Iran Analysis: The Regime's Sword Wavers

Enduring America, 14 December: "What can the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard do with a Sword which, for all the detentions and all the propaganda, dangles not as a sign of its threat but of (for now) its impotence?"

Even by the standards of this post-election conflict, the last 48 hours have been extraordinary for their rhetoric. At one point, there were no less than five regime officials (head of judiciary Sadegh Larijani, Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi, Supreme Leader representative Mojtaba Zolnour, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Tehran Governor Morteza Tamedon) throwing around threats of arrests. Yet the opposition was even more spirited and even more high-profile: both Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mehdi Karroubi met the threats with defiance and more than a little humour (both were quite concerned about Yazdi's health, physical and mental), MPs offered public support, Mir Hossein Mousavi's Alireza Beheshti challenged the regime's continuous "lies about imperialism", and Mousavi's wife, Zahra Rahnavard, held up the Green Movement as the representative of the ideals of Imam Khomeini.

The Latest from Iran (17 December): An Uncertain Regime

And the outcome today, on the eve of the holy month of Moharram? A regime, nervous and possibly a bit frightened, which can neither swing its Sword of Damocles nor keep it steady.



Yesterday afternoon EA correspondent Mr Azadi began putting the pieces together. On Tuesday, Yazdi had put out his scathing ridicule of the "joke" of Karroubi and threatened Hashemi Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi, with arrest if he stepped foot in Iran, Tamedon had talked both of security forces on alert for troublemakers on Friday and of Rafsanjani, and Zolnour apparently said all the opposition leaders should be rounded up. Then yesterday, it emerged that both Larijani and Moslehi were telling important groups of officials and clerics that the evidence was in place to hold trials; the Minister of Intelligence was now spinning a conspiracy tale in which representatives of Hashemi Rafsanjani had planned the post-election conflict in Britain with foreign agents.

The speeches were not necessarily co-ordinated. Indeed, because they probably weren't, they were far short of successful. Larijani's statement, which should have been the most significant given his official position, was a bit lost in crowded airspace, while Moslehi's speech --- at least to my outside eyes --- comes across as extreme. Is the regime really saying that Mehdi Hashemi and Rafsanjani's daughter, Faezeh Hashemi (who is in Iran), go on trial as part of the inner circle of the "velvet revolution"?

Instead of cowing the opposition into submission, the volley of regime shots were met by a furious counter-attack. Karroubi was careful, in a well-crafted response, to focus on Yazdi rather than swinging at officials such as Larijani and Moslehi, but Rafsanjani, durig the course of the day, took on not only Yazdi ("Get Help", "Get Cured") but the regime in general. Perhaps the former President was planning, after months of relative silence and uncertain manoeuvres, to surface but it appears that the attacks on him and his family helped make up his mind.

The irony is that, if the regime had kept its mouth shut or at least been more measured in its attacks, it could have left the opposition, rather than itself, in wobbling confusion. The Green movement seemed to be undecided, or even split, over tactics for the first day of Moharram. Should it join the Government-authorised marches, behind the message of "The Ideals of Khomeini are Our Ideals", or should it stand aside and let the regime have the field of demonstrations to itself for the first time in six months?

Supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi put out a letter, with a picture of Mousavi, favouring a public appearance but other activists balked: 1) some feared this would lead to violent clashes; 2) some did not want to associated with any march in honour of Khomeini, even if it had the symbols of resistance of Imam Hossein, whose death is marked by Moharram; 3) some argued that staying away would embarrass the regime when the outcome of a relatively small demonstration showed the lack of support for the Government. This morning, the argument is still unresolved.

Yet this debate in the opposition camp is secondary to the image of the regime's fist-shaking being met by a smack from Karroubi, who had been muted in recent weeks, Rafsanjani, and others. So why did it make such an inept move?

The more I look at events, the more I think that in part the answer is a fear of Rafsanjani. It was notable, for example, that Moslehi's attack did not name any other leader apart from the former President: Mousavi, Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami were all absent from the speech. And it may be equally notable that Tehran Government Tamedon specifically referred to Rafsanjani's 6 December speech in Mashhad as an unacceptable challenge to the regime.

At the time of the speech, we published not only an extract from the speech but an analysis pointing to discussions between senior clerics and Rafsanjani as part of a renewed effort for a "National Unity Plan" or similar political compromise between the regime and the Green opposition. This prospect was challenged by others as an illusory hope but we still maintained this: what mattered was whether the regime thought the initiative was serious, causing it discomfort and prompting a response.

The last 48 hours mark that response: the Government is worried about Rafsanjani, possibly even more than the protests on the streets or the Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami alliance. My hunch --- and it is only a hunch --- is that regime officials think Rafsanjani might have planned a high-profile appearance, if not tomorrow than at some point leading up to or on  the special day of Ashura (27 December), to mark his defiance of the Ahmadinejad Government. For the first time since his Friday Prayer of mid-July, the trumpet (or alarm, in the ears of the regime) would be sounded: Hashemi's Back, Hashemi's Here.

If true, that's a pretty significant development in the ongoing battle. But I think the threats also come from a second fear, and this one may be more important.

The regime is worried about its own supporters. Uncertainty and fright comes from the prospect that the large numbers won't show up tomorrow. The Friday Prayer congregation at Tehran University will be full, but how many will then go on the streets? And, if they are on the streets, how loud will they be for Khamenei and Ahmadinejad rather than Imam Hossein?

For six months, from the day-after-election "they are all dust" victory speech of Ahmadinejad to the 19 June Friday Prayer speech of the Supreme Leader to this Sunday's reprise of Ayatollah Khamenei --- not to mention the actions beyond the speeches from detentions to security presence to the steady propaganda brumbeat --- the regime has relied on attack.

But a swinging sword does not necessarily find its target. And it does not necessarily bring legitimacy (irrespective of the words of Machiavelli). So tomorrow's test is not of how many come for the opposition but, arguably for the first time since 12 June, how many come out for the Supreme Leader, for the President, and for current regime and its actions.

Iran: A Beginner's Guide to Moharram

EA correspodent Mr Azadi offers an introduction to EA readers (and to me, as I confused Moharram and Ashura in a post I wrote last week) of the religious month of Moharram, which is likely to be marked by opposition protests:

Moharram and the message of Karbala

One of the significant events for Shia Islam is the first month of the Islamic calendar, Moharram, with its meanings and rituals. It was on the 10th day of Moharram, known as Ashura, that Hussain, the third Imam of Shiites, was killed at Karbala, now located in Iraq.

The Latest from Iran (15 December): The Path to Moharram

Historical Background

The killing of Hussain at Karbala, which took place in Moharram in the year 61 in the Islamic calendar (680 AD), is one of the seminal events in the development of Shi'a Islam.

Hussain had refused an alliance with Yazid, the caliph, and declared that Yazid’s administration and government were not legitimate because they were not following the Prophet Mohammad’s manner and path. As Hussain was the only living grandson of the Prophet, his refusal to pledge allegiance could jeopardize Yazid’s position. The caliph put an ultimatum to Hussain: acceptance of his supremacy or death.

Hussain had announced that he had no intention of starting a war, but Yazid left him with no choice, Hussain, his family, and his companions met more than 5000 troops of Yazid’s army in Karbala. Hussain’s 72 companions and his family were all slain.

Hussainian Ideology

Hussain's attitude and his martyrdom have provided an ideological framework for liberating movements which identify with the event of Karbala as a stand against injustice. This ideological framework includes refusal to accept an illegitimate government, disclosing injustice, and protesting against it. It does not matter how few are in a protesting movement, for it must rise against tyranny and injustice, even if there is no immediate result.

Shiites believe that as long as there is injustice in the world, Hussain’s path is alive and must be followed: “Every day is Ashura, and every land is Karbala.” clearly declares this Hussainian ideology.

Reviving Hussain

During its history, Shiism has tried to revive the ideology and the message of Karbala in various ways, most importantly through the mourning ritual. Remembrance of Hussain, his words and message, his view and ideology, his death, and the events surrounding that death are the main parts of these rituals, which both speculative and emotional aspects.

During Moharram, people gathering in mosques or other places to listen to clergy and lecturers explain the message of Karbala and Hussain’s actions and death. In these holy ceremonies, Shiites also use symbols for the main aspects of Karbala. Flags are in three colors: red (for blood and dying for beliefs), green (for the Prophet’s family), and black (for sadness and mourning).

Moharram and Iran’s Islamic Revolution

Iran's Islamic Revolution of 1979 was based on Hussainian ideology. Imam Khomeini declared that Moharram had kept the movement alive, identifying it with the rise against the tyranny and injustice of the Shah, the 20th-century Yazid. Clergy and speakers turned Muharram from a month of mourning into a political platform for reform of the Iranian system. Iranian worshipers, adorned in black and singing of sadness, demonstrated against the Shah throughout the month, especially on the 9th and 10th days, Tasua and Ashura.

The meanings of Muharram and Ashura were reinforced during the "imposed war" (1980-88) with Iraq. In Hussainian ideology, sacrificing a life for your beliefs was more valuable than living under tyranny. Iranians identified their martyrs with the martyrs of Karbala in their ceremonies and their literature.

Muharram and Green Movement

Basing on Hussain’s goal, “reforming the Islamic society and re-establishing it with justice and Islamic values”, Iran's Green Movement draws upon Hussainian ideology to achieve its aims. Thus Muharram provides the movement with the great opportunity to rejuvenate itself through the symbol and ideas of Karbala.

The first message? Do not stay quiet, no matter how many (or few) you are or how strong your opponents may be. The second lesson? There may not be an immediate result, but the true victory is the raising of voices against injustice, a stand that will forever remain within history.

The Latest from Iran (11 December): Ripples and then Ruptures?

2200 GMT: Burning Khomeini's Picture? All day long, we have been following Iran state media's exploitation of a video allegedly showing the burning of Ayatollah Khomeini's  picture during the 16 Azar protests. (At one point, the top four stories on Fars News' website were devoted to the supposed incident.) Readers may recall that we had posted the video in question on Monday but pulled it after two hours because we thought it may have been staged, possibly as a disinformation ploy to discredit the opposition.

Tonight Mir Hossein Mousavi has issued this statement:

Those who respect me would never allow the slightest insult to Imam Khomeini and they always respect him. I am sure that the students would never do such a defiant act....I don’t have the information if this event happened or not, additionally there is no clear information about those who committed this act, but if such an event really happened, it is a suspicious act and showing such an anti-revolutionary footage from the national TV was wrong.

It would be expected from those foreign media who are hostile toward the Islamic Republic to take advantage of such event and broadcast the footage but showing this footage on the national TV that owes its very existence to the revolution that was won with the leadership of Imam Khomeini, is not acceptable at all.

2040 GMT: Some Friday-Night Posturing. Continuing the thump-thump-thump of American rhetorical pressure on Iran over the nuclear negotiations (see separate entry), as well as trying to keep Tehran out of America's backyard, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid it on thick in a press conference:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAPbelwaMhQ[/youtube]

Really? You've spent all week telling the world that Afghan-Pak-istan is harbouring the Al Qa'eda menace, and it's Iran that is #1 Terrorist supporter? I understand it's power politics, but try to keep it believable.

Tehran, meanwhile, is doing its own posing, this time in the Middle East:

Iran and Syria have signed an agreement to improve defense cooperation as the two sides are faced with “common enemy and challenges.”

The agreement was signed between Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and his Syrian counterpart Lt. General Ali Mohammad Habib Mahmoud in Damascus on Friday.

2025 GMT: Parliament, the Guards, and "Questionable" Financial Arrangements. This in from an EA source in Iran:

On Tuesday, Mr. Omidvar Rezaei, a member of the supervisory committee of the Parliament (and brother of Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei), called the establishment of a new Bank of Iran-Venezuela (following Hugh Chavez's trip to Iran earlier this year) very questionable. Mr. Rezaii said that the political maneuvring of some security organizations in order to participate in the management of this bank is against the economic interests of the country and added that the enemies will interpret these tendencies under the "holy uniform of the 12th Imam soldiers" as abuses, and it will add fire to the rumors that some organizations are transferring all oil money out of the country.

During this meeting, MP Elias Naderan said that a company called Mehr Iran belonging to the Revolutionary Guards has been established in Venezuela with a billion dollar investment in visual networks and this is inappropriate because of current situation in the country.

1845 GMT: A Friday Treat. It seems that Kermit the Frog has updated his "It's Not Easy Being Green" to take account of the last six months in Iran. We've got the video.

1835 GMT: Here's Your Medal, As For Your Rights.... The Norwegian and Swedish Foreign Ministers said yesterday that Iranian authorities have returned the Nobel Peace Prize medal and diploma of lawyer and activist Shirin Ebadi; however, they added:

Her situation continues to be serious. Ms Ebadi is prevented from working as a defender of human rights in her home country and the Iranian authorities have closed the Defenders of Human Rights Centre of which she was co-founder. The confiscation of the medal and the numerous threats directed at her, her family and her colleagues give cause for great concern and are yet another example of the worsened human rights situation in Iran since the election in June this year.

Norway and Sweden urge the Iranian authorities to allow Ms Ebadi’s safe return to Iran and to allow the Defenders of Human Rights Centre to reopen so that she can resume her important work for human rights in the country.

NEW Iran Special: Kermit the Frog Re-Mixes “It’s Not Easy Being Green”
Iran: A Renewed Washington Love Affair With The Green Movement?
Iran’s Arrest of Majid Tavakoli: “Khamenei in Hejab/We Are All Majids”
Iran: The Arrest of Majid Tavakoli “His 16 Azar Speech on Video”
Iran: “The Military Will Stand with the Iranian People”? (with Audio)
Breaking News: Khamenei Wins 2009 “Dictator of Year”
Iran Analysis: Are Rafsanjani and National Unity Plan “Spent Forces”?
The Latest from Iran (10 December): Reading the Chessboard

1625 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary. Hojatoleslam Kazem Seddiqi taking care of business today and, according to Press TV, he was not too fussed about 16 Azar. For Seddiqi, it's all about the nukes:

The Iranian nation will never give up its nuclear right at any price. [The West] cannot prevent us from using nuclear energy for peaceful aims by lies and propaganda....The enemy will concede another defeat in this propaganda war.

1605 GMT: Hmm, those Anti-16 Azar Rallies.... Not quite sure how significant they are. Fars News so far only has an item on a march in Rasht. The Islamic Republic News Agency has a lengthier piece on a gathering after Friday Prayers complaining about the alleged burning of Imam Khomeini's picture by opposition protesters. For unknown reasons, IRNA has blurred the photograph of those who were supposedly involved in today's rally.

1455 GMT: The Anti-16 Azar Rallies? Iranian state television is reporting that "thousands" of pro-Government students have demonstrated in Tehran and other cities after Friday prayers. They reportedly chanted, "Down with the U.S." and "Down with Israel" and read out statements saying the opposition could not "achieve their miserable aims by insulting" the Supreme Leader.

1430 GMT: An inspection team from the International Atomic Energy Agency arrived in Iran on Thursday for its third visit to the "second enrichment plant" at Fordoo near Qom.

1100 GMT: Interpreting the Attack on Rafsanjani. EA correspondent Mr Azadi thinks that Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi's criticism of Hashemi Rafsanjani on Thursday marks the renewal of President Ahmadinejad's battle with Rafsanjani, even though the Supreme Leader has warned against such a conflict:

It appears that the pro-Ahmadinejad newspapers, sites, and clerics are attacking Rafsanjani not only to limit his political influence but to provoke him to oppose the Supreme Leader. But Ayatollah Khamenei has emphasised his respect for Rafsanjani. The defense of Rafsanjani by the Friday Prayer Leader in Mashaad, Ayatollah Alamalhuda, was due in part to the Supreme Leader's approach.

Now with Moslehi’s speech, it seems that the crisis between Ahmadinejad and Hashemi is in a new stage. Indeed, in giving the speech, he appears to have opposed the Supreme Leader.

Moslehi criticised Hashemi Rafsanjani for two reasons: 1) Rafsanjani's views on the election result and post-election events, including his support of leaders of the Green movement and demand for the release of political prisoners; 2) Rafsanjani's recent speech in Mashhad, which Moslehi portrayed as asserting that the Supreme Leader's ultimate authority (Velayat-e-Faqih) exists only as long as it is supported by the people.

Jomhoori Islami newspaper, backing Rafsanjani, immediately responded by publishing his book in which he analysed velayat-e-faqih.

1000 GMT: We've converted a lengthy update on developments in the US media, President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize speech, and American statements on sanctions into a separate entry, "A Renewed Washington Love Affair With The Green Movement?"

0915 GMT: So much for a quiet Friday. Although it is the Iranian weekend, a series of developing and breaking stories has churned political waters. There is excitement, concern, and uncertainty as people try to assess whether those ripples will spread and strengthen. And all of this is occurring as we move into the week before the sacred month of Moharram.

The Government contributed to the tension yesterday, turning Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi loose in a frontal assault on former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Moslehi told student clerics in Qom (and, yes, the choice of venue and audience is significant, given that the religious community is split over the post-12 June actions of the Government), “[Mr Rafsanjani] believes if people do not accept the velayat-e-faghih [the rule of the Supreme Leader], he has to step down." Moslehi also sustained the ongoing warning that Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi faces prosecution for stirring of post-election conflict.

From the opposition, the arrest of student leader Majid Tavakoli on 16 Azar is spurring new forms of protest. The regime's attempt to humiliate Tavakoli by displaying him "in disguise as a woman" seems to have backfired, as supporters rally behind Tavakoli by dressing in hejab and posting satirical photographs of the Supreme Leader. The video of the activist's last speech is also racing around the Internet.

The biggest ripple this morning, however, may have come out of the Iranian military. After months of rumours of unhappiness and even divisions over the Government's actions, a letter and audio which is allegedly from eight Army and Air Force regiments, declares that they will "stand with the Iranian people" if violence against dissenters. continues.