Thursday
Nov132008
Fact x Importance = News: Pakistan
Thursday, November 13, 2008 at 8:26
There have been a swirl of news stories in the last 72 hours about the conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier of Pakistan. Beyond the escalation in bombings and shootings, the most significant may offer clues to future US policy.
These three articles, in particular, raised eyebrows. On Tuesday Antony Loyd in The Times of London and , Ben Farmer in The Daily Telegraph, and Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah in the New York Times reported that they had found "Taliban maps, manuals and propaganda...at training camps in Pakistan showing the sophistication of the insurgent's operations in the country's tribal areas". Perlez and Shah wrote of "tunnels [that] stretched for more than half a mile and were equipped with ventilation systems so that fighters could withstand a long siege. In some places, it took barrages of 500-pound bombs to break the tunnels apart." Loyd's dramatic narrative spoke of a map "which is not the work of a renegade gunman resistant to central authority; it is the assessment of a skilled and experienced fighter, and begins to explain how more than 400 Pakistani soldiers have been killed or wounded since August in Bajaur". It was Farmer, however, who offered the chilling sentence: "Britain and America...believe that Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's deputy, has been in Bajaur."
With respect to Perlez/Shah, Loyd, and Farmer, the significance of their reports was not their discovery. It is not surprising, given the porous Afghan-Pakistani border, that Taliban --- many of whose leaders were educated in Pakistani madrassas --- would be in the Northwest Frontier. And it would be a very poor, or foolhardy, fighter who would wander around without a map or a few leaflets to try and win converts to the cause. No, the significance of the stories is in the answer to the question: how did reporters for two British newspapers and the top print outlet in the United States suddenly make the same discovery?
Because all the reporters were taken there by the Pakistani military, who were at hand to emphasise (in the exact same words in the two articles), "There were students here taking notes on bomb-making and guerrilla warfare." Loyd took his piece further with the help of an "eminent Pakistani political figure": "Al-Qaeda and the Taleban...set up a joint headquarters in 2004 as an 'Islamic emirate' in North Waziristan, headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani, an Afghan Taleban commander." The tribal areas were "today the same as Afghanistan was before September 11 - controlled by foreign and local militants who fight a war on both sides of the border.”
So the Pakistanis, having lost more than 400 soldiers in fighting in the Northwest Frontier since August, have launched a PR campaign to establish the need for further and, presumably, more aggressive operations. It's not just a question of Pakistani troops, however.
Note Perlez's reference to tunnels which can only be blown apart by 500-pound bombs. The military branch with the majority of those bombs is not the Pakistani Air Force; it's their American counterparts. While it was Pakistanis who took the Western journalists to Bajaur, there should be no doubt: this is also part of an American campaign to justify continuing "hot pursuit" operations into the Northwest Frontier, even at the cost of civilian casualties.
And even at the possible cost to the Pakistani Government. A notable absence in all three stories was any comment from members of the Zardari Administration, unless Loyd's mysterious "eminent political figure" happens to be the Prime Minister in disguise.
Increasingly, it's looking like US forces are working with Pakistani military, who in turn are distinct from the purported political leaders of Pakistan. The implications of that co-operation, and effective internal split in the Pakistani ruling elite, may be far more significant than any more tunnels that intrepid Western journalists happen to "discover".
These three articles, in particular, raised eyebrows. On Tuesday Antony Loyd in The Times of London and , Ben Farmer in The Daily Telegraph, and Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah in the New York Times reported that they had found "Taliban maps, manuals and propaganda...at training camps in Pakistan showing the sophistication of the insurgent's operations in the country's tribal areas". Perlez and Shah wrote of "tunnels [that] stretched for more than half a mile and were equipped with ventilation systems so that fighters could withstand a long siege. In some places, it took barrages of 500-pound bombs to break the tunnels apart." Loyd's dramatic narrative spoke of a map "which is not the work of a renegade gunman resistant to central authority; it is the assessment of a skilled and experienced fighter, and begins to explain how more than 400 Pakistani soldiers have been killed or wounded since August in Bajaur". It was Farmer, however, who offered the chilling sentence: "Britain and America...believe that Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's deputy, has been in Bajaur."
With respect to Perlez/Shah, Loyd, and Farmer, the significance of their reports was not their discovery. It is not surprising, given the porous Afghan-Pakistani border, that Taliban --- many of whose leaders were educated in Pakistani madrassas --- would be in the Northwest Frontier. And it would be a very poor, or foolhardy, fighter who would wander around without a map or a few leaflets to try and win converts to the cause. No, the significance of the stories is in the answer to the question: how did reporters for two British newspapers and the top print outlet in the United States suddenly make the same discovery?
Because all the reporters were taken there by the Pakistani military, who were at hand to emphasise (in the exact same words in the two articles), "There were students here taking notes on bomb-making and guerrilla warfare." Loyd took his piece further with the help of an "eminent Pakistani political figure": "Al-Qaeda and the Taleban...set up a joint headquarters in 2004 as an 'Islamic emirate' in North Waziristan, headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani, an Afghan Taleban commander." The tribal areas were "today the same as Afghanistan was before September 11 - controlled by foreign and local militants who fight a war on both sides of the border.”
So the Pakistanis, having lost more than 400 soldiers in fighting in the Northwest Frontier since August, have launched a PR campaign to establish the need for further and, presumably, more aggressive operations. It's not just a question of Pakistani troops, however.
Note Perlez's reference to tunnels which can only be blown apart by 500-pound bombs. The military branch with the majority of those bombs is not the Pakistani Air Force; it's their American counterparts. While it was Pakistanis who took the Western journalists to Bajaur, there should be no doubt: this is also part of an American campaign to justify continuing "hot pursuit" operations into the Northwest Frontier, even at the cost of civilian casualties.
And even at the possible cost to the Pakistani Government. A notable absence in all three stories was any comment from members of the Zardari Administration, unless Loyd's mysterious "eminent political figure" happens to be the Prime Minister in disguise.
Increasingly, it's looking like US forces are working with Pakistani military, who in turn are distinct from the purported political leaders of Pakistan. The implications of that co-operation, and effective internal split in the Pakistani ruling elite, may be far more significant than any more tunnels that intrepid Western journalists happen to "discover".
Reader Comments (6)
It has become apparent in recent articles that the world's press has only just begun to highlight the importance of these border regions in Pakistan to the security situation in Afghanistan and the wider region. Many military and security commentators have since the beginning of the conflict in Afghanistan argued that until sustained operations were undertaken in this region, the security situation if Afghanistan would not be improved. Since the hardline Taliban leadership, as well as the vast majority of foreign fighters from Afghanistan were 'permitted' to flee from the tunnels of Tora Bora, the border areas of Pakistan have served as a safe haven; much like Laos and Cambodia did so for the Vietcong and NVA during the Vietnam War. Again the lessons of history seem to have been ignored and once again the British, U.S. and Pakistani/Afghani soldiers on the ground are forced to pay the price.
Many would argue that the political environment in Pakistan does not easily lend itself to allowing sustained coalition/Pakistani operations against insurgent forces in the Border area, however until these areas are prevented from allowing safe withdrawal for forces attacking into Afghanistan little can be achieved within the southern provinces of Afghanistan itself. Such operations may even improve the security situation within Pakistan/Kashmir.
In no way however, are such operations the key to ensuring the future of a democratic Afghanistan, much more has to be done to ensure that the average Afghani can live in a secure and prosperous nation. Whilst billions of dollars are pumped into both military and non-military projects in Afghanistan, the election of a new administration in Washington gives the international community the perfect time to redress the world's position in the region. One of the most important focuses must be on ensuring that the Afghani people are allowed to choose for themselves those projects most vital to their lives. Protecting the future of education is essential, security of schools must be ensured - it can not be acceptable to anyone that young girls who wish to learn have their faces disfigured with acid by Talib fighters; second to this the international community must work harder to provide irrigation for the farmers not only will this prevent support for the insurgents it will stem the need for everyday Afghani's to grow opium and marajuna.
In short, President-elect Obama's election not only provides the chance for a change in the politics of America, it gives the International community a chance to look at their approach to Afghanistan, should things be allowed to continue in the same form as they are currently, coalition troops and Afghanis will continue to give up their lives for many years to come. These are merely my observations but as one of those who is prepared to go to Afghanistan to do 'my part' and as a student of such conflicts throughout my academic career, I feel compelled to say my bit.
Thanks, Chris, this excellent comment is making me consider my position.
My own objections are not necessarily over confrontation with the Taliban who are now in Pakistan but the manner of the "hot pursuit": 1) I wonder if the current approach is actually driving Pakistani local communities and the Taliban together "in defence" against US operations and Pakistani forces; 2) I worry that unilateral US operations --- or operations given wink-and-nod by some Pakistani military --- may destabilise the Islamabad Government.
Not wanting to comment on current operations that are ongoing etc, but my mind is sent whirling back to the wonderful world of my study of cross-border operations during the Vietnam War. First, and foremost, it must be noted that operations in the border region must be seen to be a concerted effort to reduce the Taliban's ability to operate both within Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is my belief that the vast majority of both the Afghani and the Pakistani populations in these areas do not wish to be controlled by the Taliban and their allies, it is however, in many cases their only option given the lack of a viable alternative!!
In reply to your points Scott - 1) There will in no doubt be a certain level of local populations feeling they have to defend themselves from attack be it from U.S./Pakistani forces or the Taliban; given the nature of Pashto culture this is easuly understood. But in this situation far from driving such groups into the arms of the Taliban through carfeul consideration of cultural awareness and where necessary the imposition of 'rules of engagement', your worry I believe can be 'minimised'. As with all such conflicts the line between controlling such operations and hindering their effectiveness is a fine one!
2) Is it possible to destablilise the Islamabad Government anymore that it is already? lol One could argue that the removal of the Taliban and other paramilitary forces within the border regions would do little but to stabilise the strategic/security situation in Pakistan!! From my own point of view, such operations can not be allowed to be viewed as unilateral U.S. operations; either the coalition as a whole, in support of Pakistani forces must act, or Pakistani forces alone should be left to do the job. I fear that the second option is very much a clear route to allowing the Taliban and their allies a free-hand in the regionas it has had since the beginning of the war!!
Well here we go!! Seems like this issue just isn't going to go away anytime soon! - Suspected U.S. missiles kill 11 in Pakistan - http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/11/14/pakistan.missile.strike/index.html
So here we go the latest curve-ball in the on going saga - http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/11/18/pakistan.nato/index.html Keep your eye on this folks it is going to continue to develop. For my own part it's about time!! (he says as he takes cover from the inevitable incoming!!!)
Suspected U.S. missile kills 3 in Pakistan - here we go again!!! http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/11/29/pakistan.missile/index.html