Iran Special: 5-Point Guide to Ahmadinejad v. Supreme Leader --- What Caused It, What It Means, and What Will Happen

1. IS THIS SERIOUS?

Yes --- as an Iran-based EA correspondent summarised, "It is more than cosmetic and it is more than a minor spat."

For confirmation, look at the signals from all sides. The President's disappearance since last week is more than a "sulk": with his failure to attend meetings of the Cabinet as well as other important bodies like the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, he is effectively boycotting government with his colleagues.

The Supreme Leader staked out his position, first in a letter (leaked to supportive media) and then with a public statement, that he would not accept the forced "resignation" of the Minister of Intelligence, Heydar Moslehi. The Ministry would remain in his domain, not Ahmadinejad's.

And others around and linked to the two sides have staked out serious positions. Clerics, politicians, and officials have supported the Supreme Leader or the Government --- usually the former --- and there have been threats that Ahmadinejad could meet the fate of Iran's first President, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, who was forced from office and barely escaped with his life in 1981.

This might not have been serious had Ahmadinejad accepted the Supreme Leader's face-saving offer last week. While backing the Ministry of Intelligence, Ayatollah Khamenei called on it to live up to its important responsbilities, a concession --- albeit a minor one --- to criticism from the President's camp that the Ministry had been "weak".

Ahmadinejad could have joined in this call, accepting the Supreme Leader's authority over the Ministry but also displaying a secondary power in the Executive over his officials. He chose not to --- so far.

2. WHAT CAUSED THE DISPUTE?

The immediate cause was the attempt by the Minister of Intelligence, Moslehi, to dismiss a deputy whom he considered to be an ally of the President's office.

The broader political contest goes back years, however. In his six years in office, Ahmadinejad has tried to extend the powers of his Presidency. In his first term, for example, he dismissed a series of ministers and advisors on the economic front as he tried to stamp his authority on a new direction for Tehran. He has been in a running quarrel with Parliament, highlighted in recent months by disputes over the budget and the control of Islamic Azad University. He even waged a battle with the Supreme Leader over the naming of his closest advisors, losing in the effort to make Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai 1st Vice President but then retaining him as Chief of Staff.

But with the decision to go after the Ministry of Intelligence, Ahmadinejad chose a campaign beyond any of his previous quests for power. For the Ministry, unlike others, is specifically the territory of the Supreme Leader....

3. SO WHY DID AHMADINEJAD PICK THIS FIGHT?

The answer for the President's move on the Ministry of Intelligence, effectively crossing a "red line", lies in the Ministry's role in Iranian elections.

It is generally known that the Guardian Council of six clerics and six legal specialists decides who can and cannot run for Parliament and the Presidency. What is not usually recognised is that the Ministry of Intelligence also has that power: it vets proposed candidates for their "security".

The Ahmadinejad camp faces a major challenge in next year's Parliamentary elections, not from the reformists who have effectively been limited and even shut out of the process, but from other conservative/principlist factions. One hope to prevent a bad result was that the Guardian Council would not only disqualify candidates seen as part of the "sedition" of the Green Movement and unacceptable reformists but also would rule out some linked to Ahmadinejad rivals like Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Secretary of the Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei, and even Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani.

In recent weeks, however, the Guardian Council has been sending out signals that it would not carry out that task. So the President and his inner circle considered the alternative of the Ministry of Intelligence.

Moslehi had been selected in 2009 by Ahmadinejad, in a previous scrap over power at the Ministry, to replace Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei. But, as an EA correspondent noted yesterday, "many people selected by the President soon find it difficult to work with Ahmadinejad".  Bluntly put, the President's team did not see Moslehi as reliable and was looking for alternatives. (One of those alternatives may have been the deputy, Hossein Abdollahian, whom Moslehi tried to dismiss, sparking the immediate crisis.)

Two years ago, when the President tried to re-shape the Ministry, the Supreme Leader accepted the move. After all, there was a convergence of interest: the main threat was from the post-election protests and the rise of the Green Movement. Ahmadinejad's legitimacy was at stake, but so was Khamenei's, since he had put his personal stamp of approval on the disputed Presidential vote.

Now the challenge from the Green/reformist opposition --- many of its leaders in prison, communications disrupted, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi under strict house arrest --- has receded. With the battle is within the establishment, the alliance of necessity between the President and Supreme Leader has broken down.

Ahmadinejad could have recognised this and avoided the fight over the Ministry of Intelligence; however, he faced a ticking clock. In just over two years, his Presidency ends. If his quest to expand power was to continue, it would have to come from a successor allied with his views. That successor is thought to be his close aide, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai. And to pave the way for Rahim-Mashai, a boost in the 2012 Parliamentary elections is needed. 

Thus, the President made his choice: he had challenged Khamenei before, with partial success. Now he would go for an even bigger victory.

4. WHAT HAPPENS NOW?

The immediate mystery is Ahmadinejad's "disappearance" after the Supreme Leader's intervention on behalf of Moslehi and the Ministry of Intelligence. For more than a week, the President has not been seen, skipping his Cabinet and Government meetings.

That mystery is likely to be resolved in the next few days. Ahmadinejad is seeking a prime-time TV appearance --- live, unedited and thus "un-censored" --- to make his case to the Iranian people.

But of course, even if the President was to get his way, this would be only one tactical move in the struggle. For on the wider battlefield, iAhmadinejad has fewer and fewer troops amongst the Iranian elite. The Parliamentary leadership under Ali Larijani is against him, most of the senior clerics --- with their animosity towards Rahim-Mashai --- have no love for the Government, and his media support is contracting to the State outlet IRNA under the direction of his former aide Ali Akbar Javanfekr. The Revolutionary Guards show no sign of wanting to choose a side and, if so, choosing the President's side.

So look to Ahmadinejad to play the "populist" card, with his TV appearance and following steps like another tour of the provinces. "I have the people behind me", he will attempt to say to the Supreme Leader.

5. WILL IT WORK?

Doubtful. The supposed power of the people could be used to knock back the Green/reformist challenge, but that came through a regime effort --- note the orchestrated rallies of 30 December 2009 and 11 February 2010 to check the opposition tide.

Using the "people" in a fight within the establishment, especially in a campaign against the Supreme Leader, is a far different proposition. 

Look for Ahmadinejad's populist strategy to fade quickly. And then the President will face a deal offered to him by Khamenei: 1) no more attempted extension of Presidential power --- in effect, a "lame duck" status for Ahmadinejad until 2013; 2) no anointed successor.