The Latest from Iran (27 February): The Mousavi Interview

2230 GMT: Sneaking Out the News. It appears that the official statement of the Assembly of Experts meeting has been quietly placed on its website. We are reviewing and will have an analysis in the morning.

First impression is that while the statement is effusive about the "leadership and guidance" of the Supreme Leader to get Iran through the post-election crisis, it is not as severe in condemning the "sedition" of the opposition as the alleged statement released by Fars News in mid-week.

2115 GMT: Larijani Watch. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, continuing his Japan tour with a visit to the Peace Memorial Museum in Nagasaki, declared both Tehran's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the perfidy of the West:

Iran will host an international conference on nuclear disarmament within the next two months....After the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US made no change in its policies. Two nuclear bombs of the United States have now increased to tens of thousands.

NEW Iran Analysis: Now It Gets Interesting….
Iran Document: Latest Karroubi Interview “The Shah Didn’t Behave Like This”
Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & “The Prerequisites of Escalation”
Latest Iran Video: The Rigi “Confession” (25 February)
Iran Analysis: Khamenei’s Not-So-Big Push
Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts “The Certainty of the Uncertain”
The Latest from Iran (26 February): Closing the Door?

2100 GMT: And the Jundullah Beat Goes On. More of the same from Iran's Foreign Ministry on Saturday, via spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast:

Ties between this terrorist group and security services of the so-called advocates of human rights including the US, Britain and certain other countries indicate that they are not honest about their claims of having respect for human rights.

The support of certain so-called human rights advocates for terrorist groups and criminals such as Abdolmalek Rigi has turned into a routine issue. We have always witnessed the support of these countries for terrorist groups to continue their moves in the region.

1720 GMT: Waiting for News on "Earthquake Weapons". Apart from the Mousavi interview, a quiet day inside Iran. Press TV's website has noted the Chilean earthquake and tsunami warning; so far, however, it has not blamed the disaster on US "secret weapons" (as Iran and Venezuela did with Haiti).

1505 GMT: Academic Newsflash. Fars News reports that more than 1000 "experts" have asked for an independent inquiry of the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The article is based on a press conference held by Architects and Engineers for 9-11 Truth on 19 February.

1455 GMT: Almost all major news outlets now have summaries of the Mousavi interview. A prominent Iranian activist, via Iran News Now, offers anotherabridged version in English that parallels our translation (see 0955 GMT).

1235 GMT: Discovering Mousavi. Agence France Presse and the Los Angeles Times have now noted Mir Hossein Mousavi's interview (see 0955 GMT). Both are picking up on Mousavi's condemnation of the 22 Bahman "engineered" rally by the regime and his call for a "free" march of the Iranian people.

1200 GMT: Big in the Countryside? Peyke Iran claims that the publications, Hemmat and Mowj-Andishe, banned earlier this year are still distributed in Iran's provinces. Both are allegedly linked to President Ahmadinejad's Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

0955 GMT: Mousavi's Interview. Setareh Sabety provides a few important extracts: "Mr. Karroubi and I, in our meeting, decided that we will once again ask for a permit, according to Article 27 of the Constitution, for a march that will put an end to the rumors and accusations."

Referring to 22 Bahman (11 February) as an "engineered" rally, Mousavi says that he does not like "insulting those who do not agree with us" and continues, "We did not suppose that everyone shared our opinions or that those who were not like-minded were bad people. All are our compatriots with the exception of some sabre-wielding thugs and murderers."

Mousavi compares the amount of money and methods used to muster crowds and transport them to Tehran for 22 Bahman --- "these kinds of engineered and mandatory rallies remind us of those used prior to tne 1979 Revolution" --- with the protest of the opposition. "Our movement looks like a traditional bazaar with many kiosks, cafes and store fronts of opinion connected to one another," Mousavi asserts, and he ends with an optimistc question, "When millions of young students are part of this movement, which is unique in our history and perhaps in the history of the world, how can we not have hope for the future?"

0950 GMT: Economy Watch. Seyyed Hossein Hashemi, the head of the Mining Commission, has declared that if Iran continues its present level of imports, "grave problems will arise". He warned in particular of under-investment in the domestic metal and mining industries.

0945 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary (A Day Later). Rah-e-Sabz offers a biting commentary on the Friday Prayers of Tehran's Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati and other clerics: "Praise of the Assembly Experts and [Jundullah leader Abdolmalek] Rigi's arrest, that's all."

0940 GMT: So Much for Unity. Davoud Ahmadinejad, the brother of the President, pronounced in a speech before Friday Prayers in Isfahan that the National Unity Plan "equals the reconciliation of Yazid with Imam Hossein" (Yazid, in fact, killed Hossein)". He declared, "After all these insults, why should we sit at a table for the 'dialogue of civilizations'? We have nano-technology and we have a nano-quarrel."

0930 GMT: Economy Watch. Member of Parliament and Larijani ally Ahmad Tavakoli, writing in the pro-Larijani Khabar Online, declares that the Government's claims on implementation its subsidy reform plan are ridiculous: "In the current year the administration has not taken an actual step for executing subsidy reform bill. The Government should have requested the permission of the Majlis [Parliament] for amending the bill, but it didn't."

Rah-e-Sabz publishes a long anlaysis by Professor Mohsen Massarrat with "Answers to the Riddle of the Subsidies", especially in the energy sector.

0905 GMT: No doubt what the big story will be this morning. Kalemeh has just posted its interview with Mir Hossein Mousavi (see separate, earlier analysis). The tone is defiant, but the deeper issue will be the substance of Mousavi's call. Defending the opposition over 22 Bahman and calling for a "spread of awareness" is fair enough, but it is the substance of Mousavi's 5 points --- issued in his statement of 1 January --- that gave a boost to political demands. We'll be reading closely to see if and how Mousavi expands that platform.

Elsewhere, Robert Mackey of The New York Times has a thoughtful, in-depth consideration of the regime's propaganda over the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi. He raises the interesting point that the spin on Rigi's "confession" of his contacts with US officials is meant to discredit President Obama's "engagement" launched in his March 2009 Nowruz address to the Iranian people.

Comments

[Samuel]

From Tehran Bureau:

"The Commander of the Mohammad Rasoul Allah Guards said that the Basij districts in Tehran will be increased from 6 to 22.

Noting the 8.5 million population of Tehran, Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani said, "In order to have Basij encompass the city of Tehran and in order to see its development we needed to increase the number of Basij districts from 6 to 22."

"With this plan we can also help people to come and go in their own districts. The other aim of this project is to enable district commanders to visit [Basij] headquarters and interact with the commanders of these headquarters," he told ILNA."

This should be read in conjuction with the following:

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hgJwTH2l_QS2mD9pzuKHWngtoQigD9DP6KF00

Iran rewards Basij militia with political clout
By BRIAN MURPHY (AP) – Feb 10, 2010

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — During an Iranian government meeting late last month, a top adviser to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brought a proposal to expand the political voice of a group more known for its street muscle: the civilian militia corps called the Basij.

"If they acquire more power as a body, they will be able to recruit more forces who will see this as an instant route toward social mobility and power," said Beeman."

While this is not the "military dictatorship" of Secretary Clinton's fantasies it does show that the Basij is the spearhead of the new cultural revolution taking place.

[Observer]

Samuel, your use of the term 'cultural revolution' is apt. It is currently a noun in most dictionaries, with generally accepted definition:

'n.
A comprehensive reform movement in China initiated by Mao Zedong in 1965 to eliminate counterrevolutionary elements in the country's institutions and leadership. It was characterized by political zealotry, purges of intellectuals, and social and economic chaos.'

Perhaps you recall Mao the dictator.

[Doug]

Elsewhere, Robert Mackey of The New York Times has a thoughtful, in-depth consideration of the regime’s propaganda over the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi.
Musings over "Broadcast May Be Intended to Undercut Support for Obama in Iran"
By ROBERT MACKEY http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/broadcast-may-be-intended-to-undercut-support-for-obama-in-iran/" rel="nofollow">LINK
Scott,
     This is very confusing. The Baluchi's as a tool against Iran. The Pakistani intelligence services aligned with and against the Baluchis, Taliban, &.. as the mood hits them...
     All of these shifting alliances are hard to keep up with. They were so vague and quickly passing in the media that I've forgotten most of the intrigues, and as a casual observer, it's hard to connect the dots. Do I remember this right?
     When President Pervez Musharraf first staged his coup, the US got Pakistan to switch sides: the civilian government had been supporting the Taliban. Musharraf ostensibly was aligned with the US against them, while at the same time there were rumors that parts of the Pakistani intelligence services still supported them. Pakistan let the Taliban overrun the Swat Valley and then they took it back (almost?).
     So then the modus operandi is to barely tolerate an ethnic group for a while(keeping them poor["weak"] ), have periodic brutal crack-downs followed by truces, followed by crackdowns while the intelligence services are on both sides? [And the games had previously led to loss of East Pakistan as Robert Mackey refers to?]
     The more people allude to Pakistan, the more it seems that they are quadruple double-agents trying to balance everyone. One would have to know on which day to double-cross them for maximum benefit.
     Scott, which part of this puzzle am I missing?

[Samuel]

Observer,

The term is also used frequently in the Iranian context regarding the period just after 1979.

"The Cultural Revolution in Iran, with Close Regard to the Universities, and its Impact on the Student Movement
Author: Razavi, Reza

Abstract:

The cultural revolution (1980-83), has been regarded by the elite in Iran as one major step towards the establishment of Islamic values in the universities."

http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/mes/2009/00000045/00000001/art00001

[Don Cox]

Rather than a "cultural revolution" of one kind or another, I think the Green movement is more like the Chartist movement in 19C England. This appeared to fail at the time, but in the end all its aims were achieved.

I do agree that Mao's use of "Cultural Revolution" has permanently tarnished the phrase. It can't now be used for anything good.

[Samuel]

While the capture of Jundullah leader Rigi is a tremendous accomplishment for Iranian intelligence I look forward to the day when we do the same to these two criminal traitors.

http://rajavi.info/

[Publicola]

"The Cultural Revolution" in Iran
- an adequate term and many clarifying parallels, as analysed in 2005 -

»Ansar-i Hizbullah / Followers of the Party of God

Ansar-i hizbullah, the followers of the party of God, (also known as Ansar-i Hezbollah or Ansar-e Hezbollah), is a semi-official, paramilitary organization in Iran which carries out attacks on those whom it perceives to be violating the precepts of Islam, such as women wearing makeup, reformist protestors, and unmarried couples.

This clandestine organization took its formal name in 1992. However, its origins date back to the street gangs of the urban poor, called "Hezbollah" (Party of God), organized by various forces in the Islamic Republic regime during the revolution of 1979. Most of the members of Ansar-i Hizbullah either belong to the Basij militia or are veterans of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) who believed that they must continue fighting for the integrity of Islam. They realize their vision through physical intimidation of those whom they view as the enemies of Ayatollah Khameini and Islam. They are known to break up demonstrations against the government, assault people in western dress, and raid shops that sell forbidden items. They have also been accused by some of politically-based assassinations.

Ansar-i Hizbullah became more prominent after it attacked student dormitories at Tehran University in July of 1999. This attack was in response to a peaceful student protest on July 8th concerning further restrictions on the press. In concert with police, members of Ansar-i Hizbullah chased and beat the students back to their dorms. At the end of the morning, two students were dead and twenty were hospitalized. When the newspapers reported these attacks, protests lasting five days spread to 13-18 other cities in Iran.

The Iranian government has chosen to tacitly support groups like Ansar-i Hizbullah because they both aim to maintain the conservative status quo in Iran. Senior conservative clerics use gangs like Ansar-i Hizbullah as a way to consolidate their power and harass and/or eliminate their enemies. Therefore, Ansar-i Hizbullah enjoys a semi-official status; while they are not officially a part of the government, they complement the Iranian government's existing intelligence and security apparatus. Many senior clerics have been associated with Ansar-i Hizbullah and are thought to finance it. Additional evidence of its favorable status lies in the fact that during its 1999 attack on Tehran University, its members used 1000cc-engine motorcycles, which only security service members are allowed to possess.

Thus, the Iranian government is behaving in a manner similar to Maoist China when it channeled youthful nationalists into Red Guard gangs which would assault the government's purported enemies. Like these Red Guards, Ansar-i Hizbullah wishes to make the revolution permanent by assaulting those who advance an agenda of change.

The Iranian government, confronted with internal calls for reform, enacted a compromise by not performing a massive military crackdown on the dissidents, but rather letting militant groups like Ansar-i Hizbullah prevent the movement from spreading further.

While paramilitary groups like Ansar-i Hizbullah are currently useful in extending the government's control over its citizens, they also pose a threat to the government. First, the Iranian government must keep these groups on a tight leash or they may become powerful enough to challenge the government for political power. Second, if the government ever decides to institute any reforms, groups like Ansar-i Hizbullah may violently oppose any such actions and create instability and unrest.

Ansar-i Hizbullah has succeeded in quieting many of its political opponents through its intimidating tactics. Nonetheless, its recent violent acts may be a portent that they, along with their conservative backers, are losing power in Iran - Ansar-i Hizbullah would not be committing these acts of violence if there were no signs of modernization to confront.«

Source:
Website of GlobalSecurity.org – page last modified 26th April, 2005

http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/ansar.htm

[Publicola]

»the “military dictatorship” of Secretary Clinton’s fantasies«

To be emphasized is the exceptional, considerable economic impact and power the IRGC are wielding. The corps dominates both Iran's official and black economies with a market share of a third to nearly two-thirds of Iran. It is impossible to gauge its market share, but western estimates range from a third to nearly two-thirds of Iran's GDP. The IRGC is a corporation, a business conglomerate with guns.

From:
“The financial power of the Revolutionary Guards”, in: The Guardian, 16.02.2010

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/15/financial-power-revolutionary-guard

[Samuel]

The role of the Pasdaran in the economy can be traced to the first presidential administration of Rafsanjani who incorporated it into the reconstruction effort after the war.

[Adam]

How can Larijani and Tavakoli be taken seriously on their economic criticisms and now claims of illegality against Ahmadinejad if they do not pursue them seriously as long as it is embarrassing for or threatening to Khamenei?
While the criticisms of Ahmadinejad's economic record and total incredibility of his budget are accurate, Larijani is directly responsible for these policies as he has been a lead establishment figure lending his credibility to this crackdown on the green movement, which is the only serious threat to the status quo since it has the general population on its side. He is criticising Ahmadinejad after being largely responsible for propping up the dead lie of Ahmadinejad's election "victory".

[Doug]

Riga diversion pt.2(the references and cross-references were very long articles-- didn't have a chance to finish reading when made first comment)

On the other hand,"In 2008, Seymour Hersh reported that a former C.I.A. officer said that the Bush administration had provided support to Jundallah" http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh" rel="nofollow">LINK
Special Ops wanted to use Baluchi's to attack targets in Iran back then, supposedly, but then President Obama renounced that? A lot of what happens or is justified seems to depend on whose Baluchi ox is gored. Many groups trying to get independence or justice for Baluchistan by many different methods.... and being used by many countries...

[Doug]

Sorry. Typo: Meant Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi.

[danial]

17:20gmt...

Maybe they're talking about something like Tesla's oscillator (earthquake machine), perhaps larger and more powerful?

link:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla's_oscillator

I don't like conspiracies but I wouldn't be surprised if the US did pull off something like this, heh

[danial]

thank you EA for breaking the link

http://tinyurl.com/yzn6vq4

[Rev. Magdalen]

Nothing says "We're not a military dictatorship" like tripling the militia forces in the capital city!

[Rev. Magdalen]

Samuel, there's a really good reason other countries don't let armies become corporations running 2/3 of the economy. They tend to use their guns to force people to let them take over even more businesses, and if anyone complains, well, again with the guns. I know the Leader smokes a lot of opium, but really this should have been pretty obvious to see coming.

[samuel]

Publicola,

"A comparison of Iran with a European country might be helpful to find out, if the security forces and the military are the ruling power in Iran"

Numbers are really meaningless when answering this question. Note that Artesh, the single largest military group is largely irrelevant when it comes to the political system. The Pasdaran is a different story but as you point out it is a relatively small ideological/military entity whose primary task has always been the defense of the Islamic Revolution.

Even the Pasdaran is hardly an autonomous group representing a coherent ideological stream. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Mohsen Rezai, Larijani, Rahim Safavi, Mohammad Ali Jafari all come from the Pasdaran yet they represent different poinsts of view not at all in line with Ahmadinejad. Moreover, the top leadership is selected by the Supreme Leader who is outside and above the institutional structure.

If one looks at numbers alone one could easily conclude that Saddam Hussein's Iraq, in its day one of the most militarized societies on earth, was also a military dictatorship whereas the reality was very different. Saddam was never in the military, never trusted or was trusted by the largely Shiite Armed Forces and relied primarily on two complementary and often overlapping institutions: 1) the formally organized Ba'ath Party and 2) the informally organized Tikriti mafia which hailed from Saddam's hometown of Tikrit. The armed forces as such never had much real power.

I have characterized the Saddam regime elesewhere as a personalist/party/ethnic/geographic/police dictatorship rather than a military dictatorship. I am of course using "ethnic" in the broader sense of the word to differentiate Sunnis and Shiites in the Iraq of Saddam instead of "religious" due to the fact that Saddam as well as the Tikriti gang were militant secularists until the very end of their lives when they suddenly discovered Islam.

[Adam]

Rev. Magdalen,

I have read a lot about the Revolutionary Guards becoming a business owner as well as militia, but the truth is that just as with the Soviet Union the oil industry is the only one that is seriously profitable. Most industry has been inefficient and primarily designed to keep the population employed/complacent.
Indeed, Iran's regime today is far more dependent on oil revenues than the Soviet Union ever was, it seems to me to work with sticks and carrots. Sticks being repression at various levels depending on the political climate, Carrots being cushy economic benefits that come almost entirely from oil revenue.
The problem with this model is that it takes constantly increasing oil revenue in order to sustain it. In that context the sudden urgency of the regime's push to eliminate subsidies on basic goods for the general public makes sense, as oil prices substantially sank last year for the first time in a decade, after an increase of more than 10-fold from 1998-2008. Mind you the government's economic panic comes even with oil prices at $80, which is historically extremely high.
Since there is no way oil prices can continue to rise the way they did over the last 10 years, and since there is no way Iran's oil production can be maintained with increasingly insufficient foreign investment (which is about to get much worse due to sanctions), insiders must know that this is really just a race against time.
I'm guessing the sudden urge to "privatize" so much of the economy (often to Sepah or its agents), may be a way to divvy up the spoils before the inevitable changes come.

[samuel]

Rev,

The Pasdaran is not the Army. See Publicola's post.

[samuel]

Adam,

"I’m guessing the sudden urge to “privatize” so much of the economy (often to Sepah or its agents), may be a way to divvy up the spoils before the inevitable changes come."

You are wrong once again as the whole Pasdaran involvement goes back to the Rafsanjani presidency. There is nothing "sudden" about it.

[Adam]

Samuel,

Why don't you challenge my post instead of just taking one sentence out of context?

[Arshama]

Publicola,

"Thus differences emerge clearly when additionally taking into account the Iranian (ideologized/fanaticized) parapolice/paramilitary forces (4,2 % to 17,2%). Thus the law enforcement forces in Iran are 14 times to 57 times larger (expressed in percentage of population total) than in a European country (Germany) ! An impressive figure !"

Thanks a lot for all your calculations! Someone should write an article about that and send it to all those, who still dream of Iran as a model anti-Imperialist state.

In any case: Pasdaran no pasaran!

[Publicola]

"Pasdaran no pasaran!"

Thanks Arshama: Great epigram !

[Publicola]

In which countries in which historical situation and in particular why (!) did parallel armed organisations exist, on the one hand the traditional, purely functional armed military and police forces, on the other hand newly created armed parallel ideological-fanatical military/police (militia-like) forces ?

One answer can be found when one looks into a history book dealing with the years 1930 - 1945.

[samuel]

Adam,

Challenge accepted.

"I have read a lot about the Revolutionary Guards becoming a business owner as well as militia, but the truth is that just as with the Soviet Union the oil industry is the only one that is seriously profitable. Most industry has been inefficient and primarily designed to keep the population employed/complacent."

Iran like every other nation with large oil deposits develops an overreliance on this one export. This was true under the Shah and it is true today. An emphasis on full employment has been the policy under the IRI just like it has been the case in post war europe (see current situation in Germany and Greece to name but two examples). Basic economics tell us that this leads to inefficiencies in the long run.

"The problem with this model is that it takes constantly increasing oil revenue in order to sustain it."

Well the govt. of AN made a deliberate decision to adopt populist economic policies that would distribute the wealth to the less wealthy sections of the nation. Investment was deliberately shifted from the capital to the rural areas and small towns and cities. AN, like him or not, placed special emphasis on the poorer, less populated areas as demonstrated by his being the first president in the IRI's history to have cabinet meetings in the less developed areas. Some of this was wasteful, yes, but it was also in line with his campaign promises in 2005.

The govt. has also made an agressive push to rearm the country after defense spending dramatically decreased after the war with Iraq. Now Iran had American troops on its west in Iraq and to the east in Afghanistan and could not afford to neglect defense.

Building your own Jet fighters, tanks, armored personnel carriers, rifles, artillery and even Destroyers (as we saw a few days ago) is a necessary but expensive proposition. And unlike the Zionists Iran does not get 6 plus billion dollars in military aid every year from the Americans.

Again guns and butter spending at the same time will weaken a country economically as the Americans have realized during their history and the IRI is now trying to cut back to a more sustainable balance.

None of this is any mystery but you are trying to present it as some conspiracy to rob the nation.