Iran Election Guide

Donate to EAWV





Or, click to learn more

Search

Friday
Mar092012

Iran Special: Explaining The Supreme Leader's Nuclear Politics

A close look at Thursday's public declaration by the Supreme Leader on Iran's relations with the West and the nuclear issue.....

Press TV emphasises the initial line of defiance of Ayatollah Khamenei: “The US president has said....that he wants to bring the Iranian nation to its knees through sanctions, which reflects a continuation of [being under] a delusion in this regard. The lingering of this illusion will deal a blow to the US officials and will lead their calculations to failure."

But then is the twist, with the Supreme Leader apparently reaching out a hand to that same US President: "Ayatollah Khamenei also referred to the recent comment by Obama who said he is not thinking of a war with Iran, and noted, 'This remark is a good one and is a sign of taking a distance from illusion.'"

Our working assumption has been that Ayatollah Khamenei is much more sceptical about President Ahmadinejad about the nuclear discussions, and --- in the political environment after the Parliamentary elections, in which our parallel assumption is that Ahmadinejad is a "lame-duck" executive --- that is still the case. At the same time, the Supreme Leader has at least endorsed a public resumption of the talks; otherwise, Iran would not have extended its invitation of 14 February, accepted this week by the 5+1 Powers (US, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China).

Thursday's comments --- even if some in the international media missed the prefaratory warning to Obama about trying to bring Iran to its negotiating knees through sanctions --- extend that endorsement. So does the line in State media: IRNA is highlighting the 5+1 acceptance while claiming that "American diplomacy" has failed against its Iranian counterpart, while Press TV is headlining, "Pentagon Very Worried about Iran War: US Official".

Of course, entering into talks is different from progress being made in talks. And it is important to recognise the context for Khamenei's public signal:

1. Iran will only engage in this process with the illusion that it is doing so from strength. If the US and its allies try to present a Tehran crawling to the negotiating table because of the success of sanctions and Western pressure, the Islamic Republic will hit back with a defiant line not only in its rhetoric but in the discussions.

2. Iranian officials, from the Supreme Leader down, are nervous about the talk of war.

Perhaps more importantly, they are increasingly nervous about the trend of events in the Middle East. The rhetoric about the "Islamic Awakening" cannot hide the reality that the post-uprising manoeuvres from Tunisia to Libya to Egypt are far from the formation of a pro-Tehran alliance. And then there is Syria where, at best, the Islamic Republic has to accept an embattled President Assad.

3. At home, the Supreme Leader is trying to hammer down "legitimacy" in the wake of last week's Parliamentary elections.

It is notable that Khamenei's website --- in English as well as in Farsi --- publishes a summary of his Thursday statement to the Assembly of Experts. And it is just as notable that the statement does not begin with the nuclear remarks but with a lengthy exposition about the success of last Friday's Parliamentary vote:

"In the elections that were held on the 12th of Esfand and in the arena of confronting the camp of the enemies, the people brought in their power which originates from their religious faith and insight. And with this massive movement, they foiled the plots that the enemies had been designing for months in order to minimize voter turnout."

He added: "With their presence on the scene and with their insight and steadfastness, the people of Iran prepared the ground for divine blessings and it is necessary to thank God for this."

The seven paragraphs on this line conclude, "This election acted like a slap and awakened certain people who were cherishing illusions about the Islamic Republic and the people. It opened their eyes to the truth."

Then and only then does Ayatollah Khamenei look overseas with the defiance over sanctions.

4. That "legitimacy" is central to the Supreme Leader's construction of the nuclear talks.

Now the twist beyond the twist: the summary on Ayatollah Khamenei's website does not have the welcoming line that "Obama...is not thinking of a war with Iran....This remark is a good one." Instead, this is the selected statement:

After the controversial (Presidential) elections of the year 1388 (June 2009), certain people concluded that the people would lose their trust in the Islamic Republic, but the recent election was a decisive and clear response to this wrong conclusion.

Note Ayatollah Khamenei's admission with the word "controversial", as well as his assurance that all is now well.

It has never been the case that the Supreme Leader's approach to nuclear politics has been separate from his politics at home. And, with that recognition, it is only one step to the conclusion that his position on talks with the US and its allies is linked to "legitimacy", not in those foreign powers but in the eyes of his people.

Ayatollah Khamenei needs strength. But he does not have it right now in the Iranian economy. He does not have it in a smoothly-functioning political system. And he may not even have it in the assurance that Iranians eagerly support the fundamental of his clerical leadership. 

The Supreme Leader may try to draw that strength --- or the appearance of it --- from defiance in the face of "war". But that can only go so far, because the Islamic Republic does not want to have to endure war. 

So "strength" right now comes from a defiant entry into talks. The question, of course, is what happens next.

What happens next abroad...and at home.

PrintView Printer Friendly Version

EmailEmail Article to Friend

« The Latest from Iran (9 March): "Legitimacy" --- Home and Abroad | Main | Turkey Live Coverage (8 March): Erdogan's Kurdish Problem »

Reader Comments

There are no comments for this journal entry. To create a new comment, use the form below.

PostPost a New Comment

Enter your information below to add a new comment.

My response is on my own website »
Author Email (optional):
Author URL (optional):
Post:
 
Some HTML allowed: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <code> <em> <i> <strike> <strong>