Iran Election Guide

Donate to EAWV





Or, click to learn more

Search

Entries in uranium enrichment (4)

Monday
Dec212009

Iran & The Nuclear Talks: The View from Tehran

IRAN NUKES2Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh of the Tehran International Studies and Research Institute writes for Iran Review about the current state of discussions over Iran's uranium enrichment programme: "The issue is not too complicated and under normal circumstances, the chances of finding a solution are greater than before."

First of all, let me point out certain facts about Iran’s nuclear case:

1. Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. In 1974, the country signed a bilateral agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is known as the Nuclear Safeguards Act, to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. The agreement has been registered under No. INFCIRC/214 as Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153). Accordingly, the Agency has conducted many inspections of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear facilities, all of which attested to the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities.

Iran: Why the US Sanctions Game on Tehran is All Wrong
The Latest from Iran (21 December): The Montazeri Funeral



2. The West’s treatment of Iran nuclear case before presidency of Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made not only the Iranian elite, but also the public conclude that the end result would be losses, giving concessions with no result, submission to West’s bullying, and foregoing an inalienable and natural right.

Thereafter, all forms of negotiations were considered negative, and anything that led to progress in nuclear research was construed an emblem of patriotism, which strengthened a sense of self-confidence and national self-reliance.

3. Interactions between Iran and the Agency have been based more on goodwill than confrontation. During all the time that the Agency has been in charge of Iran’s nuclear case, adoption of a cooperative policy by the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Agency has prompted the IAEA director general to declare more than once that there has been no evidence to prove any deviation in Iran’s nuclear program toward non-peaceful applications, and the Agency has been able to verify reports submitted by Iran. All his reports attested to Iran having implemented the Safeguards Act. Iran has also provided access to declared nuclear material by the Agency and has presented necessary reports related to those materials and other nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Agency has admitted in its reports that all nuclear materials produced at Natanz facility, all installed cascades and the whole UF6 produced at Isfahan UCF are under full control of IAEA and have been accounted for. On the other hand, the Agency has announced in reports issued in September and November 2005 as well as February 2008 that all outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear activities have been resolved and the case has been closed.

4. As for allegations about Iran pursuing a military nuclear program, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency has frequently noted that there has been no evidence to uphold those allegations. In his report in May 26, 2008, Mohamed El Baradei noted that the Agency has found no information about practical design or production of nuclear weapon components in Iran. In the same report, the director general noted that there has been no practical use of nuclear materials for purposes mentioned in alleged studies. Also, one day after publication of a report by the American intelligence agencies on Iran’s nuclear program, the IAEA director general issued a statement noting that the intelligence estimate on Iran’s nuclear program totally conformed to what the Agency had asserted in the past few years about absence of any conclusive evidence to prove that there was a weapons program underway in Iran.

What is the main point which every fair mind would associate with the above paragraphs? The conclusions reached after reading the above paragraphs will be, at least, as follows:

1. At no time in the past few years have Iran’s nuclear activities been out of control;

2. Iran’s willingness to interact with the Agency is not just a propaganda drive and has been proven on many occasions; and

3. The political dimension of the nuclear program greatly outweighs its legal dimension.

Interestingly, despite all cooperation that Iran has shown with the International Atomic Energy Agency and its good interaction with P5+1 [US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China], and although Iran remains committed to NPT, the nuclear case has been reflected in Western media in such a way that as if this is the greatest threat to international peace and security.

Iif Iran was bent on opposing the demands of international community or not complying with its obligations, halting negotiations with P5+1 or quitting the NPT would have been the most available options for a country conducting a clandestine nuclear program. The claim that Iran is trying to buy time is not true: the time needed to increase uranium enrichment from below 5 percent to above 90 percent for a country which, despite extensive sanctions is trying to do it through indigenous know-how, is not comparable to prolonged periods of negotiations or asking for more time to review a proposed package more painstakingly.

At present, the nuclear case of Iran has hit a new deadline. Those who thought that Obama’s new approach and his emphasis on negotiations, combined with Iran’s acceptance of the proposal to swap its low enriched uranium with 20-percent enriched uranium, would work to solve the problem now feel that they have been duped. This is not a good sign. Marginalization of optimism and of those who hope to achieve a diplomatic solution will only bring those who have sought a military solution from the first to the fore. They will emphasize that if Iran’s nuclear facilities are bombed or more paralyzing sanctions are imposed, Iran and Iranians would be brought to their knees. After destruction of all Iranian facilities, the world would be back to normal and peace would be restored!

I don’t know about you, but I feel people who reach such a conclusion have closed their eyes on a major part of human history or know nothing about psychological reactions of nations who feel that they have been wronged.

To head off this process, finding a solution to Iran’s nuclear issue needs tact and discretion more than anything else. Both sides should be discreet enough to sit at the negotiating table and look at this issue from another angel. Otherwise, the headlines which we must expect to see in the coming weeks would be something like these: renewed threats from P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear program; Iran reiterates peaceful nature of its nuclear program; new Security Council resolution against Iran introduces tougher sanctions; Iran says resolution not fair, still insisting on nuclear rights; more sanctions contemplated by US and Europe; more pressure on Russia and China to reduce trade with Iran; Iran says capable of enriching uranium up to 20 percent; West intensifies sanctions against Iran….

However, if another side like the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose main intent is to calm down both sides and highlight positive signals which point to a possible agreement, takes up the case and goes beyond usual obstinate positions taken by the two sides to find a balanced model based on understanding of current problems, it is sure to reach a good conclusion. The issue is not too complicated and under normal circumstances, the chances of finding a solution are greater than before.
Saturday
Dec192009

The Latest from Iran (19 December): After the Mythical "Millions"

MOHARRAM31735 GMT: Making Stuff Up - The Twitter Attack. There's not much to add to Austin Heap's guest analysis for Enduring America this morning. Instead, The New York Times shows the power of pointless speculation, backed up by lack of any knowledge of important context, in an article by their technology writers:
Beth Jones, a senior threat researcher at the Internet security firm Sophos, said the attack did not look very sophisticated and probably was not the effort of a Web terrorist or other professional. “It could have been any number of people doing it,” she said. Ms. Jones said the incident may have been “hacktivism,” an attack with a social or political motivation. “The point could purely be just to prove the site is insecure,” she said

Just gonna say this one more time: if this was just "hacktivism" unrelated to the Iran internal crisis, why did the attackers first go after one of the Green Movement's primary websites for news?

(For an analysis which is more useful, and a lot funnier, see Persian Umpire's interpretation.)

NEW Iran Analysis: RegimeFail?
NEW Iran Special: Austin Heap on “The Attack on Twitter”
Latest Iran Video: Mehdi Karroubi Interview with BBC (17 December)
Iran: The Regime Takes On (Hacks?) Twitter for Moharram
Iran Analysis: The Regime’s Sword Wavers

Iran on Moharram, Day 1: The Regime Flops?
The Latest from Iran (18 December): Moharram Begins

.
1730 GMT: Today's Foreign Enemies Will Kill All Iranians Warning. Let's hand over to Revolutionary Guard Lieutenant Commander Brigadier General Hossein Salami:

Enemies will not give up their devilish moves against the Iranian nation, they have brought their front to our streets and universities today and the battle is still on....Pointing to the enemy's nonstop strategy to confront the Islamic Republic, the commander noted, "These moves form a chain of profound global plot against the Iranian nation....If we do not practice the necessary vigilance, we could (be obliged to) play in the enemy's court.

Etc., etc., etc.

1345 GMT: Confirming Torture Deaths? Mehr News reports that the judicial section of the Armed Forces has concluded that three detainees in the now-closed Kahrizak Prison died from abuse and not from meningitis, as was originally claimed. The deaths cited are those of Mohsen Ruholamini (son of the advisor to Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei), Amir Javadifar, and Mohammad Kamrani.

In its investigation of alleged abuses, the panel has questioned 22 people and indicted 12, three of whom are involved in the Kahrizak cases.

1315 GMT: Hashemi, Join Us. In an interview in Mizan News, conducted before Friday's events, the son of Mehdi Karroubi, Hossein, was blunt: people expect former President Hashemi Rafsanjani to distance himself from the Government and join those asking for justice.

1310 GMT: Khatami's Latest Statement. The website supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi published a statement from former President Mohammad Khatami to faculty at Hamedan University, insisting on reform and respect for protest:
The Islamic system does not respect people’s votes, those who behave like this should not claim to be on the path of Imam Khomeini and the revolution....The policy that is accepted in Islam is a moral policy. If we commit the worst actions under the name of religion we cannot claim that we are in favour of religion.

1300 GMT: Did the Clerics-Rafsanjani Initiative Reach Khamenei? Remember our analysis of recent weeks about discussions between senior clerics and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani in a bid for "unity" between the Government and the opposition?

Well, eyebrows are raised over this item from the reformist website Rah-e-Sabz, which claims secret but futile meetings of high-ranking Tehran and Qom clerics with the Supreme Leader. The website adds that the clerics warned Khamenei that many of his religious supporters, and indeed members of the Revolutionary Guard and Basij militia, are now searching for another "marjah" (source of emulation) after the brutal suppression of protest. (hat-tip to EA reader "Arshama")

1250 GMT: It Just Isn't Going Well. A public sign of doubt after the mini-marches yesterday: an EA reader points out the complaints from a pro-regime website about the "meagre popular support for yesterday’s rallies" and the focus of slogans attacking the opposition, rather than praising Ayatollah Khomeini. (And the comments aren't much more hopeful, with plenty to say about the "lying government".)

1230 GMT: Oh, Mahmoud, You Do Say the Darnedest Things.... Normally I wouldn't bother with this, but it's a relatively slow news day and the statement is kind of funny for its brazenness:
Iran's president says he will soon write to the UN Secretary-General asking for his country to be compensated for World War II damages. "We will seek compensation for World War II damages. I have assigned a team to calculate the costs," Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said at a Friday press conference in the Danish capital.

"I will write a letter to the UN Secretary-General [Ban Ki-moon] asking for Iran to be compensated for the damages," he added, pointing out that such a move is necessary to ensure that justice was served. Ahmadinejad told the reporters that the countries that won the Second World War had inflicted a lot of damage on Iran by invading the country and using its resources.

The president added that while the former Soviet Union, the United States and Britain received compensation after the conflict, Iran had been given nothing to make up for the suffering its people had endured.

Dude, I don't want to rain on your rhetorical parade, but the UN Secretary-General has no authority to order reparations. You could try the UN Security Council, I guess, but as three of its permanent members are the US, Britain, and Russia....

(And forgive me for being provocative, but wasn't there a really costly war for Iran more recently than 1945? One with a neighbour that supposedly has a bit of money from the oilfields it is auctioning?)

1020 GMT: And if you're into the Iran-Iraq border incident that is not war, Reuters indicates that Iran is seeking a "diplomatic" resolution over the alleged 11-troop occupation of the oil well.

0950 GMT: On the Nuclear Front. In case you want a break from the internal battle in Iran, the latest from Tehran, at least in the form of Ali Akhbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, is good-cop/bad-cop noises.

On Friday, Salehi said that about 6,000 of Iran's centrifuges were operational. That comment was jumped on by some media in the "West" and Israel as a sign of Iran's aggressive intention. In fact, it was far from that: Iran's chief enrichment plant at Natanz has 8000 centrifuges, so Salehi was admitting that, at most, Natanz was 75% effective. (The most recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency said that half of the centrifuges were working.) Salehi added that Iran would not be adding extra capacity soon, with a new generation of centrifuges not ready until 2011 and the heavy-water plant at Arak still "three or four years" away from service.

Today, however, Salehi is taking a tougher stance, declaring that "the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution against Iran is ineffective" and there would be no halt in the construction of the second enrichment plant at Fordoo.

0920 GMT: We've posted a guest analysis by Austin Heap of yesterday's cyber-attack on Twitter by an Iranian group.

0755 GMT: Mousavi Defiance Behind Regime Threats? One intriguing story this morning: the reformist website Rah-e-Sabz claims that Iran's judiciary pressed Mir Hossein Mousavi to withhold or at least moderate any statement of support for protests on 16 Azar (7 December). Mousavi's refusal, and indeed his publication of a high-profile message to Iranian students, angered the authorities and led to the ominous threats of arrests and trials.

0745 GMT: A morning, and possibly a day, to relax and assess after the fizzling of the regime's attempt to show strength on Friday (see our  special analysis, "RegimeFail").

No sign yet of counter-moves by the opposition, either within or outside the establishment, and Western media are likely to be wandering around after the Iran "invasion of Iraq" story (we're still treating 11 Iranian soldiers raising a flag over an oil well as a political manoeuvre which will bring more politics, rather than confrontation) and whatever pops up on the nuclear front.
Sunday
Dec132009

The Latest from Iran (13 December): Bubbling Over?

BASIJ STUDENTS1940 GMT: More Positions on the "Burning of Khomeini": More than 230 members of Parliament have issued a statement strongly condemning the incident, presumably (but not clearly, at least in the Press TV report) criticising the opposition and calling on the judiciary officials to punish those responsible. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has also denounced the act, expressing hope that it would not be repeated.

Iranian Students News Agency have published a series of photos (see inset) of Basij students of Azad University protesting in Jamaran, the neighbourhood where Imam Khomeini lived. Islamic Republic News Agency writes about the sit-in of Basij students at Tehran University.

1935 GMT: We Really Don't Have A Clue. Mehr News tries --- and fails --- to answer our question about President Ahmadinejad's meeting with Ali Larijani and Sadegh Larijani, "What Did They Say?" (1640 GMT): "The subsidy bill, which has become a thorny dispute between the Majlis and the administration, probably featured prominently in the talks. The Judiciary’s investigation of major economic corruption cases was also likely high on the agenda."

1800 GMT: Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani is the latest clerical supporter of the opposition to condemn the desecration of Imam Khomenei's image and the Government's manipulation of the issue.

1640 GMT: So What Did They Say? Oh, to be a fly on the wall: President Ahmadinejad has met both Ali Larijani, Speaker of Parliament, and Sadegh Larijani, head of Iran's judiciary. No details but atmosphere was cordial enough for an official photograph.

1615 GMT: Reformists Alongside Khomeini. Former President Mohammad Khatami, after a strong denial that the opposition would dishonour Ayatollah Khomeini, has upheld the Imam as a standard for the Green movement, saying that it is the duty of religious people to protest.

1550 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? Well, during all the protests and the furour over a possible showdown with opposition leaders, President Ahmadinejad is doing a spot of diplomatic entertaining. He met a Hamas delegation led by the political director, Khaled Meshaal, and declared, "The government and the people of Iran will always stand by the Palestinian resistance and the Palestinian people. Today Palestine is symbol of the global front of freedom-seekers and militants."

NEW Iran Analysis: Sifting the Propaganda – Government About to Arrest Opposition Leaders?
NEW Latest Videos from Iran's Universities (13 December)
NEW Latest Iran Video: Tehran University Protest & Strike (12 December)
Iran Special: Kermit the Frog Re-Mixes “It’s Not Easy Being Green”
Iran: A Renewed Washington Love Affair With The Green Movement?
Iran’s Arrest of Majid Tavakoli: “Khamenei in Hejab/We Are All Majids”
Iran: The Arrest of Majid Tavakoli “His 16 Azar Speech on Video”
Iran: “The Military Will Stand with the Iranian People”? (with Audio)

The Latest from Iran (12 December): Bubbling Under

1535 GMT: Demoting Rafsanjani. According to Tabnak, Islamic Republic News Agency employees have been directed to use the clerical title "Hojatoleslam" when referring to Hashemi Rafsanjani. "Hojjatoleslam" is lower in rank than "Ayatollah", the previous title for the former President.

1350 GMT: Undaunted? Videos are coming through from protests at Iranian universities. We already have four campuses in the collection we've posted, and more may emerge during the afternoon. At Tehran University, Green demonstrators are facing a counter-protest from Basij students who are declaring a three-day sit-in. Security forces have surrounded the university.

1320 GMT: Revising the Threat Assessment. Mr Smith is walking me through the video of the Supreme Leader's speech, and he has a more ominous reading of this as a warning:

[Khamenei] is quite openly saying that the opposition "shall be wiped out". You can chalk this up as a prelude to any sort of harsh measure against the opposition.

This was a "make my day" speech, and one that quite bluntly asked the opposition leaders to back off and shut up. As a challenge, it ranks with the June 19 speech, if not even more emphatic than that.

To my query, "Is this then an ultimatum to the opposition not to make trouble during Moharram (beginning this Friday?", Mr Smith replies, "I think the gist is, shut up, don't make trouble during Tasua and Ashura (26-27 December)."

1230 GMT: Putting the Threats Together, But....? The Associated Press has picked up on a warning on the website of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, linking the "burning of Khomeini" story to the prospect of arrests: ''The Guard ... won't tolerate any silence or hesitation in the immediate identification, trial and punishment of those carrying out this ugly insult and the agents behind them."

Which still leaves the question of whether the threat will be carried. Reuters is the first "Western" agency to note the Supreme Leader's speech (see 1030 GMT) but misses the passage that we noted --- "keep your calm" --- indicating that drastic action will not take place.

1030 GMT: Wow, We Couldn't Predict This. Speaking this morning, the Supreme Leader declared, "[Our] enemies' groundwork is sedition and our groundwork should be strengthening perception and vision. Some people breached law and encouraged people to stand against regime. As a result,our desperate enemies got hope and insulted our Imam."

Now, are there arrests to follow the rhetoric? Here's a hint from Khamenei that there won't be: "Following insult to Imam Khomeieni, people became angry; but keep your calm, these people are rootless and can't confront [us]."

Instead, the Supreme Leader issued a "Back Off" message to Washington, as well as playing the "foreign intervention" card, "The President of USA declared that each Government that break laws must be accountable, but USA's governement is the biggest lawbreaker in world."

0830 GMT: News this morning is dominated by the rumours of a Government crackdown on the opposition, including the arrest of Green leaders. We have posted an analysis sifting through the propaganda and confusion to assess the likelihood that the regime will make an ultimate move.

Discussion also continues about the immediate background for the latest rumours, the battle over the alleged burning of the image of Imam Khomeini. EA reader Naj offers an analysis of the Government's propaganda strategy on  the blog Neo-Resistance.

Meanwhile, if you want a diversion from the internal tension, there is always the posturing over the nuclear discussions. The US has issued a summary rejection of Iran's proposal, put by Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki yesterday, for a "swap" of uranium inside the country: "Iran's proposal does not appear to be consistent with the fair and balanced draft agreement proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency." The pro forma No does not mean, however, that the discussions have been closed.

Mottaki and the US have also swapped blows over their political power plays in Latin America. After Hillary Clinton's unsubtle warning to Latin American countries not to engage with Iran, the world's top supporter of terrorism, Mottaki took the high ground, "We condemn such attitudes which violate values of the third millennium."
Wednesday
Dec092009

Iran: A Discussion on "Engagement" and The State of the Regime (Sadjadpour and Lucas)

CHESSBOARD GREENWith all the developments of and beyond 16 Azar, we have had to put our analysis of US-Iranian relations on the back burner (especially given that the US Government seems to have taken no official notice of this week's demonstrations). So we thank an EA reader who has brought this dimension back to the forefront by sending us Karim Sadjadpour's analysis, in an interview with Middle East Progress, of the current state of "engagement". Points from the interview that I think merit further discussion:

1) Sadjadpour's portrayal is of a regime that, primarily because the Supreme Leader remains beyond challenge, has successfully ostracised "opposition within" such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, despite the hostility that he notes to President Ahmadinejad.

My own view is that the regime is more fragmented than he portrays. As we have highlighted today, there are moves from within the Establishment against President Ahmadinejad in the name of "national unity", but this is not just a case of removing one political figurehead. Simply placing an unchallenged Supreme Leader on top of this system --- apart from the fact that the Supreme Leader has himself been challenged on occasion "from within" since June --- obscures this fragmentation.

2) So Sadjadpour is on the mark that the prospect of a resolution between the US and Iran on uranium enrichment is receding, albeit not because the Iranian regime is unified under Ayatollah Khamenei but because it is riven with divisions. Indeed, if you put the nuclear issue in a wider context, those divisions come out in Sadjadpour's answer on the issue of subsidies and Ahmadinejad's economic plans.

3) Sadjadpour is right that the Obama Administration will now be "bumped", especially by Congress, into putting forth sanctions proposals. However, I think he is too optimistic about international acceptance, especially from Russia and China. The more pragmatic Obama officials recognise this, I suspect, and will try to limit the sanctions package as well as taking it outside the United Nations Security Council.

4) The most interesting part of the interview, perhaps ironically given the initial attention to "engagement", is Sadjadpour's return to the internal politics beyond the influence (and possibly cognizance) of the US Government. Thus the observation without immediate answers, as this is a marathon, not a sprint:


Both the government and the opposition are in precarious positions....I think the regime’s legitimacy will continue to decay, and they will be forced to rely on repressive measures to keep order....At the same time, the opposition leadership, partly by design, has not defined a clear game plan or end game, a clear alternative vision for Iran.

5) Speaking personally, while I may have differences in interpretation from Sadjadpour, I am alongside him on this sentiment (with the provision that one has to be very careful in explaining what it means to "facilitate...political change"):


This is an incredibly important time in Iran’s history and we want to be able to look back years from now and say we were on the right side of history. I sometimes fear that we may look back years from now and see that there was a tremendous opportunity to help champion and facilitate the cause of political change in Iran, but rather than taking it seriously we focused all of our attention on the nuclear issue.

Middle East Progress: The Iranian government has yet to agree to the IAEA proposal for enrichment of Iran’s low enriched uranium in a third country. What do you think are the aims of the government with regards to the proposal?

Karim Sadjadpour: Over the last several years—and especially since last June’s tainted presidential elections—any remaining moderates or pragmatists that were once part of the Iranian government’s decision-making structure have essentially been purged from the system.

Today the country is being run by a hardline Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who is surrounded by likeminded ideologues who have two overarching instincts: mistrust and defiance. They generally perceive proposals and overtures that are endorsed by the United States as poison pills. Individuals who were capable of deal-making—like former President Hashemi Rafsanjani—are now on the outside looking

MEP: But what about someone like Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani, who seemed willing to make deals when he was Iran’s nuclear negotiator, but is now sounding more strident?

Sadjadpour: Larijani is a good litmus test. While less than a decade ago he was referred to in the Western press as an arch hard-liner, in the current context he’s thought of as a pragmatist. If the color spectrum of the Iranian regime now ranges from pitch black to dark grey, Larijani is dark grey. But given that Larijani’s rise to power has been based on his fealty to Khamenei, he’s not going to say anything out of step with the Leader.

MEP: What do you make of the recent announcement about the ten new uranium enrichment plants?

Sadjadpour: I think it’s mostly bluster. To put it into perspective: it has taken Iran over two decades to complete the enrichment facility at Natanz, and it’s still not fully operational. Creating ten Natanz-size enrichment facilities, at a time when they’re facing more international scrutiny than ever, would take decades, and is certainly not an imminent threat. To the credit of the Obama administration they’ve projected the poise of a superpower and have largely chosen to ignore Iran’s bombast.

MEP: If the IAEA proposal doesn’t lead anywhere, what are the options for next steps for the United States and the international community?

Sadjadpour: I think the door of dialogue and engagement will remain open, but the Obama administration will be forced into policies—sanctions and other punitive measures—they would have liked to avoid.

In contrast to the Bush administration, I think the Europeans, and even the Russians and Chinese, recognize that since Obama’s inauguration last June the United States has made numerous overtures to Iran, made a good-faith diplomatic effort to change the tone and context of the U.S.-Iran relationship, but Tehran was either unable or unwilling to reciprocate. For this reason the Obama administration is in a much better position to attain a robust international sanctions regime than the Bush administration was.

MEP: You spoke a little bit about Russia and China. What is your sense of how far they are willing to go in terms of putting pressure on Iran?

Sadjadpour: Both countries are instinctively opposed to sanctions, but Iranian intransigence has put them in a bind. In the last few years, Russia’s modus operandi has been to endorse sanctions against Iran that they themselves have watered down. This way they can claim to the U.S. and EU that they’re supportive of their position, while privately also reassuring the Iranians that they’re sympathetic to Tehran’s position. U.S. officials feel more confident than ever that Russian patience with Iran is waning, but it remains to be seen what that means in concrete terms.

One of the reasons why Russian support is so important to the U.S. is because China has tended to follow Moscow’s lead on Iran policy. The China-Iran relationship is a more straightforward commercial relationship—China needs Iran’s energy—and I don’t think anyone believes that China will completely sever its economic ties with Iran. That said, though China has signed a lot of seemingly lucrative memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with Tehran, few deals have actually been executed, and because of the headaches of dealing with Iran the Chinese have increasingly sought out energy relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In essence, China will not be willing or able to singlehandedly fill the enormous vacuum left behind by Western companies in Iran.

MEP: What do you think is going on with the Ahmadinejad government’s plan to phase out the subsidies? Do you think that’s linked to sanctions?

Sadjadpour: Phasing out the subsidies has been discussed for years but has always been seen as too risky a move for any Iranian politician. Ahmadinejad’s idea is to discontinue the blanket subsidies on food items and petrol—which cost the government as much $100 billion per annum—and instead dole out some of that money directly to lower income classes that need it most.

There is a great deal of opposition to the plan from across the political spectrum; many lawmakers, including some Ahmadinejad supporters, fear that it will cause rampant inflation and further alienate middle class Iranians whose cost of living will rise dramatically but who will not receive government stipends. At a time when the government is seeking to restore stability, they fear that phasing out the subsidies could provoke further unrest.

It’s unclear how much the timing of the subsidy withdrawal debate is linked to the sanctions debate. I’m sure some elements of the regime believe that if they phase out the subsidies at the same time they’re hit with sanctions, they can blame foreign powers for the economic tumult. They may be playing with fire, however; in my experience living in Iran I always found that people overwhelmingly cited mismanage and corruption as the primary culprits of the country’s economic malaise, not sanctions. Post-June I think the government will get even less benefit of the doubt.

MEP: What is your sense of the regional perspective on Iran and what role Iran’s neighbors could play, or are playing?

Sadjadpour: I think Arab governments were happy to see the Iranian regime get its nose bloodied after last June’s elections, but they are concerned about the prospect of profound change in Tehran for a couple reasons. First, the arrival of a democratic Iran has potentially problematic implications for a predominantly autocratic region. Second, many Arab countries are deeply ambivalent if not down-right opposed to the prospect of Iran—with its vast natural and human resources—finally emerging from its largely self-inflicted isolation and beginning to realize its enormous potential.

With regards to the nuclear issue, in a nutshell, Arab governments don’t want Iran to get the bomb, and they don’t want Iran to get bombed. Their strategy is to essentially let the United States take care of the problem, though in recent weeks I’ve heard Arab officials express concern that the U.S. hasn’t presented them with a clear Iran strategy, and how they fit into that strategy.

Regarding the Arab public, there is an inverse correlation between U.S. and Iranian popularity in the region. Meaning, when the U.S. is most unpopular, Iran’s ideology resonates the loudest. Opinion polls indicate that since Obama’s arrival, Ahmadinejad and Iran’s stock has dropped among people in the region. I suspect that the post-election tumult also dismayed many Arabs who once romanticized Iran as a popular government intent on fighting injustice.

MEP: Israel has so far let the United States take the lead in dealing with Iran. What is your sense of their perspective?

Sadjadpour: The Israelis are impatient; by all accounts Prime Minister Netanyahu genuinely believes that a nuclear-armed Iran poses an existential threat to Israel, so they obviously have a far greater sense of urgency. While U.S. officials take the prospect of an independent Israeli strike against Iran seriously, I think many Israelis understand that the ramifications would likely be calamitous, particularly within Iran. I sincerely believe that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad would welcome an Israeli strike on their nuclear facilities; it is perhaps the only thing that could mend internal political rifts, silence the opposition movement, and entrench the most radical elements of this regime for years to come.

MEP: Where do things stand internally in Iran six months after the election?

Sadjadpour: Both the government and the opposition are in precarious positions. The regime hasn’t recouped its lost legitimacy, and will continue to lose supporters as the economic situation deteriorates. They increasingly resemble a military junta, and there is serious dissent among them; even folks close to Khamenei, like Larijani and Tehran mayor Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, would like to get rid of Ahmadinejad.

As for the opposition, its leadership and brain trust remains either in prison, under house arrest or unable to freely operate. Though the scale and frequency of popular protests has subsided, the millions who took to the streets post-election have not been pacified or co-opted. Smaller-sized protests, especially at universities around the country, have continued with great intensity, as we witnessed again yesterday.

MEP: What do you see happening? Where do you see things heading?

Sadjadpour: I think the regime’s legitimacy will continue to decay, and they will be forced to rely on repressive measures to keep order. I don’t question their willingness to shed blood to stay in power. Khamenei is unwilling to make any meaningful compromises with the opposition, for he believes it will make him look weak. Whatever they choose to do, history is not on their side.

At the same time, the opposition leadership, partly by design, has not defined a clear game plan or end game, a clear alternative vision for Iran. They’re taking a very deliberate approach, trying to recruit as many people as possible under the tent of the green movement, including disaffected clerics and Revolutionary Guardsmen.

It remains to be seen whether the current opposition leadership—Mousavi, Karoubi, and Khatami—has the will to see this movement through, or whether they will eventually have to hand the baton off to new blood.

Just as nobody predicted that millions would take to the streets post-election, it’s a fool’s errand to try and foretell how this might play out. I think the opposition could remain on simmer for quite some time—years even—but we could reach a tipping point that could change things quite abruptly.

MEP: How do you think that the United States and the international community can strike the right balance between moving forwards and dealing with the Iranian government but also being sensitive to what you’re talking about?

Sadjadpour: I think the United States should be more outspoken about Iran’s inability to adhere to international standards of justice—a word that Iran’s leadership frequently uses—and human rights and President Obama SHould be more outspoken in expressing solidarity with the Iranian people. I know that young people in Iran would like to see President Obama make it more clear that he’s not indifferent to their cause, that he’s rooting for them.

I think there is a way to dialogue with the Iranian government on urgent national security issues—like nuclear proliferation, Afghanistan, and Iraq—without betraying the millions of Iranians who view their government as illegitimate and continue to strive for political change. U.S. dialogue with the Soviet Union during the 1980s is perhaps a useful template.

This is an incredibly important time in Iran’s history and we want to be able to look back years from now and say we were on the right side of history. I sometimes fear that we may look back years from now and see that there was a tremendous opportunity to help champion and facilitate the cause of political change in Iran, but rather than taking it seriously we focused all of our attention on the nuclear issue.

MEP: Part of the reason that it appears that the U.S. and Iran continue to be unable to communicate with one another is that they don’t trust one another. How then do you balance the fact that in supporting the opposition you would be playing into the exact fears of the Iranian regime while trying to communicate with them?

Sadjadpour: The short answer to that question is I don’t think the regime, particularly Khamenei, wants to be disabused of their mistrust of the United States. It is politically and ideologically expedient for them to have the U.S. as an adversary, so they have a convenient culprit when, among other things, their population rises up, economic malaise worsens, or ethnic minorities agitate.

President Obama has made more effort than any U.S. president in the last three decades to try and build confidence with Tehran—including writing two private letters to Khamenei—and the U.S. took great pains not to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs at a time, post-election, when they were most vulnerable. I think this is clear to most Iranians, and most European, Russian, and Chinese officials I encounter acknowledge as much.

For many years now, so many of us have argued that if the U.S. can engage Iran and reintegrate it in the international community and open up its economy, this would foment political reform in Tehran. I think people fail to realize that Khamenei understands that argument very well, in fact he probably agrees with it, and for precisely that reason he’s resisted confidence building with the U.S.

MEP: Then the question is do you think there is any chance of progress, if accommodation is Khamenei’s ultimate fear?

Sadjadpour: I’m very skeptical about the prospect of a major diplomatic breakthrough with this Iranian government. I believe the underlying problem we have with Iran has more to do with the character of its regime than its nuclear ambitions. In other words, as long as Khamenei is leader and Ahmadinejad is president, Tehran will not be able or willing to meet us half-way, or even a third Of the way, on our various issues of contention.