshti also told Etemaad that he and his family are ready to be arrested.

1245 GMT: A reliable Twitter source says Ebrahim Mehtari of the Mojahedin-Enghelab political party and Campaign 88 has been arrested.

1010 GMT: Take Your Book and Go Home. Authorities have responded to Ayatollah Sane'i's scathing video criticism of the regime by barring his religious monograph from the 17th Koran Exhibition in Tehran.

1000 GMT: Judicial Manoeuvres. The head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, is still looking for a replacement for Tehran's Chief Prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi.

0900 GMT: Battle of the Clerics. Parleman News follows up the story of the contrasting Friday prayer sermons in Tehran and Qom (see yesterday's updates and 0530 GMT), comparing the hard-line address of Ayatollah Jannati and the criticism of the regime by Ayatollah Amini.

0530 GMT: The holy month of Ramadan, in which Muslims abstain from eating, drinking, and smoking from dawn until dusk, has begun. The Supreme Leader's Office announced the start, based on expert sightings of the new month's moon. So have a quartet of Ayatollahs who have challenged the Government: Montazeri, Sanei, Bayat-Zanjani and Sistani.

Unsurprisingly, the day has begun quietly. Interestingly, the ripples of political challenge are on Press TV's website. It reports that "principlist" MP Ali Motahari, whose public criticism of the Ahmadinjead Administration emerged last month, has called the President's proposed Cabinet "feeble and not proportional to the country's capacities". His far-from-subtle attack claimed Ahmadinejad had picked Ministers for loyalty, not expertise: "Dependent cabinet members would deprive the government of reflective and clear-sighted staff....The President wants to control and rule sensitive ministries like the Intelligence, Interior, Oil, (Islamic) Guidance, and Foreign Affairs, therefore he has chosen dependent nominees to the posts."

The other story that continues to resonate on the website is the post from last night, "In Iran, arrest of opposition leaders is hot topic". The analysis is far from a condemnation of the regime: it features Ayatollah Jannati's call in Friday prayers for the detention of "ringleaders" of post-election demonstrations". At the same time, it frames those protests as legitimate, effectively questioning if not undermining Jannati's demand:

The re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president on June 12 sparked an outpouring of anger and contempt among Iranians and massive demonstrations were staged by supporters of defeated presidential candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi who claim the vote was "fraudulent".

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The Latest from Iran (20 August): Grinding to a Halt

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2035 GMT: We had heard rumours all day about this story but, given its explosive nature, had held off posting without confirmation. It has now appeared on a "reformist site", Norooz, and has been recommended by the Facebook page of Zahra Rahnavard, Mir Hossein Mousavi's wife.

A member of staff of a Tehran cemetery told Norooz that on both 12 July and 15 July, the bodies of tens of protestors were brought in without any identification, secretly and under strict security. Staff were forced to issue compulsory burial licences, and the bodies were interred in Section 302 of the cemetery.

2030 GMT: We had reported earlier on protests last night in Tehran (1015 GMT), but it is only after seeing some video that a reader recommended that we realised quite how powerful those demonstrations, both against President Ahmadinejad and in honour of slain protestors such as Sohrab Arabi and Neda Agha Soltan, were. We have posted the video in a separate entry.

2010 GMT: Follow-up on Kayhan. It looks like the "hard-line" newspaper will escape suspension. Tabnak reports that the Tehran Prosecutor's office has denied accounts that the Media Court ordered Kayhan's temporary closure after its editor twice failed to answer court summons. (An English-language summary is on Tehran Bureau.)

1945 GMT: More extracts from the significant event of the day, Friday prayers in Qom (1445 GMT), where Ayatollah Amini criticised the Government:

You are not one another’s enemy. You are all in favor of the establishment, Islam and the rule of the Just Jurisprudent. Why don’t you, instead of talking to the enemy, talk to one another and find a solution to this disunity?

I am not talking about one party or the other… You, as the elite, must sit down and talk. If injustice has really been done to people, deal with it. If an innocent has been incarcerated, release him. And if someone has been shamed [publicly], apologize to him, and properly deal with those who are really guilty.

How must I advise you to set aside disunity for it to register? We are not enemies and our solidarity is possible. Resolve this issue through dialogue and stop giving the enemy something to talk about.

If you want to mend the situation as caring individuals, end the conflict and prevent it from expanding.

1445 GMT: News is emerging that the significant Friday prayers address was not in Tehran but from Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini in Qom. Amini demanded the release of all innocent prisoners and comforted those who had been unfairly victimised by recent events. Reportedly, the sermon has caused supporters of the pro-Government Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi to back away from plans to protest against Ayatollah Yusuf Sane'i and his now-famous video condemnation of the regime.

Amini's address follows his meeting this week, with other clerics, with the Supreme Leader, reportedly to raise criticisms about the role of Khamenei's son Mojtaba in political affairs.

1130 GMT: Officially, Not a Peach. President Ahmadinejad's office has removed his reference to former Minister of Health Kamran Lankarani as "a peach one wants to eat" (see 1000 GMT) from the official transcript of his televised broadcast.

1030 GMT: Iran Republic News Agency does not mention Jannati's challenge to arrest opposition leaders although it says he pointed out "the consequences of slander".

1025 GMT: Jannati Answers. In our first update (0645 GMT), we advised, "Watch...for how far Jannati pushes for punishment of the "ringleaders" of the protest."

Here's the response from Friday prayers in Tehran: "Riots are our main issue today ... Some people were arrested and some were not. Why weren't the leaders behind the riots arrested? ... Their arrest should be the first thing that the judiciary must do."

1015 GMT: A bit more on the broadcast: a reader points us to this from the Green movement's Mowj-e-Sabz, "There were rooftop protests all over the country and especially the Apadana area in Tehran [the neighbourhood of Sohrab Arabi, who was killed on 15 June but whose death was not confirmed for a month]. People gathered ...in streets in protest and were chanting 'Death to Dictator'. This was in solidarity with Sohrab’s family, as it was also the 40th day anniversary of his martyrdom."

1005 GMT: Ahmadinejad - Compromise or Showdown? There is one clue in last night's Presidential broadcast for this question, highlighted in an EA Soundcheck yesterday. Ahmadinejad said that, if the Ministry of Intelligence had done its job properly, there would have been no post-election conflict.

That's a clear slap at former Minister of Intelligence Ejeie and Iran's judiciary, which has just appointed him as Prosecutor General. But it also is a shot in the ongoing battle over who controls the Ministry, amidst the firing of up to 25 key officials. Look for a response from "conservative" and "principlist" opponents of Ahmadinejad.

1000 GMT: It is a relatively slow news day in Iran. We're awaiting the summary of Ayatollah Jannati's Friday prayer address in Tehran, and there has been surprisingly little reaction to President Ahmadinejad's national broadcast promoting his Cabinet choices.

We'll take advantage of the pause to feature the "hot" story on the Internet about the broadcast, noting the President's remarks about his outgoing Minister of Health, Kamran Lankarani: "In his TV appearance last night, Ahmadinejad praised him as one of the most able administrators of his previous cabinet and said: 'I have a special personal interest in him, a pious and faithful young man. Once I said he is like a peach, one wants to eat him!"

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQUwNDG1Tdc[/youtube]

I leave further interpretation and analysis up to EA readers.

0725 GMT: Picking up on another (largely unreported) story from yesterday. A Parliamentary Commission member has warned that Mir Hossein Mousavi's proposed "Green Path of Hope" political front will not receive a license for public activity.

0700 GMT: Last night's EA Soundcheck podcast includes a lengthy discussion of the pressure on President Ahmadinejad, both from inside the "establishment" and from public protest. General verdict? The President is in a long-term battle. I don't think he'll win, but before that comes the urgent question, will he offer any compromise or press even harder (possibly in co-operation with the Revolutionary Guard) for a showdown?

One clue to an answer: see if next Tuesday's fourth round of trials of political detainees goes ahead and how much publicity it gets in state media.

0645 GMT: With Ramadan starting tomorrow, this could be the last full day for political manoeuvres for the next few weeks. At the same time, nothing can defer the manoeuvres over President Ahmadinejad's submission of his Cabinet choices to the Iran Parliament.

And the challenge may have another dimension. An EA correspondent has reviewed the speech that Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani gave to the Iranian Society of Engineers, mentioned in yesterday's updates. He notes that Larijani offered a response to Mehdi Karroubi's initiative on the abuse of detainees.

On Wednesday, Karroubi sent an official letter to Larijani asking him to arrange a meeting including Ahmadinejad, the head of Iran's judiciary, Mohammad Larijani, the head of the Assembly of Experts and Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the Prosecutor General, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, where Karroubi would produce his graphic evidence of the abuses.

Larijani said yesterday that he is willing to participate in such a meeting, "We do not want to preserve any secrecy in this regard and hide any evidence from the public." So will the Speaker not only willingness but press for the gathering, knowing this could be the issue that bends if not breaks the Ahmadinejad Government?

On the public front, Ayatollah Jannati will lead Friday prayers in Tehran today. Expect a hard-line address continuing the recent theme, after last week's replacement of Hashemi Rafsanjani by Ahmad Khatami, supporting the Supreme Leader and Government and deriding the foreign-inspired protest movement. Watch, however, for how far Jannati pushes for punishment of the "ringleaders" of the protest.

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2010 GMT: Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani, a critic of the Government throughout the post-election crisis, has called on the judiciary to take the lead in stopping the calamity that has befallen Iran.

1850 GMT: Responding to a reader's question, "Did Etemade Melli newspaper publish today?" No, and according to our sources, it is unlikely to appear for some time.

1610 GMT: Tehran's chief prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi has announced that the fourth Tehran trial has been postponed from tomorrow until next Tuesday to allow defendants' lawyers more time for preparation.

1415 GMT: Forward with the Green Path of Hope. Chief Mousavi advisor Alireza Beheshti has said, "The central council of the Green Path of Hope will be a small group of five to six, including Mr. Khatami and Mr. Karroubi." Beheshti He added that the party would have a "counselling board consisting of 30 to 40 members" and "monitoring committees".

1340 GMT: Reuters has now published a summary of the Mousavi letter of support for Karroubi (see 1020 GMT): "[The authorities] asked those who were abused and raped in prisons, to present four witnesses [to prove their claim]....Those who committed the crimes were the establishments' agents."

Earth News offers more extracts:

"Those who have committed these crimes are agents of the regime....Does the rulership have no interest in knowing what these agents are doing to the people?....
Your letter on ugly treatments of prisoners have made the pro-government dailies nervous. This indicates that there might even be more horrible abuses of which we are not yet aware....

Do you [in the regime] also want four witnesses to wash off the sin from your hands?...It is expected from the Islamic clergy to fulfil their spiritual duty and only to be afraid of God and not of liars and rapists.

1300 GMT: Reformist groups have also announced their full support for Mehdi Karroubi.

1020 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi has written a letter of support to Mehdi Karroubi over Karroubi's claim of the abuse of detainees, thanking him and calling on others to share his "courage and commitment".

0945 GMT: The report of the arrest of an employee of the Italian Embassy in Tehran now appears to be an incorrect rumour spread by an Iranian blogger. The Italian Foreign Ministry has denied the story.

0930 GMT: The Iranian Labor News Agency has provided a timeline and summary of yesterday's ceremony installing Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary (our correspondent's comment: "Not sure if it's good for him behaving in this way, but Ahmadinejad is treating Rafsanjani like a has-been"):

President Ahmadinejad entered the hall 68 minutes late for the ceremony, scheduled to start at 10 a.m. Police chief Radan, Deputy Majlis Speaker Abotourabi Fard, former IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] head Rahim Safavi, Guardian Council head Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Mohsen Rezaei, and others were in their seats at 9:30. Jannati did not move towards them or Rafsanjani and "sat alone" for a while.

Head of judiciary Hashemi Shahroudi, Sadegh Larijani, the Supreme Leader's Chief of Staff Mohammad Golpaygani, and Hashemi entered the room together at around 10 a.m. Salavats were shouted in direction of Rafsanjani.

Ali Larijani walked in 20 minutess after the start of the ceremony

Sadegh's passage on need to prosecute those who have committed violence (reported on Enduring America yesterday) was "met with congratulatory remarks" by those present in the hall.

Ahmadinejad talked immediately after Sadegh and spoke of the necessity to bring "the holders of power and wealth" to justice, referring to Sadegh's previous remarks (see 0615 GMT).

Ahmadinejad left the room immediately after the end of his speech and did not wait for Rafsanjani's. Rafsanjani did not dwell at all on Ahmadinejad's remarks in his own comments. However, ILNA reiterates that Rafsanjani treated Ahmadinejad with visible respect upon the latter's entry into the hall.

Ali Larijani referred to his brother as "Agha Sadegh" in his speech and stated: "We are all offspring of the seminary and the marjayyat [clerics] who have strayed into the path of government service." His remark were met with laughter.

After the end of the ceremony, lobbying took place between various parties to try to patch up the acrimony between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad.

0850 GMT: Italian media report that an employee of the Italian Embassy in Tehran has been arrested. Iranian reports call the detainee a blogger who has supplied information to foreign media.

The employee's nationality is not known.

0825 GMT: There are indications that the legal file against the Minister of Industry, Ali Akbar Mehrabian, may be "nullified". Mehrabian was convicted last month of taking credit for the invention of "an earthquake safe room" by another scientist.

On Sunday, President Ahmadinejad proposed that Mehrabian retain his post in the new Cabinet.

0820 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz reports, from an "informed source", that Dr.Zabih, the head of the organisation of clerics supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi, and his son have been arrested.

0810 GMT: We've just posted an exchange between two of my colleagues which I think is one of the most important analyses of the post-election situation in Iran: "Is Hashemi Rafsanjani a Spent Force?"

0720 GMT:The head of the special Parliamentary committee on national security, Parviz Sorouri, has asked Mehdi Karroubi to present his evidence of sexual abuse of prisoners to the committee and Parliament. The request is a reversal, as the committee had initially declared that there was no basis for the allegations.

Saham News also reports that the committee will investigate conditions in Evin Prison today and will visit other detention centres, speaking with detainees. Those centres include "unofficial" sites such as Shapour, Eshratabad, and Pasargad.

0658 GMT: Ayatollah Sane'i's scathing attack on the regime, which was made in a speech on 12 August but emerged yesterday in a five-part video (posted on Enduring America in a separate entry), has stung the Government. Both Iran News and Raja News have called the Ayatollah a "shameless" "sinner" and "adulterer" and asked that he be given 80 lashes.

0655 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi's website, Ghalam News, is still down several days after apparently being hacked.

0640 GMT: Hossein Ali Arab, a professor in the School of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Tehran, and Ali Asghar Khodayari, a professor in mineral sciences and former Deputy Chancellor, have been released after two months in detention in Evin Prison.

0630 GMT: So is the new head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, going to be on the front line of the power struggle? Both Jomhoori Eslami and Tabnak are reporting that Larijani is going to remove Tehran's chief prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi.

Mortazavi is considered a member of President Ahmadinejad's camp, who lobbied strongly against Larijani's appointment by the Supreme Leader. That conflict in turn is part of the wider, important struggle for control of the judiciary, which we analysed on Sunday.

0615 GMT: 36 hours to go before the deadline for President Ahmadinejad's submission of his Cabinet choices to Parliament, and there is a good deal of chatter about the possible moves and conflicts.

The President, however, did take time out yesterday for the inauguration of Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary. While the initial images and chatter were about Ahmadinejad's greeting of rival Hashemi Rafsanjani, a later headline offers a different perspective: "If the power-holders and the wealthy are taken to court, then there would be no place left for those who hold lower ranks to commit any wrongdoings."

Since presumably the President isn't suggesting that he should be the "power-holder" arrested, to whom is he referring? Surely it couldn't be "the [very] wealthy" Rafsanjani, despite Ahmadinejad's election charges of corruption against his predecessor?