A "Normal" Middle East: US Presses for Arab Steps on Israel

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The Jerusalem Post reports that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, working on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meetings, urged senior officials from Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to take steps toward normalizing relations with Israel. She later told reporters that talks were "extremely productive."

While Arab nations still insist on an Israeli settlement freeze before gestures such as the opening of trade and commercial offices, permission for Israeli overflights, and academic and cultural exchanges; Washington is increasing its pressure. Jeffrey Feltman, the top US diplomat for the Middle East, said after Clinton's meeting:

We don't want to wait for the perfect package. It's time to start negotiations now... We hope that the Arabs would find ways to demonstrate to the Israeli public that Israel will be an accepted, normalized part of the region.

Still, progress is still far from assured. The State Department's press release did not mention any "extremely productive" outcome, balancing calls for the re-launching of Israeli-Palestnians negotiations without preconditions with the vision of a freeze on settlements to foster a viable Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders:

The Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and the United States met today in New York City to coordinate on efforts to promote their shared vision of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Middle East, and to intensify their consultations as partners and friends.

The Ministers welcomed the trilateral meeting among President Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and President Abbas on September 22, and expressed their hope for rapid progress towards the resumption of negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Ministers welcomed President Obama’s important statement before the UN General Assembly which calls for the re-launching of negotiations – without preconditions – that address the permanent status issues: security for Israelis and Palestinians, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem. The Ministers reiterated their call for a freeze on settlement activities. They expressed their continued support for an independent, viable, and democratic Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel, with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the Road Map, and the Arab Peace Initiative. They reiterated their full support for the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian government led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and their efforts to build the institutions of a future state. The Ministers also reiterated their support for achieving a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

Transcript/Snap Analysis: Washington's Welcome to Iran

Iran’s Nukes: Full Text of Iran’s Proposal to “5+1″ Powers

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Here's a surprise. Despite the hostility shown in the Western media towards Iran's latest proposal on its nuclear programme, notably over Tehran's negative response to the international demand to halt its nuclear enrichment programme, the State Department said Friday that the United States and the other members of the "5+1" group (Germany, China, Russia, Britain, and France) had accepted Iran's proposal to hold direct talks. Moreover, Tehran's signals of cooperation on issues such as the stability of Afghanistan and Iraq and the struggle against terrorism are appreciated by Washington.



Here is Friday's daily press briefing on Iran given by State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley:

Political directors of P-5+1 continue to study Iran document

Statement issued by Javier Solana on P-5+1 countries to arrange a face-to-face meeting

Iran paper does not reply to international community's concerns; it does not cover nuclear issue / need an early meeting to see if Iran is willing to engage seriously on these issues

We feel that they are out of compliance with their obligations under the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty], IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], Security Council resolutions/wish to have direct dialogue with Iran to see what Iran is prepared to do/5+1 countries want to have face-to-face with Iran to address all the issues that we have concerns about, including the nuclear issue.

We have great concern about Iran's support of terrorism and its role in the region/recognize that we have potentially common interests in terms of a stable Afghanistan; and a stable Iraq; willing to engage Iran on the full range of issues

Iranian election is a matter between the Iranian government and its people

Hence, despite pressure on Washington to allow an Israeli strike on Tehran and claims that the US will press for harsher sanctions, it appears that the Obama Administration is maneuvering towards an expansion of engagement. If this is the case, the next Security Council meeting on September 24 can produce an unexpected consensus with a green light for direct dialogue with Iran. Indeed, when the full transcript is read carefully, it emerges that Washington's signal for negotiations is based on wider political concerns rather than as a specific answer to Iran's nuclear proposals. As Crowley states, the only condition  is that Iran expresses its willingness to talk:

Transcript

QUESTION: On Iran? A question on Iran?

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: Regarding the proposal the Iranians made this week, you said yesterday – and your comments yesterday seemed to be focused on the fact that they didn’t address the central – the issue of central interest to the U.S., which is the nuclear program, enrichment activity. I’m wondering if, nonetheless, the P-5+1 countries have decided that they will tell the Iranians that they accept the offer to have talks.

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I would kind of bother to turn that around, first and foremost, and recall that it was the nations of the P-5+1 who made a specific offer to Iran to engage directly to address the concerns that the United States has, the international community has, the United Nations Security Council has. So it is Iran providing a paper that responds in a way to the invitation. There was a conference call this morning of the political directors of the P-5+1, and I think we continue to study the Iran document. At the same time, I believe brief – a short time ago, there was a statement made by the EU, by Javier Solana, indicating that he will be in touch with the Iranians on behalf of the P-5+1 countries to arrange a face-to-face meeting as soon as possible.

QUESTION: Just on the one-on-one –

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: The face-to-face meeting – him and – or all the P-5 --

MR. CROWLEY: I mean, the P-5+1 was put in place to provide a mechanism to address the concerns that the international community has about Iran’s nuclear program. And, clearly, the Iranian paper does not reply to these concerns. It does not cover the nuclear issue. That’s precisely why we think we need an early meeting. We’re not interested in talking for talking’s sake. We’re looking to see – and through an early meeting, should Iran be willing, we’ll be looking to see if they are willing to engage seriously on these issues, but within the context of the P-5+1, the full range of issues that we have among these countries and Iran.

QUESTION: So you’re talking about talks about talks? Because I mean --

MR. CROWLEY: We’re not interested in talks about talks.

QUESTION: Well, okay, but that’s --

MR. CROWLEY: We’re interested in finding out if – I mean, if you go to the Iran document, it says the Iranian nation is prepared to enter into dialogue and negotiation, and so on and so forth. We are going to – as Javier Solana has indicated, we will seek an early meeting and we will seek to test Iran’s willingness to engage. Clearly, from the standpoint of the international community, the central issue that we have is the nuclear issue. If we have talks, we will plan to bring up the nuclear issue. We will hope, as we said earlier this week in the IAEA, that Iran will choose to engage the international community to address the concerns that we have about the nuclear program. So we are seeking a meeting because, ultimately, the only way that we feel we’re going to be able to resolve these issues is to have a meeting. But it’s not just a meeting for meeting’s sake. It is a meeting to be able to see if Iran is willing to engage seriously on these issues.

QUESTION: But they just sent you this response to your offer. You offered them talks on the nuclear issue and other issues. They came back to you and said we’re willing to talk, but not about our nuclear program. So what’s the point of talking to them if you got your response – I mean, then how can you say these are not talks about talks? I mean, they’ve shown you through their official paper their willingness to engage on the nuclear issue, which is not to engage on the nuclear issue. So why would you want to have talks with them if it didn’t? And are you saying that you would sit down with Iran to talk about whether they’re willing to engage on the nuclear issue, or are you not going to sit across the table from Iran unless the nuclear issue is on the table?

MR. CROWLEY: We would expect, if we have a meeting with Iran, that it will be a – we would hope that it would be a substantive exchange. We will go into such a meeting, should Iran agree to prepare to talk about the substance of the issues and concerns that we have on Iran’s nuclear program, as was outlined this week at the IAEA. We feel that they are out of compliance with their obligations under the NPT, IAEA, Security Council resolutions. We wish to have a direct dialogue with Iran. We believe, and the President has said repeatedly, that we feel this is the way in which we will be able to, and hopefully can, resolve these issues. Our objective is clear: to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. I don’t think that we can resolve this issue any other way but through the kind of direct dialogue --

QUESTION: But what in that --

MR. CROWLEY: -- that leads to negotiation that we hope will lead to an understanding --

QUESTION: But what in that letter – you said we expect that there’ll be substantive talks. What gives you that expectation?

MR. CROWLEY: Well --

QUESTION: What in that letter gives you any reason to believe that you would have substantive talks with Iran about its nuclear issue?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, and that’s why we will seek a meeting to see what is – Iran is prepared to do. We’ve been waiting for some months --

QUESTION: So you’re ignoring their letter?

MR. CROWLEY: We have been waiting for some months for Iran to respond to the – to Javier Solana’s invitation earlier this year. We are seeking a meeting now based on the Iranian paper to see what Iran is prepared to do. And then, as the President has said, if Iran responds to our interest in a meeting, we’ll see when that can occur. We hope that will occur as soon as possible, and that as we head towards United Nations General Assembly, I expect there will be further meetings within the P-5+1. As the President has said, we will use this month to assess where we are in terms of our offer of engagement, and then that would lead to a conclusion by the end of the year as to what that approach has yielded.

So I don’t – we’ve gone through this situation where there have been various public statements over the past few weeks. But ultimately, the only way we’re going to resolve the serious and – concerns that we have is to have direct dialogue, see if Iran is willing to engage on these issues. If they’re not, then, obviously, that will – we’ll draw conclusions from that.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, it seems that you think the door is still open to talks on the enrichment because they didn’t explicitly refuse in the letter to talk about that subject.

MR. CROWLEY: Well --

QUESTION: Is that correct?

MR. CROWLEY: -- all I can say is our position has not changed. The United States, the other members of the P5+1 – we seek engagement with Iran, we seek to have better answers, better information, better cooperation from Iran to seriously address the issues that we have. And now it is up to Iran to determine what they are prepared to do. They have given – they’ve provided a paper. It says that they are open to dialogue. The paper itself does not address our nuclear concerns. But we will seek a meeting, as Javier Solana indicated today. And then based on that approach, we’ll see if Iran is willing to have a meeting. At that meeting, we will hope that there will be serious engagement. From that engagement, we hope there will be a willingness to address these issues. And then – but through this process, we’ll be able to determine what Iran is prepared to do, what it’s not prepared to do, and that will lead us to make judgments and there will be consequences going forward.

QUESTION: Let me put it another way. I mean, the paper, the proposals – are they better than their public statements where they refuse strictly to discuss engagement – enrichment?

MR. CROWLEY: The paper itself, I don’t think, broke any new ground. It’s, in a way, a warmed-over version of a previous paper they provided some time ago.

QUESTION: So, P.J., why wouldn’t you just see that as stalling then? I mean, the Iranians for the last several years have done this. You get right up to the deadline and then they put these papers out, then you say, okay, we’re going to go talk to them again, and it just keeps going and going down the road.

MR. CROWLEY: Well – and we will draw conclusions based on how Iran responds to the invitation by Javier Solana and the EU.

QUESTION: And their past behavior hasn’t given you any indication?

MR. CROWLEY: And we will draw conclusions if their past behavior – or their future behavior reflects their past behavior.

QUESTION: I’m sorry, but I still don’t understand – and I think probably most of us don’t – that you say that you’re going to ask Iran for talks based on their response --

MR. CROWLEY: No.

QUESTION: – based on this letter that they sent you.

MR. CROWLEY: No, no, no, no, no. We are – once again, we are making the offer of – for direct dialogue to Iran. It is a consistent approach that --

QUESTION: You made that offer, and they said we’re willing to talk to you about everything that we want to talk to you about and nothing that you want to talk to – about. So why are you – are you, like, ignoring this letter or ignoring the contents, or saying the fact that they sent us anything is a good sign and we’ll see if we could build something on that? Because if you’re saying that we’re asking them for talks based on this piece of paper that they sent you, I don’t see where there’s anything to talk about.

MR. CROWLEY: Well – and we seek direct negotiations. We want to see Iran sit down face to face with the P-5+1 countries and address all of the issues that we have concern about, including the nuclear issue. If we have a meeting, we’re going to bring up the nuclear issue, and we’ll see how Iran responds to that. And this is – this is --

QUESTION: But what – but what about this – I’m sorry, but what about this letter makes you think that they’re willing to talk to you about that? They said no thank you.

MR. CROWLEY: And we’ll find out. We’ll find out. But I – again, I go back --

QUESTION: Why aren’t you taking no for an answer, though?

MR. CROWLEY: Libby, I – Elise, I go back to the – there’s language in the letter that simply says the Government of Iran is willing to enter in a dialogue. We are going to test that proposition. Okay? And if Iran is willing to enter into serious negotiations, then they will find a willing participant in the United States and the other P-5+1 countries. If the – Iran dissembles in the future, as it has in the past, then we will draw conclusions from that.

Recall, we have a two-track strategy here. We are willing to engage, but we are also going to continue to look for ways to pressure Iran to change the path that it’s on. And we are willing to do both of those simultaneously. But ultimately, because these are serious issues, because we have a strategy that will prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, we feel the only way you’re ultimately going to resolve these issues is through direct dialogue. We recognize that Iran may or may not be willing to do so.

And as the President said, we’re going to assess where we are during the course of this month, including meetings that we’ll have at the UN General Assembly. And then at the end of the year, we’ll be able to draw some conclusions as to how successful our engagement offer has been.

QUESTION: P.J., can I follow up on that?

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: Isn’t your second track in trouble, though? I mean, you’ve got the Russian foreign minister out there saying yesterday that new sanctions shouldn’t be considered, especially anything on petroleum. That’s the same thing the Russians have been saying since this process got underway back in 2003. It just seems – how are you going to implement the second track?

MR. CROWLEY: These are not mutually exclusive. I’ll let the Russian foreign minister characterize his own words. There is unanimity within the P-5+1 in support of our two-track approach that involves engagement and pressure. Now – and we are willing to meet with Iran. We hope to meet with Iran. We want to see serious engagement on the nuclear issue, in particular. Within the context of the P-5+1, we are willing to address any other issues that they want to bring to the table. But clearly, if Iran refuses to negotiate seriously, we the United States and the international community and the Security Council can draw conclusions from that. And then based on that, we’ll make some judgments in the future.

QUESTION: P.J. --

QUESTION: I’m sorry, a quick procedural question since the announcement happened while we were in here. What level would the talks be on? Is that – the Solana announcement, what level of talks would take place with Iran? Is it political directors?

MR. CROWLEY: I would say likely at the political director level. But again, that will be part of what will be negotiated, depending on what Iran’s response is.

QUESTION: The U.S. will be at the table for that, or would it be only Solana? I’m trying to understand.

MR. CROWLEY: Oh, no. I would expect – I mean, we would seek a meeting –

QUESTION: At the initial meeting here --

MR. CROWLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: – that Solana is requesting, would it be with all six parties plus him?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, again, as he indicated in his statement, Javier Solana will be in touch with Iranian authorities, look for a meeting at an early date. And then we’ll work those details based on the Iranian response.

QUESTION: So you’re not closed to being at an initial meeting, as opposed to the follow-up meeting?

MR. CROWLEY: But I would – I think we would hope that there’d be a full P-5+1 meeting at a senior level. We’ll be looking, for example, to see from the Iranian standpoint, should this happen, what level of interlocutor will they send, what kind of authority will that person have. But we’re looking for a serious engagement by Iran, address these issues that we have. If it’s there, that will be a positive development. If it’s not there, we’ll draw conclusions from that.

QUESTION: Does that –

MR. CROWLEY: Go ahead. Go ahead.

QUESTION: So, basically, this is probably a last chance for Iran to engage on its nuclear issue, which is sort of a precondition for the talks?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I wouldn’t say – it is a – it is certainly a best opportunity for Iran. As we said at the IAEA earlier this week, we have made an offer to Iran; it’s out of mutual interest and mutual respect. But clearly, we expect to see Iran be willing to address the concerns that we have. As we said earlier this week, Iran says it has rights, but with those rights come responsibilities. So we’ll see what happens. But obviously, should Iran decide to engage, we will be at the table. Should Iran decide not to engage, that will have consequences and we’ll make judgments based on what Iran does or does not do.

QUESTION: Does that include Iran’s views on Israel and also support of terrorism?

MR. CROWLEY: We have great concern about Iran’s support of terrorism and its role in the region. At the same time, we recognize that we have potentially common interests in terms of a stable Afghanistan, in terms of a stable Iraq. As we have said frequently, we are willing to engage Iran on a full range of issues, but obviously, first on our list, first on the international community’s list, is Iran’s nuclear program.

QUESTION: And their views on Israel – wipe out Israel off the world map?

MR. CROWLEY: Obviously, that is a repugnant statement from the United States[1]. And we – but we are willing to – we have great concerns about Iran’s role in the region. It has been – hardly been a constructive player, and we will be clearly prepared to talk about that.

QUESTION: Can you take another one on Iran from another angle? Every year at the end of the month of Ramadan, the Iranian regime has begun this demonstration in support of the Palestinians. It’s coming up. It’s next week, actually. And today, Khamenei threatened the opposition that if they use that demonstration to voice their own displeasure with the results of the presidential elections that they would be faced with a harsh response and full force and everything.

Could that play – this recent comment play – have any room to play in your decision on the talks in general?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean, as we have said many, many times, the situation in the aftermath of the election is really a matter between the Iranian Government and its people. Clearly, there are many within the political structure, within the clerical structure, that want to see a broader political process, a genuine political process, the formation of a genuine political opposition. And clearly, the regime is determined, and has taken direct actions, to inhibit that from happening both in terms of the arrest of those who have expressed their views publicly of intention and inhibitions given to journalists, and so on and so forth. And obviously, this continues to roil within Iran.

I think it’s not for us to give the Iranian regime advice, other than they should continue to take actions, or should start to take actions, to meet the genuine aspirations of their people.

QUESTION: Well, in that proposal they mentioned that they respect the right of people for free – to have free elections, and they talk about justice and rule of law and --

MR. CROWLEY: I think we would say that actions speak more loudly than words. And clearly, their activities of the past few weeks hardly show a government that is interested in having a free and fair and open political process.

Latest on The IAEA Conclusion on Iran's Nuclear Programme (28 August)

Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Talks, Threats, and Propaganda

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UPDATE 2 September, 0900 GMT: In an interview with Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad el Baradei has said, "Somehow, many people are talking about how Iran's nuclear program is the greatest threat to the world. In many ways, I think the threat has been hyped....The idea that we'll wake up tomorrow and Iran will have a nuclear weapon is an idea that isn't supported by the facts as we have seen them so far."

UPDATE 29 August, 0920 GMT: An EA correspondent has pointed out, in response to my judgement, "These conclusions could be, almost word for word, the conclusions of reports from 2008", that there is a subtle difference from the IAEA's June 2009 report: "The section on possible military dimensions is considerably longer and more detailed...and also entails a subtle change of tone." In particular, the IAEA emphasizes that documentation "derived from multiple sources over different periods [is so] generally consistent and sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran".

This should not be read as a declaration that Iran has moved towards nuclear weapons capability. Rather, it is an amplification of the IAEA's frustration at not getting full access to Iranian facilities to verify the state of research and development.

As we expected, such subtleties are beyond the US press. The New York Times, confused that "Iran Has Bolstered Ability to Make Fuel but Slowed Its Output", gives up and puts out the panicky conclusion, supported by far-from-neutral "outside experts", "If Iran’s current stockpile of low-enriched uranium was further purified, it would have nearly two warheads’ worth of bomb fuel."
---

We reprint below the conclusions of the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran's Nuclear Programme. The full report is available on the website of the Institute for Science and International Security.

As we noted earlier this week, there has been and will be a rush of propaganda around this report. Those who wish to put pressure on Iran, including tougher economic sanctions, will bring out the finding that Iran "has not suspended its enrichment related activities". More ominously, they will convert the IAEA's "remaining issues of concern which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme" into the conclusion that Iran is definitely pursuing nuclear weapons. (The US State Department has already put out the statement, "Based on what we have seen in press reports ... it seems clear that Iran continues to not cooperate fully and continues its (uranium) enrichment activities." Ha'aretz has trotted out the Israeli line, "The report states that Iran may be working towards acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.")

On the other side, Iranian officials will claim, with the finding of "the non-diversion of declared nuclear material" that they are in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Or in the objective summary of Press TV, "the UN nuclear watchdog has confirmed that the country is improving its cooperation with the agency while it continues to enrich uranium in spite of UN Security Council resolutions".

All of this will overshadow the real significance of the report, which is that almost nothing has changed over the last year. Indeed, these conclusions could be, almost word for word, the conclusions of reports from 2008. This is a limbo in which Iran is neither culpable of definite violations of the NPT through pursuit of weaponry rather than civilian energy nor exonerated with full inspections of the IAEA of its research and production facilities.

Implementation of the NPT [Non-Proliferation] Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General
....
26. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.

Iran has cooperated with the Agency in improving safeguards measures at FEP and in providing the Agency with access to the IR-40 reactor for purposes of design information verification. Iran has not, however, implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, on the early provision of design information.

27. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council.

28. Contrary to the requests of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Regrettably, the Agency has not
been able to engage Iran in any substantive discussions about these outstanding issues for over a year. The Agency believes that it has provided Iran with sufficient access to documentation in its possession to enable Iran to respond substantively to the questions raised by the Agency. However, the Director General urges Member States which have
provided documentation to the Agency to work out new modalities with the Agency so that it could share further documentation with Iran, as appropriate, since the Agency’s inability to do so is rendering it difficult for the Agency to progress further in its verification process.

29. It is critical for Iran to implement the Additional Protocol and clarify the outstanding issues in order for the Agency to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

30. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.