Iran: "Allahu Akbar from the Rooftops" --- The 2009 Photo of the Year

The jury of the 53rd annual World Press Photo Contest has selected this image by Pietro Masturzo as the World Press Photo of 2009:

The Latest from Iran (13 February): Re-assessment, Renewal

Revisiting 9/11: Did the US Misread Afghanistan and Bin Laden?

Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:

Evidence now available from various sources, including recently declassified U.S. State Department documents, shows that the Taliban regime led by Mullah Mohammad Omar imposed strict isolation on Osama bin Laden after 1998 to prevent him from carrying out any plots against the United States.

The evidence contradicts the claims by top officials of the Barack Obama administration that Mullah Omar was complicit in Osama bin Laden's involvement in the al Qaeda plot to carry out the terrorist attacks in the United States on Sep. 11, 2001. It also bolsters the credibility of Taliban statements in recent months asserting that it has no interest in al Qaeda's global jihadist aims.

The Afghanistan Occupation: 700 Military Bases (and Counting)

A primary source on the relationship between bin Laden and Mullah Omar before 9/11 is a detailed personal account provided by Egyptian jihadist Abu'l Walid al-Masri published on Arabic-language jihadist websites in 1997.



Al-Masri had a unique knowledge of the subject, because he worked closely with both bin Laden and the Taliban during the period. He was a member of bin Laden's Arab entourage in Afghanistan, but became much more sympathetic to the Afghan cause than bin Laden and other al Qaeda officials from 1998 through 2001.

The first published English-language report on al-Masri's account, however, was an article in the January issue of the CTC Sentinel, the journal of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, by Vahid Brown, a fellow at the CTC.

Mullah Omar's willingness to allow bin Laden to remain in Afghanistan was conditioned from the beginning, according to al-Masri's account, on two prohibitions on his activities: bin Laden was forbidden to talk to the media without the consent of the Taliban regime or to make plans to attack U.S. targets.

Former Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil told IPS in an interview that the regime "put bin Laden in Kandahar to control him better." Kandahar remained the Taliban political headquarters after the organisation's seizure of power in 1996.

The August 1998 U.S. cruise missile strikes against training camps in Afghanistan run by bin Laden in retaliation for the bombings of two U.S. Embassies in East Africa on Aug. 7, 1998 appears to have had a dramatic impact on Mullah Omar and the Taliban regime's policy toward bin Laden.

Two days after the strike, Omar unexpectedly entered a phone conversation between a State Department official and one of his aides, and told the U.S. official he was unaware of any evidence that bin Laden "had engaged in or planned terrorist acts while on Afghan soil". The Taliban leader said he was "open to dialogue" with the United States and asked for evidence of bin Laden's involvement, according to the State Department cable reporting the conversation.

Only three weeks after Omar asked for evidence against bin Laden, the al Qaeda leader sought to allay Taliban suspicions by appearing to accept the prohibition by Omar against planning any actions against the United States.

"There is an opinion among the Taliban that we should not move from within Afghanistan against any other state," bin Laden said in an interview with al Jazeera. "This was the decision of the Commander of the Faithful, as is known."

Mullah Omar had taken the title "Commander of the Faithful", the term used by some Muslim Caliphs in the past to claim to be "leader of the Muslims", in April 1996, five months before Kabul fell to the Taliban forces.

During September and October 1998, the Taliban regime apparently sought to position itself to turn bin Laden over to the Saudi government as part of a deal by getting a ruling by the Afghan Supreme Court that he was guilty of the Embassy bombings.

In a conversation with the U.S. chargé in Islamabad on Nov. 28, 1998, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, Omar's spokesman and chief adviser on foreign affairs, referred to a previous Taliban request to the United States for evidence of bin Laden's guilt to be examined by the Afghan Supreme Court, according to the U.S. diplomat’s report to the State Department.

Muttawakil said the United States had provided "some papers and a videocassette," but complained that the videocassette had contained nothing new and had therefore not been submitted to the Supreme Court. He told the chargé that the court had ruled that no evidence that had been presented warranted the conviction of bin Laden.

Muttawakil said the court trial approach had "not worked" but suggested that the Taliban regime was now carrying out a strategy to "restrict [bin Laden's] activities in such a way that he would decide to leave of his own volition."

On Feb. 10, 1999, the Taliban sent a group of 10 officers to replace bin Laden's own bodyguards, touching off an exchange of gunfire, according to a New York Times story of Mar. 4, 1999. Three days later, bodyguards working for Taliban intelligence and the Foreign Affairs Ministry personnel took control of bin Laden's compound near Kandahar and took away his satellite telephone, according to the U.S. and Taliban sources cited by the Times.

Taliban official Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, who was then in the Taliban Embassy in Pakistan, confirmed that the 10 Taliban bodyguards had been provided to bin Laden to "supervise him and observe that he will not contact any foreigner or use any communication system in Afghanistan," according to the Times story.

The pressure on bin Laden in 1999 also extended to threats to eliminate al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan. An e-mail from two leading Arab jihadists in Afghanistan to bin Laden in July 1999, later found on a laptop previously belonging to al Qaeda in and purchased by the Wall Street Journal , referred to "problems between you and the Leader of the Faithful" as a "crisis".

The e-mail, published in article by Alan Cullison in the September 2004 issue of The Atlantic, said, "Talk about closing down the camps has spread."

The message even suggested that the jihadists feared the Taliban regime could go so far as to "kick them out" of Afghanistan.

In the face of a new Taliban hostility, bin Laden sought to convince Mullah Omar that he had given his personal allegiance to Omar as a Muslim. In April 2001 bin Laden referred publicly to having sworn allegiance to Mullah Omar as the "Commander of the Faithful".

But al-Masri recalls that bin Laden had refused to personally swear such an oath of allegiance to Omar in 1998-99, and had instead asked al-Masri himself to give the oath to Omar in his stead. Al-Masri suggests that bin Laden deliberately avoided giving the oath of allegiance to Omar personally, so that he would be able to argue within the Arab jihadi community that he was not bound by Omar's strictures on his activities.

Even in summer 2001, as the Taliban regime became increasingly dependent on foreign jihadi troop contingents, including Arabs trained in bin Laden's camps, for its defence against the military advances of the Northern Alliance, Mullah Omar found yet another way to express his unhappiness with bin Laden's presence.

After a series of clashes between al Qaeda forces and those of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Taliban leader intervened to give overall control of foreign volunteer forces to the Tahir Yuldash of the IMU, according to a blog post last October by Leah Farrall, an Australian specialist on jihadi politics in Afghanistan.

In Late January, Geoff Morrell, the spokesman for Defence Secretary Robert Gates, suggested that the United States could not negotiate with Mullah Omar, because he has "the blood of thousands of Americans on his hands," implying that he had knowingly allowed bin Laden’s planning of the 9/11 attacks.

Turkey, Bosnia, and Serbia: A Balkans Breakthrough?

Fulya Inci writes for EA:

Could this be a Balkans breakthrough? Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced that Bosnia will open an embassy in Belgrade as the result of a trilateral meeting held in Turkey this week.

Serbian, Bosnian, and Turkish foreign ministers gathered for the fifth time since October, with Turkey mediating to repair the diplomatic ties between two Balkan countries. There have been diplomatic relations between Serbia and Bosnia, but they were frozen for three years after Belgrade rejected Bosnia's ambassador. While low-level diplomacy had been conducted, the restoration of full relations is crucial for bilateral ties. Bosnian Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj said, “The appointment of the ambassador is a concrete result. We’re looking for this achievement to continue. This is very important for prosperity and stability in the Balkans.”

Davutoglu said the meetings will continue, with discussions in Sarajevo next month and in Belgrade in April. He added that the aim is to make the Balkans the center of cooperation and stability: “Balkanization will mean stabilization in the future.”



Although leaders are showing willingness for a solution, overcoming the confusion in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia, will be difficult. The country is already facing a constitutional crisis, as the political system formed by the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 is on the brink of collapse. Bosnia’s two autonomous entities,the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the Croat-Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) federation, have each demanded more authority and the system is deadlocked as a result of different interests. Recently, Bosnian Serbs pledged to hold a referendum abaut Dayton, but it is being interpreted as a threat of independence from the international community. Answering a question abaut the issue in the Ankara meeting, Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic emphasized his country's policy of respecting territorial integrity, “The solution in Bosnia should be found through dialogue. We’re not going to change our policy.”

Meanwhile, the international community, including the European Union and the United States have been silent abaut the current developments. According to some Turkish journalists, EU officials are plagued by Turkey’s mediation in the region.

Today on EA (12 February 2010)

Iran: So what happens on the day after 22 Bahman? And what does it all mean?

We have three special reports and analyses this morning. Mr Verde sees the Regime's win yesterday as pyrrhic: "For any regime, especially one that claims to be a popular republic based on Islam, pointing TV cameras at the right-looking crowd while beating the “wrong crowd” with all its might, especially on the anniversary of its formation, is not a victory."

EA's Scott Lucas considers the political significance of yesterday's events, and concludes that, if President Ahmadinejad could be said to have won, then he "won ugly". EA correspondent Mr Azadi, who was in close contact with sources in Tehran throughout Thursday, gives a detailed summary from eyewitness accounts. We have also highlighted Pedestrian’s snapshot and compelling interpretation that any “defeat” for the opposition yesterday was a tactical miscalculation rather than the end of the challenge to the Government.

We now have two video specials: the claimed attack on Mehdi Karroubi and an 8+ minute clip, analysed in detail, during the President's speech in Azadi Square.

We have posted an ABC TV interview with internet activist Mehdi Saharkhiz (of "Only Mehdi" fame) and will continue to add to yesterday's video posts from Iran (set four can be viewed here), together with other TV coverage that has and will become available.

The regime's propaganda machine drones on about nukes, nukes and more nukes, trying to divert attention away from internal squabbles and human rights issues. We'll keep you updated  on all the news our live weblog throughout the day.

Afghanistan: We've re-posted a special analysis from Nick Turse, writing for TomDispatch on the number of military bases in The Afghanistan Occupation  - 700 Military Bases (and counting).

The Latest from Iran (12 February): The Day After 22 Bahman

2150 GMT: A Quiet Night. For the first time in days, a noticeable drop in news and chatter. So we may close shop early and welcome you to a new day in several hours.

1910 GMT: We Take It All Back --- No Rest for Ahmadinejad. Remember how we said (1225 GMT) that Ali Larijani's statement on Iran's uranium programme yesterday --- which could have just as easily been given by the President --- indicated a possible easing of tensions between Ahmadinejad and his conservative/principlist opponents?

Well, forget that. Member of Parliament Ali Motahhari, who has taken the point in the challenge to the President, has resumed the attack, and he has done so in the Larijani-affiliated Khabar Online:

NEW Iran Video Special (2): Decoding the 22 Bahman Rally in Azadi Square
NEW Iran Video Special (1): The 22 Bahman Attack on Karroubi?
Iran: 22 Bahman's Reality "No Victory, No Defeat"
Iran Analysis: The Regime’s Pyrrhic Victory
Iran: The Events of 22 Bahman, Seen from Inside Tehran
Iran on 22 Bahman: Ahmadinejad “Wins Ugly” (This Time)
Iran: Greening YouTube — An Interview with Mehdi Saharkhiz
Videos: The 22 Bahman Protests From Around the World
Iran Document: Interview with Hossein Karroubi (11 February)
Latest Iran Video: The 22 Bahman Protests (11 February — Set 4)
Latest Iran Video: The 22 Bahman Protests (11 February — Set 3)
Latest Iran Video: The 22 Bahman Protests (11 February — Set 2)
Latest Iran Video: The Marches of 22 Bahman (11 February — Set 1)
Latest Iran Video: 22 Bahman – TV Coverage
Latest Iran Video: President Ahmadinejad’s Speech
The Latest from Iran (11 February): Today is 22 Bahman

We cannot claim the crisis is totally over until both sides make up for their mistakes. The differences of opinion between the government and [the opposition] might have been eased to some extent, but they still exist. Our statesmen should not imagine that people's massive presence in the Thursday rally reflects the approval of their performance.... The presence of political elite in the rally does not mean there is no longer any criticism or objection towards the regime.

Motahhari declared that the Government must stop banning the press and should release all political prisoners. And he made clear that Larijani's apparent conciliation on the nuclear issue was more of a demand that Ahmadinejad stick to a hard line against the United States:

People expect their governments not to seek compromise with big powers. The government should be honest with people and tell people if it is engaged in behind-the-scenes negotiations with big powers. Nor should the government tie Iran's nuclear issue to normalization of ties with the United States.

(English-language summary in Los Angeles Times)


1730 GMT: Your Tehran Friday Prayers Update. Hojjatoleslam Kazem Seddiqi takes the podium to sweep up after 22 Bahman. Very much a junior member of the Tehran FP group, he keeps it simple, "The epic [turnout] of the highly dignified Iranian nation was a manifestation of power, solidarity and national unity." And Western powers were disappointed, etc.

1605 GMT: More on Mousavi's Alleged Flight. A relative of Mir Hossein Mousavi has denied the Fars report that he was unable to fly from Tehran to Tabriz, because of crowds protesting at Tabriz's airport (see 1235 GMT).

An EA correspondent adds this twist: the crowds who arrived in Tabriz were not demonstrating against Mousavi but for him. Letting this story out, however, would have undermined the regime's projection of unity and support on 22 Bahman, thus Fars' re-telling of the tale.

1600 GMT: The sites of Tahavol-e-Sabz, Rah-e-Sabz and Kalemeh have been attacked by the Iranian Cyber Army. Rah-e-Sabz is now operating from an alternative site.

1550 GMT: Back With Not One But Two Video Specials. We've got claimed footage of the 22 Bahman attack on Mehdi Karroubi, and Mr Verde offers a detailed reading of an 8+ minute clip filmed in Azadi Square during President Ahmadinejad's speech.

Mr Verde's analysis should also be set alongside a viewing of this footage of Government supporters lining up to get free food and "Sandis" soft drinks, indifferent to the slogans being shouted over the loudspeakers.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z0zAutN4MKQ[/youtube]

1255 GMT: In Case You Missed It. On Wednesday, the European Parliament adopted a sweeping resolution on human rights and nuclear issues in Iran. The headline paragraph:

[The Parliament] reminds the Iranian authorities that, in order to develop fruitful relations with the EU (European Union), Iran must guarantee fundamental human rights and respect for the principles of democracy, freedom of expression, and the rule of law, as this is a prerequisite for all countries which maintain political and economic relations with the EU; emphasises that the possible conclusion of a cooperation and trade agreement between Iran and the EU is contingent on respect for these values, Iran's full compliance with UNSC (United Nations Security Council and IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) resolutions and the provision of objective guarantees regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and the cessation of Iran's support for terrorist activities.

1235 GMT: Totally Must-Be-True Story of the Day. Fars News is alleging that Mir Hossein Mousavi had to cancel a flight from Tehran to Tabriz last night:

Mousavi, who wanted to fly to Tabriz at 9.30 pm..., was forced to cancel (the flight), because the people of Tabriz, who heard of it in the afternoon, started to pour to the airport and block its doors and access routes. When Mousavi heard of the protesters and their blockade, he decided to withdraw, and authorities asked the people to go. Nevertheless some of them stayed there for hours.... {This is like what] we have seen in Tehran on 22 Bahman, where he met with the people's protests and had to flee.

1225 GMT: Larijani Takes Ahmadi's Hand? Looks like one advantage of the President's shift to his "We Will Enrich Uranium" line is that it puts him in step with Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani. He declared yesterday:

Even if US President Barack Obama dares to repeat threats of tougher sanction against us as much as ten times, we will still be determined to pursue our enrichment program, but with a much faster pace.

Whenever we make a significant breakthrough, whether it is launching a satellite into space or any other technological or scientific achievement, they quickly demonize it and claim that it is aimed at military or spying purposes. But their problem really lies with the fact that our status in the international scene is changing for the better. They can not bear to see our progress, which is why they want to keep us as an underdeveloped country.

(There are indications that the pro-Larijani Khabar Online, which had been hostile to Ahmadinejad in recent weeks, may have changed its political line. We are monitoring.)

1140 GMT: We've posted another analysis of yesterday's events, Pedestrian's "No Victory, No Defeat".

0955 GMT: Regime Beat Goes On. Uranium enrichment, rockets, satellites. Repeat as necessary.

Press TV has two more pieces this morning. Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi told a rally, ""Today Iran has emerged as one of the top ten forerunners in the field of space research and technology. Our stellar progress in space science is only one of the many benefits derived from the victory of the Islamic Revolution more than thirty years ago." And former UN arms inspector Scott Ritter said on a Press TV broadcast, "I see the truth about Iran's nuclear program prevailing over the fictions" put out by analysts on "Western" media.

0950 GMT: The Green Re-Assessment. One of the key developments of 22 Bahman, beyond superficial judgements (see 0845 GMT), is the re-evaluation amongst the opposition of its political strategy and tactics for protest. Rah-e-Sabz already features an article on the subject.

0910 GMT: Peyke Iran is claiming that more than 1000 people were detained in Tehran yesterday.

0845 GMT: How the Foreign Media Was Blinded (Almost). One of the most striking reports on 22 Bahman by a "foreign" correspondent appears in Slate, written by Jason Rezaian. It's not the headline, "On the 31st anniversary of the Iranian revolution, the regime drowns out opposition protests", or the reports of the Azadi Square rally that are significant but Rezaian's (sometimes inadvertent) glimpses into the regime's control of the story:

For the first time in months, several members of the foreign press were allowed to cover a public event in Tehran. We all gathered at the foreign-media office of the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance early this morning to receive credentials for the day, neon-colored vests marking us as press, and chocolate milk. We then boarded three buses and made our way to Freedom Square. I kept my eyes glued to the window waiting to catch signs of protests, but there was nothing....

We were led to a raised platform less than 100 feet from where President Ahmadinejad would deliver his speech. Unfortunately, we weren't allowed to mingle with the crowds, and those near us, mostly teenage girls, were told not to speak with us, but instead to show off their propaganda signs proclaiming "Death to America," "Death to Israel," and "Death to the U.K." Several minutes before the president began his speech, text-messaging service was cut.....

Despite the restrictions, some telling counter-points sneak out. Rezaian estimated "tens of thousands", not million, coming into Azadi. He notes, "Before the president had finished his speech—but after he had made his main points—the crowds began to disperse," as he concludes, "These events...are intended more for foreign-media consumption than for the crowds that are present. Any support won or reinforced among the locals is just a bonus."

Yet, in the end, Rezaian too falls victim to the regime's manipulations. For based solely on his glimpse out his bus window into and out of Azadi, he declares, "Today it seems clear that the street phase is over. The protests have been pushed underground, which means that the green revolution everyone has been waiting for will not be televised."

0830 GMT: The Nukes! Look at the Nukes! And here is one of those signals we mentioned below: the Ahmadinejad Government is putting its foot to the floor to ensure the nuclear issue takes precedence over any internal quibbles. Press TV declares:

"Iran's nuclear chief [Ali Akhbar Salehi] confirms that the country has produced its first batch of higher-enriched uranium for use in a medical-research reactor in Tehran. This comes after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had announced on Thursday that the country has successfully managed to complete production of its first stock of uranium enriched to 20 percent."

0820 GMT: A bit of a late start for us this morning, as we try to assess and move beyond the events of 22 Bahman. We have an insider's view of the day, provided by Mr Azadi from eyewitnesses in Tehran, and two analyses: Mr Verde writes a guest piece for EA on the regime's "Pyrrhic victory", and Scott Lucas considers the political significance for the Islamic Republic, the opposition movement, and especially President Ahmadinejad with his "ugly win".

We have also posted an interview of one of the most prominent post-election activists, Mehdi Saharkhiz, with America's ABC News on social media and the Green Movement.

Now, however, we're moving to the day after 22 Bahman. We're going to be watching for the reactions and manoeuvres of those involved with the political developments. While Iran is now in the midst of a four-day holiday, there may be some signals, not only with the setpiece of Friday prayers but with individuals and groups trying to re-align their positions.

So, not quite back to normal following yesterday's tensions, dramas, and letdowns. But then again, when has the day ever been "normal" since 12 June?