Friday
Nov282008
Agreement in Iraq: Half-Full, Half-Empty
Friday, November 28, 2008 at 13:51
The optimistic view of the Iraq Parliament's passage --- by 149-35 with 14 abstentions and 77 not present --- of the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States comes from US and British papers that headline passage with "a substantial majority" and "an overwhelming show of hands".
The not-so-optimistic view? Well, that would come from a bit of detailed reading and some basic reflection. Only The Washington Post, at the end of the sixth paragraph of its report, mentions those 77 Parliamentarians who didn't show for the final vote. That means --- and here the Post deserves a bit of credit --- that "just over half" of the members voted for the Agreement.
Interpretation? For that, you have to bypass the glowing headline, "31 December 2011: day the last US soldier leaves Iraq". The politics are far more complex: in effect, the Government of Nouri al-Maliki and leading Shi'a parties, as well as supporting Kurdish parties, have a bit of breathing space because they bought abstentions from Sunni and some uncertain Shi'a members.
Because of those abstentions, the al-Maliki Government can present the vote as a ringing Sadrists, with only recalcitrant Sadrists opposing the Agreement. Had those abstentions been votes against, however, the final tally would have been 149-136, far from the "consensus" demanded by Ayatollah Sistani and some other key political figures in Iraq.
The Government paid a price for the clear victory, giving assurances to Sunnis that they would have input into future legislation. More importantly, at least in the short term, al-Maliki gave way to the Sunni demand for a national referendum on the agreement in the middle of 2009.
Perhaps the most telling comment on that referendum came --- buried in The New York Times report --- from the veteran politician Adnan Pacachi: the referendum will ensure that US leaders are “more careful and they will not make mistakes that will cause the Iraqi people to reject the agreement". In other words, this is a marker that the Obama Administration shows good faith both in drawing down US forces and in not re-interpreting the Agreement, say, for US military operations without Iraqi approval and for the continued use of private contractors immune from Iraqi law.
There is, in other words, a dual negotiation going on here. One is the negotiation between factions in Iraq for influence, notably the Sunni struggle to retain some say in political affairs at national level, and one is the negotiation to limit and possibly remove the American presence. Neither of these negotiations came to an end on Thursday.
Fatuous commentary of the day:
The report in The New York Times maintains:
"Throughout the government’s negotiations on the pact, ...neighboring countries, especially Iran, have been invisible but influential players. As recently as Wednesday night, lawmakers said messages came from Iran expressing disapproval of the political deal that was essential to the pact’s ratification.
But lawmakers nevertheless pushed on with the negotiations, and the final compromise, arrived at less than an hour before the Parliament vote, differed little from the version rejected by the Iranians."
The implication that Iran was the main obstacle to ratification is misleading, ignoring the internal Iraqi dynamics. It also is inaccurate and misses the key point. As Juan Cole documents, Iranian state-run radio indicates Tehran's approval of the Agreement and the associated referendum:
"The agreement of the Iraqi government and parliament with holding a referendum shows that Iraqi officials, who are under pressure from America, will be in a better position to express their views by referring to the general consensus and the support of the Iraqi people, and will be able to free themselves from the pressures of the American statesmen."
The not-so-optimistic view? Well, that would come from a bit of detailed reading and some basic reflection. Only The Washington Post, at the end of the sixth paragraph of its report, mentions those 77 Parliamentarians who didn't show for the final vote. That means --- and here the Post deserves a bit of credit --- that "just over half" of the members voted for the Agreement.
Interpretation? For that, you have to bypass the glowing headline, "31 December 2011: day the last US soldier leaves Iraq". The politics are far more complex: in effect, the Government of Nouri al-Maliki and leading Shi'a parties, as well as supporting Kurdish parties, have a bit of breathing space because they bought abstentions from Sunni and some uncertain Shi'a members.
Because of those abstentions, the al-Maliki Government can present the vote as a ringing Sadrists, with only recalcitrant Sadrists opposing the Agreement. Had those abstentions been votes against, however, the final tally would have been 149-136, far from the "consensus" demanded by Ayatollah Sistani and some other key political figures in Iraq.
The Government paid a price for the clear victory, giving assurances to Sunnis that they would have input into future legislation. More importantly, at least in the short term, al-Maliki gave way to the Sunni demand for a national referendum on the agreement in the middle of 2009.
Perhaps the most telling comment on that referendum came --- buried in The New York Times report --- from the veteran politician Adnan Pacachi: the referendum will ensure that US leaders are “more careful and they will not make mistakes that will cause the Iraqi people to reject the agreement". In other words, this is a marker that the Obama Administration shows good faith both in drawing down US forces and in not re-interpreting the Agreement, say, for US military operations without Iraqi approval and for the continued use of private contractors immune from Iraqi law.
There is, in other words, a dual negotiation going on here. One is the negotiation between factions in Iraq for influence, notably the Sunni struggle to retain some say in political affairs at national level, and one is the negotiation to limit and possibly remove the American presence. Neither of these negotiations came to an end on Thursday.
Fatuous commentary of the day:
The report in The New York Times maintains:
"Throughout the government’s negotiations on the pact, ...neighboring countries, especially Iran, have been invisible but influential players. As recently as Wednesday night, lawmakers said messages came from Iran expressing disapproval of the political deal that was essential to the pact’s ratification.
But lawmakers nevertheless pushed on with the negotiations, and the final compromise, arrived at less than an hour before the Parliament vote, differed little from the version rejected by the Iranians."
The implication that Iran was the main obstacle to ratification is misleading, ignoring the internal Iraqi dynamics. It also is inaccurate and misses the key point. As Juan Cole documents, Iranian state-run radio indicates Tehran's approval of the Agreement and the associated referendum:
"The agreement of the Iraqi government and parliament with holding a referendum shows that Iraqi officials, who are under pressure from America, will be in a better position to express their views by referring to the general consensus and the support of the Iraqi people, and will be able to free themselves from the pressures of the American statesmen."
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